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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā in the context of the schools of 
Tehran and Qum. Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah or 
ḥikmat) avails itself to a number of readings; however, this thesis focuses on the philosophical 
and mystical (ʿirfānī) readings in terms of their development, transmission and their impact 
on how ḥikmat is understood in the modern Iranian seminary (ḥawza). The way in which a 
text is read in the ḥawza has great implications for the development of ideas, as the ḥawza 
uses a text based system to train students in a particular field. While both readings were 
studied by the majority of transcendental philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) in the school of Tehran, the 
school of Qum saw a greater separation between the readings and I show that for a number of 
reasons, including the introduction of seminal texts written by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, a 
preference developed for a more philosophical reading of transcendental philosophy. I 
examine evidence for the different preferences of the ḥukamāʾ for either a more philosophical 
or ʿirfānī reading of ḥikmat through an examination of their writings on the subjects of 
existence (wujūd), guardianship (walāyah) and resurrection (maʿād) which act as case studies. 
The theoretical implications of both approaches are examined in each chapter as well as their 
interdependence. The schools of Tehran and Qum built on Mullā Ṣadrā’s framework and 
provided new interpretations of important issues. Apart from the intricate discussions on the 
core aspects of ḥikmat, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī’s masterful examination of the Seal of the 
Saints and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s philosophy of bodily resurrection are examples of a thriving 
interpretive tradition in Iran and constitute significant developments of important 
philosophical and ʿirfānī concepts from the ideas of their predecessors. 
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I. Part 1: Wujūd in Theoretical ʿIrfān ............................................................................................................. 189 
I. Revisiting the Subject of ʿIrfān ..................................................................................... 190 
II. The Univocity (ishtirāk maʿnawī) of Wujūd .................................................................. 194 
III. The Breath of the All-Merciful (nafas al-Raḥmānī) ................................................... 197 
IV. The Oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-Wujūd)........................................................... 204 
V. Wujūd-by-Something-Else ........................................................................................... 212 
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III. The Principality of Wujūd ........................................................................................ 232 
IV. The Mentally posited Nature of Quiddity ................................................................. 235 
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Introduction 
 
Comprehending the metaphysical, understanding the nature of the human, living a life of true 
happiness and success and reaching true understanding in the experience of the Divine are 
all goals of Islamic spirituality. The Qurʾān and aḥādīth refer to these concepts1 and in the 
context of the modern Shiʿi ḥawza ʿilmīya (the traditional Shiʿi seminary, lit. territory of 
                                                          
1 The works that elucidate the views of the scriptural sources on these goals are too many to cite and generally 
include the commentary genre both of the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth. For the period of concern a good number of 
these works within the philosophical and ʿirfānī frameworks are cited throughout the thesis and I return to 
explain the relationship between the scriptural sources and ḥikmat later. Among many other primary references, 
for the Qurʾān see: 2:255, 36:1-83, 59:17-24 114:1-4. The most comprehensive of these references is the sūrat al-
fātiḥaḥ 1:1-7: In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. The 
Beneficent, the Merciful. Master of the Day of Judgment. Thee do we serve and Thee do we beseech for help. Keep us 
on the right path. The path of those upon whom Thou hast bestowed favors. Not (the path) of those upon whom Thy 
wrath is brought down, nor of those who go astray. For the aḥādīth see Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh Qummī, 
al-Tawḥīd, ed. Sayyid Hāshim Ḥusaynī Tihranī (Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa li-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, no date) and 
Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, eds. Niʿmat Allāh al-Jalīlī et al. 15 vols (Qum: Dār al-ḥadīth, 2008) 
(1), (2) and (3) which comprises the sections on intellection and ignorance, knowledge, tawḥīd (unity of God), 
ḥujjat (the proof of God) and belief and unbelief all of which contain aḥādīth about these issues.  
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knowledge)2 they are most fully explored in the sciences of philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān.3 
There is an intricate interdependence between the later two subjects and this relationship is 
the focus of the present study with reference to the ḥukamāʾ (Sadrian philosopher-ʿārifs) of 
the Sadrian tradition in the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. While some ḥukamāʾ had 
deep ʿirfānī inclinations, others relied more upon the foundations of transcendental 
philosophy, while others used the corpus of Islamic scriptural sources to solve problems in the 
                                                          
2 Ḥawza (pl. ḥawzāt) is the term used for a traditional seminary within the Shīʿī world often adjoined by the 
geographical locality in which it exists (like the ḥawza of Najaf). Within that locality a number of madressas may 
also be referred to as a ḥawza with an adjoining word of choice such as the ḥawza of Ahl al-Bayt for example. The 
ḥawza has traditionally been an informal setting for the transmition of knowledge, even though the ḥawza of 
Qum has seen more formalization in recent years. See R. W. Hefner and M. Q. Zaman (eds.) Schooling Islam: The 
Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010) 250-252. Islamic 
law has been the centre of ḥawza education and so patronage was not usually received from political parties to 
maintain the ḥawza’s independence, see R. Brunner amd W. Ende (eds.) The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: 
Religious Culture and Political History (Leiden and Boston: BRILL, 2001) 59. Both the ḥawzāt of Iran and Iraq have 
tried to improve educational methods in the last century, see R. L. Euben and M. Q. Zaman (eds.) Princeton 
Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2009) 181.  For some prolblems associated with the informal ḥawza setting such as the control of religious 
authority and the regulation of who can and cannot wear a turban see L. S. Walbridge (ed.) The Most Learned of 
the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 142. For a history of the 
ḥawzāt in Qum, Ray, Baghdad, Najaf, Hilla, Jabal Amil, Isfahan, Tehran, and Mashhad see G. H. Adel, M. J. Elmi, 
and H. Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya: Shīʿī Teaching Institution: An Entry from Encyclopaedia of the World 
of Islam (London: EWI Press, 2012). 
3 The term ʿirfān is commonly translated as Gnosticism and an ʿārif as a Gnostic. This is perhaps due to the lack 
of an exact translation of the terms as ʿ irfān has very little in common with Gnosticism except for the attainment 
of knowledge of transcendence by way of the inner aspect of the human. For this reason, I have avoided 
translating the term altogether in the thesis. The term only appears in quotations from other authors who have 
chosen to use the term. For a more in depth critique of the use of the term Gnosticism in various contexts see M. 
A. Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). The meaning of ʿirfān is explained in detail in the section concerning definitions later in 
this introduction. 
10  
light of Sadrian philosophy. Most ḥukamāʾ intricately combined all of these aspects whilst 
showing a preference for one trend overall.  
 
The variation of perspectives resulted in a rich tradition of commentary on the most 
important matters of Islamic belief. While theologians had incorporated philosophical 
concepts in their discussions, it is the ḥukamāʾ from the Sadrian tradition that stand firmest 
on the intellectual battleground of comprehending the intricacies of belief. Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 
circa 1045/1636) contribution in providing a new framework from which to further explore 
these intricacies, drawing from the previous philosophical and ʿirfānī discussions, cannot be 
underestimated. The tradition that followed him discussed his ideas and while the key 
principles of his philosophy are accepted by all who would consider themselves part of his 
tradition, there are some issues that did not sit well with many. That agreement amongst 
Sadrian ḥukamāʾ is reflected in the chapter of this thesis concerning existence (wujūd), while 
the most contentious issue is that of resurrection (maʿād), which is explored in the final 
chapter of the thesis.  
 
The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is how did philosophical and ʿirfānī 
reasoning develop in the seminary as receptions of Mullā Ṣadrā from the Qajar period to the 
Islamic Republic? The importance of the role of variant readings when trying to understand 
the development of ideas in the traditional Shiʿi seminary is acute, as a ḥawza education is 
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centred upon the reading of specific texts. A student’s training in ḥikmat4 thereafter affects the 
way in which they explain and develop traditional questions of belief and how they deal with 
contemporary challenges. Understanding the development of ideas and belief systems 
enables dialogue and development.  
 
This study falls into a number of interlinked circles of academic study and therefore has a wide 
base of readers who would be interested in its findings. Starting with the more general areas, 
this thesis contributes to the study of the Islamic intellectual tradition by examining an 
intellectual response to key matters of belief and law.5 It is in a Shiʿi context and so overlaps 
the area of Shiʿi studies.6 It is from both a philosophical and ʿirfānī perspective which causes 
                                                          
4 Ḥikmat (lit. wisdom) is a word used in the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth as a valuable moral trait, see for example in 
the Qurʾān: He grants wisdom to whom He pleases, and whoever is granted wisdom, he indeed is given a great good 
and none but men of understanding mind (2:269) and Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly 
exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; surely your Lord best knows those who go astray 
from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right way (16:125). However, in this thesis it is a term that 
connotates the system of belief and understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā, best expounded in his magnum opus the 
Asfār.   
5 The Islamic intellectual tradition comprises a large part of Islamic studies and literature in the field is usually 
narrowed down to a specific thinker, area or concept. For some studies of the tradition see F. Daftary (ed.), 
Intellectual Traditions in Islam (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); A. Saeed, Islamic Thought: An 
Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); A. Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and 
Intellectual History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); for the modern period see I. M. Abu Rabi’, 
“Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective”, Islamic Studies, (44/4) 503-526; and M. 
Q. Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Thought and Internal Criticism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012).   
6 For works in this field see for example M. Momen, An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: The History and Doctrines of 
Twelver Shiʿism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); A. J. Newman, Twelver Shiism: Unity and Diversity in the 
Life of Islam, 632 to 1722 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); A. J. Newman, The Formative Period of 
Twelver Shīʿism: Ḥadīth as Discourse Between Qum and Baghdad (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); F. 
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it to cross over into the fields of philosophy in the Islamic world7 and specifically in Iran8 as 
well as the field of Sufism and mysticism in Islam.9 Since Mullā Ṣadrā was influenced by Ibn 
ʿArabī and his school, scholars of those fields will find interest in seeing how the ḥukamāʾ of 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretive tradition interaction with the school of Ibn ʿArabī and their works, 
as well as the developments they made to those ideas. Aside from the inherent importance of 
the ḥukamāʾ of the research period to scholars in the fields of ḥikmat and ʿirfān, the research 
question is also of specific interest to researchers dealing with Mullā Ṣadrā, as it investigates 
the reception of his ideas and their interpretation from within the tradition that he hailed 
from.   
 
Mullā Ṣadrā himself had his own reading of the philosophy of his predecessors. An intrinsic 
quality of his works is that they can be understood from a variety of perspectives. His al-Ḥikma 
                                                          
Daftary, The Study of Shiʿi Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014) and Y. Richard, Shiʿite Islam: Polity, Ideology and Creed, 
translated by A. Nevill (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995). 
7 For a general overview until Sabzavarī see S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, History of Islamic Philosophy (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996) and P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); more specifically for the field of logic: J. Walbridge, 
“Logic in the Islamic Intellectual tradition”, in Islamic Studies, (39/1) 55-75; for a contemporary critique see ʿA. 
Jabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique, translated by A. Abbassi (Austin: University of Texas, 
1999). 
8 For the Islamic intellectual tradition in Iran see S. H. Nasr, The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia (Richmond 
and Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996). 
9 The study of Sufism has captured a great deal of interest from a number of perspectives, for some works see N. 
Green, Sufism: A Global History (Chichester and Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); W. C. Chittick, Sufism: A Short 
Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000); A. T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007); F. De Jong and B. Radtke, Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies 
and Polemics (Leiden: Brill, 1999); and L. Lewisohn (ed.), The Heritage of Sufism, 3 vols (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 1999). 
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al-mutaʿālīya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīya al-arbaʿa (the Asfār),10 for example, is not a book of pure 
philosophy, nor of ʿirfān, nor of theology and it is not exclusively a work that commentates on 
the Islamic scriptural sources. Rather it is a work that encompasses all of these facets and 
therefore is susceptible to a variety of readings. The study of these readings within the context 
of the schools of Tehran and Qum has not been attempted previously, and so this thesis goes 
beyond the limited discussion of the legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā. This thesis will use a wide range of 
sources distinctly understudied in Western language scholarship and will examine some 
important aspects of philosophical and ʿirfānī thought in recent Shīʿī Iranian discourse. 
 
There are two main readings that this thesis will focus on, both in terms of their historical 
development over the last two centuries as well as a demonstration of how these readings 
affect each other and how they result in a rich tradition which has been able to address the 
detailed questions of Islamic belief. The first reading is a philosophical one which rests on the 
historical development of philosophy in the Islamic world. These are Peripatetic or 
Illuminationist approaches. Mullā Ṣadrā introduces new concepts to these traditions in such 
a way that he creates a new philosophy based on ʿirfānī teachings, but the reading of that 
philosophy is understood from within the existing philosophical tradition. The second reading 
is an ʿirfānī one where Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy seeks to create a philosophical framework 
through which ʿirfān can be better explained. His texts are full of hints and guidance towards 
comprehending higher ʿirfānī truths. From these two ways of reading Mullā Ṣadrā two styles 
                                                          
10 It is important to note that it is unlikely that Mullā Ṣadrā wrote all or even most of the Asfār himself. Rather his 
students seemed to have contributed with their notes from his lectures. See S. H. Rizvi, Mulla Sadra and 
Metaphysics (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) 19. This study primarily uses the Asfār to present Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s opinions as it is his most comprehensive work. 
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of teachers evolved. One type of ḥakīm inclined more to the philosophical reading and 
specialised more in elaborating Mullā Ṣadrā using a Peripatetic or Illuminationist approach, 
where as the other type of ḥakīm elaborated Mullā Ṣadrā’s views from a more ʿirfānī 
perspective.11  
 
This difference is found in the types of critique of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy as well as the other 
classes the ḥukamāʾ taught and the works they wrote. Ḥukamāʾ with a greater ʿirfānī 
inclination became teachers of ʿirfānī texts and transmitted the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā 
to future generations. While ḥukamāʾ with more philosophical reading were teachers of 
Peripatetic texts like the Shifāʾ and the Ishārāt of Ibn Sīnā and were not as well known for 
having expertise in ʿirfān. The difference between these two types of ḥakīm was clear enough 
to be noted in biographical works and historians of the period make note of which ḥakīm sided 
with which tendency. But these tendencies have rarely been related back to the different types 
of reading of transcendental philosophy due to the lack of studies on the ḥukamāʾ of this 
period.  
 
Specifying two key readings is a simplification as there are other readings which are attested 
by the different types of criticism levelled upon transcendental philosophy. It is only the two 
specified readings that will be investigated in this thesis and they are arguably the most 
important. A key finding of this research is that alongside the philosophical reading, the ʿ irfānī 
                                                          
11 This difference in reading Mullā Ṣadrā is reflected in modern literature as well, see I. Kalin, Knowledge in Later 
Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect and Intuition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 198-
201. 
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reading of Mullā Ṣadrā became very popular in the school of Tehran due to the presence of 
exceptional teachers who were proficient in expounding this reading and complementing the 
ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā with expertise in reading ʿirfānī works. However, after the 
transition of the main activity of Sadrian philosophy to Qum, that reading has become more 
philosophical due to a variety of factors which will be explained further in the thesis. 
 
This thesis therefore seeks to construct a web of beliefs concerning two principle readings of 
Mullā Ṣadrā and shows that his ideas have a vibrant interpretative tradition. It argues that the 
philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, due to certain factors is currently the predominant 
reading. Though both readings are required to fully grasp ḥikmat, the ḥukamāʾ of the schools 
of Tehran and Qum can be placed within a spectrum of the two readings. Although passing 
mention may be made of the wider historical and political contexts in the thesis, I will not 
investigate them further as they are not of primary concern to the research question. An in-
depth examination of these factors would also distract the focus of the thesis from the 
examination of an intricate interplay between the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā.  
 
This introduction is split into three main parts. The first part contextualises the discussion of 
ḥikmat and ʿirfān in the schools of Tehran and Qum by placing it within the larger academic 
discussions surrounding the history of Islamic philosophy and Sufism. It provides an 
introductory glance at some of the subtle trends that will be brought out further through the 
course of the thesis such as the interaction between the sciences of philosophy and ʿirfān and 
the consequent tendencies to read Mullā Ṣadrā according to the context in which his 
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philosophy is analysed. The study of both ḥikmat and ʿirfān in the ḥawza is through a text 
based system that draws on all of these phases in the history of both sciences.12 A tentative link 
between the scriptural sources and the sciences is also established through the interaction 
between the Shiʿi Imams and important Sufis in their times.  
 
                                                          
12 In the modern ḥawza a training in transcendental philosophy usually comprises of a reading of ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Bidayat al-ḥikma followed by Nihayat al-ḥikma and perhaps Hādī Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma and Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya before the Asfār. For theoretical ʿirfān the sequence is Ibn Turka’s Tamhīd al-
qawāʾid followed by Dāwūd Qayṣarī’s Sharḥ fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and then Hamza Fanārī’s Miṣbāḥ al-uns with only a 
few formally reading selections of Ibn ʿ Arabī’s Futūḥāt or other advanced texts like Ibn ʿ Arabī’s Mawāqiʿ al-nujūm 
or the Taʾīyah of Ibn Fāriḍ. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Hādī Sabzavarī and Mullā Ṣadrā will be discussed in some detail 
throughout this thesis. Sāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī (d. 835/1432) was a Timurid philosopher and mystic who 
also had important occult themes in his works see Melvin-Koushki, M. S. The Quest for Universal Science: The 
Occult Philosophy of Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Turka Iṣfahānī (1369-1432) and Intellectual Millenarianism in Early Timurid Iran, 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 2012. For more on him see S. H. Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin 
to the Present, (Albany: SUNY, 2006) 209–210, and Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, TamhƬd̄ fƬ ̄sharḥ qawāʾid al-
tawḥƬd̄, translated and commented upon by Muḥammad Ḥusayn NāʾƮj̄Ʈ,̄ 2 vols (Qum: Matḅūʿāt-i dƮn̄Ʈ,̄ 1383 
Sh/2004) (1) 3–21. Sharaf al-Dīn Dawūd Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350) was a student of ʿ Abd al-Razzāq Qāsānī (d. 730/1330) 
and his importance within the school of Ibn ʿArabī in a Shīʿī setting stems primarily from his commentary on the 
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam of Ibn ʿArabī which is studied as a core text within the ḥawza system. Chittick has schown his 
indebtedness to Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) who was Ibn ʿ Arabī’s son in law and student, see W. C. Chittick, 
“The Five Divine Presences: From al-Qunawi to al-Qayseri” in Moslem World, 1982, (72) 107-128. For more on 
Qayṣarī see S. Murata The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1992) 99-101; M. Ali, QaysạrƬ’̄s Muqaddima to His Sharḥ Fusụ̄s ̣ al-ḥikam: A Translation of the First Five 
Chapters Together with a Commentary on Some of Their Themes, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
California at Berkeley, 2007 and T. Izutso Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983). Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Hamza Fanārī (d. 
833/1429) was also substantially indebted to Qūnawī but chose to express Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas differently from Ibn 
Turka and Qayṣarī by not using Peripatetic terminology in the expression of ʿirfānī concepts. His commentary on 
Qūnawī’s Mafātīh al-Ghayb is an important work that deserves further research. Fanārī’s thought is the most 
under researched of these three important figures with only passing mention of him in most academic studies. 
For Qūnawī’s influence on Fanārī see see R. Todd, The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical 
Anthropology (Leiden: Brill, 2014) 174-175. 
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The second part analyzes the definition of both sciences as well as some epistemological 
concerns. While both philosophy and ʿirfān discuss nondelimited wujūd (i.e. existence 
without limitations or conditions) there is a difference in what is meant by wujūd and by 
nondelimitation in each science. This difference is discussed and illustrated. There is potential 
for confusion for the reader of transcendental philosophy. This confusion is explained by 
differentiating between three aspects, the subject, the mode of explanation, and the approach 
of the reader. It is from this differentiation that the issue of different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā 
is evaluated and the readings that are investigated in this thesis explained.  
 
The first epistemological discussion concerns the intellect. ʿIrfān accepts the intellect in its 
own sphere but rejects its supremacy over the heart. Rather it is less a question of supremacy 
and more an issue of how different faculties have different uses and how the heart has the 
ability to witness realities first hand. The discussion then moves onto the primary method of 
ʿirfānī knowledge which is kashf (unveiling). The discussion of epistemology throws light on 
the method of philosophy encouraged by Mullā Ṣadrā and the way that he himself took by not 
accepting to base his arguments on unveiling alone, but to provide intellectual proof. But he 
also makes clear that intellectualising without unveiling is certainly deficient.  
 
The third part deals with the methodological considerations and my assumptions in the 
writing of this thesis. While my approach is anti-foundational, I aim to create a web of beliefs 
about the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā in the schools of Tehran and Qum and a central 
hermeneutic I use in the analysis of the works produced in this time is the distinction between 
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manyness and oneness. Whilst using manyness as the basis of explanation is philosophical, 
maintaining oneness as the overarching principle is ʿirfānī.  
 
I then move on to discuss my assumptions by formulating a number principles concerning 
what I believe about the way the texts are produced. I use some of the reflections of Mark Bevir 
in his book, The Logic of the History of Ideas. The books, treatises, glosses, super-glosses and 
text books produced by the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum are intentional, 
sincere, rational (meaning inner consistency) and conscious. That is that the texts accurately 
reflect the true beliefs of their authors and their works are rational at least for them and can 
therefore be reflected rationally. The web of beliefs I create seeks to avoid inconsistencies 
which result in dilemmas and in this way I try to offer the most consistent web to answer my 
research question. However, since I am constructing a web which is based on the portrayed 
webs of beliefs of the ḥukamāʾ of this period through their works, it does not matter which 
strand I start with and I present the strands that are important to the web. I then move on to 
briefly discuss some historiographical concerns of the period as a whole, such as political 
agendas and some reasons for why there is a lack of research on the schools of Tehran and 
Qum.  
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1. The Context of the Schools of Tehran and Qum 
 
Philosophy as an independent subject developed in three main stages in the Islamic world. 
The first phase was the introduction of Greek philosophy through the translation movement,13 
which resulted in a philosophical tradition in the Islamic lands which produced important 
works like the Shifāʾ of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037).14 These early philosophers were known as 
Peripatetic philosophers and while owing a great deal to Greek philosophy also contributed 
to its development. It was the works of these philosophers, primarily Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), 
which would be translated into Latin and reintroduced to the West contributing to the 
thought of figures such as Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274).15 It was therefore not surprising that early 
academic efforts to understand Islamic philosophy were also focused on understanding the 
                                                          
13 See D. Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 
ʿAbbasaid Society (2nd-4th/5th-10th c.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). 
14 For more on Ibn Sīnā see A. Goichon. La distinction de l’essence st de l’existence d’après Ibn Sīnā (Paris: Desclée 
de Brouwer, 1937), W. Gohlman, (ed.), The Life of Ibn-Sina (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974); J. R. Michot, La destinée de 
l’homme selon Avicenne: le retour à Dieu (maʿād) et l’imagination (Lovanii: Aedibus Peeters, 1986); P Adamson, 
(ed.) Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and Gutas, Avicenna 
and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014). For a good introduction to some of the main 
themes of Greek philosophy until Aristotle see P. Adamson, Classical Philosophy: A history of philosophy without 
any gaps, volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Adamson’s podcast at 
http://historyofphilosophy.net/. 
15 Studies on the relationship between Aquinas and Islamic philosophy is a vast area of research. Some studies 
include: M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1958); T. O’Shaughnessy, St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One (no place, 1960); M. İskenderoğlu, 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Thomas Aquinas on the Question of the Eternity of the World (Leiden: Brill, 2002) and R. 
Acar, Talking About God and Talking About Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions (Leiden: Brill, 
2005). 
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impact of Islamic philosophy on such important western thinkers.16 There was also an effort 
to reinterpret Aristotle in the light of Arab thinkers. Ibn Sīnā was a figure who rather than 
reinterpreting Aristotle’s metaphysics moved towards its abandonment by providing a 
concrete replacement for Aristotle’s works.17 An effort was also made to revise the traditional 
Orientalist view of Peripatetic philosophy and show the importance of philosophy as a way of 
life.18 The premature conclusion of the stagnation of Islamic philosophy after a scathing attack 
by Ghazalī in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa was an acceptable academic view until efforts were made 
to understand Islamic philosophy as a living tradition in the Islamic lands and especially in 
Iran.19  
 
                                                          
16 See for example, E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956) 
and E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (London: Gollancz, 1961). 
17 See A. Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ: A Milestone in Western 
Philosophical Thought (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) viii. 
18 See M. Azadpur, Reason Unbound; On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Perepatetic Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2011). 
19 Rather Ghazālī’s critique was part of a larger dialoge between philosphers and theologians on the validity of 
philosophy. But by the time of Ghazālī wrote his Tahāfut al-falāsifa, Avicennian principles had infiltrated as far 
as juristic theory and so any kind of sudden death of intellectual pursuit would be inconceivable. See S. H. Rizvi, 
Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, 17-18. The discussion was particulary important for Ghazalī 
who attempted to set intellectual boundries for what could be considered an Islamic science, see F. Griffel, “al-
Ghazali”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-
ghazali/#PlaFalIsl [Accessed 7th May 2016] Interestingly new evidence has been presented showing that although 
al-Ghazālī ostensibly rejected Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy his mystical and eschatological views were rooted in 
philosophy, see A. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Mystical Cognition and 
its Avicennian Foundation (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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It was the pioneering writings of Henry Corbin, Seyyed Hosein Nasr and others including 
Fazlur Rahman and Max Horten,20 which threw light upon the inherent value and richness of 
Islamic philosophy and ʿirfān after the death of Ibn Rushd. The views first expressed in the 
writings of Corbin and Nasr became the paradigm for later academic studies on the history of 
Islamic philosophy.21 The nature of these more recent philosophical and ʿirfānī investigations 
in Iran contributed to a philosophy connected to the Islamic scriptural sources, very different 
to the early Arab Peripatetics such as KindƮ ̄(d. 252/866), FarābƮ ̄(d. 339/950), Ibn SƮn̄ā and Ibn 
Rushd and the Greek philosophy from which they drew inspiration.22   
                                                          
20 Such as H. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, tr. L. Sherrard, with the assistance of P. Sherrard (London & 
New  York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) which was the first work of its kind, offering a summary of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition as a whole and H. Corbin, “Confessions extatiques de Mir Damad: maître de théologie à 
Ispahan”, in H. Massé (ed.) Mélanges offerts à Louis Massignon, 3 vols (Damascus, 1956) (1) 331–378, where Corbin 
introduces the term “school of Isfahan” to describe the philosophical milieu during the reign of Shāh ʿAbbās I. 
For Nasr see S. H. Nasr, “The School of Iṣpahān”, in M. M. Sharif (ed.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols 
(Wiesbaden, 1963-66) (1) 904–932, where he expands on Corbin’s introduction to the school; S. H. Nasr, Ideals 
and Realities of Islam (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966); S. H. Nasr, Sufi Essays (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972); S. H. 
Nasr, Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, SuhrawardƬ ̄and Ibn ‘ArabƬ ̄ (Delmar, NY : Caravan Books, 1976); and S. H. 
Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1964). Rahman’s important work was F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1975). Horten was much earlier and was the first to stress the originality of Mullā Ṣadrā’s works and 
assiociated Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought with ʿirfān, see for example, M. Horten, Das Philosophiche System von Schirazi 
(Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trubner, 1913); M. Horten, Indische Strömungen in der islamischen Mystik 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitärsbuchhandlung, 1927-28); and M. Horten, Die philosophie des Islam in ihren 
Beziehungen zu den philosophischen Weltanschau-ungen des westlichen (Orients, 1924). 
21 This impact was intentional and desired, as both Nasr and Corbin felt that it was only a certain aspect of Islamic 
philosophy termed falsafa that was receiving academic attention. Falsafa left out other aspects such as Sufism 
science and art, see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 107–108 
22 Hādī Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, trs. M. Muḥaqiq and T. Izutsu (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 
1991) 3. It was Naṣr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s defense of Avicenna that has influenced the acceptance of his works in Shiʿi 
circles and consequently the ḥikmat tradition, see Sabzavārī, Metaphysics, 4. For more information on Ṭūsī’s 
important role in Imami theology and philosophy, see H. Landolt “Khwāja NasƮ̣r̄ al-DƮn̄ al-ṬūsƮ ̄ (597/1201-
22  
 
The second stage of the development of philosophy started with a major challenge to the 
Peripatetic school by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) who founded the Illuminationist 
school of philosophy with his work Ḥikmat al-ishrāq. He had a profound effect on 
philosophical discourse in the Islamic lands with the introduction of key concepts23 — such 
as knowledge by presence, the existence of an imaginal world and the principality of light — 
that were incorporated or modified in later philosophies. While Suhrawardī accepted the 
rational basis of philosophy, he also stipulated that the philosopher had to purify himself in 
order to comprehend the metaphysical realm. For this reason, his Ḥikmat al-ishrāq starts by 
stressing the importance of self-purification and its place in the attainment of true knowledge 
to ensure true happiness.24  
 
                                                          
672/1274), Ismāʻīlism and IshrāqƮ ̄Philosophy”, in N. Pourjavady and Z. Vesel (eds.) NasƬ̣r̄ al-DƬn̄ ṬūsƬ:̄ Philosophe 
et Savant Du XIIIe Siècle (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran and Presses Universitaires d’Iran, 2000) 
13–30. 
23  The Illuminationist tradition began after Suhrawrdī’s death and by the end of the 13th century his books were 
read in the major centers of Islamic learning in Syria, Iraq and Iran. His ideas finaly spread to the Turkish 
Ottoman and Persian Indian traditions. Ziai points out that modern thinkers such as Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār were also 
influenced by Iluminationist thought. See H. Ziai, “The Illuminationist Tradition”, in S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman 
(eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2003) 465-496; Gh. I. DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Shuʿāʿ-yi andƬs̄ha va shuhūd 
dar falsafa-i SuhrawardƬ ̄(Tehran: Intishārāt-i ḥikmat, 1388 Sh/2009); S. H. Nasr, “The Spread of the Illuminationist 
School of Suhrawardi”, in Studies in Comparative Religion, (6/3) 
http://www.studiesincomparativereligion.com/public/articles/The_Spread_of_the_Illuminationist_School_of_S
uhrawardi-by_Seyyed_Hossein_Nasr.aspx [Accessed 24/5/2016]  and R. Marcotte, “Suhrawardi”, in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online] 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/suhrawardi/ 
[Accessed 4/3/2011].  
24 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazurī, Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, ed. Ḥusayn Żiyāʾī Turbatī (Tehran: 
Pazhūhishgāh-i ʿulūm-i insānī va muṭālaʿāt-i farhangī, 2001) 2–5. 
23  
With a more explicit inclusion of ʿirfānī experience, philosophers had a precedent to interact 
with the science of ʿirfān and at about the same time the most monumental figure in Sufism, 
Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 636/1240) and the students of his school formulated a language for 
ʿirfān that was similar to the language of the philosophers. Suhrawardī’s philosophy was based 
on the principality of light (i.e. that light was reality), but not only philosophers responded to 
his ideas.25 ʿUrafāʾ also took it upon themselves to stress the principality of wujūd based on Ibn 
ʿArabī’s theory of the oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-Wujūd).26  
 
While all three trends accepted an underlying reality to the extramental in opposition to 
sophistry, they differed in their understandings and explanations of what was the factor that 
gave things their external existence. Peripatetic philosophers stipulated that existence was a 
condition to bring about the realisation of something and was therefore specific to each thing, 
whereas both Suhrawardī and the school of Ibn ʿArabī claimed that there was another factor 
that flowed throughout the whole of existence that was the principle. For Suhrawardī that 
factor was light and for the school of Ibn ʿArabī it was the Truth, which was also expressed as 
Existence. Later the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā would take a middle ground 
between the latter two opinions in specifying wujūd (or existence with a small e) — which is 
a mode that repels nonexistence — as the factor at the heart of reality.  
                                                          
25 His discussion on quiddity was as a critique to Ibn Sīnā’s existence-essence distinction rather than a 
proposition of the principality of essence as Rizvi points out, see S. Rizvi “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-
Essence Distinction Suhrawardi’s Visonary Heiracrchy of Lights”, in Asian Philosophy, 1999, (9/3), 219-227. 
26 This is clearly expressed in Dāwūd Qayṣarī’s exposition in his introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-
ḥikam of Ibn ʿArabī, see Dāwūd Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, edited by Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 2 vols (Qum: 
Bustān-i Kitāb, 1382sh/2003) (1) 21-61. 
24  
 
As the philosopher needed purification in order to comprehend the higher truths, the science 
of wayfaring or practical ʿirfān (al-ʿirfān al-ʿāmalī) became pertinent in order to clarify the 
process of self purification and attaining the higher stations of the soul’s perfection. 
Theoretical ʿirfān (al-ʿirfān al-naẓarī) and especially the school of Ibn ʿArabī also became 
relevant as it sought to expound many of the same issues and indeed in some cases ʿurafāʾ 
were writing with the philosophical audience in mind.27 Expounding ʿirfān in a philosophical 
way gave rise to a philosophical reading and understanding of ʿirfān. That is that while the 
science of ʿirfān seeks to explain Reality as it is, a cognitive philosophical understanding of 
ʿirfān can also be created from the texts written by the ʿ urafāʾ. This was perhaps to some extent 
the intent of writers of theoretical ʿirfān, but was usually accompanied by a caution to the 
readers that the realities explained can only be fully grasped by directly tasting and witnessing 
the truths that were being explained. With so much common ground it was natural for these 
                                                          
27 A good example of this is Ibn Turka’s Tamhīd al-qawāʾid, which takes time to recount the proofs of those who 
reject unveiling as a method of comprehending the realities and to produce counter arguments against such 
proofs. See Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan 
Ramażānī Khurasānī (Beirut: Muʾassasat Umm al-qurā li-l-taḥqīq wa-l-nashr, 2003) 136–149. Tamhīd is the first 
text studied in theoretical ʿ irfān and a traditional sequence was to study this text after a full training in Peripatetic 
philosophy and before studying transcendental philosophy. However with the change in the system of teaching 
with the introduction of Bidāyat and Nihāyat al-ḥikma a student would study Tamhīd after completing their 
training in transcendental philosophy. The reason for the selection of this text seems quite obvious when placed 
within the first method of study. Tamhīd has a Peripatetic voice and speaks to a Peripatetic audience. At the same 
time, it introduces the main principles of theoretical ʿirfān while assuming that the reader is new to the subject 
unlike the books that are studied later such as Qayṣarī’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ and Miṣbāḥ al-uns of Fanārī. 
The traditional pathway of studying philosophy also provides a more holistic outlook where both readings of 
Mullā Ṣadrā are introduced before training in transcendental philosophy.  
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two sciences to interact, with different scholars taking different positions on the spectrum of 
intellection and ʿirfān. 
 
The philosophical understanding of ʿirfān was elucidated in a new way in the third major turn 
in philosophy in the Muslim lands with the transcendental philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. Mullā 
Ṣadrā was educated in Shiraz and later in Isfahan under the auspices of teachers such as Bahā 
al-Dīn Āmulī (d. 1031/1621) and Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631).28 He brought together the 
contributions of his predecessors and critiqued them in his Asfār.29 This later tradition — 
which forms the mainstream philosophical tradition of the ḥawza today — combined the rich 
philosophical, ʿirfānī and theological discussions and came to be known as ḥikmat (lit. 
wisdom). The school of Shiraz, where Mullā Ṣadrā had his early education, was a centre of the 
intellectual sciences and ʿirfān.30  
 
                                                          
28 Much has recently been published on this great figure. For a good bibliography of many of these works see I. 
Kalin, “An Annotated Bibliography of the Works of Mullā Ṣadrā with a Brief Account of His Life”, in Islamic 
Studies, 2003, (42/1), 21-62 and M. Amawi and F. Sezgin, Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640) and his School: Texts 
and Studies (Frankfurt am Main: Inst. For the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
Univ, 2000) and more recently S. Rizvi, “Mulla Sadra”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mulla-sadra/ [Accessed 24/5/2016]; S. Meisami, Mulla Sadra (London: 
Oneworld Publications, 2013) and I. Kalin, Mullā Ṣadrā (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
29 It is only recently that the Asfār has become widely available in critical editions. Before these receny efforts 
this valuable work was only available in lithographed format. See S. H. Nasr, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his 
Transcendent Theosophy: Background, Life and Works (Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, 
1997) 13. For a survey of Mullā Ṣadrā’s main principles see R. Akbarian, The Fundamental Principles of Mulla 
Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy (London: Xlibris, 2009). 
30 See A. Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna: an Intellectual History of the Philosophers of Shiraz, unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, Exeter University, 2015, 13-62. 
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One of the main families of scholars was the Dashtakī family. The first important scholar from 
the Dashtakī family was Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī (d. 903/1497) whose positions regarding 
cognitive existence (wujūd al-dhihnī) are discussed in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Asfār.31 He was the real 
founder of the school of Shiraz and had a chain of teachers which led back to Ibn SƮn̄ā.32 
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Shirāzī (d. 949/1542), the son of Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī, was a prolific 
scholar and the Madrasa-yi Manṣūrīya was founded for him by Shāh Tahmasp.33 There is a 
historical relationship between the Iranian court and philosophers. The court would sponsor 
schools and give generous gifts to talented philosophers and conversely would seek answers 
to philosophical questions. This relationship is a key factor in understanding the various 
bursts of philosophical activity that make up a school and the reason for a school to relocate.  
 
Although Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shirāzī did not write seminal texts, they 
commented on the existent ones. These commentaries were not simple expositions but were 
places where they would discuss their own ideas.34 Shāh Ṭāhir b. Rāzī al-Dīn Ismāʿilī Ḥusaynī 
(d. 952/1545-1546 or 956/1549), the student of one Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s top students, Shams al-Din 
Muhammad Khafrī (d. 935/1528-1529 or 957/1550),35 settled in India, where he was active in 
                                                          
31 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336.  
32 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 195–196. 
33 See Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna, 81-82 and Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336. For more details on 
him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 199–202. His collected works have been published; see Sayyid Ghiyāth al-Dīn 
Manṣūr HusaynƮ ̄Dashtakī Shirāzī, Musạnnafāt Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr HusaynƬ ̄Dashtakī Shirāzī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh 
NūrānƮ,̄ 2 vols (Tehran: Silsila-yi intishārāt-i anjuman-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhang, 2007).  
34 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 196. 
35 For more on him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 202–203. 
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propagating Shiʿi thought.36 Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s son, Amīr Ṣadr al-Dīn II (d. circa 961/1553-1554) 
also established himself as a scholar and wrote a book on mineralogy.37  
 
Other key figures include ʿAḍud al-DƮn̄ I ৴jƮ ̄(d. 756/1355), Sayyid SharƮf̄ JurjānƮ ̄(d. 816/1413) and 
Najm al-DƮn̄ Maḥmūd al-NayrƮz̄Ʈ ̄(d. after 933/1526).38 Another strand of philosophy was argued 
by Jalāl al-DƮn̄ DawānƮ ̄ (d. 908/1501)39 whose debates with the DashtakƮs̄ had an impact on 
philosophical discussion for decades afterwards.40 The school dispersed after the death of 
Ghiyāth al-Dīn and spread to other areas of the Islamic world including Isfahan. The 
discussions in the fields of philosophy, ʿirfān and theology of the school of Shiraz, prepared 
the ground for the intellectual boom that occurred in Isfahan.  
 
Contemporary to the school of Shiraz were two figures from the school of Ibn ʿArabƮ;̄ Ibn AbƮ ̄
Jumhūr Aḥsāʾī (d. 906/1501)41 and Ibn Turka Isf̣ahānƮ ̄(d. 835/1432). After Ibn ʿArabƮ’̄s death his 
                                                          
36 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 337. For more details on Shirāzī scholars who contributed to the 
intellectual milieu in India see A. Thubūt, Faylasūf-i Shirāz dar hind (Tehran: Markaz-i bayn al-milalī-yi guftagū-
yi tamuddunhā, 1380 Sh/2001). See also Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 204–7 for the role of MƮr̄ Fatḥ-Allāh ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄and 
Shāh Ṭāhir, the foremost student of KhafrƮ,̄ in India. 
37 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336. 
38 R. Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran; Najm al-DƬn̄ Maḥmūd al-NayrƬz̄Ƭ ̄and his Writings (Leiden: Brill, 
2011) 
39 For more on him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 197–199. 
40 R. Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, ix. 
41 For a list of the works published by the Institute of Ibn AbƮ ̄ Jumhūr al-AḥsāʾƮ ̄ see 
http://ibnabijumhur.com/list.pdf. See also S. Schmidtke, “The Influence of Šams al-Dīn Šahrazūrī (7th/13th 
century) on Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī (d. after 904/1499)”, in L. Edzard and C. Szyska (eds.) Encounters of Words 
and Texts: Intercultural Studies in Honor of Stefan Wild on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday. Presented by His Pupils 
in Bonn, (Hildesheim: Olms, 1997) 23-32; S. Schmidtke, Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwölferschiitischen 
Islam des 9./15. Jahrhundrets: die Gedankenwelten des Ibn AbƬ ̄ G৮ umhūr al-AḥsāʼƬ ̄ (um 838/1434-35-nach 905/1501) 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000); S. Schmidtke, “Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī und sein Spätwerk Sharḥ al-Bāb al-ḥādī 
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mantle was taken up by a number of important characters of Persian origin. In fact his key 
disciple and stepson Ṣadr al-DƮn̄ QūnawƮ ̄(d. 673/1274) the son of Majd al-DƮn̄ Isḥāq b. Yūsuf 
RūmƮ ̄ was Persian, had links with Jalāl al-DƮn̄ RūmƮ ̄ (d. 672/1273); and exchanged 
correspondence with NasƮ̣r̄ al-DƮn̄ ṬūsƮ ̄ (d. 673/1274).42 QūnawƮ ̄ was an erudite scholar of 
philosophy, aḥādƬt̄h and ʿirfān and drew ideas with important philosophical ramifications 
from Ibn ʿArabƮ’̄s works.43 Chittick points out that Qūnawī’s reading is only one way in which 
the works of Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄can be read and his reading at times seems to miss the Shaykh’s main 
purpose in exposing the imaginal realm.44 At the same time, it was QūnawƮ’̄s stance on 
philosophy that was to bring together the philosophical and ʿirfānī traditions in Iran, which 
contributed to and culminated in the ḥikmat tradition.45  
 
One of QūnawƮ’̄s students, SaʿƮd̄ al-DƮn̄ FarghānƮ ̄ (d. 700/1300) wrote a commentary on the 
Tāʾīyah of Ibn Fāriḍ in which he clearly uses the term waḥdat al-wujūd in a technical sense 
                                                          
ʿashar”, in A. Neuwirth and A. C. Islebe (eds.) Reflections on Reflections: Near Eastern writers reading literature. 
Dedicated to Renate Jacobi, (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2006) 119-145 and S. Schmidtke, ““New sources for the life and 
work of Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī”, in Studia Iranica, 2009, (38) 49-68.  
42 See Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Al-Murāsalāt bayn Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī wa Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, ed. Gudrun 
Schubert (Shtutgart: Shtaynar, 1995). 
43 Qūnawī’s discourse dominates the school of Ibn ʿArabƮ,̄ but research on him and his ideas has not reflected his 
importance to the school. In the traditional seminary it is through Qūnawī that the majority of the students of 
irfān will gain an authoritative grasp of the subject. Michel Valsan was perhaps the first to write on him, see M. 
Valsan “L’Epitre sur Orientation Parfaite (R. al-Tawajjuh al-atamm) by Sadr al-dīn al-Qunâwi”, in Études 
Traditionelles, (67) 241-268. More recently see W. C. Chittick, “Qūnawī on the One Wujūd”, in Journal of the 
Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabƬ ̄Society, 2011, (49) 117-128, which is a translation of the first section of his Miftāḥ al-ghayb; A. 
F. Shaker, Thinking in the Language of Reality (Xlibris US, 2012) and R. Todd, The Sufi Doctrine of Man. 
44 See W. C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989) xviii. 
45 R. Todd, The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology. 
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perhaps for the first time.46 Another of QūnawƮ’̄s other probable students, Nasị̄r or Nāsịr al-DƮn̄ 
KhūʾƮ ̄ wrote a work in Persian called Tabsịrat-i mubtadƬ ̄ that helped to disseminate the 
teaching of Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄to the general populous,47 and Mullā Aḥmad IlāhƮ ̄translated QūnawƮ’̄s 
Miftāḥ al-ghayb into Persian at the request of Meḥemmed II Fātiḥ in 880/1475-6, further aiding 
the dissemination of the teachings of the school.48 While the school of Shiraz was developing 
Islamic philosophy the school of Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄was in full swing producing works of theoretical 
ʿirfān and poetry in a variety of locations.  
 
In a more formal Sufi setting Niʿmat-Allāh Walī Kirmānī (d. 834/1431) wrote over one hundred 
works and trained many disciples making him an important figure in the history of Shiʿi 
Sufism in this period. It is this Persian tradition of interpreting the ideas and works of the 
Shaykh al-akbar to answer philosophical questions that is continued through the school of 
Tehran and in the school of Qum until the present day.49 
 
The modern ʿirfān tradition has extensive discussion of intellectual interests in Najaf. The 
practical side of ʿirfān in Najaf is an area that requires further investigation, as possibly one of 
the most influential ʿurafāʾ in recent times — Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabāʾī — was based in 
                                                          
46 See W. C. Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, in The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2000) (X) 318. Another contender 
is Ibn SabʿƮn̄, W. C. Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, 320. 
47 Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, 320. 
48 Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, 322. 
49 For the influence of these Persian thinkers on Ottoman scholars see K. Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History 
in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 312-344. 
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Najaf after moving from Tabriz.50 The view that there was little interest in philosophy is also 
brought into question by figures like Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Rafīʿī 
who both studied philosophy in Najaf.51 Aside from the well known Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabāʾī the 
biographical literature betrays many more unknown personalities of importance such as 
Kāẓim DawlatābādƮ ̄ BaghdādƮ,̄52 Muḥammad BahārƮ ̄ HamadhānƮ ̄ who was the successor of 
Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ ̄(the teacher of Sayyid Aḥmad KarbalāʾƮ ̄who was the teacher of Sayyid 
ʿAlī Qāḍī);53 Murtaẓā Mudarris GƮl̄ānƮ ̄who became an important teacher and wrote a large 
number of works on his return from Najaf after being a student of Sayyid ʿAlƮ ̄QāḍƮ;̄54  Sayyid 
Murtaẓā KashmƮr̄Ʈ ̄NajafƮ ̄and others. The connection between these scholars based in Najaf 
and the philosophical tradition in Iran will be investigated later in this thesis.  
 
It was common for Iranian scholars to spend time in Najaf completing their studies in 
jurisprudence and its principles. These advanced students and teachers probably affected the 
outlook towards ʿirfān and philosophy in Najaf. Suhā has included chapters on Mullā Ḥusayn-
QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ ̄and Mullā Fatḥ-ʿAlƮ ̄Sultạ̄nābādƮ,̄55 who were ʿurafāʾ based in Najaf, and within 
                                                          
50 For more on Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabāʾī see Mahdī QāḍƮ,̄ Aৄyat al-ḥaqq (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ḥikmat bā hamkārƮ ̄
intishārāt-i baṣƮr̄at, 1386 Sh/2007). 
51 For more details on the condition of philosophy in Najaf see A. Bdaiwi, “Philosophy and anti-philosophy in 
twentieth century Najaf”, in R. Gleave (ed.) Clerical Authority in Shiʿi Islam: Historical Perspectives (London: The 
British Academy, forthcoming). 
52 See Muḥammad Muḥsin Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
Bihbahānī, (Tehran: Maktabah wa-matḥaf wa-markaz wathāʾiq majlis al-shūrā al-islāmƮ,̄ 2009) 69–70. 
53 Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 279. For a 
diagrammatic representation of this chain see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the 
Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect, tr. M. Faghfoori (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003) xvii. 
54 Ṭihrānī, Kernel, 345–346. 
55 He was buried in Sayyid Ṣadr al-DƮn̄ cemetery. See Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, ed. Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 10-13. 
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these chapters he also discusses the history of some other personalities in Najaf at that time.56 
Meir Litvak has generally surveyed the activities of the ʿulamāʾ (scholars) in Najaf and Karbala 
but does not include information regarding informal philosophical or ʿirfānī circles, choosing 
to focus on the leadership, socio-political and jurisprudential aspects of the Shiʿi scholars 
based in these shrine cities. Many of his observations relating to the ʿulamāʾ in Iraq equally 
apply to those in Iran and he frequently mentions links and contrasts between the two sets of 
scholars.57   
 
Spiritual practice has long been a feature of Shiʿism as the Shiʿa tried to emulate the spiritual 
characteristics of the Prophet and his family, such as staying awake in the nights in prayer, 
plentiful supplication, recitation and reflection upon the verses of the Qurʾān, fasting on 
specific days, continuous remembrance of God, watchfulness over their actions, devotion to 
the Prophet and showing kindness towards the needy and deprived. Their spiritual states of 
love, fear, hope, reliance, satisfaction, their disregard for what is worthless of the world and 
their hope in God’s promise are recorded in narrations about them and in their own words.  
 
Since the Imams are considered the true inheritors of Prophetic knowledge their words are 
considered to contain deep secrets only understood by the friends of God and are the 
sustenance of the philosophers and ʿurafāʾ. Shaybī discusses the role of the Imams in inspiring 
Sufi asceticism focusing on the worship and states of the fourth Imam known with the epithet 
                                                          
56 See M. Ṣadūqī Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ va ʿurafā-yi mutaʾakhkhir-i Ṣadr al-mutaʾallihīn (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
ḥikmat, 2002) 209-257. 
57 See M. Litvak, Shiʿi Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ʿUlemaʾ of Najaf and Karbalaʾ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Zayn al-ʿābidīn (the adornment of the worshipers).58 A collection of supplications narrated 
from him constitutes one of the most important contributions to Shiʿi spiritual heritage.59 
Within this work there are countless examples of intense spiritual states which inspire those 
who read them until today.  
 
The notion of a relationship between the spirituality of Shi’ism and ʿirfān is one that is hotly 
debated and at times the difference between popular Sufism and ʿ irfān is not clearly defined.60 
The issue is complex due to the varied nature of Iranian Sufism and its link to the political 
landscape. Mirza Mahdī Iṣfahānī was the founder of the Maktab al-tafkīk based in Mashhad 
which stressed the independence of scriptural sources from both philosophy and ʿirfān.61 Such 
views are still widespread in the ḥawza especially amongst students who do not specialise in 
philosophy or ʿirfān. Others propose a direct relationship between Sufism and Shi’ism.62 
According to Shaybī, the first link between Shiʿism and Sufism (in its undistinguished sense) 
seems to have been forged by the extremists (ghulāt) who turned to esoteric doctrines to 
                                                          
58 See K. Shaybī, al-Ṣila bayn al-taṣawwuf wa-l-tashayyuʿ, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-andalus, 1982) (2), 29 
59 See ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn, The Psalms of Islam, tr. William C. Chittick (London: The Muhammadi Trust, 1988). 
60 See L. Ridgeon, The Sufi Castigator: Ahmad Kasravi and the Iranian Mystical Tradition (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006) especially pages 13-33. For the general rejection of Sufism among more traditional elements in 
Sunnism see E. Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 1999). 
61 See R. Gleave, “Continuity and Originality in Shiʿi Thought: The Relationship between the Akhbariyya and the 
Maktab al-Tafkik”, in D. Hermann and S. Mervin (eds.) Shiʿi Trends and Dynamics in Modern Times (XVIII-XX 
Centuries) (Beirut: Ergon Verlang Würzburg in Kommission, 2010) 71-92. Views of Sufism in Iran between For 
more of the Maktab al-tafkik see Muḥammad Riżā Hakīmī, Maktab-i tafkik (Qum: Markaz-i barrasīhā-yi Islāmī, 
1373 Sh/1994) 
62 See Muḥammad ʿAlī Muʾadhdhin Sabzawārī Khurāsānī, Tuḥfa-yi ʿAbbāsī: The Golden Chain of Shīʿite Islam, tr. 
M. H. Faghfoory (Lanham: University Press of America Inc., 2008) 
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justify their claims.63 Another potential link between the Shiʿism and Sufism can also be found 
in some of the companions of the Shiʿi Imams who were also well known Sufis. It is perhaps 
through these figures that the teachings of the Imams reached Sufi circles. Most of the Imams 
themselves were able to integrate into the wider Muslim society and had the opportunity to 
teach the spirituality of the household of the Prophet.64 This opportunity was especially 
present during the Immate of Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq.  
 
An example of the interaction between the companions of the Imams and Sufi circles may be 
found in the book the Lantern of the Divine Law (Miṣbāḥ al-sharīʿa) which although attributed 
to Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, seems to more accurately be the work of one of his companions. 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭihrānī attributes the work to Fuḍayl b. ʿAyāḍ who had links with 
Sufism.65 If this assertion is assumed to be correct, Lantern of the Path is an intelligently 
written book that quotes Imam al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765)66 on various spiritual issues and at the 
same time weaves in the quotes from famous Sufis, showing the similarities in the views as 
well as highlighting what the Imam has to offer to the Sufis in terms of spiritual advice. In this 
sense it can be seen as an attempt by Fuḍayl to share the ʿirfānī views of Imam al-Ṣādiq with 
                                                          
63 Shaybī, al-Ṣila, 21-27 
64 There are numerous examples including the story of Bishr al-Ḥāfī, see Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥillī, Minhāj 
al-karāma, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Mubārak (Qum: al-Hādī, 1379 Sh/2000) 59.  
65 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭihrānī, Wilāyah al-faqīh fī ḥukūmat al-islām, 4 vols (Beirut: Dār mahajja al-bayḍāʾ, 
1428H/2007) (3) 39-40. 
66 Imām Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq was a decedant of ʿ Alī and Fāṭimah and is the 6th Imām of the twelver Shīʿīs. 
It is the dispute over his succession that lead to the split between twelver Shīʿīs (also known as the Jaʿfarī school) 
and Ismāʿīlīs. For more on Imām al-Ṣādiq and the Jaʿfarī school see H. Halm, Shiʾism, tr. J. Watson and M. Hill, 2nd 
ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Universtity Press, 2001) 28-154.  
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the Sufis of his time. It is interesting therefore that Imam al-Ṣādiq is considered by Sufis as a 
Sufi par excellence and is quoted in Sufi works.  
 
The Ismaʿili tradition also focused on esoteric doctrine emphasizing on the allegorical (taʾwƬl̄). 
On the other hand, due to the practice of dissemination (taqīyah) and the persecution of the 
ʿAbbasid authorities some Shiʿa found safety in calling themselves Sufi due to the close link 
between Sufism and Sunnism.67 It is the overwhelming character of ʿ AlƮ ̄b. AbƮ ̄Ṭālib as a source 
of spiritual inspiration and emulation, and the notion of walāyah (guardianship)68 which 
provides an important link between Sufi writings and Shiʿi theoretical ʿirfān.  
 
With the rise of the Safavids and the adoption of Imamism,69 Twelver Shiʿi Sufism gained 
temporal authority combining the roles of traditional ʿulamāʾ, devoted Sufis and political 
statesmen into a complex intellectual environment with a host of motives and implications. 
The vicious repression of Sufis by the Safavids in an attempt to consolidate their power has 
affected attitudes towards Sufism until today and it is sensitive to refer to the spiritual trend 
                                                          
67 N. ʿAlishah, “Shiʿism, SuƧƬsm and Gnosticism (ʿirfān)” in S. G. Safavi (ed.) Sufism (ʿirfān) (London: London 
Academy of Iranian Studies Press, 2008) 78. 
68 Walāyah is a multifaceted term linked to the scriptural sources, see M. M. Dakake, The Charismatic Community: 
Shiʿite Identity in Early Islam (Albany: SUNY, 2012). Here it corresponds greatly to Amir-Moezzi’s analysis where 
it relates to the ontological reality of the Imam, see M. A. Amir-Moezzi, “Notes à Propos de la Walāya Imamite 
(Aspects de l’Imamologie Duodécimaine)” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 2002, (122) 722-741. This is 
what draws me to prefer the terms guardianship or sainthood rather than friendship and the concept will be 
elucidated in great detail in the chapter on walāyah.  
69 See K. Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shiʿism”, in Iranian Studies, 1994, (27 
1/4) 135-161. See also R. Jaʿfariyān, Siyāsat va farhang-i rūzgār-i safavī, 2 vols (Tehran: Nashr-i ʿilm, 1387 Sh/2008). 
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as Sufi.70 This stigma has lead to the adoption of the word ʿirfān to delineate the same trend of 
spiritual attainment without the social connotations of Sufi orders. Muṭahharī stresses that 
ʿurafāʾ in this sense are real ʿurafāʾ, rather than those who have evolved cultural practices 
outside of the mainstream.71 In the second part of Shaybī’s work he traces the connection 
between Shiʿism and Sufism until the Safavid period and so this study — which starts in the 
Qajar period — will contribute to the study of Shiʿism and ʿirfān, although not in a strictly Sufi 
sense. 
 
During the Safavid period philosophical thought reached a turning point that would 
emphatically establish Shiʿi philosophy. A new philosophy called transcendental philosophy  
was founded, which took positions on all the major discussions between the Peripatetics and 
the Illuminationists. This period saw philosophers such as Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1631),72 Mīr 
                                                          
70 See for example, R. J. Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2004) 137. There is an important polemic that occurs in the Safavid period that shifts the authority of the Sufis to 
the traditional ʿulamāʾ and that shift is epitomised by a shift in terminology from Sufism to ʿīrfān. See A. Anzali, 
Safavid Shiʿism, the Eclipse of SuƦƪsm and the Rise of ʿIrfān, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Rice University, 2012. 
71 M. Muṭahharī, Madkhal ilā al-ʿulūm al-islāmƬȳah, tr. into Arabic by H. A. al-Hāshimī, 2 vols (Qum: Dār al-kitāb 
al-islāmƮ,̄ 1431/2010) (2) 59.  
72 For more on him see, ʿA. Mūsawī-Bihbahānī, Ḥakīm-i Astarābād, Mir Damad (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 
1998); ʿA. Awjabī, Mīr Dāmād: Bunyānguzār-i hikmat-i yamānī (Tehran: Ṣāḥat, 2004); M. KhāminihƮ,̄ MƬr̄ Dāmād 
(Tehran: Bunyād-i ḥikmat-i islāmƮ-̄i Ṣadrā, 1384 Sh/2005) and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 212-16. For his works see 
Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, Kitāb al-qabasāt, eds. Mahdī Muḥaqiq et al. (Tehran: Intishārāt-i dānishgāh-i 
Tehrān, 1374 Sh/1995); Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, al-Ṣirāt ̣ al-MustaqƬm̄, ed. ʿAlī Awjabī (Tehran: MƮr̄ās-i 
maktūb, 2002); Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād,  Musạnnafāt-i MƬr̄ Dāmād, ed. ʿAbd Allāh NūrānƮ,̄ 2 vols (Tehran: 
Anjumān-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangƮ,̄ 1381 Sh/2002-1385 Sh/2006); Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, DƬv̄ān-i 
ishrāq, ed. Samīrā Pūstīndūz (Tehran: MƮr̄ās-i maktūb, 1385 Sh/2006) and Muḥammad Bāqir Mīr Dāmād, TaqwƬm̄ 
al-īmān, edited by ʿAlī Awjabī (Tehran: MƮr̄ās-i maktūb, 2006). 
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Abū-l-Qāsim Findiriskī {d. 1050/1640),73 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shirāzī, Mullā Muḥsin 
Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680), Mullā ʻAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī (d. 1072/1661)74 and Qaḍī Saʿīd 
Qummī (d. after 1107/1696) who were all very different thinkers.75  
 
Philosophers such as Mullā Rajab-ʿAlƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄(d. 1080/1669) and ʿAlƮ-̄QulƮ ̄b. QarchaqāyƮk̄hān 
disagreed with many positions taken in al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah such as the primacy of being 
(aṣālat al-wujūd), the identity thesis (ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl) and motion in the category 
of substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah).76 With such diversity of thought it is hard to view the 
philosophical activity in Isfahan as a unified school. Philosophical activity significantly slowed 
down with the fall of Safavid rule and some philosophers were persecuted or expelled due to 
a temporary change in attitudes towards ḥikmat.77 Yet philosophical activity did not stop 
completely as evidenced by intact chains of transmission of philosophical thought and in the 
                                                          
73 For more on him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 216-218, Mīr Abū-l-Qāsim FindiriskƮ,̄ Risāla-i ṣināʿīya, ed. Ḥasan 
Jamshīdīh (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2009) 9-75 and the english introduction to his Muntakhab jūg bāsisht, 
see Mīr Abū-l-Qāsim FindiriskƮ,̄ Muntakhab jūg-i bāsisht, ed. Sayyid Fatḥ Allāh Mujtabāʾī (Tehran: Iranian 
Institute of Philosophy, 2006) 16-23 as well as plenty of other works in Persian. 
74 For more information on his life, works and ideas see W. Madelung, “Abd-al-Razzāq LāhƮj̄Ʈ”̄, in Encyclopaedia 
Iranica [online], 1982, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abd-al-razzaq-lahiji-11th-17th-century-theologian-
and-philosopher [Accessed 24/5/2016]. 
75 He was a student of both Mullā Rajab ʿAlƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄and Fayḍ KashānƮ,̄ who both had views that were poles apart; 
see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 219. His works mainly consist of commentaries on aḥadīth such as his exposition of 
forty ḥadith and his magnum opus; Sharḥ tawḥīd al-Ṣudūq. For more information on him see S. Rizvi, “Qāẓi Saʿid 
Qomi”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica [online], 2005, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/qazi-said-Qomi [Accessed 
24/5/2016]. 
76 See ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, Muntakhab al-khāqānƬ ̄ fƬ ̄ kashf ḥaqāʾiq -i ʿirfānƬ,̄ ed. Najīb Māyil Haravī (Tehran: 
Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1361 Sh/1982) 13. 
77 As illustrated later by the case of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ardistānī (d. 1134/1721) who was banished from Isfahan by 
Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn. Isfahan was the capital of the Safavid dynesty and had been a hub of philosophy and ʿirfān. 
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cases of some specific thinkers.78 It was at this stage that philosophical activity moved to 
Tehran — the new capital chosen by the Qajar rulers — and a new phase in the history of 
Islamic philosophy in Iran commenced.  
 
Of key concern in this thesis is the question of how the subjects of Sadrian ḥikmat and 
theoretical ʿirfān have interacted in the traditional Shiʿi seminary in Iran. Both their 
interaction in terms of the essential nature of the subjects and how this interaction has been 
perceived differently by various ḥukamāʾ of the Sadrian school. During the course of the 
discussion I argue since Mullā Ṣadrā drew upon theoretical ʿirfān, philosophy, Qurʾānic 
hermeneutics and aḥādīth, his philosophy can be read with different readings.79 The two most 
evident readings are a philosophical reading and an ʿirfānī reading. Due to a number of 
historical factors, both within the traditional seminary and external to it, the philosophical 
reading of Mullā Ṣadrā has become predominant. External factors such as the interaction 
between ḥikmat and Western philosophy and modernization, and internal factors such as the 
interaction between ḥikmat and the principles of jurisprudence; and the role played by the 
seminary in the decline of Sufism and the rise of ʿirfān.  While this thesis cannot hope to 
examine each of these factors in detail, it concentrates on the role of the preferences of the 
ḥukamāʾ with the variant readings played in this separation. Although a discussion of how 
theoretical ʿirfān developed in the Shiʿi context is important to understand why and how it 
                                                          
78 See J. R. I. Cole, “Ideology, Ethics, and Philosophical Discourse in Eighteenth Century Iran” in Iranian Studies, 
1989, (22/1), 7-34. 
79 For the extent of Ṣadrā’s success in exploiting this synergy see Z. Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and 
Reason in the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā: An Analysis of the al-Hikmah al-ʿArshiyyah (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003).  
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was incorporated into Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought, the majority of the thesis will focus on the 
development of ḥikmat after Mullā Ṣadrā and specifically focus on the schools of Tehran and 
Qum, which until now have not received much academic attention. 
 
2. Epistemology and Definitions 
 
According to Aristotelian logic, sciences can be differentiated according to the subject they 
address. Subjects should therefore be articulated in a formulated statement that includes all 
of the issues addressed in the subject and at the same time prevents the inclusion of those 
issues that are irrelevant to the subject. This kind of definition is based on the subject having 
a quiddity80 so that its definition can be formulated in terms of genus and differentia. What is 
immediately clear from the nature of both ḥikmat and theoretical ʿirfān is that their subject is 
not a quiddity. In ḥikmat the subject is wujūd and in ʿirfān it is God and both of these concepts 
cannot be defined in the sense above. Even though some ḥukamāʾ consider the concept of 
wujūd as the subject of ḥikmat, that concept is based on direct experience. Both subjects 
therefore rely on the self evident nature of their subject matter and the fact that that self 
evidency is more indicative of what is being discussed than defining the subject matter using 
quiddity.  
 
                                                          
80 The quiddity of something is its whatness and it is intellectually diferentated from a thing’s existence. So for 
example the quiddity of a human is that he is a rational animal and this is differentiated from his existence in 
the extramental. 
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Efforts have been made to define each subject, not in its strict logical sense, but in order to 
differentiate the subjects. This can be achieved by describing the most specific proprium 
(akhaṣṣ al-lawāzim) or by a specified genus and species (al-jins wa al-faṣl al-ṣināʿī). Ḥamza 
Fanārī wrote one of the most influential commentaries on Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Mafātīḥ al-
Ghayb which is a text studied closely as part of the ḥawza curriculum in theoretical ʿirfān. It is 
after studying this text that the student of ʿirfān will attain the qualification to study the field 
of ʿirfān by himself, although some choose to embark on a reading of Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futḥāt al-
Makkīya as well. Fanārī’s commentary, as well as the other commentaries and works studied 
in the ḥawza, are a key part of how concepts are explained in this thesis as familiarity with 
these texts is important to an understanding of the development of ideas in the context of the 
ḥawza. Fanārī says the following about the esoteric sciences: 
 
The esoteric sciences are realised after solidifying the outward laws...if it is related to 
building the inside with heart centric acts, the removal of that which causes destruction 
and the attainment of that with leads to salvation, then that is the science of Sufism 
(taṣawwuf) and wayfaring (sulūk). If it is related to the connection between the Truth and 
the creation and [from] the perspective the dispersion of manyness from true oneness 
with their difference, that with its connections and levels; then [it is] the science of 
realities, unveiling, witnessing and the Shaykh calls it: the knowledge of God (al-ʿilm bi 
Allah), in the same way that he names what is before it: the stations of the afterlife.81 
                                                          
81 Ḥamza Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad 
Qummī, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
Mawlā, 1388 Sh/2009) 28. 
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The esoteric sciences can therefore be split into two: one aspect deals with the practical side 
of wayfaring and experiencing and the other aspect relates to the knowledge of how God 
interacts with His creation. Since knowledge of the pure Essence of God is incomprehensible 
it is outside the realm of human understanding as for the human conscious to comprehend 
something it must be through differentiation. The first aspect in the context of the modern 
ḥawza is referred to as practical ʿirfān and the second aspect is classified as theoretical ʿirfān. 
 
The words ʿirfān, ʿārif and maʿrifa come from the Arabic root ʿ - r – f which means to know or 
to recognize.82 In the modern Iranian ḥawza the word ʿirfān is used for the more spiritual 
nature of Islam as opposed to the term Sufism.83 Outside of the ḥawza ʿirfān has been used in 
Iran in a variety of other ways as a substitute for general spirituality.84 There are two broad 
senses in which ʿirfān can be discussed. The first is a natural inclination in the human towards 
                                                          
82 For some other definitions see for example, Miṣbāḥ al-munīr where ʿirfān is to know something through the 
senses Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Fayyūmī, Al-Miṣbāḥ al-munīr fī gharīb al-sharḥ al-kabīr li-l-rāfiʿī, (Beirut: Maktabat 
Lubnān, 2001) 153; Rāghib Iṣfahānī says it is to comprehend something by thinking and contemplating on its 
effect, it is more specific than knowledge and its opposite is refusal (al-inkār); Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Rāghib 
Iṣfahānī, Muʿjim mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʿān, ed. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī (Beirut: Dār al-qalam, 1412/1992) 560-562. 
83 See Anzali, Safavid Shiʿism, the Eclipse of SuƦƪsm and the Rise of ʿIrfān, 277-279 where he explains the usage of 
the term ʿirfān as mysticism as opposed to Sufism and shows that this is a modern development by tracing the 
defintions of both terms in Persian dictionaries. In these dictionaries it is the term Sufism that holds the 
monopoly on the spiritual dimension of Islam. However, it was the emergence of modern media and the social 
transformations in Iranian society that caused a move away from Sufism towards ʿirfān.  
84 Anzali, Safavid Shiʿism, the Eclipse of SuƦƪsm and the Rise of ʿIrfān, 7. The Sufis in Iran and Sufism were fiercely 
combated after the revolution see M. V. Bruinessen, Sufism and the ‘Modern’ Islam (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007) 67. While both terms are used to denote the path to knowledge of God, ʿirfān indicates the heart of 
knowing God without the sociological connotations of Sufi orders. 
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returning to his origin within the higher realms and a desire for abstraction from the material 
body in order to experience those realms further. It is a natural pull towards wanting to 
witness God and a natural tendency to want to increase that relationship due to its innate 
pleasure and the graded nature of that pleasure. This inclination is found across most religions 
and time periods and the Qurʾān refers to it as the natural disposition (fiṭra) of the human. It 
is the starting point of religion and the basis for comparative ʿ irfān. It is an aspect of the human 
that in of itself is related to existence and so therefore in the same way as existence cannot be 
defined neither can the human’s natural disposition.85  
 
On the other hand, the word ʿ irfān can be understood in terminological sense within a specific 
science in reference to the spiritual station of knowing. It is commonly understood to refer to 
a specific path or way, but this is inaccurate. It is the paths that lead to ʿirfān rather than the 
paths themselves being ʿirfān. The term was used as such within Sufi circles from about the 
third century hijri to distinguish simple abstention (zuhd) from the real goal of Sufism as 
knowing God (maʿrifa).86 This is characterized as the Sufi path of knowledge as opposed to the 
Sufi path of love. The distinction between the two Sufi paths is an intellectual one as true 
ʿurafāʾ strive for both knowledge and love, which cannot really be separated in the realm of 
experience.  
 
ʿIrfān in this sense is also specific to Islam as it is to reach the realities upon which Islam is 
based and many ʿ urafāʾ have stressed a deep link between the outward religion and the inward 
                                                          
85 ʿAbd Allāh Javādī Āmulī, Fiṭrat dar Qurʾān, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Isrāʾ, 1379 Sh/2001) 26. 
86 Anzali, Safavid Shiʿism, the Eclipse of Sufism and the Rise of ʿIrfān, 13-24. 
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realities that they experience. It is not the case for these ʿurafāʾ that the outward aspect of 
religion is just a construct that fades when reality is experienced. Rather it is the experience 
of reality that helps one to understand the depth of the outward religion and enable them to 
comment upon it and explain it. This is perhaps understood further when considering the role 
of the Muḥammadan reality (al-ḥaqƬq̄ah al-Muḥammadīyah) in both theoretical and practical 
ʿirfān which will be explored later in the section on walāyah. Ibn ʿArabī classified the ʿārifūn 
(plural of ʿ ārif which can also be rendered as ʿ urafāʾ) as the greatest friends of God.87 The ʿ urafāʾ 
are the elite Sufis. Qayṣarī further clarifies theoretical ʿirfān in his treatise on Unity, Prophecy 
and Guardianship where he has a section concerning the subject, questions and principles of 
the science: 
 
There is no doubt that this group [of ʿurafāʾ] researches and clarifies about the Essence 
of God, His Names and His Attributes from the perspective that they lead all of their 
manifestations and hidden aspects to the Divine Essence. Therefore, the subject of this 
science is the Unified Essence and its eternal and everlasting Attributes. Its issues [for 
discussion] are how manyness came about from It and how it returns to It; the 
explanation of the manifestation of the Divine Names and the Lordly Attributes; and the 
explanation of how the people of God return to Him; how their wayfaring, efforts and 
asceticism is...88 
 
                                                          
87 Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 148. 
88 Dāwūd Qayṣarī, Rasāʾil-i Qayṣarī, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pazhūhishī-yi ḥikmat 
va falsafa-i Īrān, 1381 Sh/2002) 6. 
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The subject of theoretical ʿirfān in this passage is defined as the nondelimited Essence and its 
modes which are the Names, rather than a defined subject to which those issues are essential 
accidents (ʿawāriḍ dhātīya).89 Qayṣarī carries on in his Rasāʾil to compare the sciences of ʿ irfān, 
philosophy and theology placing his preference with the science of ʿirfān. But the philosophy 
he is critcising is not what he calls al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah90 as he later praises the science in 
his exposition.  
 
This science [of ʿirfān] is the most honourable and greatest science from among the 
sciences due to the honour of its subject and the greatness of its issues. [As for] the 
sciences of philosophy and theology, even though their subject is the same as the subject 
of this science [of ʿirfān], they do not investigate how the servant reaches his Lord...what 
is comprehended in their sciences is an understanding with their imaginations and 
thoughts, [which] is nothing except for their intellectual view and not the Essence of the 
Everlasting Truth.91  
 
                                                          
89 The secondarly literature usually doesn’t seek to radically redefine the subject area, rather they try to explain 
the expressions of earlier sources like the one quote above. See for example K. Ḥaydarī, Al-ʿIrfān al-shīʿī (Beirut: 
Dār al-hādī, 2008) 10 where he quotes Qūnawī and Y. Yazdānpanāh, MabānƬ ̄ va usụ̄l-i ʿirfān-i naẓarƬ ̄ (Qum: 
Intishārāt-i muʾassasa-yi āmūzishƮ ̄va pazhūhishƮ-̄yi Imām KhumaynƮ,̄ 1389 Sh/2011) 76-78 who refers to Qūnawī 
and Qaysarī. 
90 Qayṣarī, Rasāʾil-i Qayṣarī, 16. The term al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿaliyah was first introduced by Ibn Sīnā in his al-
Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt and is explained by Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī as philosophy which can only be completely 
understood through discussion and unveiling together. See S. H. Rizvi, Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation 
of Being, 23.  
91 Qayṣarī, Rasāʾil-i Qayṣarī, 6. 
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Qayṣarī gives the science of ʿirfān superiority because of its practical aspect of guiding a 
servant to God by explaining the method of wayfaring and because of the truth of what he 
experiences. In this passage he does not differentiate between the subjects of all three sciences 
in general sense, while in his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam he is careful to differentiate 
what Existence connotates in ʿirfān from what it means in philosophy.92 It is the lack of 
differentiation that leads to confused readings of philosophical and ʿirfānī works. To analyse 
this further it is useful to make a simple differentiation between three interrelated aspects of 
interpretation; the actual subject of the science, the mode of explanation and the approach of 
the reader.  
 
The Subject 
 
 
 
The mode of explanation    The reader’s approach 
 
Fig 1.1: Factors in the interpretation process. 
 
                                                          
92 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 21-60. 
45  
The Peripatetics discuss the concept of wujūd and also explain the subject within a conceptual 
explanation. There is little confusion as there is unity between the subject, the mode of 
explanation and the approach of the reader. Illuminationist philosophy on the other hand 
discusses light which exists in the extramental as the essential subject of their understanding 
of reality. However, the mode of explanation is Peripatetic and here is where there is a 
possibility of misunderstanding. The mode of expression is not conducive to the underlying 
concept of light in the extramental as while Illuminationists are trying to explain a 
phenomenon in the extramental, the tools for explanation are designed to explain the concept 
of something in the mind.  
 
Light (in the extramental) 
 
 
 
Quiddity (in the mind)     Peripatetic 
 
Fig 1.2: The potential for misinterpretation in the reading of Illuminationist Philosophy. 
Transcendental philosophy has two philosophical readings for a single subject. The subject of 
transcendental philosophy is wujūd as it is in the extramental. One reading of transcendental 
philosophy returns the subject to the conception of wujūd like the Peripatetics. Here there is 
confusion between the explanation of wujūd as an outside reality and the subject of wujūd as 
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a conception. This is the Peripatetic reading of Sadrian philosophy, which is the reading 
presented by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1401/1981) in Bidāyat and Nihāyat al-ḥikma as will be 
investigated later. The second reading is where the subject of transcendental philosophy is 
wujūd in the extramental, but the nature of philosophical enquiry is conceptual and so 
therefore the reading is conceptual. Here again there is confusion but to a smaller extent as 
since the explanation matches the reading there is some unity. Still the fault is on the side of 
the reader who cannot find his way out of conception. This is why the study of ʿirfān is 
complementary to a reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as it releases the philosopher from the world of 
pure conception leading to a third reading.  
 
Wujūd (in the extramental) 
 
 
 
Wujūd (in the mind/reading 1)      Philosophical (reading 1,2&3) ʿIrfānī (readings 1&2) 
 
Fig 1.3: Philosophical readings of ḥikmat. 
The subject of ʿirfān discusses the Truth and it also has a variety of readings while its 
explanation is philosophical. Although at first glance there seems to be confusion between 
the subject and the explanation, the ʿurafāʾ seemed to have realised this issue and therefore 
cautioned the reader not to take their expressions at face value. They have also differentiated 
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between the terminology as used in philosophy and its use in ʿirfān.93 Here although there is a 
potential misunderstanding from the explanation due to the use of philosophical terms, the 
ʿurafāʾ tried to avoid that by reviewing and changing some philosophical terms and at times 
by using their own terms. But there were still many problems with using terminology from 
Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy. In ʿirfān the subject is in the extramental and the 
explanation is also of the extramental and not the concept. The approach of the reader 
remains the third facet. The redefinition of terms and the caution not to take the expressions 
at face value was a kind of warning not to understand ʿirfān with a Peripatetic mindset as the 
Wujūd that is discussed is the self-disclosed Truth, not the understanding of the Truth or wujūd 
as the Peripatetics saw it.  
 
The first reading of ʿirfān is like the second reading of ḥikmat, where although what is being 
discussed is the Truth in the extramental, the concept of the Truth is what is read. This concept 
can be understood with a Peripatetic approach, an Illuminationist approach, an approach that 
reads transcendental philosophy with its first reading or an approach that reads 
transcendental philosophy with its second reading. From here many issues of understanding 
arise and as such some criticisms can be answered by showing the differences in the reading 
of the subject. The second reading of ʿirfān is the reading of an ʿārif who himself experiences 
the realities explained in the text. Here there is no confusion between the explanation and the 
subject as the reader is able to see past the restraints of philosophical terminology.  
                                                          
93 See for example, Dāwūd Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (1) 21-60 and Ibn Turka 
Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī, 90-130. 
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In this thesis the first two readings of Sadrian philosophy will be investigated as a single 
“philosophical reading” and the third reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as well as the two readings of 
ʿirfān will be investigated as an “ʿirfānī reading” of Mullā Ṣadrā. From the third reading of Mullā 
Ṣadrā, Sadrian philosophers are able to link the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā to the first 
reading of ʿirfān. It is from this reading of Mullā Ṣadrā that his philosophy offers a more 
suitable framework for the philosophical discussion of ʿirfān than Peripatetic and 
Illuminationist approaches and terminology. This reading of transcendental philosophy is a 
great contribution to theoretical ʿirfān, but since it was born in a Shiʿi setting how far it has 
impacted the Sufi sphere is yet to be investigated.  Understanding these three aspects is a 
powerful tool in understanding the works of Islamic philosophers and ʿurafāʾ. 
 
Wujūd (in the extramental) 
 
 
 
Philosophical but adjusted      Philosophical (reading 1,2&3) ʿIrfānī (readings 1&2) 
 
Fig 1.4: Readings of theoretical ʿirfān. 
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Philosophers considered their subject as the highest and greatest of all sciences. The proof 
they offered for this was that the subject was the most general from among the sciences 
dealing with reality. Since the subject of philosophy was more general the science was a 
prerequisite for the sciences which had more limited subjects. In the classical categorisation 
of the sciences the sciences were first split into sciences dealing with reality and sciences that 
were formulated. The sciences dealing with reality were then split into the sciences that were 
sought for themselves and sciences that were sought for the sake of other sciences. Then 
finally the sciences desired for themselves were split into mathematics, physics and 
philosophy. Philosophy was the supreme science because its subject was the most general 
compared to mathematics or physics as both of those sciences dealt with wujūd but with the 
condition of something as opposed to philosophy which dealt with nondelimited wujūd. It 
was therefore required before the other subjects as the subject of philosophy affected all other 
subjects.  
In the same way that the adherents of philosophy championed their science by its subject, the 
ʿurafāʾ also sought to place their science above all other sciences including philosophy by 
using the same argument as the philosophers. The difference between the subject of ʿ irfān and 
the subject of philosophy can be explained using terminology that came about after Mullā 
Ṣadrā.94 While this is not the terminology directly used in the writings of the ʿurafāʾ (as they 
were limited to Peripatetic and Illuminationist terminology as explained previously) the 
terminology helps to clarify what was being discussed. Although the philosophers and ʿurafāʾ 
both discussed nondelimited wujūd, philosophers took nondelimitation as a condition for 
                                                          
94 Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ʿAṣṣār, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1376 
Sh/1997) 25-26. 
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wujūd. What was being discussed was nondelimited wujūd as opposed to delimited wujūd as 
category of wujūd. 
 
 
Nondelimited wujūd (philosophy) 
 
Wujūd (ʿirfān) 
 
wujūd limited by a condition 
(mathematics/physics)   
 
Fig. 1.5: Categorization of wujūd. 
 
Furthermore for the Peripatetics that nondelimitation was in the mind as realities in the 
extramental were completely separate. However, the ʿurafāʾ discussed nondelimited wujūd 
but without nondelimitation as a condition as they spoke directly about God, which meant 
that both nondelimited wujūd with nondelimitation as a condition and delimited wujūd with 
delimitation as a condition both fell under the subject of ʿirfān. This level of nondelimitation 
even precedes transcendental philosophy whose subject is the single reality of wujūd which 
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flows throughout creation. It was therefore ʿirfān that had the most general subject and was 
consequently the greatest and most honorable subject.  
 
The second factor that made ʿirfān more honorable was that it dealt with the reality of wujūd 
and not the understanding of wujūd as was the case with philosophy. The terms for these 
different categories are that ʿirfān investigates wujūd without condition as the source of 
division (lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī) whereas philosophy investigates wujūd without condition 
but as a division (lā bi sharṭ al-qismī). Mathematics and physics investigate wujūd with a 
condition (bi sharṭ shayʾ). JavādƮ ̄ ĀmulƮ ̄ expands on this point in the introduction to his 
commentary on TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid: 
 
Theoretical ʿirfān is a science above philosophy as it concerns nondelimited existence. 
That is, it researches wujūd unbounded even by the bound on nondelimitation (without 
condition as the source of division). The issues raised [are therefore] concerning the 
specifications of that nondelimitation and not nondelimitation itself. Philosophy studies 
wujūd with the condition of not something else (bi shart ̣ lā), that is without natural, 
mathematical, ethical or logical specification. Since unconditional wujūd (lā bi shart)̣ — 
which is the subject of ʿirfān — is above wujūd with the condition of not something else 
(bi shart ̣ lā) — which is the subject of philosophy — theoretical ʿirfān is above 
philosophy.95 
 
                                                          
95 See ʿAbd Allāh JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ ʿAyn-i nażżākh, 3 vols (Qum: Intishārāt-i Isrāʾ, 1387 Sh/2009) (1) 31. 
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Lā bi sharṭ al-qismī (philosophy) 
 
Lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī (ʿirfān) 
 
Bi sharṭ shayʾ (mathematics/physics) 
 
Fig. 1.6: Lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī. 
 
On the other hand, some Sadrian philosophers like Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva (d. 1314/1896)96 stressed 
the similarity of both subject matters due to the third reading of ḥikmat. In his gloss on the 
Asfār when discussing what is meant by the flow of wujūd in all of the existents he says: 
 
...The existence of the Necessary in terms of noticing those Names and archetypes is split 
into three categories; taking It [the Necessary] with the Names and archetypes which 
would be the degree of Dualistic Unity; taking It in terms of the nonexistence of those 
Names and archetypes which would be the degree of Non-dualistic Unity; and taking It 
without condition. That is without the condition (lā bi sharṭ) of them [the Names and the 
archetypes] and without the condition of their nonexistence which would be the degree 
                                                          
96 He was one of the four founding ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran and is discussed later in the next chapter. 
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of the flow [of wujūd] in all of the existents, meaning the Names and archetypes and this 
is the degree of the Necessary according to the ʿurafāʾ. As for the ḥukamāʾ: the Necessary 
with the condition of no (bi sharṭ lā) and what they mean by with the condition of no is 
the Essence without any imperfections which is the same as the level of without 
condition according to the ʿurafāʾ, so do not be heedless!97 
 
According to this reading although there may be a technical difference in the different 
expressions of the conditions or lack of conditions with which wujūd is taken, Jilva in this 
paragraph explains that what the philosophers meant by taking wujūd with a condition was 
the same as what the ʿurafāʾ meant when taking wujūd without a condition. That is that 
according to Jilva they both discuss the flow of existence which he equates to the Essence, 
which is either expressed as nondelimited wujūd without the condition of nondelimitation, or 
wujūd with the condition of no imperfection. If this is the case then there is no difference 
between the subject of ḥikmat and the subject of theoretical ʿ irfān. Jilva’s analysis is inaccurate 
as he has confused the flow of existence to be the Essence according to the ʿurafāʾ while they 
are vastly different as will be shown in the chapter on wujūd. In the above passage Jilva 
illustrates the confusion between the subject, the reading and the method of explanation. This 
confusion begins for Jilva in the definition and differentiation of the subjects. 
 
                                                          
97 Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ḥakīm Jilva, edited by Ḥasan Riżāzāda (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
Ḥikmat, 1385 Sh/2007) 160-161. 
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It is no coincidence that the ʿurafāʾ discussed the supremacy of their subject in the intellectual 
sphere. In much the same way that philosophy had been criticised by Islamic scholars from 
other fields, the validity of ʿirfān as an authentic Islamic science was disputed and still is until 
today in traditional ḥawza environments. Therefore in the same way that the philosophers 
had to address these criticisms through their writings in order to find acceptance and 
following for their subject, so too did the ʿurafāʾ. Major criticism to ʿirfān came from 
philosophy as the main epistemological tool in philosophy is the intellect, while some sayings 
of the ʿurafāʾ concerning the intellect seem to be derogatory to it at first glance. So it is not 
surprising that the definition of ʿirfān and in fact most of the issues in theoretical ʿirfān are 
discussed in a philosophical voice.  
 
Qayṣarī explains that the reason for the birth of the science of theoretical ʿirfān was the 
criticism the ʿurafāʾ received from other parts of the intelligentsia.98 According to Sayyid 
Kamāl Ḥaydarī it was the need to validate knowledge from kashf that caused some writers like 
Ibn Turka in his Tamhīd al-qawāʾid and ultimately Mullā Ṣadrā to provide a scientific basis 
and framework to the knowledge attained by kashf and this is ḥikmat.99 Theoretical ʿirfān as a 
science developed later then philosophy in the Islamic world as philosophy was introduced 
with the translation movement during the Abbasid reign. The ʿ urafāʾ therefore had the benefit 
of formulating the basis of their science with philosophy in sight. They were therefore able to 
                                                          
98 Cited in Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī 
Khurasānī, 6-7. 
99 Ḥaydarī, Al-ʿIrfān al-shīʿī, 8-9.  
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show the supremacy of their science by placing it above philosophy, which had already fought 
a battle for supremacy. 
 
I. The Intellect (ʿAql) 
 
The Arabic word for intellect carries different meanings according to different sciences; but 
two meanings are the most important when discussing the intellect in philosophy and ʿirfān. 
The first are the ontological intellects, which are transcendental beings and the second 
meaning of the intellect is a faculty of the human, or in Sadrian terms a level of the human 
soul. It is the aspect of the human that can comprehend the universals as opposed to the 
imagination which can only comprehend particulars. The second meaning is of 
epistemological concern and the centre of discussion in this section.100 While quoting some of 
the sayings of the ʿ urafāʾ may indicate a negative position on the value of the intellect in ʿirfān, 
much of the criticism of the ʿurafāʾ on the intellect is when the intellect is considered 
competent to comprehend that which is above its level. The intellect is a valuable tool for the 
ʿārif in explaining what he has witnessed; deciphering between true and false experiences; 
                                                          
100 It is worth mentioning that the Islamic scriptural sources have yet another definition of the intellect. It 
confirms the ontological intellect and comprises a wider definition of the intellect within the human. For an 
example of some of the aḥādīth on the ʿaql see Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 23-71. Amir-Moezzi finds the most suitable 
translation for the ʿaql of the aḥadīth to be hiero-intellegence and differentiates it from the use of the term ʿaql 
used in thelogical texts. See M. A. Amir-Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism: The Sourcs of Escotericism in 
Islam (Albany: SUNY, 1994) 6-13. 
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understanding the instructions and teachings of his Shaykh101 and for learning about the path 
he is to follow from the writings of the previous ʿurafāʾ. However, the intellect cannot 
comprehend reality first hand as that is the job of the heart. The intellect that is accepted by 
the ʿurafāʾ is the intellect which is in harmony with the heart, not that intellect which refuses 
to accept the hearts place as the main source of illumination and reception. In this regard Ibn 
Turka says: 
 
We do not accept that the intellect does not comprehend the unveilings and 
understandings of that high way which are beyond the intellect in their entirety. It is true 
that there are some hidden matters that the intellect itself cannot reach, rather it reaches 
and comprehends them with the help of another faculty which is more honourable than 
it...after attaining [that knowledge] the intellect comprehends it in the same way as the 
other comprehensibles. Like the particulars [for which] it requires another faculty to 
comprehend them...102   
 
                                                          
101 A Shaykh, Murshid or Pīr is a spiritual mentor or guide. A spiritual mentor is often likened to a travelling guide 
who guides the traveller through unfamiliar territory. In the same way, the wayfarer requires a spiritual guide in 
order to navigate the spiritual plane and purify his soul. 
102 Ṣāʾin-l-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā 
Maḥmūd Qummī, edited by Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 383-384. 
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Mullā Ṣadrā confirms this analysis of the intellect and stresses the importance of experience 
and unveiling as well as intellectualising and proving. In his Asfār when explaining why he has 
discussed many of the opinions on the limitation of effusion103 he says: 
 
“The purpose of mentioning all that we have mentioned is so that the researcher in these 
issues can fully comprehend all that has been said [concerning them]...so that he may 
know the value of what we have understood...and that he does not put what we have said 
down to unveiling and taste alone, or [simply] following the divine law, without 
providing proofs and arguments...as unveiling alone, without proof is not sufficient in 
wayfaring in the same way that only researching without unveiling is a great 
deficiency...”104  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 According to Mullā Ṣadrā, in line with theoretical ʿirfān, God’s effusion is never ending due to the 
superabundance of the Essence. In faṣl 3&4 of mawqif 10 Mullā Ṣadrā takes great pains to recount as many of of 
the proofs of those who deny this opinion as he can and refutes them see Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, al-
Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya fƬ-̄l-asfār al-ʿaqlīyah al-arbaʿah, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., 9 vols (Qum: ṬalƮ ̄ʿ ah al-
nūr, 2009) (7) 265-288. At the beginning of faṣl 5 he explains why he takes such pains to do so which is quoted 
above. This is different to texts in theoretical ʿirfān which will usually simply state this opinion as definitive or as 
a nessesary aspect of their view of existence and then explain its implications. 
104 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya fƬ-̄l-asfār al-ʿaqlīyah al-arbaʿah, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 288.  
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II. Unveiling (Kashf) 
 
Unveiling and thereby witnessing or tasting is the basis of ʿirfānī knowledge. 105 ʿAbd al-Razzāq 
Qāsānī shows the place of witnessing in his definition of the ʿārif when he says the ʿārif is: “[the 
one] who God has made to witness his Essence, Attributes, Names and Actions, and therefore 
knowing occurs from what he has witnessed.”106 Kashf is a direct connection between the 
knower and the known where the knower witnesses or tastes the known. This connection is 
something common to all types of witnessing including sensory and intellectual knowing, but 
the heart is capable of this connection on a higher level and so it is the knowing of the heart 
that is intended in ʿirfān. In Sadrian terms, witnessing is graded and at each level of witnessing 
the soul uses the appropriate tool, be that sense, the intellect or the heart or indeed yet deeper 
levels of the inner explained by the ʿurafāʾ such as the spirit (rūḥ), the secret (sirr), the hidden 
(kafī) and the more hidden (akhfā). As the tool of knowing increases in its depth of 
comprehension, the knower also becomes less prone to making mistakes. Rather the ʿurafāʾ 
claim that on some levels of knowing there is no possibility of being mistaken. This is due to 
the increase in the clarity of the unity between the knower and the known. Qayṣarī defines 
taste as:  
                                                          
105 For more on dhawq in the view of al-Ghazālī see F. Shehadi, Ghazali’s Unique Unknowable God (Leiden: Brill, 
1964) 43-47 and A. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Mystical Cognition and 
its Avicennian Foundation (London and New York: Routledge, 2012) 48-63. As a concept shared by a Jewish 
philosopher-mystic see D. Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religeous Experience in 
Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000) 174-176. 
106 ʿAbd al-Razzāq Qāsānī, Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfīya, ed. ʿĀṣim Ibrāhīm al-Kayālī al-Ḥusaynī al-Shādhilī al-Darqāwī 
(Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, 1426/2005) 44. 
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What the knower finds in terms of self evidence and unveiling, not by proof or learning, 
nor by taking by faith or blind following, as all of these while being worthy in terms of 
their own level do not reach the level of the unveiling sciences as news [of something] is 
not the same as seeing it.107 
 
Tasting is experiencing first hand rather than learning about something second hand. Here 
there is a link between kashf and the concept of knowledge by presence as both directly 
experience the known. Kashf is more general than knowledge by presence as what can be 
known through unveiling may be both by presence and through attaining. This difference is 
seen in the categorisation of two types of kashf: kashf ṣūrī (image unveiling) and kashf maʿnawī 
(meaning unveiling).108 Mullā Ṣadrā also draws on the above classification by Qayṣarī in his 
Mafātīḥ al-ghayb.109 While an image unveiling comprises the witnessing of the unseen with 
the senses, a meaning unveiling is direct experience of the realities. While these can occur 
separately most of the time they are experienced together.110 The knowledge from an image 
unveiling is knowledge by attainment. It is akin to knowledge through the senses in the 
sensory world, except the senses used in an unveiling are the senses of the heart. The direct 
                                                          
107 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Mumidd al-himam fī sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Tehran: Wizārat al-thaqafa wa-l-irshād 
islāmī, 1378 Sh/1999) 654. 
108 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 127-140. 
109 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī, 2 vols (Tehran, SIPRIn Publication, 
2003) (1) 245-247. 
110 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 130. 
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experience of knowledge in a meaning unveiling is knowledge by presence, while the 
explanation of that knowledge would fall into the category of knowledge by attainment.  
 
Due to the epistemological centrality of witnessing to the science of ʿirfān it was important for 
ʿurafāʾ to explain the difference between kashf and baseless hallucinations (awhām). 
Hallucination is a creation of the soul with no relation to reality. However, kashf by its 
definition is an unveiling of reality and so there is no kashf without reality to be unveiled. It is 
in connecting and discovering reality by unveiling that the science of ʿirfān finds a foundation 
from which to base itself on. That basis is in no way constructed by the intellect, but is a direct 
experience of the reality which is the object of discovery. It is therefore impossible for any 
intellectual science to be the benchmark by which the correctness of the science of ʿirfān is 
judged.111 The difficulty with kashf for those outside of the science of ʿirfān is the personal 
nature of such experiences. Unveilings can only be understood by those who experience them 
and that makes ʿirfān somewhat exclusive. At the same time, how is one to decipher one who 
claims to have understood something by kashf and someone who has dressed their own 
thoughts in the apparel of kashf?  
 
The answer to these questions is that ʿirfān is a personal path to God and what is witnessed 
along that path is a gift from Him. While it is true that the experiences are exclusive, the ʿirfānī 
path of certainly is not and those that sincerely pursue such a path may experience similar 
                                                          
111 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 7. 
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things due to the oneness of reality. Secondly, Kashf is the basis of ʿirfānī knowledge but is not 
the tool used to explain reality as individual experiences are not a proof upon anyone other 
than the person who experiences them. Rather the outward proofs are used to explain the 
realities, while kashf guides the ʿārif to what outward opinions are correct according to his 
experience. As Qayṣarī clarifies: 
 
This science, even though it is of an unveiling tasting type [of science]...the people of the 
exoteric sciences think that this science does not have a basis upon which it is 
built...rather it is poetic imaginations...without any proof...and the simple claim of 
unveiling does not necessitate guidance by it...What is mentioned in terms of proof and 
argument is brought because of their [the people of the exoteric sciences] sticking to their 
way [of rational argument]...as the unveiling of the people of witnessing is not a proof 
upon them, and the outward of the [Qurʾānic] verses and [ḥadīth] reports are based upon 
what the people of kashf say and its basis is with them [the people of kashf], so it became 
necessary for us to speak with them in their language...112 
 
So while kashf is a direct experience of reality through unveiling there are other methods of 
reaching that reality which are more laborious. Rather each faculty attains the knowledge that 
is suitable to its level. The outward ear cannot create intellectual proofs, but it can listen to an 
authentic tradition. The intellect cannot directly experience reality as the faculty for 
experiencing reality is the heart. But it can comprehend those realities intellectually according 
                                                          
112 Qayṣarī, Rasāʾil-i Qayṣarī, 7. 
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to its own level. The inner aspect of what is mentioned in the Islamic scriptural sources is 
witnessed by the people of kashf, while its outward aspect is accepted by the people of the 
exoteric sciences. Therefore the platform of discussion between these two groups is that of the 
outward sciences. The ʿārif enters such a discussion with the benefit of his unveiling, whilst 
the people of the exoteric sciences have no such advantage. The place of kashf therefore 
remains in its personal sphere and is not used as a proof upon others, but the ʿārif uses his 
experience to guide his choices in carving an understanding from the complex scriptural 
sources.  
 
The validity of kashf is further attested in the scriptural sources which deny the possibility of 
knowing God through intellectual speculation or through the senses. God is above the 
corporeal senses as the corporeal senses only comprehend matter limited by time and space. 
Similarly God is above the mental forms created by the mind, as those forms are limited firstly 
to man’s comprehension and secondly are themselves based on sensory experience. At the 
same time as denying the possibility of knowing God through these means, the scriptural 
sources validate the possibility of knowing God through the heart.113 Although that 
comprehension is not in terms of a complete understanding, it is a greater level of 
understanding then what can be derived from applying intellectual laws. Comprehension of 
God occurs through the heart, making knowing God a personal journey where God 
continually increases the understanding of His servant, unveiling to him what is hidden to 
                                                          
113 For a Qurʾanic reference see the story of Khiḍr in Qurʾān, 18:65. The aḥadīth also make reference to this type of 
knowledge such as: “Knowledge is not by learning, it is a light that ignites in the heart of the one that God wishes” 
see Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (attr.) Miṣbāḥ al-sharīʿa (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamī li-l- maṭbūʿāt, 1979) 16.  
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others. When this journey is discussed on a scientific level it is the science of ʿirfān, and kashf 
is its epistemic basis as the other ways of knowing cannot comprehend what the heart can. 
 
Kashf is of many types and it takes an expert to differentiate between the different types.114  
The ʿārif with his determination can even create reality itself.115 There are also many possible 
pitfalls and mistakes that are known to those who excel in this science.116 Qayṣarī explains 
further in his introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ: 
 
If a person sees something in his imaginal realm, sometimes it is correct and at other 
times it is mistaken. That is because what he is witnessing is either something real or not. 
If it is real, then he has achieved vision of it and if not then it is something he has created 
from his false imaginations, in the same way that the confused intellect creates with 
fantasy [impossible issues like] for an existence, existence and for that existence another 
existence [i.e. that there is infinite regress in existence, which is impossible] or that there 
is a partner to the Creator, and other such concepts that have no reality in actuality.117 
 
                                                          
114 See the chapters on kashf, mushāhada and muʿāyana in ʿAbd-l-Razzāq Qāsānī, Sharḥ manāzil al-sāʾirīn, ed. 
Muḥsin Bīdārfar (Qum: Intishārāt-i Bīdār, 1385 Sh/2006) 701-719 for an initial breakdown.  
115 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīyah al-ʿarbaʿah with the glosses of 
Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 6 vols (Tehran: Vizarat-i farhang va irshād-i islāmī, 1386 Sh/2008) (1) 436. 
116 Ṣadr al-Dīn QūnawƮ,̄ al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1382 Sh/2004) 
113-114. 
117 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 99. 
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The imaginative faculty is therefore a tool which can be used to witness reality or to witness 
something completely detached from reality. Like all tools it can either be used for its purpose 
or misused. Therefore, the ʿārif needs to learn how to use the tool of his imagination and 
understand when he has misused it and can thereby differentiate between experiences of 
reality and those detached from reality. Qayṣarī explains the conditions for an effective 
imaginative faculty: 
 
...Reaching the reality has causes, some of them concern the soul, others concern the body 
and some concern both. As for the causes that concern the soul [they are issues such as] 
full attention to the Truth, being habitually truthful, the leaning of the soul towards the 
intellectual spiritual realm, its purity from deficiencies, turning away from bodily 
occupations and characterising itself with striving to attain good qualities, as these 
meanings necessitate the enlightenment and strengthening of the soul and according to 
the amount it is illuminated and strengthened it is able to tear through the sensory world 
and lift the darkness that is preventing him from seeing. Also his compatibility with the 
abstract souls increases as he is characterised by their character traits, so they emanate 
the meanings upon the soul...As for the causes related to the body [they are things such 
as] its health, balanced constitution and blood. As for those causes that concern both of 
them, it is performing the obediencies and bodily worships...The causes of mistakes is 
what is opposite to that [which has been mentioned]...118 
 
                                                          
118 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 100-101. 
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The conditions are therefore both bodily and spiritual. Through wayfaring the ʿārif gains these 
conditions and is able to witness reality, but fully fulfilling the conditions to always witness 
reality is something limited to a few. Rather most wayfarers will witness reality some of the 
time and this is the reason for a guide who can help the wayfarer differentiate between 
experiences: 
 
When the soul moves from the outward to the inward in sleep, these [false] meanings 
[from his mistaken actions] become formed for the soul and so distract it from its real 
world and he has confused dreams (aḍghāth aḥlām)...so these things that are seen are all 
a result of the outward states. A vision may sometimes [be seen] while awake and other 
times may be seen while asleep. In the same way that what is seen in sleep may be 
confused dreams or otherwise, so too what is seen whilst awake is either true issues 
occurring in actual fact or what is imagined with no relation to reality, satanic, which 
Satan may with something of the truth to lead the person who is seeing astray. That is 
why a sālik needs a guide who guide him and save him from those things that will cause 
his destruction...for the distinction between true issues and purely imagined [i.e. 
fantasised] issues there are scales that are known by the lords of tasting and witnessing 
according to their unveilings in the same way that for the philosophers there is a 
scale...which is logic. A general scale is the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth which are based on 
the full Muḥammadan (saw) unveiling...119 
 
                                                          
119 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 99-101. 
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Reference to a person who knows the difference between these types of vision is essential for 
the beginner and one of the principle roles of a spiritual mentor. Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī 
(one of the students of Ḥasanzāda Āmulī and a contemporary teacher of ḥikmat and ʿirfān) 
writes in his gloss on Tamhīd al-qawāʾid of Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī: 
 
Know that the author, after clarifying the truth of the paths of purification and 
examining the principles of the realizers of the people of unveiling and the people of 
proof, intended to indicate that in the same way that in the path of theorization, it is 
necessary for the theorizer to have rules that would prevent him from making 
mistakes in thought — which is the science of logic — so too, in the path of 
purification it is necessary for the sālik (wayfarer) to have a scale by which he can 
distinguish between true unveilings and false imaginations. In short what he [Ibn 
Turka] means here is that if the sālik has a perfect Shaykh, who perfects others, then 
his scale is his Shaykh and his Murshid, as he presents him with his states and visions 
so his Shaykh guides him in every station according to what he sees in him and 
according to his capacity, and saves him from the destructions and darkness of his 
fantasies.” However, if the sālik does not have a Shaykh then before taking the path 
of purification he must first inculcate the intellectual sciences so that he can attain 
the trait of comprehension...so he is able to distinguish between truth and falsehood 
and between true visions and things that are false imaginations.120 
                                                          
120 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī, 
588-589 nt 469. 
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Ramażānī offers a solution for not having a Shaykh based on the interplay between studying 
the outward sciences and attaining an ability to decipher between true and false visions. It is 
through increasing ones intellectual abilities that comprehension is attained which in turn 
aids the wayfarer in understanding what he has seen. This is because as Qayṣarī pointed out 
above, the Muḥammadan kashf was the complete and most perfect kashf by which all other 
experiences of reality can be compared. This again points to the interplay between the 
intellect, the Islamic scriptural sources and ʿirfānī knowledge. However, the intellectual 
sciences also are important as what is discovered by kashf may be above the intellect but will 
not be at odds with the intellect. The intellect therefore plays a key role in both theoretical 
and practical ʿirfān.  
 
III. The role of Kashf in Transcendental Philosophy 
 
There are similarities when comparing what has been mentioned above, concerning the 
subject of ʿirfān and the importance of kashf in attaining true knowledge, with Mulla Ṣadrā’s 
ideas on the subject of ḥikmat and the importance of kashf within ḥikmat.121 For Mullā Ṣadrā 
kashf was originally an essential part of ḥikmat but it was a certain group of philosophers that 
removed kashf from philosophy.122 Although this issue repeats itself in different ways in many 
of Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings it echoes the position he expounds in the beginning of the Asfār, 
                                                          
121 See I. Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy, 195-256. 
122 See for example, Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (2) 191 where he explicitly states this.  
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where he explains the subject of ḥikmat and his own personal journey to enlightenment. In 
his introduction to the Asfār, while explaining that there is no other subject that deals with 
purely intellectual sciences without any relation to matter or any other science that deals with 
the development of the substance of the human except for al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah, Mullā 
Ṣadrā enters into a definition of what that science involves: 
 
It is the knowledge of God (al-ʿilm bi Allah), His Attributes, His angels, His books and His 
messengers; and how things emanated from Him in the most perfect way; and the best 
order; and how His Graciousness and Knowledge is by it and His running of it, without 
mistake or shortcoming...and the science of the soul and its path to the afterlife and its 
connection to the highest presence (al-malaʾ al-aʿlā)...123 
 
The overlap between this definition and the definition of ʿirfān given by Qayṣarī above is 
immediately apparent with the same key phrase at the beginning of the definition; the 
knowledge of God (al-ʿilm bi Allah). What differentiates this definition from the definitions of 
the ʿurafāʾ above in terms of the mention of angels, divine books, messengers, the perfect 
system of creation and the path of the soul to the afterlife, is less relevant to philosophy than 
the Islamic scriptural sources. Rather this definition seems to have been inspired directly from 
                                                          
123 See Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 30. For similar definitions in his other works see 
Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Asrār al-āyāt, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī (Tehran: Anjumān-i islāmī-yi ḥikmat va 
falsafa-i islāmī, 1360 Sh/ 1981) 2, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Tafsīr al-qurʾān al-karīm, ed. Muḥammad 
Khājavī, 7 vols (Qum: Bīdār, 1366 Sh/1987) (1) 261 and Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, 784-785. 
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verses of the Qurʾān.124 Later in the same introduction Mullā Ṣadrā explains how he had found 
many precious points in the words of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophers and 
wanted to write in order to bring these points to the fore. But a major point in Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
intellectual life was his period of seclusion where: 
 
My soul, due to the length of struggling, was enlightened with an illuminated 
enlightenment and my heart, due to the great amount of ascetic practices, with great 
strength caught fire. So the celestial lights emanated upon it...and the lights of [the degree 
of] Non-dualistic Unity met it...so I became aware of secrets that I had not been aware of 
until now, and signs became unveiled for me that were not unveiled with this kind of 
unveiling by proof. Rather I saw everything that I had known by proof and more, by 
witnessing and seeing, in terms of the divine secrets...so His Mercy determined that these 
unveiled meanings from the Emanator of the world of secrets would not be hidden in the 
inner and [behind] veils...so I authored a divine book for the wayfarers busy with the 
attainment of perfection, and I made manifest the lordly wisdom for the seekers of the 
secrets of the presence of the Possessor of Beauty and Majesty...and surely God made me 
                                                          
124 For example, see Qurʾān 2:177 “It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards the East and the West, but 
righteousness is this that one should believe in Allah and the last day and the angels and the Book and the 
prophets…”, Qurʾān 2:164: “Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night 
and the day, and the ships that run in the sea with that which profits men, and the water that Allah sends down from 
the cloud, then gives life with it to the earth after its death and spreads in it all (kinds of) animals, and the changing 
of the winds and the clouds made subservient between the heaven and the earth, there are signs for a people who 
understand” and Qurʾān 67:3-4: “Who created the seven heavens one above another; you see no incongruity in the 
creation of the Beneficent Allah; then look again, can you see any disorder? Then turn back the eye again and again; 
your look shall come back to you confused while it is fatigued”.  
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aware of the meanings with bright lights in the knowledges of His Essence and Attributes, 
while the intellects of the intellectuals wander around it and return grieved...125  
 
In this passage there are some important points regarding the nature of what Mullā Ṣadrā 
experienced which would be his impetus to write the Asfār. It was after a period of practical 
wayfaring; in terms of ascetic practices and seclusion that Mullā Ṣadrā’s heart became 
enlightened and became the locus of divine secrets that were shown to him. It is the heart that 
is the receptacle of these secrets which were not only what Mullā Ṣadrā had known through 
proof, but more. Mullā Ṣadrā takes this point further by saying he was made aware of the 
knowledges of the Essence and Attributes of God, while those knowledges are 
incomprehensible to the intellects. The Essence and the Attributes are the subject and the 
issues (masāʾil) of theoretical ʿirfān.126 Here Mullā Ṣadrā gives a place to the intellect, as much 
of what he had known was by proof, but also recognises that there are some things that the 
intellect cannot comprehend first hand. Rather it is the clean heart which is the receptacle of 
divine secrets.  
 
The terminology he uses such as unveiling and witnessing are ʿirfānī in nature and a scholar 
like Mullā Ṣadrā would be aware of the purport of using this kind of terminology. From this 
passage, and the introduction as a whole it is clear that it is what Mullā Ṣadrā experienced and 
comprehended with the heart that inspired his ideas and gave him the certainty to write the 
                                                          
125 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 34-36 
126 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 6-7. 
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Asfār. That is, it was what Mullā Ṣadrā had attained by ʿirfān that is the underlying knowledge 
of what he sets about to prove by proofs in the Asfār. This is very similar to the relationship 
between practical and theoretical ʿirfān, as what the ʿārif experiences informs what he 
explains. Until the exposition of Mullā Ṣadrā the ʿurafāʾ used the principles laid down by the 
Peripatetic philosophers to explain their insights. Mullā Ṣadrā on the other hand was a capable 
enough philosopher to initiate his own principles, while at the same time show that some of 
what he had understood through experience was what some earlier philosophers had tried to 
explain.  
 
The usefulness of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles in explaining the conclusions of 
theoretical ʿ irfān will be seen in the upcoming chapters. Ḥikmat therefore has a lot of common 
ground with ʿirfān and some may even place Mullā Ṣadrā in the school of Ibn ʿArabī due to his 
great contribution to the field of theoretical ʿirfān. Mullā Ṣadrā’s style of explanation is 
primarily philosophical and in the Asfār it is clear that he sets about to create his own 
framework and explanation of the major tenets of Islam. So while ʿirfān is at the heart of that 
framework his work is not only a work of theoretical ʿirfān, but a synergised contribution to 
our understanding of Islam. Mullā Ṣadrā also had a clear picture of those he wrote the Asfār 
for and saw himself as part of a wider tradition of those who seek to know the deepest of 
realities: 
 
I wrote it for my brothers in religion and my friends on the path of unveiling and certainty, 
as it will not be useful except to the one who had understood most of the discussions of 
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the intellectuals, and who has understood the purport of the writings of the wise ones 
(ḥukamāʾ)...127 
 
To understand the Asfār fully the reader has to at once be well read in the writings of the 
philosophers and ʿurafāʾ, as well as be a man of unveiling and certainty as these people are the 
intended audience of the Asfār. However, these conditions are not easily fulfilled and so what 
may happen is that those who are not fully qualified to understand the full meaning of all that 
is contained in the Asfār may understand and benefit only from some aspects of it.128 At the 
same time, those that are qualified may not agree with all of it. A part of the argument in this 
thesis is this that is precisely what has happened in the Iranian ḥawza. While some experts in 
ḥikmat have stressed the synergistic nature of the writings of Mullā Ṣadrā and the importance 
of ʿ irfān within that synergy to fully comprehend what Mullā Ṣadrā intended to convey, others 
have presented a Peripatetic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. This trend has increased over time with 
the more general acceptance of Sadrian philosophy and the wider teaching of the subject 
matter across the entire board of ḥawza students, regardless of whether they intend to 
                                                          
127 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 36. 
128 The levels of certainty that are gained differ according to the completeness of the journey the seeker 
undertakes. Sabzawārī points this out in his gloss concerning why Mullā Ṣadrā organised the Asfār based on the 
journeys of the ʿurafāʾ: “...The intellectual journeys are an indication towards the journeys previously mentioned 
that the book explains in correspondence with the journeys of the wayfarers and friends [of God], as the 
intellectual and practical faculties are both important in the [comprehension] of the lights and effects. With the 
first [journey] certain knowledge (ʿilm al-yaqin) is attained and with the second [journey], the eye of certainty 
(ʿayn al-yaqin) [i.e. witnessing] and the reality of certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn)...” Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 41. The first part of this explanation which is referred to in the paragraph above is an effort 
to tie together the issues discussed in the Asfār with the four journeys of the wayfarers. The chain of the 
explanation goes from Sabzwārī to Muḥammad Qumshihī to Muḥammad Ḥasan Nūrī to Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī. Shīrāzī, 
al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 41-42.    
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specialise in philosophy and ʿirfān or not. This separation is therefore a natural phenomenon 
which occurs with a more generalised teaching of ḥikmat, while there are stringent conditions 
for one to truly be a ḥakīm.  
 
Mullā Ṣadrā, based on a prophetic tradition, warns against giving this wisdom to those who 
do not deserve it as that will only increase them in misguidance.129 Rather wisdom should only 
be given to those who deserve it, those who have “alive souls”130 and Mullā Ṣadrā even advises 
his readers to purify themselves before they embark on a reading the Asfār.131 While defining 
philosophy he places the development of ḥikmat in the soul with practical improvement and 
shows that this method is encouraged in the Islamic scriptural sources.132 In many ways this 
synergy is a summary of his approach to ḥikmat.  
 
IV. Ḥikmat, ʿIrfān and the Souce Literature 
 
Since the case studies of wujūd, walāyah and maʿād examined in this thesis are considered 
within the traditional seminary in Iran, it is necessary that the conclusions arrived at 
correspond to the Islamic scriptural sources; the Qurʾān and the aḥādƬt̄h, as these texts also 
express intricate views on these issues. That nessesity is born out of a strong tradition of 
                                                          
129 For the ḥadīth see Muḥammad b. Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Abī Jumhūr, ʿAwālī al-laʾālī al-ʿazīzīya fī al-aḥādīth al-dīnīya, 
ed. Mujtabā ʿArāqī, 4 vols (Qum: Dār sayyid al-shuhadāʾ li-nashr, 1405/1985) (4) 80. 
130 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 36-37. 
131 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 38. 
132 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 47-49. 
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criticism within the ḥawza against that which is “unislamic” and indeed a propensity for 
pronouncments of unbelief. The interpretations of the ḥukamāʾ may conflict with literal 
interpretations of the scripture and this is a source of tension between ḥukamāʾ and more 
literalist scholars. But the onus to show the relevance of their persuit to the scripture is 
certainly on the ḥukamāʾ and the ʿurafāʾ. Although the process of reconciliation may not be 
central to the subjects themselves, the audience of scholars within the seminary considers this 
aspect as one of the most important benefits of these sciences.  
 
The best proof to such a claim is the plethora of literature which expounds the verses of the 
Qurʾān and provides more complex insights into the aḥādīth. Two of the main contributors to 
this literature were Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn ʿArabī themselves. While Mullā Ṣadrā wrote 
commentaries devoted to specific chapters of the Qurʾān and a separate work dealing with 
some of the main themes in the Qurʾān in his Asrār al-ayāt, his Asfār is replete with Qurʾānic 
references.133 He has a dedicated section to the reality of the Qurʾān in the Asfār while other 
parts specifically expound particular aḥādīth. He wrote a partial commentary on al-Kulaynī’s 
al-Kāfī and one would be hard pushed to find a single work of his that did not refer to a 
scriptural source in any way.134  
 
                                                          
133 See Saleh, M. M. The Verse of Light: A Study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophical Qurʾān Exegesis, unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, Temple University, 1994 and M. Rustom, The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2012). 
134 See also A. Eschraghi, “‘I was a Hidden Treasure’. Some Notes on a Commentary Ascribed to Mullā Ṣadrā 
Shīrāzī: Sharḥ ḥadīth: ‘kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan’”, in A. Akasoy and W. Raven (eds.) Islamic Thought in the Middle 
Ages (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008) 91-101. 
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The same can be said for Ibn ʿArabī, who built his framework on the Qurʾān and ḥadīth rather 
than relying on other sciences.135 It is less a process of reconciliation, but rather a process of 
interaction, where what is understood by experience and the intellect is confirmed by the 
scriptural sources, and what is found in the scriptural sources provides inspiration for 
reflection, study and precision. In other cases conclusions may be directly taken from the 
scriptural sources and this is the case for many particularities in the topic of resurrection. 
Reference to the Qurʾān and aḥādīth provide another point of intersection where the sciences 
of ḥikmat and ʿirfān meet. The use of the scriptural sources is an important part of Islamic 
rhetoric as the scriptural sources are the axis of Islamic studies. The interaction of philosophy, 
ʿirfān, theology and the Islamic scriptural sources in dealing with the question of wujūd is a 
quintessential characteristic of the ḥikmat tradition which seeks to optimize the synergies in 
all of these sciences. After discussing the concerns of the ḥukamāʾ in reading ḥikmat, I now 
turn to discuss some of my own assumptions and discuss how this study will be conducted in 
the next section. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This section will discuss some of the overarching principles that will inform the way in which 
the present study will be carried out. Approaching conceptual or intellectual history has been 
the subject of much discussion in recent years.136 In a broad sense, the study of intellectual 
                                                          
135 See Chitick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, xv-xvi. 
136 Many works are cited in the bibliography of D. Little, “Philosophy of History”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy [online], 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/history/ [Accessed 26/11/2011]. As Little points out 
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history is born from the fact that humans generate ideas and try to communicate those ideas 
to others, who then also add to the corpus of ideas by generating ideas of their own. Critically 
assessing the way in which philosophical and ʿirfānī texts have been understood — texts that 
are specifically produced to convey meaning — will assist in formulating the appropriate way 
this study should be conducted, as it aims to understand concepts expressed in the writings 
of specific authors.  
 
The texts produced can be thought of as historical artifacts and in the same way history is 
selective according to human interest, popular texts and ideas are a selective representation 
of vaster underlying activity. Historians construct historical narratives based on the artifacts 
they have inherited and this is a limitation when trying to grasp the reality of a historical 
situation. Thinking about these issues will also bring to light the underlying assumptions and 
presuppositions when assessing the thoughts of the ḥukamāʾ in this study. Despite the 
plurality of thoughts in this area I choose to approach these texts within a framework inspired 
by the analytic philosophy tradition. I specifically use some of Mark Bevir’s reflections in his 
book The Logic of the History of Ideas which focuses on how to justify the understandings we 
reach from interacting with texts rather than the process of interaction itself. Bevir’s approach 
is reconcilable with a hermeneutical method and indeed it is hermeneutic meanings (i.e. 
meanings that an individual seeks to express or understand as being expressed) that Bevir is 
                                                          
the philosophy of history overlaps many philosophical concerns and consequently has been the subject of debate 
from various angles. An annotated bibliography of many except the more recent works, maintained by Andrew 
Reynolds (Cape Breton University) can also be found at http://faculty.uccb.ns.ca/areynold/paul/alphabib.htm 
77  
concerned with.137 I will then highlight some general concerns raised by historians of the Qajar, 
Pahlavi and contemporary periods.  
 
I. Hermeneutic Meanings 
 
Hermeneutics focuses on the way an interpreter grasps the meaning of a text and makes it 
part of his own system of understanding. It is the theory of interpretation which finds its roots 
in Greek philosophy and was later used to interpret religious texts before taking a 
philosophical turn with thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Ricoeur and Wilhelm 
Dilthey.138 At this time, a key question that needed to be answered was how to justify the 
humanities on the foundations of reason?139 Dilthey argued that the humanities complement 
and complete the scientific explanation of how the world works by understanding their 
human and historical aspect.140 In his essay, The Rise of Hermeneutics, he argues that historical 
knowledge can only be valid if it can be raised to the level of universality.141 Ricoeur, on the 
other hand, finds validity of an interpretation in comparing it with other interpretations of 
the same material.142  
 
                                                          
137 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 53. 
138 See B. Ramberg, and K. Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2005, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/ [Accessed 24/5/2016]. 
139 Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
140 See R. Makkreel, “Wilhelm Dilthey”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dilthey/ [Accessed 1/1/2012]. 
141 See Wilhem Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics” tr. F. Jameson, in New Literary History, 1972, (3/2), 229-244. 
142 See Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trs. K. Blamey, and J. B. Thompson (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1991) 160. 
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These two views express what was later to be understood as foundationalist and post-
foundationalist approaches to interpretation, where post-foundationalists, in contrast to 
foundationalists, reject the idea of an objective reality or reject the proposal that man can ever 
fully know an existing objective reality. Raising knowledge to the level of universality implies 
an objective reality and this is how texts in the ḥawza are often taught. But considering the 
tripartite analysis of the possible readings of ḥikmat in the previous section, Ricoeur’s stance 
is more suitable to this analysis as it allows the question of the reality of an interpretation to 
be suspended and replaced by the best known human explanation, a concept which will be 
developed further in this section shortly.  
 
A powerful tool for understanding the process of interpretation is the hermeneutical circle. 
Understanding is a dynamic and cyclical process, as is the process of interaction. If it is a text 
that is the object that one wants to understand, then the understanding of that text evolves as 
interaction with it increases. Each new partial understanding contributes to revising a 
previous understanding of the text as a whole, which itself it made up of past partial 
interactions. Interpretation and understanding are graded processes and occur by degrees 
which start with some kind of prejudgment of the text.143 The hermeneutical circle can be left 
when one gains a coherent, clear and indubitable understanding of the text.144 History can also 
be understood as a hermeneutical circle, where each additional investigation results in a 
better picture of the whole.145 The approach assumes an underlying order in history, such that 
the smaller investigations find their roots in larger themes and is coherent with Hegel’s view 
                                                          
143 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 279- 282. 
144 Ramberg and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
145 Ramberg and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
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that rationality is intrinsic to reality.146 On the other hand the hermeneutical circle may be self 
fulfilling in that the larger picture is simply the evolved cumulative understanding of the 
previous parts. 
 
An important hermeneutic I use is the differentiation between oneness and manyness to 
distinguish the readings of the ḥukamāʾ as either ʿirfānī or philosophical. Understanding the 
whole system of ḥikmat hinges on this issue and permeates throughout the analysis of the 
theological discussions presented in the later chapters. For example, the principle of 
gradation, which is a primary hermeneutic in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works,147 is dependent on this 
distinction. Gradation can be viewed from its manyness or from its oneness. That depends on 
the perspective of the reader in deciphering what the purpose of gradation is within Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Is gradation a system of manyness with graded reality accorded to each 
level? Or is it a system which brings manyness back to oneness in a way that is acceptable to 
a philosophical approach? While the perspective of manyness is from a more philosophical 
perspective, using oneness as the overriding principle is ʿirfānī.  
 
This is expressed again in the discussion of cause and effect, where philosophy accredits real 
existence to effects, whereas ʿirfān uses the concept of self-disclosure to avoid that attribution 
of real existence to an effect in order to maintain the oneness of Existence. These are all 
concepts that will be explored in much detail throughout the course of the thesis. By using 
this hermeneutic as a starting point for the hermeneutical circle the writings of ḥukamāʾ can 
be categorized as fundamentally philosophical in outlook or ʿirfānī.  
                                                          
146 Little, “Philosophy of History”. 
147 See S. H. Rizvi, Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. 
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Ricoeur highlights that meaningful actions themselves are a form of text in that they are a 
replacement for actual words.148 Hence hermeneutics can be used as an epistemological 
theory and the hermeneutical circle is between us and our understanding of the world. At this 
stage hermeneutics leaves the area of historical enquiry and becomes concerned with 
existence. Gadamer brought this ontological turn back to history, viewing man as already 
affected by the cumulative culture produced by the texts he wishes to objectively examine.149 
Hence there is no way to access the meaning the text had for its contemporaries as a complex 
web of interpretation effects the way the text is now perceived. In fact, the meaning of the text 
can never be grasped in its entirety.150 But this is not necessarily a problem as studying a text 
still provides a better understanding of it and a better understanding of ourselves in what 
Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons.151 
 
A key criticism of Gadamer’s understanding of interpretation is the potential relativism that 
could result, as the hermeneutical circle can be radically different when different people are 
trying to understand the same text. Hermeneutics, like phenomenology, runs into a problem, 
in that the results of applying methods based on these methodologies may not yield 
repeatable results. But the proponents of such approaches may not see this as a problem as 
endeavors from different perspectives will result in richer understandings. That said the 
number of interpretations is limited by the fact that the author of the text intended a specific 
                                                          
148 Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 146-67. 
149 Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
150 Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
151 Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”. 
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meaning and it is that meaning that is being investigated. Additionally, although 
phenomenology tries to access fixed real meaning in the life-world through bracketing,152 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics accepts the impossibility of ever really knowing the real meaning 
and instead advocates a more dynamic role for the meaning of a text. This view of meaning 
allows for a level of relativism and from here many meanings for a text are possible and the 
reader is not limited to finding the intended meaning of the text. Mark Bevir’s approach seeks 
to avoid relativism, by proposing that all webs of belief are rational for their proponents and 
can be represented faithfully.153 This presents a scale against which the value studies can be 
judged; that is how faithfully they represent the webs of belief under investigation. It is his 
ideas to which we will turn to now. 
 
II. Constructing a Web of Beliefs about the Readings of Mullā Ṣadrā 
 
At the point of intersection between analytic philosophy and history, issues which are at the 
heart of the truth of historical knowledge are examined such as objectivity, causation, 
verifiability and generalizability. Some of the philosophers that have concerned themselves 
with these discussions include Dray, Danto and Gardiner.154 A contemporary thinker that has 
discussed intellectual history in depth based on analytic philosophy is Mark Bevir. In one of 
his writings, The Logic of the History of Ideas — where he also discusses the ideas of other 
contemporary academics such as Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner and John Pocock — he bases 
                                                          
152 D. W. Smith "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online] 2013, E. N. Zalta, ed. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/phenomenology/ [Accessed 24/5/2012] 
153 See Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 171-3. 
154 Little, “Philosophy of History”. 
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his approach on the writings of thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson.155 
He aims to present a grammar of historical investigation.156  
  
Bevir explains that the study of the history of ideas revolves around meaning and therefore 
involves interpretation.157 He rejects the idea of given truths or self-evident truths making him 
an anti-foundationalist.158 However, anti-foundationalism in this sense does not reject that 
some principles can be agreed upon and used as a foundation, as that would mean that 
nobody would agree on anything. But all truths that contribute to an individual’s web of ideas 
can be questioned and so principles do not entail ontological commitments.159 This implies 
that all starting points must be justified before they can be relied upon.160 Here Bevir suggests 
that the foundations for a particular field are the “...concepts operating in a discipline, and this 
suggests that these concepts provide the foundation of the logic they construct.”161 So if one 
accepts the understanding of the world propounded in a given discipline as valid, they must 
accept the foundations of that discipline as valid.162 It does not matter whether the foundations 
in the disciple are actually true as the truth of these foundations can never be known with 
certainty.163  
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While both the subjects of ḥikmat and ʿirfān appeal to a foundationalist understanding 
through the self evidency of their subject matter and the idea that some of the concepts 
explained are realities, the study of the development of the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā is open to 
an anti-foundationalist approach. This approach admits human limitation in constructing the 
“real” narrative of the development of these readings but rather the practitioners of this 
discipline can “...make rational decisions between rival webs of theories, and thereby 
pronounce their theories to be the best currently available to us.”164 There are four foundations 
that are the bases to my approach. 
 
The first justifiable foundation of this anti-fundationalist approach is establishing the 
intentionalism or “individual viewpoint” of the authors of the texts that I interact with.  When 
discussing the hermeneutical activity of the historian of ideas, Bevir distinguishes between 
strong and weak intentionalism (Skinner on the other hand is a strong intentionalist).165 
Intentionalism occurs because the meaning of our communication is an expression our 
intentions, that is when we convey a meaning we intended to convey that meaning. While 
strong intentionalism stipulates that the writer of a text consciously and preemptively intends 
the meaning he portrays, weak intentionalism allows for changes in the writers intend during 
the process of writing.166 “Weak intentions are individual viewpoints”.167 But authors may not 
know their own intentions at the time of writing or at the very least may not realize the 
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intention they portray in their utterance.168 This was an important aspect of the tripartite 
distinction between the reader, the subject and the mode of explanation explained previously.  
 
Due to the limitations of explaining a new philosophical framework within the terminology 
of and older one, the intentions of the author may be misunderstood. The same issue arises 
for an interpreter of the interpreters of those texts as the ḥukamāʾ fell into the same trap of 
explaining themselves in the same way as the previous generations. Since the word intention 
implies prior purpose, Bevir changes the term to “individual viewpoint”,169 which he later 
equates to expressed belief, regardless of actual belief.170 Objects do not have meaning in 
themselves; rather meaning is assigned to them by humans.171 What is expressed by the 
ḥukamāʾ is therefore taken to be their beliefs making it possible to classify their 
interpretations on a spectrum from the purely philosophical to the solely ʿirfānī.  
 
The second foundation is that expressed beliefs are “...sincere, conscious, and rational 
beliefs.172 Bevir establishes sincerity as a starting point, as without this assumption there would 
be no possibility of deception and because it is the conceptual starting point in human 
interaction.173 This is not to rule out the acts of deception if there are other factors, such as the 
danger in frankly expressing controversial beliefs in an orthodox environment; but the 
writings are initially conceived of as sincere before contradictory factors challenge that 
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assumption.174 Since the writings discussed in this thesis were at a time where philosophical 
pursuit was encouraged by the ruling parties and due to the nature of philosophical discussion 
this foundation is acceptable.  
 
On the other hand, ʿirfān presents a more challenging situation. For example, although 
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʿī studied ʿirfān with some of the most important ʿurafāʾ of his time, he only 
taught ʿ irfān privately and his works notably lack ʿ irfānī analysis. Is this solely due to his belief? 
Or were there other factors at play that prevented ʿAllāmah from expressing himself in an 
ʿirfānī manner? According to the assumptions presented here the only aspects of his belief 
that can be evidenced are those that he expressed. His writings are presumably sincere as 
although it is plausible that there were factors preventing ʿirfānī expression that does not 
undermine an analysis of his approach in his written works.  
 
Consciousness is prior to unconsciousness as when a reason cannot be attributed to an action 
it is referred to as unconscious.175 In this capacity it is unlikely that philosophical and ʿirfānī 
texts are produced unconsciously but rather they are written in a self-conscious, deliberate 
manner and are influenced by pre-conscious beliefs. Rationality — meaning inner 
consistency — is correlated to consciousness, but Bevir separates them due to the possibility 
of rational unconscious or irrational conscious beliefs.176 This approach avoids the possible 
ethnocentricity and intellectualism of equating rationality to a self critical outlook.177 
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Rationality does not become relative as webs of ideas can be compared to assess which best 
explains the facts.178     
 
The third foundation, based on semantic holism, is that a historical interpretation derived 
from a set of facts cannot be claimed as conclusive, as all theories are subject to 
improvement.179 There is no need to claim an infallible interpretation of the facts as this level 
of certainty is impossible even in the sciences, making the flexibility for improvement a more 
realistic position than pure objectivism.180 Hence arriving at the best current theory is less 
about the facts as comparing the merits of rival theories, where theories are an explanation of 
significant relationships found in the facts.181 It is intellectual honesty in taking criticism 
seriously; relying on “established standards of evidence and reason”182 in order to accept 
evidence that contradicts preferred theories; and preferring theories open new possibilities 
— rather than negative theories that are designed to block criticism — that allows a stronger 
theory to replace a weaker one.183   
 
But these general rules are not set in stone and if they seem to prevent a correct understanding 
of reality, they may be sidestepped.184 The better web of theories therefore, is that which 
explains the greatest amount of facts while positing coherent relationships between them. 
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Inconsistencies in a theory do not necessarily invalidate it, as a better theory is one that has 
fewer inconsistencies than other theories.185 Consequently a theory, even though it may not 
be accurate, is accepted to explain a group of facts until a better theory is proposed.186 An 
unrealistic theory would quickly result in problematic consequences, and so the reliability of 
theories shows that our perceptions can result in reliable theories.187 Hence; “We can ground 
objective knowledge on facts, facts on perceptions, and perceptions on our ability to interact 
successfully with our environment.”188  
 
Finally, since individual beliefs make sense by their relation to other beliefs in the web, it does 
not matter which belief the historian starts with as long as they can explain its location in the 
web.189 To this end people’s beliefs are situated in the background of the traditions of their 
time, which themselves have been formed by the web of beliefs of those in the past.190 These 
traditions change over time as individuals accept or reject aspects of the past web in their own 
web, which in turn becomes part of tradition for the next generation.191 Hence there is a role 
for explaining inherited tradition in terms of the way a web of belief started, rather than 
determining its final amalgamation.192 So a belief cannot be accounted for solely by reference 
to traditions, but should be explained by its position in the web of beliefs of the individual.193 
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Hence webs of belief aid the historian in explaining the meaning of a text without being the 
meaning itself.194 A historian prioritizes the web of beliefs of an individual and what is 
important to that web (in this case the readings), as opposed to contextualists who 
immediately seek to explain beliefs by their context, or the sum of a previous tradition.195  
 
III. Historiography and Iranian Studies 
 
Turning our attention to concerns specific to Iranian history, historians of the Qajar (1786-
1925) the Pahlavi (1925-1979) and the Islamic Republic (1979-present) periods, have discussed 
some historiographical concerns particular to them. There are two key strands in Iranian 
historical writing, which were both uncritical in their approach; nationalistic histories where 
the need to create a national heritage is expressed and Islamic writings which caused many 
historiographical issues due to sectarian and ideological bias.196 Philosophical and ʿirfānī 
writings fall into both of these categories in their own way as on the one hand the philosophers 
and ʿurafāʾ are usually from the ʿulamāʾ class and are therefore linked to Islamic ideals, and on 
the other philosophy and ʿirfān occupy an elevated place in Iranian culture.  
 
This complexity also manifests itself in the relations between the Sadrian philosophers and 
the state, reflecting the narratives of Arjomand and Amanat more than the confrontational 
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explanations of Algar and Keddie.197 The Qajar period was a time when traditional methods of 
history were replaced with more popular efforts and innovation in style.198 There were also 
many problems mainly due to the lack of an academic environment and organized resources 
despite the copious amount of documents, which allowed for abuses in history for political 
motives.199  This perhaps explains the lack of research on the schools of Tehran and Qum in 
the Persian language. 
 
Although the focus of historians had primarily been the writing of history, Iranian historians 
have shown an increased interest in incorporating historiographical concerns.200 The reason 
for this relatively late interest may be because the scholars writing Iranian history seldom tend 
to be specialized historians, but are scholars from other fields.201 But for the historian of ideas 
this has its benefits as they are less likely to misrepresent or misunderstand those ideas. 
Unfortunately, most of the historical literature produced does not concern the construction 
of a narrative of the intellectual trends examined in this study. An exception to this is the Sufi 
and Shiʿi biographical literature which stands independent of other historical literature 
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produced as they are usually underrepresented in state produced histories.202 Exaggeration of 
the merits of a scholar and inaccuracy of attribution are always possibilities in these writings 
as writing to form an ideal or to flatter a particular figure are features of such literature. 
Hagiography is a concern in this genre. 
 
The revolution of 1979 changed the intellectual landscape and affected the historical image 
created by writings at the time of the Shah and those that supported his regime in the West.203 
As is generally the case, the revolution led to the production of literature by and about the 
revolutionaries.204 The traditional seminary relies on the practical success of certain 
individuals to maintain its spiritual authority and therefore it is not a large step to over 
exaggerate the merits of a certain scholars, thereby idealizing them and encouraging others to 
emulate them. On the other hand, the revolution freed the writing of Iranian history from the 
political agenda of the Pahlavis,205 while bringing its own political agendas as explained above. 
Cronin notes that the role of the ʿulamāʾ was specifically sensitive to the Pahlavi regime and 
therefore Western academia shied away from examining it.206 Newman, on the other hand, 
argues that academics believed that with secularization and modernization in Iran religion 
would become more and more insignificant, mitigating the need to study the ʿulamāʾ.207 After 
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the revolution works were produced which focused on the political and jurisprudential role 
of the scholars, which was conceivably more pertinent. It is part of this gap created by political 
pressure that this study aims to contribute towards.  
 
The introduction has covered a number of important issues and so it will be useful to sum 
some of them up before moving on to the first chapter concerning the context of the schools 
of Tehran and Qum. The beginning of the introduction sought to place the research question 
within the Islamic philosophical and ʿirfān traditions and thereby show how these traditions 
share a common audience. That audience received Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy 
and comprises a number of different approaches to reading his works. These readings were 
explained in detail and two principle readings were chosen as the focus of this thesis within 
the context of Mullā Ṣadrā’s more recent interpretive tradition in the schools of Tehran and 
Qum. I argue that the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum interpret ḥikmat on a 
spectrum. On one end is a purely philosophical reading and the other end is a purely ʿirfānī 
reading. From the school of Tehran to the school of Qum there is a visible shift in attitudes to 
reading Mullā Ṣadrā with a preference for a philosophical reading. I show the complexity of 
these readings taking the concepts of existence, guardianship and resurrection as case studies 
to prove my argument. Understanding how Mullā Ṣadrā is interpreted can reveal a lot about 
the development of ideas within the traditional ḥawzā where ḥikmat is the dominant 
philosophy.  
 
Central to the ʿirfānī approach is the issue of unveiling and taste. It is with the heart that 
realities are grasped in their clearest form and subsequently the role of the intellect is to 
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explain those understandings and unveilings. This method of enquiry is also a key aspect of 
ḥikmat and something the Mullā Ṣadrā himself makes plentiful reference to. While theoretical 
ʿirfān focuses on oneness, philosophy relies on manyness to distinguish between realities. 
These are themes that will be explained in greater detail in the coming chapters. But in the 
next chapter the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum will be introduced in order to 
contextualize the readings investigated in the later chapters. 
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Chapter 1: The School of Tehran and the School of Qum 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The context in which the various readings of Mullā Ṣadrā are examined in this thesis is that of 
the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. It is therefore necessary to trace the historical 
development of these readings through these two schools and investigate which ḥukamāʾ 
sided towards which tendency. It is also important to introduce the figures whose writings will 
be used to further investigate the relationship between the two readings in the upcoming 
chapters, in terms of their teachers, students and writings in order to situate them within the 
larger activity that can be called a school.  
 
Historicising will also add to the limited research on the schools of Tehran and Qum and take 
another step in contributing to our understanding of the period. One of the key aspects of this 
contribution is a deeper look into the chains of transmission of ḥikmat and ʿirfān, which will 
also provide an insight into the transmission of these sciences in Najaf. The relationship 
between the centre of seminary studies in Najaf and that of Tehran and Qum was one of 
interdependence and most successful scholars of the period studied jurisprudence and its 
principles in Najaf. The transmission of ḥikmat and ʿirfān from Isfahan to the predominantly 
Iranian scholars residing in Najaf resulted in a burst of activity in exclusive circles. 
 
An interpretive tradition is the hallmark of seminary activity due to the method of teaching in 
the ḥawza. Teaching usually is concentrated on a single text rather than focusing on a subject 
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in general. Therefore there is a rich tradition of glosses, super-glosses and commentaries on 
specific texts, while the use of separate treatises or correspondences fulfilled the need to write 
on specific subjects. As a text moves down the chain of scholars, criticism and discussion of it 
ensures a strong framework until an exceptional scholar changes that framework by writing 
another text which is then studied over generations. This is the process by which a text 
becomes seminal. 208 As such the ḥawza system is conducive to producing a school of thought 
centered on an important figure who produced an important work. A school from this 
perspective may last for centuries and in various locations. A good example is the use of the 
term “the school of Ibn ʿArabī” which refers to the commentators and interpreters of the 
thought of Ibn ʿArabī no matter what location or time period.  
 
The complication that exists in the activity that is discussed in this thesis is the intertwining 
of more than one trend within one set of scholars. The term “school” was first coined by Corbin 
and Nasr to describe a philosophical movement within a specific location, but one should not 
assume that philosophical activity at a certain time was confined to these areas. Rather the 
term denotes a burst of activity that primarily occurred in a certain place. Other scholars who 
were not present in those areas may have contributed to the thought at that time and 
influence the next burst of activity. An example of such a scholar relevant to this study is Mullā 
HādƮ ̄Sabzavārī who almost created a school of activity in Sabzavar due to his prowess as a 
teacher of numerous students and his being an author of a seminal text. He therefore 
influenced the school of Tehran both in terms of some his students, who later became part of 
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the school of Tehran — such as Ḥusayn Sabzavārī — and the teaching of his text in ḥikmat, 
the Manẓūma.  
 
The scholarly use of the term school also shows a limitation in a complete understanding of 
history as the conception of “bursts of activity” is based on the available scholarship which 
always leaves the possibly of the exclusion of important figures unmentioned or under 
investigated. At the same time, it seems as though there was great fluidity in the transmission 
of ideas in the Islamic world, perhaps due to the culture of traveling to seek knowledge.209 The 
success of this designation to the activity in Isfahan has resulted in its use to explain localized 
philosophical activity in other times and areas.210 
 
There are certain conditions that contribute to the success of activity in one area to make it a 
school. Teachers who have a deep affinity with the core texts and explain them at a high level 
are essential in the formation of a school. Their importance is increased due to the patronage 
structure the distribution of which is based on an informal student teacher relationship. 
Conversely genuinely interested and intelligent students are key to an intellectual milieu as 
learning is a two way process. Both students and teachers must produce works, which may 
culminate in creating textbooks and works of originality. It is these works that testify to the 
richness of activity and which allow the ideas of the school to be transported to other places, 
thereby attracting more students and teachers. Students that leave the school to take up 
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teaching posts in other areas, while disseminating the center of learning act as ambassadors 
for the school, attracting those students who want to pursue their studies further to go to the 
school itself. Those students that stay in the school must continue the activities of their 
teachers and improve on them so that students are attracted and continue to benefit.  
 
Thereafter factors not directly related to studies are important, such as security, 
accommodation, patronage, facilities for foreign students, and other support functions. If 
these support functions are present in more than one area at more than one time, then it is 
the prowess of the students and teachers that result in the formation of a school as the method 
of study in traditional environments was — and to a large extent still is — to attach oneself 
to a teacher.    
  
This chapter will begin by linking the school of Isfahan to the school of Tehran by investigating 
some of the key figures and lines of transmission that directly affect the scholars of the school 
of Tehran. Thereafter it chronologically moves through the generations of teachers and 
students, showing the different tendencies that resulted in different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā. 
A key aspect of this chapter is an investigation into the role of Muḥammad Bīdābādī as a 
teacher to whom both the school of Tehran and the school of Najaf can trace their ʿirfānī 
reading of Mullā Ṣadrā back to. An investigation of his students also shows the interchange 
between the ḥukamāʾ that travelled to Najaf and those who remained in Tehran.  
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2. From Isfahan 
 
After the “full flowering of Islamic Philosophy” with Mullā Ṣadrā and the school of Isfahan,211 
philosophers who had trained in Isfahan faced more difficult times at the end of the Safavid 
period with the loss of patronage which was further enhanced by the onset of the Afghan 
revolt. The pursuit of philosophy requires a stable, peaceful and wealthy situation, especially 
when the government is a major player in the patronage network. The outbreak of war and 
general instability is enough to turn royal attention back to what is really important for them, 
which is the continuation of their rule. While hostility towards philosophy and theoretical 
ʿirfān has always existed amongst traditional scholars,212 there also seems to have been a 
change in attitudes towards ḥikmat within the ruling class as illustrated in the case of 
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Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ardistānī (d. 1134/1721), who is considered by Nasr as perhaps the most 
important ḥakīm and ʿārif of his time.213 Ardistānī was expelled from Isfahan by Shāh Sulṭān 
Ḥusayn and due to the harsh weather conditions he and his family died in the expulsion.214 He 
wrote a treatise on Jaʿl concerning how possible existences are supported by the First Truth in 
the same style as Mullā Ṣadrā. Additionally, a transcription of his lessons on the soul was 
formed into a treatise called Ḥikmat-i ṣādiqīya by Mullā Ḥamza GƮl̄ānƮ.̄215  
 
Despite the unfavourable situation, the teachers and students of Sadrian philosophy 
continued to spread his teachings to the next generation of Islamic philosophers. An 
important facet of the robustness of transmission of the teachings of ḥikmat and ʿirfān in the 
face of hard times is that spiritual practice calls the ḥakīm to a frugal lifestyle and helping the 
                                                          
213 Muḥammad Jaʿfar LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir li-Mullā Ṣadrā, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī (Qum: 
Bustān-i kitāb, 1386 Sh/2007) 21. Two other ḥukamāʾ are mentioned in generation of ḥukamāʾ who were taught 
by the students of the direct students of Mullā Ṣadrā; ʿInāyat Allāh Gīlānī and Sayyid Ḥusayn Ṭāliqānī, see I. H. 
Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī (Tehran: Sharikat-i chāp va nashr bayn al-milal, 2008) 334. 
214 Muḥammad Maʿṣūm ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq, ed. Muḥammad Jaʿfar Mahjūb, 3 vols (no place: Kitābkhāna-
yi SanāʾƮ,̄ no date) (3) 165 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 235-6. 
215 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya fƬ ̄ manāhij al-sulūkīya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn 
Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1388 Sh/2010) 96-97 and Lāhījī, Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 79-82.  For the treatise 
Ḥikmat-i ṣādiqīya itself see Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, (ed.) Muntakhabātī az āsār-i ḥukamā-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān az ʿaṣr-i 
Mīr Dāmād va Mīr Findriskī tā zamān-i ḥāżir, 4 vols (Qum: Dantar-i tablīghāt-i ḥawza-yi ʿilmīya-yi Qum, 1378 
Sh/2008) (4) 60-220. A student of his — Ṣāliḥ al-Mūsawī al-Ḥakīm became a teacher at the madrasa Dust ʿAlī 
Khān. He wrote a commentary on a work attributed to Ibn ʿArabī’s called al-Aʾimmah al-ithnā ʿasharīya and a 
commentary on the Qaṣīdah ḥikmīya of Mīr Findirskī, see Murtaḍā Mudarris Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjam al-
ḥukamāʾ, chosen and commented upon by Manūchihr Ṣadūqī Suhā (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi pazhūhishī-yi ḥikmat 
va falasfa-i Īrān, 1384 Sh/2005) 106. Perhaps Ardastanī’s most important student was Mullā Ismāʿīl Khwājūʾī who 
was one of the teachers of Muḥammad Mahdī Narāqī and Muḥammad Bīdābādī, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az 
āsār-i ḥukamā, (4) 224. 
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poor in difficult times while not letting such factor affect their faith or their teaching. Weekly 
classes in ethics attended by many students at all levels of the ḥawza reinforce such ideas.216  
 
The most important ḥukamāʾ of this interim period according to the biographical dictionaries 
included the likes of Mullā Ismāʿīl Khwājūʾī (d. 1173/1759),217 Mirzā Muḥammad Taqī Almāsī 
(d. 1159/1746)218 and Sayyid Qutḅ al-DƮn̄ Muḥammad NayrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄(d. 1173/1759)219 who were 
the teachers of the likes of Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1198/1783)220 and Muḥammad Mahdī 
                                                          
216 Adel, Elmi, andTaromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya, 12. 
217 Among his important students aside from Bīdābādī and Narāqī was Abū-l-Qāsim Isfahanī (d. 1203/1789) who 
studied in Isfahan and taught in the madresa Chahār Bāg ShāhƮ ̄until he died. His writings include a commentary 
of Nahj al-Balāgha; a commentary on the Qurʾān and on each of the four books of ShƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ ̄aḥādƬt̄h and a gloss on 
TafsƬr̄ al-KāshƬ,̄ see Muḥammad Muḥsin Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, 2 vols (Najaf: al-Matḅaʿa al-
ʿilmīya fƮ ̄al-Najaf, 1954-1958) (1) 50. Khwājūʾī wrote over one hundred and fifty works, glosses and commentaries; 
see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 336-337. For his treatise on some issues to do with resurrection called 
Thamarah al-fuʾād, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 227-364. While Khwājūʾī is mentioned as a teacher 
of some of the great ḥukamāʾ of the next generation his role as a teacher of ḥikmat is questionable and it seems 
as though his main expertise was in jurisprudence and its principles, theology, ḥadīth and Qurʾānic exposition 
see I. Ḥ. Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 2008) (1) 483; Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i 
islāmī, 335. For this reason he is not included in the chains of transmission of ḥikmat and ʿirfān in this thesis.  
218 His full name was Muḥammad Kāẓim b. ʿAzīz Allāh b. Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī. There is scant information 
about him in biographical works, but the most important fact mentioned concening him was that he was the 
teacher of Bīdābādī. 
219 His spiritual training was at the hands of Shaykh ʿAlī Naqī Iṣṭahbānātī (d. 1129/1717)and became his successor 
in the Dhahabī chain. Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī (d. 1241/1826) learnt under Nayrīzī when the latter stopped in Aḥsā. 
Nayrīzī’s works include Faṣl al-khitāb which has been published along with the commentary of Abū-l-Qāsim 
Amīn al-Sharīʿah Khūʾī (d. 1347/1928) in three volumes, see Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī, Mīzān al-ṣawāb dar sharḥ faṣl al-
khitāb, edited by Muḥammad Khājavī, 3 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1383 Sh/2004). He also wrote various 
treatises, see ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (3) 216-219. 
220 Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Rafīʿ al-Jīlānī known as BīdābādƮ,̄ as he lived and taught in an area called Bīdābād 
in Isfahan, was a key figure who spiritually and intellectually trained many important students. He was the 
teacher of Mullā Muḥammad MahdƮ ̄NarāqƮ,̄ the father of Mullā Aḥmad NarāqƮ ̄both of whom wrote important 
works in ethics and of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī. Other students of his were Sayyid MƮr̄zā Abū-l-Qāsim Isf̣ahānƮ ̄(d. 1203 
a.h.); A৴ khund Mullā NaẓƮr̄ ʿAlƮ ̄GƮl̄ānƮ ̄who wrote a work on epistemology called Tuḥfah, see No author. TafsƬr̄ 
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sūrat fātiḥat al-Kitāb, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1386 Sh/2007) 11; and Sayyid Ṣadr al-
DƮn̄ DizfūlƮ ̄who wrote many works including Irshād al-murƬd̄Ƭn̄ and Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha; DalƬl̄ al-mutaḥayyirƬn̄ 
on the etiquettes of wayfaring and the adhkār written by his brother Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAlƮ;̄ Ṣirāt ̣al-Ḥaqq on 
wayfaring; Misḅāḥ al-dhākirƬn̄ on literature; Mirāt al-dhākirƬn̄ on supplications, protections and specific points 
on verses of the Qurʾān and the Names of God; Qāsịm al-jabbārƬn̄; Rawḍah al-sālikƬn̄; Kalimāt al-maknūna; al-
Fawāʾid al-Nūrīya; a dƬv̄ān of poetry called KullƬȳāt; and Miʿrāj al-muʾminƬn̄ a commentary on one of the verses of 
Ḥāfiẓ and a commentary of the famous ḥadƬt̄h “man ʿarafa nafsahu faqad ʿarafa rabbahu” (“whoever knows his 
self, knows his Lord”); see Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, (2) 667; and ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (3) 
214-5. It was through Dizfūlī that the ʿīrfānī tradition was transmitted to the scholars of Najaf, see see Surūr, 
Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 489 but there were also other key figures of that tradition who studied with Bīdābādī. 
Important figures like Sayyid Mahdī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm who wrote a famous treatise on wayfaring, Sayyid Murtażā 
Kashmīrī, Mīrzā Muḥammad Javād Tabrīzī and Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī were all students of Bīdābādī, see Āshtiyānī, 
Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 367; Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 339. Ashtiyānī comments on the similarity in the 
ethical writings of Bīdābādī and Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī and uses this to strengthen his assertion that 
Hamadānī was a direct student of Bīdābādī, Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 367-368. However Bīdabādī 
died in 1198/1783 whereas Hamadanī was born in 1239/1824 making it impossible for Hamadanī to have studied 
directly under Bīdābādī. This is also the case for Mīrzā Muḥammad Javād Tabrīzī and Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī who were 
students of Hamadānī. Another key student was Mirzā Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Muẓaffar Isfahanī who was another 
intermediary in the transmition of ʿirfānī teachings to the likes of Majdhūb ʿAlī Shāh, Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī and 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 488. Although Bīdābādī’s teacher in the 
intellectual sciences was Ismāʿil Khwājūʾī, he learnt ḥikmat with Mullā ʿAbd Allah al-Ḥakīm, see Surūr, Madrasat 
al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 483; His spiritual mentors were Sayyid Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who was the spiritual head of the 
Dhahabīya order and Muḥammad Taqī Almāsī see ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq, (3) 214.  Significantly both of the 
ʿirfānī trends in Iran and Iraq have roots leading back to this key teacher and some of his students also benefited 
directly from Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who spent some time teaching Ibn ʿArabī’s Futuḥāt in Najaf see ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Ṭarāʾiq 
al-ḥaqāʾiq, (3) 217. Surūr disputes Bīdābādī’s learning under Nayrīzī due to not finding anything in Bīdābādī’s 
works that indicate a relationship with Nayrīzī, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 484. For his treatise on al-
Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 373-417. Bīdābādī’s works include a commentary 
on the Qurʾān until the chapter of The Cave; Risāla-i ḥusun va dil; a treatise in wayfaring written in answer to 
Sayyid Ḥusayn Qazvīnī; a treatise on wayfaring in answer to Mīrzā Qummī; and a treatise on relinquishment 
(takhlīya), embellishment (taḥlīya) and the ettiquets of wayfaring as well as glosses on many books, see Surūr, 
Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 490. His ʿirfānī letters have been compiled in Muḥammad Bīdābādī, Tadhkirat al-sālikīn, 
ed. ʿAlī Ṣadrāʾī Khūʾī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Khūʾī, 1389 Sh/2010).  
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Narāqī (d. 1209/1794).221 After the dust settled from a period of turbulence, new scholars rose 
to spread the teachings of ḥikmat. Chief among them was Mullā ʿAlī b. Jamshīd Nūrī (d. 
1246/1830) who taught many important students and wrote important works and glosses.222 
He studied under Sayyid Qutḅ al-DƮn̄ Muḥammad NayrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄and Muḥammad Bīdābādī. 
It was primarily Bīdābādī’s students who were the major scholars of the ensuing period and 
who formed the basis of the school of Tehran; which thereafter outshone philosophical 
activity in Isfahan.223 Some of his most important students were Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī (d. 
1270/1853), Mullā ʿAbd Allah Zunūzī (d. 1257/1841), Muḥammad Jaʿfar Langrūdī, Ḥasan Nūrī224 
and Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī.225  
                                                          
221 He was one of the greatest Shiʿi scholars and wrote many works on various subjects. Surūr lists thirty seven 
works, see see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 342-343. Perhaps his most famous work is his work on ethics Jāmʿ al-
saʿādāt. His treatise on existence called Qurrah al-ʿuyūn has been published, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, 
(4) 427-607. See also R. Pourjavady, “Mullā Mahdī Narāqī”, in R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke (eds.) Philosophical 
Traditions in Qajar Iran, (Brill: Leiden, forthcoming). One of his students Majdhūb ʿAlī Shāh was the successor to 
Nūrʿ Alī Shāh as the head of the Niʿmatullahī order, see Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, (1) 258. 
222 Aside from his glosses and answers to questions and citicisms about Islam during his time, he wrote a treatise 
on waḥdat al-wujūd which has been published, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 616-666; and Nasr, 
Islamic Philosophy, 236. Suhā includes the names of NūrƮ’̄s teachers such as Mīrzā Abū-l-Qāsim Mudarris, MƮr̄zā 
TaqƮ ̄AlmāsƮ ̄and Muḥammad IsmāʿƮl̄ KhwājūʾƮ,̄ see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 86. Suhā also traces many lines of 
transmission from Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄back to Mullā Ṣadrā, see especially the diagrams on pages 95-118 and devotes 
an entire chapter to this pivotal figure, mentioning his teachers, works and students see pages 143-155. See also 
ʿAbd Allāh Niʿma, Falāsafat al-shīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1987) 353 and S. H. Rizvi “Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī: 
inheritor and reviver of ḥikmat in Qajar Iran”, in R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke, (eds.) Philosophical Traditions 
in Qajar Iran (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). 
223 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 236. 
224 He was the son of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī yet very little is known about him. His birth and death dates are unknown 
and none of his works have been discovered or passed down. According to Kūhsārī his importance is only 
ascertained through oral transmission, see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 353. He was a teacher of ʿAbd Allāh 
Zunūzī and perhaps this is where his importance is ascertained, see ʿA. Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi 
falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 2, in Kharadnāmah-i Ṣadrā, 1998, (4/14) 83. 
225 These figures will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
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The Qajars established their new capital in Tehran which was significant in many ways, but 
primarily in terms of the movement of government patronage in order to promote the new 
capital. The Qajars patronised the writing of philosophical works; provided stipends; endowed 
specific madrasas which taught ḥikmat; and had an associated printing press from which they 
printed important philosophical texts.226 As well as attempting to legitimise their rule, the 
Qajars also sought to respond to the challenge of secular schooling in Europe.227 The 
concentration on the new capital was likely to bring greater material benefits that have always 
been a basic requirement for flourishing education. Additionally the Qajars were keen to 
maintain a relationship with the intellegencia ensuring political benefits and influence for the 
ḥukamāʾ.  
 
Philosophical activity is part of a flourishing court and culture and as such the Qajars had an 
interest in supporting philosophy. Nūrī was invited to Tehran by the Qajar ruler Fatḥ-ʿAlī 
Shāh, to teach in the newly built Madrasa-yi Khān Marvī (also known as Madrasa-yi Fakhrīya) 
but due to his old age and the large amount of students that were dependent on him in Isfahan 
(over four hundred students were at the required level and attend his classes), he sent one of 
                                                          
226 S. Rizvi “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya): two poles of intellectual and mystical enquiry in Qajar Iran”, in 
R. Gleave, (ed.) Religion and Society in Qajar Iran (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) 115. 
227 S. Rizvi “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 115. For the interactions between the court and three ḥukamāʾ, 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Hādī Sabzavārī see pages 116-117. The legitimacy of Qajar 
rule was discussed among Shīʿī scholars, see A. Hairi, “The Legitimacy of the Early Qajar Rule as Viewed by Shīʿī 
Religious Leaders”, in Middle Eastern Studies, 1988, (24/3), 271-286. 
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his foremost students Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, the father of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī who was 
one of the major four key figures who established the school of Tehran.228  
 
Many other scholars moved to Tehran for a variety of reasons including; Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī’s son 
Mirzā Ḥasan, who was invited by Iʿtimād al-Salṭana; Āqā Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī who was invited 
by Mirzā ʿAlī Riżā Gurgānī; and the teacher of ʿirfān, Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī (d. 
1306/1888),229 who was requested to teach at the Madrasa Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam.230 It is important to 
note that all of these key scholars had connections to the Qajar court. The purpose of these 
invitations was to ensure the ḥukamāʾ a teaching position and consequently patronage. Other 
scholars, such as Sayyid ʿAlī TanakābunƮ ̄ — another student of Mullā ʿAlī NūrƮ ̄ — already 
resided in Tehran.231 These ḥukamāʾ and many others formed a scholastic environment of 
individuals concerned with interpreting and expanding on the works of their predecessors. 
With the migration of these teachers a new capital for the teaching of ḥikmat was established 
in Tehran, and although this period saw an explosion in intellectual output — with many 
scholars and writings — this aspect of this period remains under researched.232 
 
                                                          
228 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 238-242. 
229 See Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 18-19. 
230 See S. Rizvi, “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 116.   
231 Sayyid TanakābunƮ ̄taught in the MarwƮ ̄school, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 153 
232 The lack of scholarship in the area is evident from the silence on this period in writings which generally explore 
the history of Islamic philosophy. These writings commonly stop after Mullā Ṣadrā and sometimes include a brief 
mention of Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī. See for example, M. Aminrazavi, “Mysticism in Arabic and Islamic Thought”, in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-mysticism/ 
[Accessed 12/3/2012] and Nasr, The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia.  
104  
There are two pivotal figures in this period for the transmission of ḥikmat and theoretical 
ʿirfān. Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī can be considered the grandfather of ḥikmat in the school of Tehran and 
his teacher Muḥammad Bīdābādī is the figure through which ʿirfānī teachings spread to both 
the school of Tehran and to Najaf. It is useful therefore to devote some space to studying their 
lines of transmission to Mullā Ṣadrā and their students, through whom those teachings 
reached the school of Tehran. Nūrī was a student of Bīdābādī and so they both share lines of 
transmission back to Mullā Ṣadrā, but the students of Nūrī generally are more inclined to 
ḥikmat whereas some of those that trace their lines back to Bīdābādī directly, without going 
through Nūrī, incline more to ʿirfān. This is an indication of their respective teaching styles. 
One of the chains the Suhā traces is as follows:233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and Muḥammad Bīdābādī’s chain to Mullā Ṣadrā. 
                                                          
233 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 96-97.  
Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045/1636) 
Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1124/1712) 
Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. 1185/1771) 
Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1198/1783) 
Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (d. 1246/1830) 
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The Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī in this chart is not the commentator on Ibn ʿArabī who lived in the 
eighth century hijri, but rather one of the direct students of Fayḍ Kāshānī. In another chart 
instead of tracing transmission through Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī, Suhā traces Bīdābādī’s line 
through Mullā Ismāʿīl Khwājūʾī to Ḥakīm Muṣṭafā Qumshihī to Qaḍī Saʿīd Qummī back to 
Fayḍ Kāshānī.234 It seems that Khwājūʾī was not as much of a master in ḥikmat as he was in 
other Islamic sciences and so chains that feature him as the teacher of Bīdābādī may be called 
into question.235 Another chain features Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī as the teacher of Bīdābādī leading 
back to Shāh Muḥammad Dārābī back to Mullā Ṣadrā.236 None of Suhā’s chains feature Mullā 
ʿAbd Allāh Ḥakīm, who was Bīdābādī’s teacher in ḥikmat according to Surūr.237  
 
These chains of teachers show the transmission of teachings back to Mullā Ṣadrā, but it is hard 
to analyse what the readings were transmitted in these lines. Although they seem to establish 
the transmission of ḥikmat, what about the transmission of ʿirfān? Bīdābādī was certainly a 
teacher that had a stronger ʿirfānī stance but from which line did he learn the transmitted 
teachings? Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī seems like a logical starting point and due to his being the head 
of the Dhahabīya order, Bīdābādī could find his line of transmission back through the Shuyukh 
of that order.238 However, another possibility is suggested by Āshtiyānī in his commentary on 
                                                          
234 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 116-117. 
235 Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 483; and Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 335. 
236 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 117-121. For more on Shāh Muḥammad Dārābī Anzali, Safavid Shiʿism, 222-247 
237 Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 483 
238 For the origins of the Shiʿi identity and indeed the naming of the Dhahabīya order see A. Anzali, “The 
Emergence of the Zahabiyya in Safavid Iran”, in Journal of Sufi Studies, 2013, (2) 148-175. For an indepth analysis 
of the Niʿmatullāhī order in Iran from the Qajar period to the Islamic Repbulic see M. Van Den Bos, Mystic 
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the introduction of Qayṣarī’s commentary on the Fuṣuṣ. He suggests that Mullā Ṣadrā cannot 
be included in a Sufi chain but at the same time should be included in the annals of the ʿ urafāʾ. 
It is certain, according to his own statements cited at the beginning of this thesis, that he 
experienced knowledge by unveiling and through purifying his heart through the dictates of 
religion. Mullā Ṣadrā’s style was to include ʿirfān within philosophical theory and religious 
practice.239 He therefore in some sense had his own type of ʿirfān which is intrinsically 
intertwined into his whole corpus of thought and this is what is reflected in these lines of 
transmission. Some interpreters took a greater interest in expounding the ʿirfānī aspect of 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s teachings and specialised in the works of the ʿurafāʾ while spiritually training 
the students of ḥikmat, while others focused on the philosophical framework that Mullā Ṣadrā 
proposed and taught students the intricacies, implications and depth of those ideas.  
 
The following chart shows the extent of Bīdābādī’s prowess as a teacher of the ḥukamāʾ of the 
following generation. It is a general chart which does not differentiate between ḥikmat and 
ʿirfān but will be separated into a series of charts for further analysis. These charts are based 
on the biographical literature and not a rigorous examination of permissions (ijāzāt). They 
should also be viewed with the knowledge that Bīdābādī was certainly not the only teacher of 
these students. Rather it was common for students to study under a number of teachers some 
of whom would be of different persuasions. The charts are therefore presented in order to 
                                                          
Regimes: Sufism and the State in Iran, from the late Qajar Era to the Islamic Republic (Leiden, Boston and Köln: 
Brill, 2002). 
239 Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, Sharḥ muqaddima-i Qayṣarī bar Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Mashhad: Inishārāt-i Pāstān, 
1385 Sh/2006) 49-50. 
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illustrate the position of Bīdābādī within the biographical literature as an extremely important 
figure in the transmission of ḥikmat to the schools of Tehran and Qum: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2: Chains of transmission back to Bīdābādīof the hukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and 
Qum.  
Ṣadr al-Dīn 
Dizfūlī (d. 
1256-7/1840-41) 
Bīdabādī (d. 1198/1783) 
Abu-l-Qāsim 
Isfahanī (d. 
1203/1789) 
Mullā ʿAlī 
Nūrī (d. 
1246/1830) 
Muḥammad 
Mahdī Narāqī 
(d. 1209/1794) 
Mahdī Baḥr 
al-ʿUlūm (d. 
1212/1797 
Muḥammad 
Javād Tabrīzī 
(d. 1343/1925) 
Sayyid ʿAlī 
Qāḍī (d. 
1366/1947) 
Sayyid Riżā 
Lārijānī (d. 
1270/1853) 
Muḥammad 
Riżā Qumshihī 
(d. 1306/1888) 
ʿAbd Allah 
Zunūzī (d. 
1257/1841) 
ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī (d. 
1309/1891) 
Aḥmad Narāqī 
(d. 1245/1829) 
ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 
1401/1981) 
Rūḥ-Allāh 
Khumaynī (d. 
1409/1989) 
Mulla Hādī 
Sabzavārī (d. 
1295/1878 
Sayyid ʿAlī 
Shushtarī (d. 
1283/1866) 
Ḥusayn-Qulī 
Hamadānī 
(d. 1311/1894) 
Abū-l-Ḥasan 
Jilva (d. 
1314/1896) 
Aḥmad 
Karbalāʾī (d. 
1331/1913) 
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The first sub chart that can be drawn from this general chart is one that reveals Bīdābādī’s 
influence on the ʿirfānī circles of Najaf and the consequent return of this line of scholars to 
Iran in the school of Qum. All of the direct students of Bīdābādī in this diagram were known 
for their ʿirfānī inclination. While ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī was known for his interest in practical 
ʿirfān he chose to interpret and explain Mullā Ṣadrā in a philosophical manner as will be 
shown during the course of the thesis. A stint in Najaf to perfect the sciences of jurisprudence 
and its principles was normal for many scholars who were seriously pursuing the transmitted 
sciences. It was through the students of Bīdābādī that an ʿirfānī movement began in Najaf, 
while another strand of his students remained in Iran and were the foundation for the school 
of Tehran. Although some of the scholars in the following diagram remained in Najaf such as 
Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍīm, figures like Muḥammad Javād Malikī Tabrizī, Imam Khumaynī and 
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī travelled to Qum after their years in Najaf and the latter two scholars were 
to have a profound effect on the school of Qum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3: Chains of transmission leading back to Bīdābādī of the ʿirfānī ḥukamāʾ of Najaf. 
 
The next sub chart shows the transmission of ḥikmat. This is a chart which is relative to the 
chart that will follow it concerning the transmission of theoretical ʿirfān. At this stage in the 
Ṣadr al-Dīn 
Dizfūlī (d. 
1256-7/1840-41) 
Mahdī Baḥr 
al-ʿUlūm (d. 
1212/1797 
Muḥammad 
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(d. 1343/1925) 
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Qāḍī (d. 
1366/1947) 
ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 
1401/1981) 
Rūḥ-Allāh 
Khumaynī (d. 
1409/1989) 
Sayyid ʿAlī 
Shushtarī (d. 
1283/1866) 
Ḥusayn-Qulī 
Hamadānī 
(d. 1311/1894) 
Aḥmad 
Karbalāʾī (d. 
1331/1913) 
Bīdabādī (d. 1198/1783) 
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development of the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā there is much more of an interaction between the 
readings which have not entirely distinguished themselves from each other. But there are 
some ḥukamāʾ that have a very distinct ʿirfānī approach and so the following chart does not 
include them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 2.4: Ḥukamāʾ with a philosophical reading whose chains lead back to Bīdābādī.  
 
The final sub chart shows a chain of transmission of ʿirfān to the school of Tehran: 
 
 
 
 
Bīdabādī (d. 1198/1783) 
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Isfahanī (d. 
1203/1789) 
Mullā ʿAlī 
Nūrī (d. 
1246/1830) 
ʿAbd Allah 
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Fig. 2.5: A chain of transmission of ʿirfān to the school of Tehran from Bīdābādī. 
 
There are other chains of transmission but the ones presented here illustrate Bīdābādī’s 
influence both on the chains of transmission of a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā (Fig. 
2.4) and a more ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā (Figs. 2.3 and 2.5). The rest of this chapter 
explores the key figures in the schools of Tehran and Qum. It starts by analysing the main 
writings to date on the schools and their figures and then moves onto a discussion of those 
figures in order to contextualise the following chapters. In the chapter an attempt has been 
made to classify ḥukamāʾ in terms of their intellectual leanings in order to understand the 
basis behind different readings. This classification follows easily from the biographical 
literature which made a point to specifying which scholars specialised more in which field. 
The chapter is split into generations of ḥukamāʾ starting with the establishment of the school 
Bīdabādī (d. 1198/1783) 
Sayyid ʿAbd al-Jawād 
ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄KirmānƮ ̄(d. 
unknown) 
Sayyid Riżā 
Lārijānī (d. 
1270/1853) 
Muḥammad 
Riżā Qumshihī 
(d. 1306/1888) 
Mullā Muḥammad 
Jaʿfarābādī (d. 
unknown) 
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of Tehran and explores the links between various teachers and students are explored in order 
to determine the transmission of the two key readings which are focused on in this thesis. 
 
3. The School of Tehran 
 
According to ṬārimƮ ̄the school of Tehran was established in approximately the year 1816, with 
the establishment of the Marwī school and continued as the main centre of ḥikmat until about 
1998 before transferring to Qum; lasting about a hundred and eighty two years.240 While the 
establishment of the MarwƮ ̄ school is an important event in the formation of the school of 
Tehran, the reason behind the formation of schools was the creation of Tehran as the capital 
of the Qajars and their search for legitimacy as rulers. TārmƮ ̄gives no indication of why he 
considers the transfer to Qum to occur in about 1998. Perhaps the first whisperings of a 
philosophical school in Qum were the lessons of Mirzā ʿAlƮ ̄Akbar Hakīmī YazdƮ ̄who had been 
a student of the four ḥakīms and had later settled in Qum;241 as well as the classes of Sayyid 
Abū-l-Ḥasan RafīʿƮ ̄ QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄ (d. 1392/1973)242 and Mirzā Muḥammad ʿAlƮ ̄ ShāhābādƮ ̄ (d. 
                                                          
240 Ṭārmī, ʿA. “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, in Kharadnāmah-i Ṣadrā, 1998, (4/13) 65. 
241 His classes were attended by Imam Khumaynī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī, see Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-
rubūbīya, 112; Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 454, 480; and Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 399. 
242 For his biographical details and a summary of some of his key ideas see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 427-
436. For more detailed accounts see the introductions of his collected treatises and his collected glosses; Abū-l-
Ḥasan Rafīʿī QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥawāshƬ ̄va taʿlƬq̄āt bar kitāb-i kalāmƬ,̄ falsafƬ ̄va ḥikmƬ,̄ ed. Ghulām-Ḥusayn Riżā 
Nazhād (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pajūhishƮ ̄ḥikmat va falsafa-i I ৴rān, 1386 Sh/2008) and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ 
Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil va maqālāt-i falsafƬ,̄ ed. Ghulām-Ḥusayn Riżā Nazhād (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pajūhishƮ ̄ḥikmat 
va falsafa-i I ৴rān, 1386 Sh/2008). In Qum he taught the Manẓūmah and the Asfār; see Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-
rubūbīya, 113. He was also a teacher of Khumaynī; see Lāhījī, Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 99. 
113  
1369/1950)243 who remained in Qum for about seven years.244 These activities were followed by 
classes in Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma and Ṣadrā’s Asfār initiated by Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ ̄in 1956. 
From that time the school of Qum was established by a series of migrations of significant 
teachers of ḥikmat and ʿirfān. Some important scholars remained in Tehran and were still 
teaching ḥikmat at the University level.245  
 
                                                          
243 In Qum he taught the Asfār, the Manẓūmah, the Fuṣūṣ and Miṣbāḥ al-uns; see Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 
113. Marʿashī Najafī was also one of his students see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 409, 410. ShāhābādƮ ̄is a key 
figure who deserves further study. He was born in Isfahan and migrated to Tehran where he studied under Ḥasan 
Āshtiyānī, Hāshim Gīlānī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ (2) 595; Suhā also mentions him 
as one of the students of Jilva, Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 482. After travelling to Najaf he returned to Iran and stayed 
for some time in Shāhābād and then he travelled to Qum. After teaching there for some time he travelled to Ray 
where he is buried. There is scant information concerning him, but his importance is accertained from the 
accounts and the high level of respect given to him in the writings of his student Rūḥ-Allāh Kumaynī. From his 
writings it seems that there was a Shaykh/murīd relationship between them despite the fact that they met later 
in Khumaynī’s intellectual life. Recently a number of works in Persian have been published concerning him 
including a translation of his Rashaḥāt al-biḥār, see Muḥammad ʿAlī ShāhābādƮ,̄ Rashaḥāt al-biḥār, ed./tr. Zāhid 
WaysƮ ̄ (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1387 Sh/2008) and a 
commentary on the same work, see N. ShāhābādƮ,̄ Sharḥ rashaḥāt al-biḥār, (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i 
pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1387 Sh/2008); Muḥammad ʿAlī ShāhābādƮ,̄ Rashaḥāt al-maʿārif, 
complied by Ḥaydar Tihrānī commented upon by Fāżil GulpāygānƮ,̄ (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i 
pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1387 Sh/2008);  Muḥammad ʿ Alī ShāhābādƮ,̄ Fitṛat-i ʿ ishq, commented 
upon by Fāżil GulpāygānƮ ̄ (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1387 
Sh/2008); Muḥammad ʿAlī ShāhābādƮ,̄ Shadharāt al-maʿārif, commented upon by Nūr Allāh ShāhābādƮ ̄(Tehran: 
Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1386 Sh/2007). Studies on his views include ʿA. 
MurtaḍawƮ,̄ Faylasūf-i fitṛat (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1387 
Sh/2008); H. Vakīlī, ʿA. Khusrūpanāh and B. ʿAlīzādah (eds.) ḤadƬs̄-i ʿishq va Ʀƪtṛat: darbāra-yi ārāʾ-yi ḥikmƬ ̄
mʿarifatƬ-̄yi ʿārif ḥakƬm̄ Āyātallāh al-ʿuẓmā Muḥammad ʿAlƬ ̄ ShāhābādƬ ̄ (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i 
pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-i islāmƮ,̄ 1386 Sh/2006). His son’s glosses on the Asfār have also been 
published; see Muḥammad ShāhābādƮ,̄ Rashaḥāt al-ḥikma: taʿlīqa ʿalā al-asfār (Qum: Nashr-i mahdīyār, 
1424/2003). 
244 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 112-113. 
245 For example, Dr. Ghulām-Ḥusayn IbrāhƮm̄Ʈ ̄DƮn̄ānƮ ̄who was a student of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfi‘Ʈ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ.̄ 
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After a period of alliance with the ʿulamāʾ Riżā Shāh’s relationship with the traditional 
seminary deteriorated with his move towards westernisation and he made an effort to remove 
clerics from legislative positions.246 These movements decreased the prowess of the ḥawza in 
Tehran and some scholars from Isfahan moved to Qum in protest of the order for 
conscription.247 One of the most important factors for the establishment of Qum was the 
political shift in power from the Iranian aristocracy to the revolutionary ʿulamāʾ. Since this 
was a process the assignment of a specific date to the end of the school of Tehran rather forced 
as the transfer in focus was certainly more gradual and important teachers travelled between 
Qum and Tehran regularly.  
 
Nasr was one of the first to contribute to an understanding of this period in the English 
language with chapters in two of his publications concerning the history of Islamic 
philosophy, but draws attention to the lack of scholarship on the figures in this period and 
identifies areas for further research.248 His introductions to the school of Tehran are full of 
information on key figures and texts, but as chapters in a larger work concerning the entire 
history of Islamic philosophy, they cannot hope to present the detail that would be possible 
in more focused works on the later periods alone. Furthermore, these chapters cannot analyze 
the thoughts of any particular ḥakīm in the school of Tehran or any important themes as these 
would require separate studies. Although he indicates that different ḥukamāʾ were known for 
                                                          
246 See S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavī Period (Albany: 
SUNY Press 1980) 23-60 and S. H. Nasr, H. Dabashi and S. V. R. Nasr (eds.) Expectation of the Millenium: Shiʿism in 
History (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989) 225. 
247 Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya, 8; 42. 
248 See Nasr, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 99 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 18; 255; 334 nt 34; and 335 nt 39. The sentiment 
is echoed in S. Rizvi, “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 7; and 16-17 nt. 17. 
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different intellectual preferences he does not explore the issue further and does not show how 
these preferences affected Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretive tradition.  
 
The only figure of this period studied in any depth is Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī,249 who arguably is 
not part of the school of Tehran as he was not based in Tehran and did not study under any of 
its teachers, despite being a student of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī for about two years.250 Due to his 
scholarly erudition he affected the school of Tehran and the subsequent tradition in Qum and 
his poetical rendition of ḥikmat the Sharḥ al-manẓūma is still taught in traditional seminaries 
to this day. An indication of the importance of this text can be seen in the number of 
commentaries and glosses written on it. Suhā lists over sixty (one written by himself) with 
some of them belonging to key figures in the school of Tehran such as Mirzā Abū-l-Ḥasan 
Jilva,251 Mirzā Aḥmad A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ (d. 1340/1921), Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī (d. 1306/1888), 
                                                          
249 See the English introduction to the Manẓumah by Toshihiko Izutsu; Hādī Sabzavārī, Sharḥ ghurar al-farāʾid, 
eds. M. Muḥaqiq and T. Izutsu (Tehran: Anjuman-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangī, 1384 Sh/2005), 1-152. Apart from 
this introduction and a translation of the “General principles” (al-umūr al-ʿāmma) Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics of 
Sabzavārī; J. Cooper, “RūmƮ ̄and Ḥikmat: Towards a Reading of SabziwārƮ’̄s Commentary on the MathnawƮ”̄, in L. 
Lewisohn (ed.) The Heritage of Sufism: Classical Persian Sufism from its Origins to Rumi (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 1993) 409–33; S. Rizvi, “Mulla Hadi Sabzavari and the school of Mulla Sadra”, in S. Mervin and D. 
Hermann, (eds) Shiʿism in Modern Times (1800-1925) (Beirut/Frankfurt: Deutsches Orientinstitut, 2010) 449-474 
and a chapter in Nasr, The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia, 304-19, very little has been written on this great 
figure in the English language despite the publication of many of his other works including: Hādī Sabzavārī, Sharḥ 
duʿāʾ al-sabāḥ, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i dānishgāh-i Tehran, 2007); Hādī Sabzavārī, Sharḥ nabrās 
al-hudā, ed. Ṣadr al-Dīn Ṭāhirī (Tehran: Anjuman-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangī, 2007); Hādī Sabzavārī, Rasāʾil 
ḥakīm Sabzivārī, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i usva, 2007); and Hādī Sabzivārī. (attr.) Rāḥ 
al-qarrāḥ, ed. Majīd Hādīzāda (Tehran: Anjuman-i asār va mafākhir-i farhangī, 2002). Mehdi Mohaghegh has 
provided an annotated bibliography of Sabzivārī’s works in Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 25-28. Nasr 
has indicated that there is a need to study this figure in much more depth Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 331 nt. 25, a 
sentiment which few can fail to agree with.    
250 Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 13. 
251 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 173-177. 
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Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r (d. 1396/1975) and Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan RafƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ.̄ The work was also 
analyzed and commented upon by members of the school of Qum such as Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄
and Murtażā MutạhharƮ ̄(d. 1399/1979) who were students of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ.̄252  
 
Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad’s presentation of translated articles from the Encyclopaedia of the 
World of Islam on the Shiʿi ḥawza provides key sections on the schools of Tehran and Qum as 
well as the other main geographical locations that saw important seminary activity.253 But 
since this work is a survey of so many locations it is unable to delve into detail into each one 
and as such does not investigate the ḥikmat and theoretical ʿirfān trends sufficiently. At the 
same time, it is a good source for more general information on the ḥawza and its main activity 
in Tehran and Qum as well as the other major cities of traditional learning. 
  
Works in Persian that deal which focus on the school of Tehran include a four part series by 
ʿAbbās Ṭārmī published in the Khiradnāmeh254 — a quarterly journal published by the Sadra 
Islamic Philosophy Research Institute (SIPRIn) — and Suhā’s Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ va ʿurafā-yi 
mutaʾākhkhirīn, which mainly deals with philosophers from Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī to the early 
philosophers in the school of Tehran. ṬārmƮ’̄s articles serve as a good starting point, presenting 
                                                          
252 Translations of works from this period are extremely rare, although Abū-l-Ḥasan RāfīʿƮ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ’̄s treatise on 
the four journeys (al-asfār al-arbaʿa) has been translated into English and annotated by Sajjad Rizvi, see A. 
Qazwini, “On the Four Journeys”, tr. S. Rizvi, in S. G. Safavi (ed.) Sufism (ʿIrfan) (London: London Academy of 
Iranian Studies Press, 2008) 117-123.  
253 Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya. 
254 See ʿA. Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1; ʿA. Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi 
falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 2; ʿA. Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 3, in Kharadnāmah-i 
Ṣadrā, 1999, (4/16) 74-81  and ʿA. Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 4, in Kharadnāmah-i 
Ṣadrā, 1999, (5/17) 93-100. 
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the reader with information about the four founding ḥakīms of the school, but lack any in 
depth analysis. Furthermore they do not include other key members of the school, who were 
not necessarily founders but contributors to the intellectual movement.  
 
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī has significantly contributed to the historical understanding of 
the period with important sections in the introductions of critical editions of various 
philosophical works. These introductions usually exceed a hundred pages and information on 
various figures from the school of Tehran is spread throughout.255 His Muntakhibātī az āsār-i 
ḥukamā-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān is a collection of works from key figures of the period after Mullā Ṣadrā. 
Information regarding particular figures can also be found in the introductions to their 
collected works. At times these introductions discuss the ideas of the figures whose works are 
presented, but none of these introductions fully discuss the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā presented 
in this thesis. Furthermore, they usually focus on one figure in the ḥikmat tradition rather than 
analysing the tradition as a whole. Āshtiyānī’s contributions are barely critical and often not 
evidenced. Nevertheless, his contributions show how the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran are 
regarded by those within the tradition and so his works are still an important source from that 
perspective. 
 
On the other hand, Suhā’s work is well researched, detailed and scholarly. He traces lines of 
transmission from Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī back to Mullā Ṣadrā, mostly through NūrƮ’̄s teacher 
                                                          
255 A comprehensive listing of these works can be found in the section concerning him in the part of this chapter 
which discusses the school of Qum. 
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Muḥammad BīdabādƮ,̄ and therefore establishes the connection between the school of Isfahan 
and the school of Tehran as it was Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī’s student — Mullā ʿAbd Allāh ZunūzƮ ̄— 
who connects the two schools by his migration to Tehran to teach at the MarwƮ ̄ school.256 
While Suhā deals with other key figures in the same rigorous fashion, he can only hope to 
explore a few of the main figures which connected the school of Isfahan to the school of 
Tehran and so many later figures from the school of Tehran are not included, and no key figure 
in the school of Qum receives detailed attention. Additionally, since it is a book that deals with 
the history of philosophers after Mullā Ṣadrā, it lacks analysis into the ideas of the scholars it 
explores. He does, however, include a very important chapter on Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ ̄(d. 
                                                          
256 Therefore, any attempt to trace a chain of transmission between the two schools has only to take the numerous 
chains constructed by Suhā and add Mullā ʿAbd Allāh ZunūzƮ’̄s name to the end, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 91-
123. 
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1311/1894 or 1317/1899)257 and Fatḥ-ʿAlƮ ̄Sultạ̄nābādƮ ̄(d. 1318/1900),258 which also includes details 
of various Iranian scholars that spent a significant amount of time in Najaf.259  
 
Books that cover the history of Iranian philosophy in a more general sense sometimes include 
relevant entries on some members of the school of Tehran, although they do not deal with the 
school itself.260 Rare works examine the thoughts of specific scholars,261 such as DƮn̄ānƮ’̄s Maʿād: 
                                                          
257 Refer to Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 207-236. He was a student of Bīdābādī and Sayyid ʿAlī Shushtarī (d 1283/1866), 
see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (2) 527; and of Mullā Hādī Sabzvārī see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 209; and was one 
of the teachers of Muḥammad Javād Malikī Tabrizī and Sayyid Aḥmad Karbalāʾī. Some of his teatises and 
admonitions are presented by Surūr, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (2) 530-554. He was well known for his 
spirituality and trained a number of important students aside from Tabrīzī and Karbalāʾī such as Shaykh 
Muḥammad Bahārī Hamadānī (d. 1325/1907) who after being of his special students became his successor see 
Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 279; and 
Shaykh Kāẓim al-Dawla Ābādī Bagdādī (d. 1313/1895) who was of the special students (khawās)̣ of MƮr̄zā 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn TehrānƮ.̄ Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan narrates concerning him that he went to Najaf and 
became acquainted with Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄ HamadānƮ ̄ and pursued the spiritual path with him until he became 
enlightened. see Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
Bihbahānī, 69-70. 
258 Refer to Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 237-258. Much has been narrated concerning his knowledge and asceticism 
as well as his karāmāt, see Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
Bihbahānī, 11-13. He studied in Najaf under Shaykh Murtażā Anṣārī and migrated to Samurra when Āyatullāh 
Ḥasan Shīrāzī migrated there. He was the teacher of Mirzā Ḥusayn Nūrī the author of Mustadrak al-wasāʾil and 
Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 245-246. 
259 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 209-231, see especially note 15. Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ’̄s letters to his students have 
been collected by Shaykh IsmāʿƮl̄ Tāʾib TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄who was also one of the students of Jawād MalikƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄in a book 
called Tadhkirah al-mutaqƬn̄. 
260 See Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī; ʿA. Ḥalabī, Tārikh-i falsafa-i īrānī: az āghāz-i islām tā imrūz (Tehran: 
Intishārāt-i zavvār, 2002); and Ḥ. MaʿmalƮ ̄et. al. TārƬk̄h-i falsafa-i islāmƬ ̄(Qum: Markaz-i jahān-i ʿulūm-i islāmƮ,̄ 
2006).  
261 See for example, Gh. NūshƮn̄, ḤakƬm̄-i Sabzavārī (no place: Intishārāt-i sināʾƮ,̄ 2002); M. KadƮv̄ar, and Gh. I. 
DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ “Ibtikārāt-i hastƮ ̄shanāsƮ-̄i ḥakƮm̄-i muʾassis Āgā ‘AlƮ ̄Mudarris ṬihrānƮ:̄ mutạ̄laʿa-i mawrid-i asạ̄lat-i vujūd”, 
in ʿUlūm-i insānƬ,̄ 1378 Sh/1999 (13), 141-160. See also M. Kadīvar, “Kitābshanāsī-i tawṣīfī-i ḥakīm muʾassis āqā ʿAlī 
Mudarris Ṭihrānī”, in Āyīna-i pajūhash, 1376 Sh/1997 (4/46) 80-98 and M. Kadīvar, M. “Jarf andƮs̄ha-hā-yi ḥakƮm̄-i 
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az dƬd̄gāh-i ḥakƬm̄-i mudarris Zunūzī where his explanation of the concept of resurrection in 
ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī’s thought explores a key area in Sadrian philosophy.262 As possibly the 
only full size book analyzing ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s thought in a single key area, DƮn̄ānƮ’̄s work 
is a major contribution to the analysis of the school of Tehran and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s 
thought in particular.263 DƮn̄ānƮ ̄ highlights the innovative nature of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s 
responses regarding the nature of Resurrection in his Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam;264 his glosses on the 
part regarding spiritual psychology in the Asfār;265 and an independent treatise SabƬl̄ al-rashād 
fƬ ̄ithbāt al-maʿād.266 ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s views are based on Sadrian principles but depart 
from them enough to constitute as ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s own as will be discussed later in the 
section on maʿād.267 However, most of the information about this school is to be found in the 
prefaces of works produced by the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran.268 To this end it seems as 
                                                          
muʾassis dar Asfār-i Ṣadr al-MutaʾalihƮn̄”, in Nāme-i mufīd, 1387 Sh/2008 (2/10), 97–154. Some of Kadivar’s other 
articles are reproduced in the collected works of ʿ Alī Mudarris which he edited in ʿ Alī Mudarris ZunūzƮ,̄ Majmuʿa-
yi muṣannafāt-i ḥakīm-i muʾassis Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris-i Ṭihrānī, ed. Muḥsin. Kadīvar, 3 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
iṭṭilāʿāt, 1999) 
262 See Gh. I. DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād: az dƬd̄gāh-i ḥakƬm̄-i mudarris Zunūzī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ḥikmat, 2003). 
263 DƮn̄ānƮ’̄s introduction not only includes Sadrian points but includes the thoughts of Western scholars in the 
introduction, especially those of Kant. This comparative approach was a feature of the school of Tehran. 
Discussion of some of Kant’s ideas is presented in Mudarris’s Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam, which is a key text in this area; 
see DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 16 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240-1. During the eighth issue Kant is actually mentioned by 
name, see DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 16. Comparative philosophy is now a prominent feature in the discussion of Sadrian 
ideas, evidenced by the plethora of books and papers written, especially in Persian, on such issues. 
264 See ʿAlī Mudarris ZunūzƮ,̄ Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam, ed. Aḥmad Wāʿiẓī (no place: Muʾassasa-yi chāp va nashr-i ʿAllāma 
ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ 1997). 
265 See ZunūzƮ,̄ Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (1) 583-721. 
266 DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 17. For the treatise see ZunūzƮ,̄ Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 85-143. 
267 DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 17. 
268 See Muḥammad ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār; ZunūzƮ,̄ Majmuʿah-i muṣannafāt; and ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-
ilāhīya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pazhūhishī-yi ḥikmat va falsafa-i Īrān, 1381 
Sh/2002). 
121  
though there is still much room for writing the history of this period even in the Persian 
language itself. Although interest in the period seems to be increasing, perhaps due to the 
increasing awareness of the important works that were written during the period.269 
 
An earlier attempt to analyze the thoughts of ʿAlƮ ̄ Mudarris Zunūzī was Muḥsin Kadīvar’s 
paper, presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra in Tehran in May 1999.270 He highlights 
the importance of ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī as a key figure in the interpretive tradition following 
Mullā Ṣadrā271 as ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī not only elucidated Mullā Ṣadrā’s views but added his 
own arguments and ideas to those of Mullā Ṣadrā.272 Kadīvar proceeds to analyze ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī’s ideas on the principality of existence, where ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī examines the 
intricacies of the concept including different types of principality.273 The majority of the paper 
deals with two new arguments presented by ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī for the principality of 
existence.274 Kadīvar compares these views to the opinions of Mullā Ṣadrā and Mullā HādƮ ̄
Sabzavārī, interpreting ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī’s contributions as a “logical continuation of Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s thoughts.”275 He highlights an important historiographical issue in attributing new 
                                                          
269 See especially the translation of two of important treatises of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, W. C. Chittick, “Āqā 
Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshaʾī”, in S. H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi (eds.) An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia: From 
the School of Shiraz to the Twentieth Century (London: I. B. Taurus, 2015). 
270 M. Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Ṭihrānī (A Case Study: The 
Problem of the Principality of Existence)”, in The Papers Presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra, 10 vols 
(Tehran: SIPRIn Publications, 2002) (5) 389-415. 
271 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 389.  
272 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 389. This point is also 
stressed in Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 241. 
273 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 396. 
274 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 401-412. 
275 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 391. 
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ideas to later philosophers, as many of the works of scholars between Mullā Ṣadrā and the 
ḥakīms that later followed in his tradition have not been published.276 The English translation 
of the article has room for improvement, the most debilitating issue being the sparse use of 
transliteration for key terms, making it difficult to trace the exact meaning of key translated 
terms in an article focusing on technical issues.  
 
Biographical dictionaries usually comprise one the most basic sources of information on the 
lives of scholars and possible links of transmission. The names of students, teachers and works 
are recorded in some cases. For the later periods which are less concerned with narrators of I 
aḥādƬt̄h than scholars in various fields, some of the most important biographical dictionaries 
are Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a by A৴ qā Buzurg TihrānƮ;̄ Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq by Muḥammad Maʿsụ̄m 
ShƮr̄āzƮ;̄ Mudarris GƮl̄ānƮ’̄s Muʿjam al-ḥukamāʾ;277 Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ by Ibrahīm Ḥusayn Surūr; 
Tadhkirat-i riyāḍ al-ʿārifƬn̄ by Riḍā QulƮ ̄Khān Hidāyat and Aʿyān al-shƬ ̄ʿ a by Sayyid Muḥsin al-
AmƮn̄. Biographical information can also be obtained from encyclopaedic entries on various 
figures, but due to the limited study of this period, many key figures do not have designated 
entries. Biographies and indeed autobiographies of varying length have been written on many 
                                                          
276 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 391. 
277 This work has been summarized; see Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjim al-ḥukamāʾ. 
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figures including Mullā HādƮ ̄ Sabzavārī,278 Sayyid Kaẓim Asṣạ̄r,279 Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ 
A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄280 ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄281 and Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ.̄282 
 
ṬārmƮ ̄notes some trends that distinguish the school of Tehran from the proceeding school of 
Isfahan. The philosophers of the school produced of works in ḥikmat which depart from 
traditional Sadrian ideas and the publication of critical editions of important texts. They also 
defended Sadrian philosophy from newly introduced Western ideas.283 One of the earliest 
works to do this was ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam which was a response to the 
questions of his student and Qajar prince, ʿImād al-Dawla. This mantle` was to be taken up by 
the school of Qum and an important work worthy of note was ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s Uṣūl-i 
falsafa va ravish riʾālīsm which was commented upon by Murtażā Muṭahharī. Comparative 
philosophy is currently taught in the modern ḥawza; however, a full discussion of this aspect 
of the ḥikmat tradition is outside the scope of this thesis.  
                                                          
278 See M. Muḥaqqiq (ed.) ZindagƬ ̄nāma va khadamāt-i ʿilmƬ ̄va farhangƬ:̄ ustād Mullā HādƬ ̄Sabzivāri ̄ (Tehran: 
Anjumān-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangƮ,̄ 2007). 
279 See M. Muḥaqqiq (ed.), ZindagƬ ̄nāma va khadamāt-i ʿilmƬ ̄va farhangƬ:̄ ustād Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r 
(Tehran: Anjumān-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangƮ,̄ 2007). 
280 See M. Muḥaqqiq (ed.), ZindagƬ ̄ nāma va khadamāt-i ʿilmƬ ̄ va farhangƬ:̄ ustād Sayyid Jalāl al-DƬn̄ AৄshtiyānƬ ̄
(Tehran: Anjumān-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhangƮ,̄ 2007); M. ṢāḥibƮ,̄ Jalāl-i hikmat va ʿirfān (Qum: Nashr-i iḥyāgār, 
2005); ʿA. Khusrūhpanāh, SharƬ ̄ʿ a-yi shuhūd (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-yi 
islāmƮ,̄ 2007); M. MalakƮ,̄ Dar imtidād-i falsafa va ʿirfān (Tehran: Nashr-i hastƮ-̄namā, 2005); and ʿA. KhānƮ ̄and Ḥ. 
ʿArab, Khirad-i jāvidān: jashn-nāma-yi ustād Sayyid Jalāl al-DƬn̄ AৄshtiyānƬ ̄(Tehran: Nashr va pazhūhish-i farzān, 
1998). 
281 See H. Algar, “Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī: Philosopher, Exegete, and Gnostic”, in Journal 
of Islamic Studies, 2006, (17/3) 326-351; and no author, Marzabān-i vaḥy va khirad: yādnāmaa-yi ʿAllāma-yi 
Tạbātạbāʾi ̄ (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1381 Sh/2002). 
282 M. Borzgar, Najm al-dƬn̄ (Qum: Būktiāb, 2008) and M. Borzgar, Jamʿ-i parākanda (Qum: Būktiāb, 2008).  
283 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 65.  
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Another feature is the movement of discourse from purely Arabic to Arabo-Persian, where 
many of the words and terminology in a philosophical work are in Arabic, while the overall 
text is in Persian. Another offshoot of the Persianisation of philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān 
was an effort to translate important works into Farsi. These moves were to widen the ḥikmat 
audience while maintaining the continuity of the tradition.284 The Arabo-Persian style has 
filtered through to the school of Qum, where it has become the predominant language for 
both writing and teaching philosophy and ʿirfān.  
 
I. The Beginnings of the School of Tehran 
 
The establishment of the Marwī school and the invitation of Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shāh at the behest of 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Khān Marwī to Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī to teach there was an indication of the 
royal intention to move the capital of philosophical activity from Isfahan to Tehran. Many 
factors were required to create the conditions for a flourishing school such as madrasas, 
stipends and networks of scholars who would attract students and distribute those stipends. 
With the building of schools and invitations from the court to important ḥukamāʾ the corium 
of high quality teachers began to grow. There were a number of important schools in Tehran 
such as the Sepahsālār school, the Ṣadr school — which hosted many of the teachers with a 
more ʿirfānī preference — the Dār al-Shifāʾ, the ʿAbd Allāh Khān school and the Marwī school. 
There were also a few schools of less importance such as the Dānkī school which was founded 
                                                          
284 Rizvi, “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 117. 
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by Sayyid Ḥusayn Lārijānī.285 The importance of the first four schools is easily understood by 
the fact that each of them hosted one of the four founding ḥukamāʾ and thereafter their 
students. Abu-l-Ḥasan Jilva taught at the Dār al-Shifāʾ; Ḥusayn Sabzavārī taught at ʿAbd Allāh 
Khān; Qumshihī taught at Ṣadr and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī taught at the Sepahsālār. 
 
Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, the son of Bābākhān ZunūzƮ,̄ was the first teacher of Sadrian 
philosophy in the Marwī school.286 His life is described by his son in an account found by Jalāl 
al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ which contains most of what is known about him.287 After studying the 
introductory sciences in Zunūz where he became an expert in Arabic grammar to the extent 
that people called him ʿAbd Allāh the grammarian, he went to Karbala and studied the 
principles of jurisprudence under Sayyid ʿAlī Ṭabāṭabāʾī. He then went to Qum and continued 
pursuing his studies in the principles of jurisprudence under Abū-l-Qāsim Qummī. It was after 
completing these studies that he went to Isfahan and studied ḥikmat under Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī 
while continuing to pursue his studies in jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence as 
well as mathematics.288  
 
                                                          
285 Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ḥakīm-i Ṣihbā, ed. Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī and Khalīl Bahrāmī 
Qaṣrchimī (Isfahan: Kānūn-i pazhūhish, 1378 Sh/1999), 93.  
286 Ḥusayn al-Amīn, Mustadrakāt aʿyān al-shīʿa, 7 vols (Beirut: Dār al-taʿāruf li-l-maṭbūʿāt, 1408/1988) (7) 135; 
Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 66. 
287 For his biography written by his son ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī see Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 145-147. The 
account of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī does not give dates for the movements of his father to Karbala, Qum and Isfahan 
but just uses the term he went (تفر)…this is probably because ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī was born in Isfahan and may 
not have known the exact dates for these movements himself. Other sources follow ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s 
account and therefore also do not mention a specific date see for example ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, Anvār-i jalīya, ed. 
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1371 Sh/1992) 37-39. 
288 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 67. 
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His writings include Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya which discusses the existence of God and His 
Attributes in a detailed fashion; Anvār-i jalīya which includes a commentary on the ḥadƬt̄h of 
Kumayl where he askes Imam ʿAlī about reality; Risāla-i maʿārif which is a Farsi treatise that 
remains unpublished in the archives of the MillƮ ̄ library in Iran;289 Muntakhab al-khāqānƬ ̄ fƬ ̄
kashf ḥaqāʾiq-i ʿirfānƬ ̄which is a shorter discussion of the existence of God and His Attributes 
than in Lamaʿāt while not simply being a summary of it as the Muntakhab includes proofs not 
to be found in Lamaʿāt;290 and his Risāla-i ʿillīya discussing God’s Anger. Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄
discovered his commentaries on the Asfār, al-Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya 
and Shawāriq al-ilhām.291  
 
ʿAbd Allāh ZunūzƮ’̄s efforts were complemented by the deep spirituality of Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī 
(d. 1280sh/1901),292 who was known as being “the possessor of spiritual state of the king of the 
inner” and “knower of the occult sciences to perfection”.293 Lārijānī had studied ʿirfān under 
Sayyid ʿAbd al-Jawād ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄ KirmānƮ ̄ and Mullā Muḥammad JaʿfarābādƮ ̄ who were both 
students of Muḥammad BīdābādƮ.̄294 After his father passed away he travelled to Isfahan with 
his mother and brother and entered the seminary of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī where he studied 
Peripatetic, Illuminationist and Transcendental philosophy. He was one of the best students 
of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and a teacher in the school of Isfahan.295  
                                                          
289 ZunūzƮ,̄ Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 15. 
290 ZunūzƮ,̄ Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 16. 
291 For more information on him see Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, (2), 765. 
292 For a basic entry on him see Muḥammad ʿAlī Muʿallim Ḥabībābādī, Makārim al-āsār, 7 vols (Isfahan: Nasr-i 
nafāʾis-i makhṭūṭat-i Iṣfahān, 1364 Sh/1985) (6) 1957. 
293 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 261-262. 
294 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 262; and LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 69, nt. 1 
295 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68. 
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His abilities in the sphere of ʿirfān were unrivalled at his time. However, he was under a lot of 
pressure with some — such as Ḥājj Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Kalbāsī — even pronouncing him 
an unbeliever.296  Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī points out that this type of pronouncement did not 
meet the conditions of the revealed law as he had not done anything to deserve such a verdict. 
Furthermore he says that the reason there were many scholars that opposed Sayyid Rażī was 
that there are always fewer people that understand the intellectual sciences and could 
therefore understand Sayyid Rażī’s excellence.297 Larijānī is one example of many such 
pronouncements within the traditional ḥawza.298  
 
Even though Sayyid Rażī is considered as one of the masters of the school of Isfahan, he went 
on to teach in the school of Tehran when he responded to an invitation from Āqā Ismāʿīl 
Gurgānī before 1888.299 QumshihƮ ̄ reportedly relates that the students of Sayyid Rażī were 
required to attend classes in tawḥƬd̄ (unity) with minor ablution (wuḍūʾ) as it is impossible to 
understand the science of tawḥƬd̄ without sincere worship as well as intellectualization.300 
These kinds of practical instructions betray the more hidden practical aspect of ʿirfān where 
the teacher privately instructs the student to observe a number of practices that will enhance 
his spirituality. As the relationship between teacher and student develops so does the nature 
                                                          
296 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68. 
297 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 90.  
298 For more information on this kind of phenomenon and the reaction of different kinds of scholars. see Anzalī, 
Safavid Shiʿism; and C. Adang, H. Ansari, M. Fierro and S. Schmidtke, (eds.) Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A 
Diachronic Perspective on Takfir (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
299 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 67-68. 
300 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 90. 
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of that instruction until the student becomes qualified to be a teacher in the practical aspects 
of ʿirfān. Minor ablution is a relatively simple and basic instruction compared to the type of 
instruction that would be privately received by a qualified student. Sayyid Rażī was forced to 
pretend he was mad in order to preserve his life and therefore did not suffer the same fate as 
other accused ʿurafāʾ before him.301 He taught the books of Ibn ʿArabī and Qūnawī to students 
such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Mirzā Naṣīr Gīlānī.302 
 
II. The Four Founding Ḥukamāʾ 
 
Nasr, Suhā and other scholars of the period speak of four teachers that established the school 
of Tehran both due to the strength of their own scholarship and the copious students they 
trained.303 They were ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī (d. circa 1309/1891), Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Mirzā 
Ḥusayn Sabzavārī and Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī.  
 
i. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī 
 
A৴ qā ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī also known as Ḥākim-i Ṭūs was the son of Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī 
and accompanied his father when he migrated from Isfahan to Tehran at the age of three. He 
was one of his father’s closest students and taught philosophy and ʿirfān for about forty years 
in Tehran and was finally at the Madrasa Sephasālār where he taught for about twenty years.304 
                                                          
301 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68. 
302 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68. 
303 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 239-46; and Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 63. 
304 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 2, 83. 
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He began his studies under his father and progressed to study advanced texts such as Shawāriq 
al-ilhām, TūsƮ̣’̄s commentary on the Ishārāt of Ibn SƮn̄ā and al-Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād of Mullā 
Ṣadrā.305 After his father died he pursed studies in jurisprudence and its principles in Tehran 
and then in Isfahan where he studied under Mirzā Ḥasan Nūrī for 3 years and became busy in 
studying the intellectual sciences.306 Hence he has intellectual lines of transmission to Mullā 
ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄both through his own father and Mirzā Ḥasan. During his time in Isfahan he also 
studied with important figures such as Sayyid Riżā and Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar LangarūdƮ ̄(d. 
1255/1839).307 So while the majority of his training and consequently his writing style are more 
geared towards a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, he also benefited from more ʿirfānī 
inclined ḥukamāʾ even if he did not embrace theoretical ʿirfān as fully as some of his 
contemporaries.  
 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s movements from Tehran back to Isfahan to study with some of his 
father’s contemporaries and his subsequent return to Tehran illustrates the gradual 
geographical transmission of ḥikmat. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī taught the important texts in 
ḥikmat including the Shifāʾ of Ibn SƮn̄ā, Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq of Qutḅ al-DƮn̄ ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄and the 
Asfār of Mullā Ṣadrā.308 His treatises include a treatise on tawḥƬd̄ (the unity of God’s Essence), 
a treatise proving resurrection, a treatise on wujūd al-rābit ̣(existence-in-something-else), a 
treatise on ḥaml (predication); a treatise on the rules of wujūd (existence) and māhīyah 
(quiddity); a treatise on the al-ḥaqƬq̄ah al-Muḥammadīyah (the Muḥammadan reality) and a 
                                                          
305 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240. 
306 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 2, 83. 
307 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240. 
308 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240. 
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treatise on the history of the philosophers. He also wrote glosses on the Asfār; on al-Shawāhid 
al-rubūbīya; on Sharḥ al-hidāya; on the glosses of Mullā Ṣadrā on the ilāhīyat section of Ibn 
SƮn̄ā’s Shifāʾ; on Mullā Ṣadrā’s gloss on the commentary of Qutḅ al-DƮn̄ ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄on SuhrawardƮ’̄s 
Ḥikmat al-ishrāq; on Shawāriq al-ilhām; on LāhƮj̄Ʈ’̄s gloss of the Ishārāt and glosses on some of 
his father’s writings including Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya.  
 
One of his most important works is Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam which was written at the behest of ʿImād 
al-Dawla who himself was well versed in ḥikmat and had written glosses on the Mashāʿir of 
Ṣadrā, al-Durrah al-fākhirah of JāmƮ ̄and a summary of SuhrawardƮ’̄s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq called 
Ḥikmat ʿ imādīya.309 DīnānƮ ̄points out that the nature of the questions asked by ʿ Imād al-Dawla 
shows that he was aware of Kant’s ideas, even if only on a general level.310 He sent these 
questions to two ḥakīms ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī and Mirzā ʿAlƮ ̄Akbar Mudarris YazdƮ ̄ḤakīmƮ,̄311 
who himself was a student of ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva and was one of the 
teachers of Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ.̄ Below is a chart summarizing ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s 
training leading back to Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (and consequently his chain back to Mullā Ṣadrā) and 
some of his students who taught figures in the school of Qum: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
309 DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād 16. 
310 DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 17. 
311 DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Maʿād, 17; He moved to Qum in the later part of his life where he taught students such as Aḥmad 
Khwansārī, Muḥammad Taqī Khwansārī and Rūḥ-Allāh Kumaynī, see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 399.  
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Fig. 2.6: ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s teachers and students. 
 
 
ʿAbd Allah 
Zunūzī 
Sayyid Riżā 
Lārijānī 
Muḥammad 
Jaʿfar Langarūdī 
(d. 1255/1839) 
Ḥusayn 
Bādkūbahī 
(d. 1385/1968) 
ʿAlī Akbar 
Yazdī Ḥakīmī 
(d. 1344/1926) 
Rūḥ Allāh 
Kumaynī 
ʿAbdallāh 
Javādī Āmulī 
Ibrāhīm 
Āshtiyānī (d. 
1365/1946) 
Muḥammad 
Taqī Āmulī 
(d.1391/1971) 
Jalāl al-Dīn 
Āshtiyānī (d. 
1426/2005) 
Mullā ʿAlī 
Nūrī (d. 
1246/1830) 
Sayyid iżā 
Lārijānī (d. 
1270/1853) 
ʿ  ll  
Zunūzī (d. 
1257/1841) 
ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī (d. 
1309/1891) 
Rūḥ-Allāh 
Khumaynī (d. 
1409/1989) 
ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 
1401/1981) 
Mahdī 
Āshtyānī (d. 
1372/1952) 
132  
ii. Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva 
 
The second hākim, Abū-l-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄was known as Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva312 
(d. 1314/1896). He was born in 1238/1822 in Ahmadabad, Gujarat and travelled to Isfahan with 
his father at the age of seven.313 After his father passed away he spent his early years playing 
until one day a miller reminded him of his lineage which was full of scholars and admonished 
him for not taking the same line.314 This event had a deep effect on him and he started his 
studies in the course of which he learnt under teachers such as Mirzā Ḥasan Nūrī, Mirzā Ḥasan 
Chīnī (d. circa 1264/1843);315  Mullā ʿAbd al-Javād Tūnī,316 who was a well known scholar in the 
fields of jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics and language 
as well as ḥikmat;317 and Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Langrūdī, all of whom had been students of 
Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī in Isfahan and had later migrated to Tehran. Isfahan became unsuitable for 
him for a variety of reasons and so he moved to Tehran.318  
 
He taught ḥikmat for forty one years and spent his life researching and studying, becoming 
one of the four ḥukamāʾ who established the school of Tehran.319 He was esteemed and gained 
                                                          
312 As he would sign his poetry with the pen name Jilva, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ḥakīm Jilva, 19. 
313 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 468. 
314 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 469. 
315 He had been a student of Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄ Nūrī and taught ḥ̣ikmat in Isfahan, see Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi 
falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 4.  
316 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 4. 
317 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 5. 
318 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 468. 
319 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 69. 
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a good reputation such that Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh came to visit him in the Dār al-Shifāʾ.320 He was 
well known as a Peripatetic philosopher but also taught other texts such as al-Shawāhid al-
rububīya and Ḥikmat al-ishrāq and according to Āshtiyānī, was possibly the best teacher of 
the safar-i nafs (the journey of the soul) section of the Asfār during his time.321  
 
He was involved in producing critical editions of texts and would correct a text before teaching 
it.322 Furthermore he edited and wrote glosses on the three main theoretical ʿirfān texts taught 
in the traditional seminary, although A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ stresses that since he was not an expert in 
ʿirfān it was not his job to correct these texts.323 A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄criticizes Jilva based on the issues 
Jilva raises on some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s views saying that these criticisms showed that Jilva did 
not fully grasp Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas. He quotes Mirzā Ḥasan KirmānshāhƮ ̄stating that until the 
time of his death Jilva did not fully grasp Ṣadrā’s notion of motion in the category of substance 
(al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah).324 Because of his work editing important texts Jilva never wrote a 
large separate work expressing his ideas but wrote many glosses, including a gloss on the Shifāʾ 
among twenty six other known works.325  
                                                          
320 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70. 
321 Isfahanī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 19. 
322 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70. 
323 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Sih rasāʾil-i falsafƬ,̄ ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1388 
Sh/2010). 
324 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Sih rasāʾil-i falsafƬ,̄ 24. 
325 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 468-9. He edited TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid of Ibn Turka Isf̣ahānƮ;̄ the Shifāʾ of Ibn SƮn̄ā; the 
MathnawƬ ̄of RūmƮ ̄and Misḅāḥ al-uns of Ḥamzah FanārƮ.̄ He wrote glosses on the Asfār explaining some of its 
foundations; TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid; the Shifāʾ; the MathnawƬ ̄of RūmƮ;̄ Misḅāḥ al-uns; al-Durra al-fākhira by JāmƮ;̄ 
Sharḥ al-mukhlas ̣ of ChagmƮn̄Ʈ;̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma of Sabzavārī; Sharḥ al-hidāya, Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād and 
mashāʿir of Ṣadrā and the introduction of QaysạrƮ’̄s commentary on the Fusụ̄s ̣ al-ḥikam. He also wrote the 
following treatises: Risālah fƬ ̄bayān kayfīya istijāba al-duʿaʾ; Risālah fƬ ̄anna al-qaḍīya al-muhmala hiya al-qaḍīya 
al-ṭabƬ ̄ʿ Ƭȳah; Risālah fƬ ̄tarkƬb̄ wa aḥkāmuhu; Risālah fƬ ̄al-jism al-taʿlƬm̄Ƭ;̄ Risālah fƬ ̄al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah; Risālah 
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His students include Ḥusayn Bādkūbahī (d. 1385/1968) also popularly known as “Mullā Ṣadrā 
Bādkūbahī” who had a philosophical study circle in Najaf;326 Sayyid Shihāb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who 
was part of the school of Tehran, taught at the Ṣadr school and was the author of a 
commentary and glossary on the Asfār;327 Mirzā Ṭāhir Tanakābunī a teacher in philosophy and 
ʿirfān from the school of Tehran;328 Ḥāj Fāżil Rāzī Ṭihrānī who was one of the students of Mullā 
Ḥusayn Sabzavārī and a member of the school of Tehran;329 ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Rashtī also one of 
the students of Ḥusayn Sabzavārī as well as many other important scholars;330 ʿAbd al-Majīd 
Mirzā bin ʿAlī Naqī Mirzā, a descendent of Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shāh;331 ʿAbd al-Nabī Nūrī Tihranī one of 
the teachers in the school of Tehran;332 Mullā Muḥammad Hīdjī Zanjānī a teacher in the school 
of Tehran;333 Muḥammad Bāqir Iṣṭahbānātī Shīrāzī part of the school of Najaf and Tehran;334 
Muḥammad Maʿsūm-ʿAlƮ ̄Shāh the author of Tarā’q al-ḥaqā’iq and the son of Rahmat-ʿAlƮ ̄Shāh 
who had been the head of the NiʿmatullāhƮ ̄order when its leadership was unified; and Sayyid 
Mūsā Zarābādī Qazvīnī who owned a school for ḥikmat and ʿirfān in Qazvin and who later 
became the founder of the Maktab-i tafkīk.335  
                                                          
fƬ ̄rabt ̣al-ḥādith bi-l-qadƬm̄; Risālah fƬ ̄al-kullƬ ̄wa aqsāmuhu; Risālah fƬ ̄wujūd al-ṣūrƬ ̄al-nawʿīya; Risālah fƬ ̄al-wujūd 
and a short introduction to the DƬv̄ān of Mujmir ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄making 26 works, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 473-5. 
326 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 246. 
327 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 5. 
328 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 6 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 246 
329 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 7. 
330 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 8. 
331 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 8. 
332 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 10. 
333 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 12. 
334 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 13. 
335 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 14. 
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Jilva taught Asad Allāh YazdƮ ̄and MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄who were both teachers of Sayyid Jalāl al-
DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ;̄ Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil TūnƮ ̄336 who taught the books of ʿirfān to Ḥasanzāda 
A৴ mulƮ;̄ ʿAlī Akbar Ḥakīmī Yazdī a teacher in both the schools of Tehran and Qum who was one 
of the teachers of Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ;̄337 and Muḥammad ʿAlƮ ̄ShāhābādƮ ̄who was Rūḥ-Allāh 
KhumaynƮ’̄s spiritual master. This places Jilva as a key influence on the direction of philosophy 
and ʿirfān until the present age.338 Most of the students mentioned here were students of the 
other ḥukamāʾ and so benefitted from the different readings and teaching styles of these 
experts. While Jilva’s reading is considered more Peripatetic there are many instances in his 
works where he discusses ʿirfānī principles and points. However, he was by no means the 
authority on the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as will be explained further when discussing 
the fourth ḥakīm. 
 
iii. Mirzā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī 
 
Little is known about the third ḥakīm, Ḥusayn Sabzavārī (d. 1352/1934) except that he was a 
student of Mullā HādƮ ̄Sabzavārī and was an expert in mathematics. He taught ḥikmat in the 
                                                          
336 His treatises have been published in a collection, see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil TūnƮ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi rasā’il-i ʿ irfānƬ ̄
va falsafƬ,̄ ed. Majīd Dastyārī (Qum: Kitābsarā-yi ishrāq, 1386 Sh/2007) and separately by Intishārāt-i Mawlā, see 
for example, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil TūnƮ,̄ Ilāhīyāt, ed. Mahnāz Raʾiszāda (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1386 
Sh/2007).  
337 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 11. 
338 For a list of Jilva’s most important students see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 475-82 
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Madrasa ʿAbd Allāh Khān with Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAsṣạ̄r339 who was Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r’s 
father and first teacher.340 The limited information on Ḥusayn Sabzavārī makes it hard to 
ascertain why he is considered a founding ḥakīm by some historians of the period. In fact, 
Kūhsārī does not include him with the other founding ḥukamāʾ but rather as an important 
student of Sabzavārī.341 Rather, Kūhsārī mentions his mastery over philosophical issues and 
how he was known as Mirzā Ḥusayn Kabīr in Tehran. 
 
iv. Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī 
 
The previous three ḥukamāʾ were better known for their philosophical grasp of ḥikmat. Abū-
l-Ḥasan Jilva had a Peripatetic approach whereas ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s approach was more 
of a Sadrian blend. Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī on the other hand was a master of the ʿirfānī 
reading. According to MahdawƮ,̄ Muḥammad Riżā b. AbƮ-̄l-Qāsim al-Qumshihī and was born 
in 1241/1825 and died in 1306/1888.342 This would make him sixty five years old when he died, 
but Suhā maintains that he was eighty making his birth date 1226/1811.343 Qumshihī studied the 
Fusụ̄s, Sharḥ al-mashāʿir and Sharḥ al-tajrƬd̄ with Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar LangarūdƮ ̄who was 
one of the well known students of Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄and who was also a teacher of ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris 
                                                          
339 He was the son of Sayyid Maḥmūd ʿAsṣạ̄r and his works include Nāsikh al-TafāsƬr̄; Mawāhib al-RaḍawƬ ̄ a 
commentary on Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma; as well as a correction of some of the poetry in Manẓūma in a work called 
Ishrāqāt al-Raḍawi ̄; and an answer to some questions in Pāsukh Nāmah. 
340 ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 1 nt. 1. 
341 Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 400-401. 
342 Maṣlah al-Dīn Mahdawī, Tadhkirat al-qubūr yā dānishmandān va burugvan Isfahān, eds. Muḥammad Riẓā Nīl 
Frūshān and Raḥīm Qāsimī (Iṣfahān: Kitābfurūshī thaqafī, 1348 Sh/1969) 327. 
343 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 261. 
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Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva in Isfahan.344 LangarūdƮ ̄himself studied philosophy with Mirzā 
Abū-l-Qāsim Mudarris KhātūnābādƮ ̄(d. 1202/1787) and Mullā Miḥrāb GƮl̄ānƮ ̄(d. 1217/1802). 345  
 
Although it seems LangarūdƮ ̄did not write many works he did write a commentary on Ṣadrā’s 
al-Mashāʿir answering the issues raised by Aḥmad AhsāʾƮ.̄346 He wrote a glossary on the 
glossary of KhafrƮ ̄ on the commentary on QūshchƮ ̄ on TajrƬd̄ and another glossary on the 
ilāhīyāt section of QūshchƮ’̄s commentary on TajrƬd̄ are attributed to him in some biographical 
dictionaries but remain unconfirmed.347 Qumshihī also studied under Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄ NūrƮ’̄s son 
Mirzā Ḥasan who taught ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva as well.348 His teacher in 
ʿirfān in Isfahan was Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī with whom he studied the Fusụ̄s ̣ again in a more 
profound way as he says Langarūdī was a philosopher whereas Sayyid Rażī was a dervish; and 
teaching the Fusụ̄s ̣is the work of a dervish.349 This statement shows how there are also variant 
readings of ʿirfānī texts.   
 
Qumshihī was an important figure in the transmission and the development of the ʿirfānī 
reading of ḥikmat. His presence, expertise and efforts contributed to creating an environment 
of enthusiasm for ʿirfān as he trained important students whose students were influential in 
the school of Qum. He taught Tamhīd al-qawāʾid; Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī’s commentary on the 
                                                          
344 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 7; and Āghā Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, (1), 239. 
345 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 18. 
346 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 61. 
347 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 61. 
348 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 261. 
349 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 61, nt. 2. 
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Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam;350 al-Fanārī's commentary of Ṣadr al-DƮn̄ QūnawƮ'̄s MafātƬḥ̄ al-ghayb; Miṣbāḥ 
al-uns; and Ibn ʿ ArabƮ’̄s al-Futuḥāt al-makīya.351 He is sometimes credited with the introduction 
of Tamhīd al-Qawāʾid into the ḥawzā’s theoretical ʿirfān curriculum, although Qumshihī 
studied the text with his own teacher Sayyid Riżā Lārijānī.352 A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ includes Qumshihī 
among the important expositors of the thought of Ibn ʿArabƮ,̄ such as QūnawƮ,̄ QaysạrƮ ̄and 
KāshānƮ.̄353 After Qumshihī passed away Mirzā Hāshim RashtƮ ̄ (d. 1332/1913) carried on his 
classes.  
 
Qumshihī’s other students included Shihāb al-DƮn̄ NayrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄(d. 1320/1902) (who was also 
a student of Abū al-Ḥasan Jilva) who taught the Fusụ̄s, the Asfār and Qurʾānic hermeneutics;354 
Ghulām-ʿAlƮ ̄ ShƮr̄āzƮ ̄ who wrote interesting glosses on Sharh al-Fusụ̄s ̣ and the Asfār; and 
Ḥusayn NajmābādƮ.̄355 The classes taught by the students of Qumshihī were more popular that 
the classes of other masters at that time who were not only based in Tehran but other areas 
such as Isfahan and Sabzavar.356 Below is a chart of the chains of transmission leading back to 
                                                          
350 This is the chosen commentary taught in the traditional ShƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ ̄ḥawza, despite the existence of many other 
commentaries on the Fusụ̄s ̣ and it is primarily QaysạrƮ’̄s introduction that distinguishes his commentary over 
others. For a translation in English of the first five chapters of this introduction (out of twelve) with commentary 
on the some of the themes see Ali, QaysạrƬ’̄s Muqaddima to His Sharḥ Fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam.  
351 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 101. 
352 Isfahanī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 12. 
353 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 101. 
354 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 477; Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 388. 
355 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam, (1) 8. 
356 Isfahanī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 18. 
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Qumshihī through Hāshim Rashtī. The significance of this chart will be understood further as 
this chapter expands on the significance of each of these students:357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.7: Chains of transmission back to Qumshihī through Hāshim Rashtī. 
 
III. Contemporaries of the Four Ḥakīms 
 
                                                          
357 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 90-91. 
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Although the four ḥakīms are well known for their impact on the teaching of philosophy and 
ʿirfān, there were others who contributed to the teaching of ḥikmat in different localities at 
the same time as the four ḥakīms. Isfahan was still an important center of learning and the 
movement of the center of ḥikmat to Tehran was a gradual process. There were therefore 
important teachers who remained in Isfahan. One of these figures was Mullā IsmāʿƮl̄ Isf̣ahānƮ ̄
(d. 1281/1865) who had been one of the top students of Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄and as Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ’̄s 
health deteriorated his students started to attend classes with Mullā IsmāʿƮl̄ who would teach 
them after teaching his own students.358 Among these students of NūrƮ ̄ was Mullā HādƮ ̄
Sabzavārī.359 Mullā IsmāʿƮl̄ wrote a gloss on Shawāriq al-ilhām and a precise treatise responding 
to the intellectual challenge of Shaykh Aḥmad AḥsāʾƮ ̄on which Mullā HādƮ ̄wrote a gloss.360  
 
Another important center for traditional ḥawza studies is Mashhad which also became a hot 
spot in the debate between Sadrian philosophers and the Maktab-i tafkīk. A৴ qā Buzurg ShahƮd̄Ʈ ̄
(ḤakƮm̄) (d. 1355/1936) was a descendant of MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄ShahƮd̄ and studied philosophy in 
Tehran before teaching it in Tehran and later in the seminary in Mashhad.361 Some of the 
students of Muḥammad Riżā QumshihƮ ̄ were his students including MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄ IlāhƮ ̄
Qumshihī.362 ḤājƮ ̄Fāżil KhurāsānƮ ̄(d. 1342/1924) also taught for some time in Mashhad where 
both he and A৴ qā Buzurg ḤakƮm̄ combated anti-philosophical sentiment.363 HājƮ ̄Fāżil was a 
student of Mullā HādƮ ̄ Sabzavārī and seems to also have studied under MƮr̄zā Muḥammad 
                                                          
358 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 95. 
359 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 95. 
360 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 95. 
361 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 101. 
362 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 294. 
363 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 101-102. 
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SarūqadƮ ̄(with whom he studied the Asfār for a while) and Mullā Ghulām-Ḥusayn Shaykh al-
Islām who were both themselves students of Mullā HādƮ ̄ and had been active in Mashhad 
before ḤājƮ ̄Fāżil and A৴ qā Buzurg ḤakƮm̄. Mullā Ghulām-Ḥusayn was the leader of the Friday 
prayer in Mashhad and had been a student of Mullā HādƮ ̄for six years after which he travelled 
to Najaf to study under Shaykh Ansạ̄rƮ ̄before going to Mashhad.364 
 
Much has been written concerning Mullā Hādī Ibn Mahdī Sabzavārī (1212/1797/8-1295/1878), 
who was based in Sabzavar and was an enigmatic character. His popularity was such that 
during his lifetime he sparked a center of learning around his own personality. Although he 
was not part of the school of Tehran his activities influenced the school and his student MƮr̄zā 
Ḥusayn Sabzavārī was an important teacher in Tehran. Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī is considered by 
some as the greatest philosopher of the nineteenth Century,365 a sentiment echoed by Mullā 
ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī himself in his Risālah fƬ ̄wujūd al-rābit.̣366 He wrote Sharḥ ghurar al-farāʾid 
more popularly known as Sharḥ al-manẓūma which has been studied and taught by many 
ḥukamāʾ including the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum until the present day. His other popular 
work was a book called Asrār al-ḥikam, which he wrote in Persian for Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh 
Qajar.367  
 
                                                          
364 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 117. 
365 Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 1. 
366 “He [Sabzavārī] is unequaled in our time and matchless in our era.” See ZunūzƮ,̄ Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 175. 
367 For more information see M. Muḥaqqiq, “Asrār al-ḥekam”, Encyclopaedia Iranica [online], 1987, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/asrar-al-hekam-fil-montatah-wal-moktatam-the-title-of-a-book-written-
for-naser-al-din-shah-qaar-by-the-philo [Accessed 24/5/2016]. 
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Sabzavārī also wrote a very important gloss on the Asfār, but he notably did not write any 
commentaries on the important works of ʿirfān. This is an important fact, as Sabzavārī was a 
prolific writer and while his ʿirfānī tendencies cannot be missed in many of his works he is a 
figure — like ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī — who sits in the middle of either extreme.368 He wrote an 
autobiography due to the requests of some people who wanted to know more about his 
education, which is one of the main sources for information on his life. His son in law Mirzā 
Sayyid Ḥasan also wrote a biography on him.369 
 
IV. Students of the School of Tehran 
 
In the previous sections the ḥukamāʾ that connected the school of Isfahan to the school of 
Tehran were examined and in this section the ḥukamāʾ that connected the school of Tehran 
to the school of Qum will be discussed. Some of these figures have been introduced in the 
diagrams of ḥukamāʾ in the preceding sections. There were two generations of students that 
formed a connection between the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. The earlier 
generation were the important students of the four ḥakīms, who transmitted Sadrian 
philosophy and Ibn Arabian metaphysics to the next generation of ḥukamāʾ who were to 
become the teachers of the school of Qum.  
 
                                                          
368 Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄points out that Mullā HādƮ ̄was not an complete expert in theoretical ʿirfān and 
so seems to have faltered when explaining some mystical points such as confusing the understanding of waḥdat 
al-wujūd and its manifestation in the outside world, see ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 115.  
369 Browne, A Year amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, Character, and Thought of the People of Persia 
Received during Twelve Months’ Residence in that Country in the Year 1887-1888 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1391 Sh/2012), 144-147. 
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One of the key figures of the earlier generation was Mirzā Maḥmūd Qummī (d. 1346/1927) who 
was born in Qum and had travelled to Tehran to complete his studies where he became one 
of the well known students of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī because of his sharp intellect. He 
was famous for his expertise in ʿirfān.370 Like many other scholars of this period, he was 
afflicted with poverty. He also benefited from the lessons of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abu-l-
Ḥasan Jilva. He wrote glosses on Sharḥ al-manẓūma, the Asfār and on Dawūd al-Qayṣarī’s 
commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam as well as a treatise on vilāyat-i kullī (complete 
Guardianship) and composed ʿirfānī poetry, some of which is still extant.371 His students 
included Abū-l-Ḥasan Shaʿrānī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī who were both teachers of 
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī among others.372 Another of QumshihƮ’̄s students was Shaykh Ghulām-ʿAlƮ ̄
ShƮr̄āzƮ.̄ He also wrote a glossary on Qayṣarī's Sharḥ al-fusụ̄s,̣ which contains the thoughts of 
his teacher as well as other interesting points and glosses on the Asfār and al-Shawāhid al-
rubūbīya.373  
 
The most important students of ʿAlƮ ̄ Mudarris Zunūzī and Qumshihī to effect the next 
generation of scholars were MƮr̄zā Ḥasan KirmanshāhƮ ̄ who was an expert in peripatetic 
philosophy, medicine and mathematics,374 and MƮr̄zā Hāshim RashtƮ ̄ who was an expert in 
ʿirfān and Illuminationist philosophy.375 The next generation of the school of Tehran such as 
                                                          
370 Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjim al-ḥukamāʾ, 183. 
371 Isfahanī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 17-
19. 
372 Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjim al-ḥukamāʾ, 183-187. 
373 Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjim al-ḥukamāʾ, 182-187. 
374 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 104. 
375 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 104. 
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Muḥammad ʿAlƮ ̄ShāhābādƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā Aḥmad A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā Maḥmūd 
A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄and Abū-l-Ḥasan RāfiʿƮ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄were all students of these two masters.376 Although 
MƮr̄zā ʿAlƮ ̄Muḥammad Isf̣ahānƮ ̄had been one of the most important students of ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris 
Zunūzī and Qumshihī, he did not have the same effect on the next generation his 
contemporaries partly due to health problems which prevented him from active teaching.377  
 
ḤakƮm̄ Ṣafā was a ʿārif who taught the commentary of the Fusụ̄s ̣and the Ishārāt in Tehran 
before migrating to Mashhad where he gave up teaching to focus on spiritual exercise.378 He 
seems to have started this training before migrating and was never reported to have left the 
bounds of the law or belief although some have reported he was afflicted by madness at the 
end of his life.379 He has a divān of ʿirfānī poetry which contains important theoretical points 
and from which his spiritual states can be understood.380  
 
The next generation of the school of Tehran includes many key figures who contributed with 
important writings and teaching. Among them was MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄(d. 1372/1952) who 
translated Ṣadrā’s Asfār into Persian; wrote a commentary of Tuḥfah al-ḥakƬm̄ of Shaykh 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Isf̣ahānƮ ̄as well as an incomplete commentary of the Fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam of 
FārābƮ,̄ which he stopped when he found out that one of his contemporaries, MahdƮ ̄ IlāhƮ ̄
Qumshihī, was also writing a commentary on the same text. He also wrote glosses on the Asfār 
                                                          
376 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 105. 
377 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 105, nt. 1. 
378 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 105, nt. 1. 
379 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 105, nt. 1. 
380 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 105, nt. 1. 
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and on Baḥr al-fawāʾid.381 One of his students, Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ ̄ relates that he 
entered upon his teacher near the time of his death and found him in a calm state, facing the 
qiblah and remembering God until he recited “Oh the most Merciful of the merciful” (yā 
arḥam al-rāḥimƬn̄) three times, dying during the third repetition.  
 
MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄IlāhƮ ̄Qumshihī (1318-1393sh) had travelled to Tehran and taught at the Madrasa-
yi Sephasālār. He had been one of the students of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and was one of 
the teachers of Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ ̄and JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ.̄ His printed works include a gloss 
on the TafsƬr̄ AbƬ ̄al-Futūḥ, Naghmih-i ussāq, Naghmih-i ḤusaynƬ,̄ TawḥƬd̄-i huwshmandān, a 
translation of FārābƮ’̄s Fusụ̄s ̣and his unpublished works include Maqāmāt al-ʿārifƬn̄, Risālat al-
ʿushshāq, Risālat marātib al-idrāk, Risālat al-mantịq, a gloss on al-Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād of Mullā 
Ṣadrā, and commentary on the famous Khutḅat-i Ḥammām in Nahj al-balāgha called 
Naghmih-i ilāhī. His other works include Falsafah-i kulƬ,̄ Marātib al-ʿishq, a translation of the 
Qurʾān, a translation of al-SaḥƬf̄ah al-Sajjādīya which is a compilation of supplications 
attributed to the fourth Shīʿī Imām ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn who had the epithate of Sajjād and a 
translation of MafātƬḥ̄ al-jinān, the famous supplication compendium written by Abbās 
Qummī. The common aspect of these three works is their wide practical appeal and use 
amonst Shīʿīs; layman and scholar alike. His other unpublished works include a work of 
poetry, Risālah fƬ ̄al-umūr al-ʿāmmah on metaphysics and Risālah fƬ ̄sayr wa sulūk on practical 
ʿirfān.  
 
                                                          
381 Āghā Buzurg ṬihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 434-435. 
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Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r, traveled to France and other Western countries to learn new sciences 
not taught in the East before traveling to Najaf to complete his training in jurisprudence and 
its principles. He was an open minded scholar and a key link in the transmission and flow of 
ḥikmat to the West. In Tehran he had studied at the MarwƮ ̄and Ṣadr schools and later taught 
at the Sepahsālār. His teachers in the intellectual sciences were MƮr̄zā Hāshim RashtƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā 
Ḥasan KirmanshāhƮ ̄and MƮr̄ Shihāb al-DƮn̄ NayrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ShƮr̄āzƮ.̄382 His primary teacher in ʿirfān was 
MƮr̄zā Hāshim GƮl̄ānƮ.̄383 In Najaf he studied under Sayyid Ḥusayn Bādkūbahī who was also a 
teacher of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄in theoretical ʿirfān.384  
 
His works include a treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd; a treatise on change in decree (badāʾ); a 
treatise on the answering of prayers in relation to the question of change in decree; a treatise 
on the science of ḥadƬt̄h; a treatise on explaining the Qurʾān; a book containing some lessons 
in philosophy and logic; a treatise answering some selected metaphysical problems; a work on 
freewill and predestination; and glosses on the Asfār, Sharḥ al-ʿarshīya, the Manẓūma and on 
part of Usụ̄l al-kāfƬ.̄ He was also behind the Civil Code produced at the time of Reza Shah.385  
 
Some of his most important students became instrumental in the development of ḥikmat and 
the writing of its history in both the East and West including Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄who 
has produced numerous critical editions and is introductions where he includes the history of 
the school of Tehran in many cases for the first time; A৴ yātullāh MarʿashƮ ̄NajafƮ ̄whose library 
                                                          
382 ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 3. 
383 His other students included Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī and Mahdī Āshtiyānī, see Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjim 
al-ḥukamāʾ, 180, 188. 
384 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 351-2. 
385 See S. Guppy, The Blindfold Horse: Memories of a Persian Childhood (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006) 23. 
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is testament to the work he did to preserve Shiʿi works of all genres; Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ ̄
who was an important teacher; Manūchahar SadūqƮ ̄ Suhā, Dr. MahdƮ ̄ Muḥaqqiq and Dr. 
Hossein Nasr who are all well known for their academic contribution.386 Below is an 
illustration of his teachers and students: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.8: Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār’s teachers and students. 
 
A৴ qā Aḥmad A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄was born in 1879/1300 in Tehran and was the youngest son of Mirzā 
Ḥasan Āshtiyānī. He studied the classical texts in theoretical ʿ irfān and the ilāhīyat of the Asfār 
with Mirzā Hāshim RashtƮ.̄ He studied the ṭabiʿīyāt and ilāhīyat sections of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Shifāʾ, 
                                                          
386 See Muḥammad ʿAsṣạ̄r, Pāsukh nāma, ed. Aḥmad ʿĀbidī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 19. 
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the commentary on the al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt of Ibn Sīnā, the journey of the soul in the 
Asfār and other general issues in the Asfār under Mirzā Ḥasan Kirmanshāhī and was taught a 
large part of the Asfār by Shihāb al-DƮn̄ NayrƮz̄Ʈ.̄ He also studied medicine with famous 
teachers during his time. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī has based his edition of Tamhīd al-qawāʾid on 
Āqā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī’s critical edition of the text and a version written by Mirzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī who wrote glosses on it, some of which seem to have been copied from his teacher 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī.387  
 
MƮr̄zā Abū-l-Ḥasan ShaʿrānƮ ̄TihrānƮ ̄(d. 1435/2014) is an example of a ḥakīm who tried to apply 
his training in ḥikmat to elucidate the Islamic scriptural sources, He had studied in the 
Madrasa-yi MarwƮ ̄and wrote super commentary on ṬūsƮ’̄s Tajrīd; an introduction and gloss on 
Sabzavārī’s Asrār al-ḥikam; and a book on philosophical terminology. As to the scriptural 
sources he produced translations and commentaries on Duʿaʾ al-ʿarafa of Imam Ḥusayn and 
SaḥƬf̄ah Sajjādīyah; a gloss on the commentary on the Qurʾān called Manhaj al-ṣādiqƬn̄; a gloss 
on Majmaʿ al-bayān; a gloss on the hermeneutical work of Abū-l-Futūḥ al-RāzƮ;̄ an incomplete 
encyclopedia of Qurʾānic terminology; a gloss on Mullā Ṣāliḥ’s commentary on Usụ̄l al-kāfƬ;̄ 
glosses on Wasāʿil al-shƬ ̄ʿ a and Irshād al-qulūb. He also produced some astronomical works 
and taught astronomy at the Sepahsālār. Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄was one of his special students. 
ShaʿrānƮ’̄s teachers in the intellectual sciences had included MƮr̄zā Maḥmūd QummƮ.̄ He 
distinguished between tasạwwuf that does not benefit the murƬd̄ with practices outside of the 
divine law and spiritual development within the bounds of the law.388 
                                                          
387 Isfahanī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 14-
17. 
388 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 381 and BadƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ,̄ M. Dar asmān-i maʿrifat (Qum: Tashayyuʿ, 1385 Sh/2006) 132-175. 
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The last major figure of this generation to be mentioned in this section is Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan 
RāfiʿƮ ̄QazvƮn̄ī who came from an esteemed family of Shiʿi scholars.389 He began his studies in 
his hometown of Qazvin before traveling to Tehran to pursue them at a higher level and began 
studying under Shaykh ʿAbd al-Nabī Nūrī in 1915.390 He also studied under MƮr̄zā Ḥasan 
KirmānshāhƮ,̄ Hājī Fāżil TihrānƮ ̄ShamƮr̄ānƮ ̄and MƮr̄zā Maḥmūd QummƮ ̄among others.391 He 
also studied mathematics with MƮr̄zā IbrāhƮm̄ ZanjānƮ ̄and Shaykh ʿAlƮ ̄RustƮ ̄before traveling 
to Qazvin for two years in 1920.392 On his return to Tehran he taught a variety of books 
including the Manẓūma and Ibn SƮn̄ā’s Ishārāt, and then went to Qum in 1922 where he 
attended Shaykh ʿAbd al-KarƮm̄ ḤāʾrƮ ̄YazdƮ’̄s classes in jurisprudence and its principles while 
teaching the books of jurisprudence and its principles as well as holding classes on the Asfār 
and the Manẓūma.393 He then moved back to Qazvin for between 1930-1960 before returning 
to Tehran where he passed away.394 He studied ʿirfān with MƮr̄zā Hāshim AshkivarƮ ̄for some 
time.395  
 
QazvƮn̄ī’s many students included Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ,̄ Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ 
Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Dr IbrāhƮm̄ DƮn̄ānƮ ̄and Dr Sayyid Hossein Nasr.396 QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄wrote glosses 
                                                          
389 For a study of some of the major themes in his writings see M. ArdastānƮ,̄ Rafʿat ḥikmat: AndƬs̄ha-nāma-yi 
Āyātallāh ʿAllāma Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan RafƬ ̄ʿ Ƭ ̄QazvƬn̄Ƭ ̄ (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va 
andƮs̄ha-yi IslāmƮ,̄ 1388 Sh/2009). 
390 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 19. 
391 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 19. 
392 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 19. 
393 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 20. 
394 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 21. 
395 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 25. 
396 QazwƮn̄Ʈ,̄ Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 30-31. 
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on many works including all the taught texts in the ḥikmat tradition. He wrote separate 
treatises on many subjects including waḥdat al-wujūd, motion in the category of substance, 
the reality of the intellect, ḥudūth al-dahrƬ,̄ the reality of the night of decree, the Prophet’s 
night ascension and a commentary on the supplication recited in the mornings in the month 
of Ramadan. 
 
By discussing some of the most important figures in each generation of the scholars of the 
ḥikmat tradition, this section has shown how the tradition has been passed though close 
teacher student relationships which has been the hallmark of classical Islamic education. 
While the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn ʿ ArabƮ ̄had been faithfully transmitted by clarifying 
the meanings of obscure phrases in their works and explaining their thoughts and 
ramifications, the tradition also developed its own interpretations and a plethora of works 
were written. Some of these works returned to the original scriptural sources with the strength 
of philosophical thought and ʿirfānī illumination, whereas other works added dimensions to 
understanding the original texts through glossing and commentating on them. Important 
treatises on key topics such as wujūd, walāyah, resurrection, changes in decree, logic, spiritual 
wayfaring and other topics important to the understanding and application of ḥikmat or 
related to its practical realization were authored. Critical editions of important texts and well 
as translations of the Asfār and other important Shiʿi works were produced. This method of 
learning continued in the school of Qum, to which we will shortly focus our attention.  
 
What is noticeable about the last generation of ḥukamāʾ that graduated from the school of 
Tehran is a balance between the more philosophical reading and the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā 
Ṣadrā. Although there were those who inclined more to a specific reading, most of these 
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ḥukamāʾ sought to benefit from variant readings by attending the classes of different experts. 
At this stage in the development of ḥikmat and its teaching in Iran there was a level of 
cohesion. That cohesion was propounded by some of their students who became teachers in 
the school of Qum. However, in the present age there is a wider separation between the two 
readings amongst the students of ḥikmat and the reasons for that will be explained further in 
the following sections.  
 
4. The School of Qum 
 
Qum has been a centre of traditional Shiʿi learning for centuries; however, the mainstream 
ḥawza was usually associated traditionalism as Qum has been an important centre of ḥadīth 
scholarship. 397 Yet it hosted some of the best ḥukamāʾ of the Safavid period in its geographical 
periphery such as Mullā Ṣadrā who spent his years of seclusion in Kahak, and Fayḍ Kāshānī 
who retired to Kashan where he was a prolific writer and teacher. While Isfahan and Tehran 
flourished as the centres of philosophy, there was no notable figure like Sabzavārī to start a 
centre of ḥikmat in Qum. There were others who spoke out against Sufism such as Muḥammad 
Tāhir Qummī who had been a student of Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī and was later based in Qum 
where he wrote a treatise with anti-Sufi sentiment.398 This situation has changed in recent 
times due to various factors, the most important of which are the migration of philosophers 
— including those trained by the school of Tehran — after the rejuvenation of the ḥawza in 
                                                          
397 See M. al-Ṭabsī, Qum: ʿĀṣimat al-ḥaḍāra al-shīʿīya (Beirut: Dār Jawād al-aʾimma, 2006) and Newman, The 
Formative Period of Twelver Shīcism both of which give some insight into the intellectual milieu in Qum. 
398 K. Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2002) 425-429. 
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Qum under the leadership of ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī (d. 1355/1930) and the success of the 
Islamic revolution.399  
 
Sadrian philosophy found its popularity and became more significant after the revolution due 
to the new role of traditionally trained scholars in national politics400 and the role philosophy 
played in defending the Islamic outlook from competing ideologies such as Marxism and 
Westernisation. The foundations for traditional scholarship in Qum had been set by ʿAbd al-
Karīm Ḥāʾirī YazdƮ ̄401— who within the space of a few years revitalized Qum as a centre of 
learning — and Āyātullah Burūjurdī, who introduced important financial reforms.402 The two 
visits to Qum by Aḥmad Shah Qajar during Ḥāʾirī’s term also contributed to the thriving of 
Qum.403 His first visit was in 1342/1923 to present his congratulations for its establishment and 
the second visit was on the arrival of some of the most eminent scholars of Najaf to Qum. 
These scholars included the likes of Abū-l-Ḥasan Isfahanī and Mirzā Ḥusayn Nāʾīnī.  Ḥāʾirī 
welcomed these scholars and immediately vested them with teaching positions which helped 
                                                          
399 See Shīrāzī Nayrīzī, Shihāb al-Dīn. al-Ḥawāshī ʿalā Tamhīd al-qawāʾid, ed. by Wisām al-Khaṭāwī and 
Muḥammad al-Mahrī al-Sabzawārī (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Sayyida al-Maʿṣūma, 2009) 5. 
400 See Mullā Ṣadrā, The Elixir of the Gnostics (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2003) xiii. 
401 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 112. For more information on his life see H. Algar, “Ḥāʾeri”, in Encyclopaedia 
Iranica [online], 2002, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/haeri [Accessed 24/5/2016]. 
402 See H. Algar, “Borūjerdī, Ḥosayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica [online], 1989, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/borujerdi-ayatollah-hajj-aqa-hosayn-tabatabai-1292-1380-1875-1961 
[Accessed 24/05/2016] and ʿ A. JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād (Qum: Intishārāt-I Isrāʾ, 1381 Sh/2002) 99-116. Burūjurdī 
studied philosophy with A৴khund KāshƮ ̄and JahāngƮr̄ Khān QashqāʾƮ,̄ LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 100, nt. 1. 
ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī YazdƮ ̄had previously established a ḥawza in Arāk but when he moved to Qum his students 
moved with him and the ḥawza in Arāk consequently fizzled out, see Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-
yi ʿIlmiyya, 8. 
403 Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya, 42. 
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to bolster Qum’s intellectual activity.404 The resultant “university town”405 home to the school 
of Qum has not been investigated in depth in modern scholarship.  
 
Some publications have investigated the views of specific figures,406 such as Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī407 and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī408 but the largest contributions have been by 
way of translations of their works, originally written in Persian and Arabic. Such translations 
are usually targeted at the lay Shiʿi lay population in English speaking countries and are, at 
times, poor renditions of the originals.409 Information about the scholars in this school and 
their works can also be found in the forwards of these translations.410 The lack of material in 
English may lead some to believe that Qum has remained disinterested in ḥikmat tradition or 
has some limited involvement with it, however, a review of the works published in Persian 
and Arabic and of scholars of importance over the last few years paints an entirely different 
picture. 
 
                                                          
404 Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya, 42. 
405 M. Litvak, Shici Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq, 2, where he uses the term in reference to Najaf which has 
similar characteristics as a center of learning, commerce and pilgrimage. 
406 One exception to this is the publication of Mehdī Hāʾiri Yazdī’s PhD dissertation which was originally written 
in English. See M. Haʾiri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence 
(Albany, SUNY Press, 1992).  
407 See H. Algar, “ʻAllāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī: Philosopher, Exegete, and Gnostic”; and M. H. 
Tihrani, Shining Sun [Mihr-i tābān], tr. Tawus Raja (London, ICAS Press, 2011). 
408 See A. Matsumoto, “Ayatollah Khomeini and the Concepts of Wilayah and Walayah”, in Journal of Shiʻa Islamic 
Studies, 2010, (3/1), 5-23. 
409 See for example, M. Mutahhari, M. H. Tabatabai, and R. Khumayni, Light Within Me (Qum: Ansariyan 
Publications, 2001) and M. H. Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel showing the difference in the quality of publishing. 
410 For example, on ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī see the references above as well as M. H. Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements of 
Islamic Metaphysics, (Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah), tr. Sayyid ʻAlī Qūlī Qarā’ī (London: ICAS Press, 2003). 
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Two important interrelated developments in the history of Islamic philosophy occur with the 
school of Qum. The first is the expansion of the discipline from a few interested individuals to 
the larger population of Shiʿi scholars. One of the key reasons that enabled this expansion of 
the ḥikmat audience was the introduction of Bidāyat al-ḥikma which is an introductory text 
written by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī to be studied by all students of the ḥawza regardless of their 
specialisation. Bidāyat is written in accordance with a Peripatetic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and 
in many places Ṭabāṭabāʾī holds positions on philosophical issues which are Peripatetic rather 
than Sadrian. The book also completely removes the ʿirfānī discussions or explanations of 
ḥikmat which are found in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works.  
 
The consequence of this method of explaining ḥikmat is that the most widespread 
understanding of ḥikmat among ḥawza students based on a Peripatetic reading without the 
inclusion of theoretical ʿirfān. Ṭabāṭabāʾī also wrote a text for advanced students of ḥikmat 
called Nihāyat al-ḥikma. The same issues explained above concerning Bidāyat are to be found 
in Nihāyat and have had a profound effect on the study of ḥikmat as the ʿirfānī reading of 
ḥikmat may only be studied after completing Nihāyat, but is usually embarked upon after 
reading the Asfār as well. Other factors which have increased the ḥikmat audience include 
recorded lectures on most of the studied books of ḥikmat which has facilitated self learning 
and the continuation of learning after leaving Qum; the publication of a critical edition of the 
Asfār; the availability of philosophical books; and the monetary concentration on Qum and 
its development as the primary centre of learning in the Shiʿi world.  
 
Philosophy plays a key role in disciplines such as the principles of jurisprudence which 
incorporate a level of philosophical discussion at the level of baḥth al-khārij (advanced 
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research). This means that a student of jurisprudence — which continues to be the mainstay 
of the ḥawza — requires a good understanding of philosophy to full participate in 
contemporary discussions on the principles of jurisprudence. In some sense this is a natural 
development as the principles of jurisprudence is a meta-science considering the 
methodological issues in deriving jurisprudential rulings and is therefore philosophical by 
nature. Philosophy is therefore taught to increase the prowess of a scholar and ensure sound 
intellectual abilities.  
 
The second development is the visible separation in the teaching of philosophy and ʿirfān 
among contemporary teachers of the school of Qum such as Misḅāḥ YazdƮ ̄and Ghulām-Riżā 
FayyāżƮ.̄ As mentioned above, this phenomenon finds its roots in the institutionalization of 
the ḥikmat tradition in the traditional seminary and a precedent in Bidāyat al-ḥikma. 
Furthermore, solely teaching a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā at an introductory level 
to a wider corpus of students means many of these students who do not specialise in ḥikmat 
do not experience or understand the close relationship between philosophy and ʿirfān still 
advocated by other members of the school of Qum such as Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Sayyid Kamāl 
Ḥaydarī and Muḥammad TaqƮ ̄JaʿfarƮ.̄411  
 
                                                          
411 Muḥammad TaqƮ ̄JaʿfarƮ ̄studied at the madrasa MarwƮ ̄and studied the Manẓūma and the Asfār with MƮr̄zā 
MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ.̄ He travelled to Najaf where alongside his studies in jurisprudence and its principles, he studied 
philosophy with Shaykh Ṣadrā QafqārƮ ̄and Shaykh Murtażā ṬāliqānƮ.̄ He returned to Tehran and began a career 
teaching and writing, producing voluminous commentaries on Nahj al-Balāgha and the Mathnawi ̄ of RumƮ ̄
among about one hundred and fifty works. He also studied Western philosophy and the contemporary issues 
they raised, see M. F. AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, in Fasạlnāma-i isrāʾ, 1388 Sh/2010, (2) 128-
130. 
156  
The school of Qum also develops characteristics found in earlier schools, the most important 
of which is its interaction with Western philosophy and its elucidation of ideas fermented in 
its traditional milieu. It was Islamic metaphysics that asserted an Islamic worldview and 
protected the position of the ḥawza in the face of an onslaught of new ideas from the West. 
Works in this regard were written by ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ Murtażā MutạhharƮ ̄ and MahdƮ ̄
ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ.̄ The most important of these works was Uṣūl-i falsafa va ravish-i riʾalīsm written 
by Ṭabāṭabāʾī and commented upon by Muṭahharī which was a timely written book dealing 
with western thought and Marxism. Muṭahhari also has works on social issues such as hijāb 
(Islamic modest dress), education in Islam and sexual ethics.412 The school of Qum uses ḥikmat 
and theoretical ʿirfān as a tool to increase the depth of unrelated topics such as political 
philosophy in the scheme of walāyat al-faqƬh̄ (guardianship of the jurist), Qurʾānic 
hermeneutics, ethics and the environment. This has its precedent in the wide inclusion of 
topics in the writings of Mullā Ṣadrā and its contemporary manifestation in the prolific 
writings of JavādƮ ̄ A৴ mulƮ,̄ Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Misḅāḥ YazdƮ ̄ and Jaʿfar SubḥānƮ.̄ The state of 
completeness (jamʿ) between knowledge of the intellectual and transmitted sciences as well 
as ʿirfānī realization on a practical level, as the quintessential prototype of the perfect scholar 
is the driving force behind such efforts. Knowing reality is attained by utilizing all of man’s 
abilities and revelation, expressed as an infusion of Qurʾān, philosophical burhān (proof) and 
ʿirfān.413 
                                                          
412 M. Muṭahharī, Masʾala-yi ḥijāb (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ṣadrā, 1368 Sh/1989); M. Muṭahharī, Taʿlīm va tarbiyat dar 
Islam, 56th ed. (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ṣadrā, 1386 Sh/2007) and M. Muṭahharī, Akhlāq-i jinsī dar Islam va jahān-i 
gharb, 29th ed. (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ṣadrā, 1389 Sh/2010). 
413 Ḥasanzāda champions this view and has written a separate treatise on it see: Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Qurʾān 
va ʿirfān va burhān ham judāyī nadārand (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim, 1374 Sh/1995) 
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I. Key figures in the School of Qum 
 
There are several key figures that have been instrumental in shaping the philosophical and 
ʿirfānī landscape in the contemporary ḥawza. In this section some of those figures will be 
examined further. Perhaps the most influential philosopher in establishing the school of Qum 
was ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ who as well as writing the twin seminal texts, 
Bidāyat al-ḥikma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma, which replaced Mullā HādƮ ̄ Sabzavārī’s Sharḥ al-
manẓūma as the taught text in the ḥawza, wrote some valuable treatises; a major work of 
Qurʾānic hermeneutics al-MƬz̄ān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān; and trained important students who 
currently hold the mantle of philosophy and ʿirfān in the contemporary ḥawza. ʿIrfān was the 
hallmark of Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ,̄ the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and his stance 
on the subject contributed to its acceptance in the mainstream ḥawza.  
 
At the same time, other important teachers from the school of Tehran like Shaykh 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil TūnƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄IlāhƮ ̄Qumshihī, Sayyid 
Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r, Aḥmad A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ MƮr̄zā Abū-l-Ḥasan ShaʿrānƮ ̄and Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan RāfiʿƮ ̄
QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄ contributed to the education of important students like ʿAbd Allāh JavādƮ ̄ A৴ mulƮ,̄ 
Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ Dr Ghulām-Ḥusayn IbrāhƮm̄ DƮn̄ānƮ ̄414 
                                                          
414 A professor at the University of Tehran who has a number of important works including Gh. I. DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Qawāʾid-
i kullƬ-̄i falsafƬ ̄ dar falsafa-i IslāmƬ,̄ 2 vols (Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i ʿulūm-i insānƮ ̄ va mutạ̄liʿāt-i farhangƮ,̄ 1388 
Sh/2009); Gh. I. DƮn̄ānƮ,̄ Shuʿāʿ-yi andƬs̄ha va shuhūd dar falsafa-i SuhrawardƬ;̄ and Gh. I. DƮn̄ānƮ ̄Wujūd-i rābit ̣va 
mustaqil dar falsafa-i IslāmƬ ̄(Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pazhūhishƮ-̄yi ḥikmat va falsafa-i I ৴rān, 1383 Sh/2004). 
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Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ ̄415 and Sayyid Hossein Nasr. These students of the school of Qum 
are teachers in various intellectual environments including Iranian and Western academia 
and are current experts in their fields. In the contemporary era their students enjoy increased 
popularity and will eventually take their place in shaping the landscape of philosophy and 
ʿirfān in the Iranian ḥawza. Some of those students include Dāwūd ṢamadƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ,̄416 Ghulām-
                                                          
415 He was a student of MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄for about fourteen years, studying the Fusụ̄s ̣of Ibn ʿArabƮ,̄ Misḅāḥ 
al-uns, Ṣadrā’s al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya and parts of the Fusụ̄s ̣ of FarābƮ ̄ with him during that time. He had 
immense respect for his teacher and always had pen in hand during class. After A৴ shiyānƮ’̄s death he attended the 
classes of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfi‘Ʈ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄for twenty years and would have private classes in ʿirfān with him during 
the holidays. He also attended the classes of MahdƮ ̄Qumshihī and Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r. See M. RabbānƮ,̄ Ḥamd-i 
RabbānƬ ̄(Qum: Matḅūʿāt-i dƮn̄Ʈ,̄ 1382 Sh/2003) 4-7. He has written commentaries on the Qurʾānic chapters of al-
Fātiḥah (chapter 1) and al-Kawthar (chapter 108); a book on Lady Fātịmah; the Prophet’s night ascension; Imām 
Ḥusayn and his companions; and resurrection. See Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ,̄ Kawsar-i RabbānƬ ̄ (no place: 
Intishārāt-i muʾallif, 1371 Sh/1992); Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ,̄ AৄʾƬn̄a-yi īzadnuma ̄ (Tehran: Nashr-i jānān, 1376 
Sh/1997); M. RabbānƮ,̄ Miʿrāj-i RabbānƬ ̄ (Tehran: Nashr-i dānā, 1382 Sh/2003); Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ,̄ 
Sarmastān ṣuhbā-yi ʿishq (Qum: Biżʿa-yi rasūl, 1383 Sh/2004); and Muḥammad Riżā RabbānƮ,̄ Maʿād-i Rabbānī 
(no place: Muʾassasa-yi kƮh̄ān, 1376 Sh/1997). 
416 He has made important contributions as a commentator on A৴yātullāh Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ’̄s works including D. 
ṢamadƮ ̄ĀmūlƮ,̄ Sharḥ daftar-i dil (Qum: Intishārāt-i nabūgh, 1386 Sh/2007) which is an exposition of some of 
Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ’̄s poetry; D. ṢamadƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ,̄ Sharḥ marātib-i tahārat az risāla-yi vaḥdat az dƬd̄gāh-i ʿ ārif va ḥakƬm̄ 
ʿallāma-yi Ḥasanzāda AৄmulƬ ̄(Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim A৴ l Muḥammad, 1388 Sh/2009); D. ṢamadƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Aৄdāb-i 
sālik ilā Allāh (Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mƮm̄, 1386 Sh/2007); and D. ṢamadƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Sharḥ risāla rābitạ-i ʿilm va dƬn̄ 
(Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim A৴ l Muḥammad, 1387 Sh/2008). He has also translated some of Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ’̄s works 
into Farsi including Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ Tarjuma-yi risāla-i wujūd-i rābit ̣ va rābitƬ̣,̄ tr. D. Ṣamadī Āmulī 
(Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mƮm̄, 1387 Sh/2008); Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Tarjuma-yi risāla-i jaʿl, tr. D. Ṣamadī Āmulī 
(Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mƮm̄, 1387 Sh/2008); Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Adhkār-i sālik ilā Allāh, tr. D. Ṣamadī Āmulī 
(Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mƮm̄, 1387 Sh/2008). His own works include a book on consciousness from a practical 
ʿirfān perspective, see D. ṢamadƮ ̄ A৴mulƮ,̄ Ḥużūr va murāqabāt (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim A৴ l Muḥammad, 1387 
Sh/2008); and a commentary on ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s Nihāyat al-ḥikma, see Dāwūd ṢamadƮ ̄ A৴mulƮ,̄ Sharḥ nihāyat al-
ḥikma, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim A৴ l Muḥammad, 1386 Sh/2007). 
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Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄417 Ḥasan RamażānƮ ̄KhurasānƮ,̄418 Muḥammad Ḥusayn NāʿƮj̄Ʈ,̄419 ḤamƮd̄ Parsāniā420 
and Sayyid Yad-Allāh Yazdānpanāh.421  
 
Aside for these key students many others were trained by the second generation of teachers 
in the school of Qum and the students of JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄and Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄are especially 
plentiful in the current ḥawza system. With the introduction of recording devices during the 
careers of the A৴ mulƮs̄ the lessons of these masters have been preserved for future generations 
who may not have had direct access to their classes. Recorded lessons of the A৴ mulƮs̄ and some 
of their most important students include all the major works and seminal texts in philosophy 
and ʿirfān and are easily available at low prices. These recorded sessions are often transcribed 
further facilitating the possibility of self study, which adds a new dimension to traditional 
Islamic learning, allowing students to benefit from a variety of classes on the same text 
whether they are present in Qum or anywhere else in the world. This development especially 
facilitates learning for women, who are usually unable to attend segregated classes. The 
critical editions of important works produced by both the school of Tehran and the school of 
                                                          
417 A famous teacher of ḥikmat, who is more well known for his departures from Sadrian philosophy some of 
which are explained in his four volume gloss of ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s Niḥāyat al-ḥikma. 
418 Who has trained many students as well as produced an important Arabic gloss on Ibn Turkah’s TamhƬd̄ al-
qawāʾid and a treatise on asceticism in ʿ irfān in a series of forty lessons using Khwājah ʿ Abd Allāh Ansạ̄rƮ’̄s Manāzil 
al-sāʾirƬn̄ as a basis, see Ḥ. Ramażānī KhurasānƮ,̄ Riyāḍat dar ʿurf-i ʿirfān (Qum: A৴yat-i ishrāq, 1388 Sh/2009).  
419 He has produced a sizable Farsi commentary on TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid in two volumes and possibly the first 
complete ShƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ ̄commentary on Misḅāh al-uns of Ḥamzah FanārƮ ̄in Farsi in five thick volumes.  
420 The author of various writings including a book on Science and Philosophy see H. PārsānƮȳā, ʿUlūm va falsafa 
(Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va andƮs̄ha-yi islāmƮ,̄ 1388 Sh/2009).  
421 His introductory lessons on ʿ irfān have been transcribed and published, see Yazdānpanāh, MabānƬ;̄ he has also 
written a two volume work on Iluminationist philosophy see Y. Yazdānpanāh, Ḥikmat-i ishrāq, ed. M. ʿAlīpūr, 2 
vols (Qum: Pazhūhishgāh-yi ḥawza va dānashgāh and Tehran: Sāzmān-i muṭālaʿa va tadvīn-i kutub ʿ ulūm-i insānī 
dānashgāh-hā, 1391 Sh/2012).  
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Qum became widely distributed with the modernization of the printing press. More recently 
software which contain libraries of books and search facilities are provided at discounted 
prices to seminary students, further facilitating the study and spread of ḥikmat within or 
outside the city of Qum.  
 
i. Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ ̄
 
Although KhumaynƮ ̄taught philosophy he was clearly more influenced by and took a larger 
interest in the ʿirfānī aspects of the ḥikmat tradition and this is evident in his writing where he 
more often expresses his ideas in ʿirfānī terms. This aspect of his personality was also evident 
from his disinterest in Peripatetic philosophy as opposed to Illuminationist and 
transcendental philosophy, which are both closer to ʿirfān than the purely rational approach 
of the Peripatetics.422 He felt that Sadrian philosophy was so different to the Greek philosophy 
that greatly influenced the Peripatetics that Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy could 
not be said to have originated in Greek philosophy.423 This outlook clearly influenced both his 
reading and teaching of Mullā Ṣadrā. He studied ʿirfān under Muḥammad ʿAlƮ ̄ShāhābādƮ ̄and 
frequently acknowledges his teacher’s excellence in his writings.424  He also studied ʿirfān with 
MƮr̄zā Javād MalikƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ for a short period until his death. Tabrīzī had migrated to Qum 
                                                          
422 M. ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ Justārhā-yi falsafƬ,̄ ed. ʿA. Naṣrī (Tehran: Muʾassasah-i pazhūhishƮ-̄yi ḥikmat va falsafa-i I ৴rān, 
1384 Sh/2005) 356-7; 482. 
423 See Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ NaqdƬ ̄bar Tahāfat al-falāsifa-i GhazālƬ ̄(Qum: Daftar-i tablƮḡhāt-i IslāmƮ,̄ 1378 
Sh/1999) 30. 
424 He has mentioned him by name about fifty times in his collected works and also refers to him with terms such 
as Shayykhunā and the perfect ʿārif (ʿārif-i kāmil). 
161  
from Najaf after spending some time in Tabriz and Tehran.425 MalikƮ ̄ TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄ wrote on the 
secrets of prayer in Asrār al-salāt; on meeting God in Risālat liqā Allāh; and the spiritual states 
and manners of each month of the Islamic calendar in al-Murāqabāt.  
 
KhumaynƮ’̄s teachers in ḥikmat included Abū-l-Hạsan RāfiʿƮ ̄QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄and ʿAlƮ ̄Akbar YazdƮ,̄426 
who was a student of AlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva.427 KhumaynƮ ̄contributed to 
the field by writing glosses on QayṣarƮ’̄s commentary on the Fusụ̄ṣ428 and Misḅāḥ al-uns; a 
commentary on sūrat al-Fātiḥa (the first chapter of the Qurʾān); two books on prayer, Asrār 
al-ṣalāt and Aৄdāb al-ṣalāt; a commentary on the supplication recited in the early hours of the 
morning in the month of Ramaḍān known as Duʿāʾ al-saḥr; a commentary on forty aḥādƬt̄h 
which serves as a text from which classes on ethics are given in the contemporary ḥawza; a 
commentary on one ḥadƬt̄h from al-KāfƬ ̄called Junūd-i aql va jahl; and an important work on 
walāyah called Misḅāḥ al-hidāya ilā al-kilāfa wa al-walāya.429 He also wrote glosses on the Asfār 
which have been lost.430 KhumaynƮ ̄believed that a book on ethics should not explain ethical 
issues in an academic and detached way, but that the book itself should improve the readers 
and solve their ethical deficiencies.431 That is that since knowledge should not be pursued 
                                                          
425 BadƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ,̄ Dar asmān-i maʿrifat, 111. 
426 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 113 
427 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 454; 480. 
428 A commentary on his gloss has been published, see ʿA. MaẓāhirƮ,̄ Sharḥ taʿlƬq̄a-yi Āyātallāh al-ʿuẓmā Imām 
KumaynƬ ̄bar Fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam-i Ibn ʿArabƬ ̄(Tehran: Nashr-i ʿilm, 1387 Sh/2008). 
429 For a discussion of this see Y, Bonaud, L’Imam Khomeyni, un gnostique méconnu du XXe siècle (Paris: al-Bouraq, 
1997) 268-277.  
430 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 114. 
431 He expressed this view in his ethical writings, see for example, Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ,̄ Junūd al-ʿaql wa al-jahl, 
tr. A. FahrƮ ̄(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamƮ ̄li-l-matḅūʿāt, 2009) 10-11. 
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simply for its own sake, but for self improvement and seeking the Truth, writings dealing with 
those subjects should reflect those aims and stay away from scientific points of limited use.  
 
KhumaynƮ ̄ was an accomplished jurist and spent many years studying and teaching 
jurisprudence and its principles at the highest levels offered by the Islamic seminary and was 
the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran. His most prominent teacher of jurisprudence and 
its principles was the founder of the seminary in Qum, ʿAbd al-KarƮm̄ ḤāʾirƮ ̄ YazdƮ.̄ The 
collective nature of his personality as jurist, ʿārif, philosopher and revolutionary has served as 
an inspiration to many, especially those within the ḥawza and his ideas are taught until today 
in the modern ḥawza. He taught Sharḥ al-manẓūma and the Asfār in Qum between 1944 and 
1949 although many of his classes were private due to the negative attitude towards 
philosophy in Qum at that time when some philosophers were pronounced infidels.432 It was 
KhumaynƮ’̄s attitude in creating an environment for philosophy that paved the way for the 
success of other philosophers like ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.433 His students include Murtażā 
MutạhharƮ,̄ MahdƮ ̄ ḤāʾirƮ ̄ YazdƮ,̄ Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ and Sayyid ʿAbd al-GhanƮ ̄
ArdabƮl̄Ʈ.̄434 
 
ii. ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ 
 
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the key figure who transmitted the philosophical teachings of the 
school of Tehran to the school of Qum and the time he spent in Qum marks a key turning 
                                                          
432 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 114. 
433 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 114. 
434 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 114. 
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point in the ḥawza.435 While most biographical accounts about him are posthumous and 
hagiographical, he no doubt had a deep affect on the ḥawza. Soon after ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄arrived 
important students like JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄(in 1955)436 and Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄(in 1963)437 moved to 
Qum from Tehran. His teacher in TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid, Sayyid Ḥusayn BādkūbahƮ ̄was a student 
of Mirzā Hāshim AshkivarƮ ̄who was a student of Muḥammad Riżā QumshihƮ,̄ AlƮ ̄Mudarris 
Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva.438 ʿAllāmah in turn taught TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid among other 
subjects and texts in private circles in Qum but has an Avicennian approach in his 
philosophical writing. His teacher in practical ʿirfān was Sayyid ʿAlƮ ̄QāḍƮ,̄ who had been the 
student of Sayyid Aḥmad KarbalāʾƮ ̄who was a student of Mullā Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ.̄439  
                                                          
435 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄ dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 117. There is not much written about him save H. Algar, 
“ʿAllāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī: Philosopher, exegete, and mystic” and R. Hajatpour, Iranische 
Geistlichkeit zwischen Utopie und Realismus: Zum Diskurs über Herrschafts und Staatsdenken im 20. Jh. 
(Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2002) 160-179. But see S. Rizvi and A. Bdaiwi, “ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-
ḥikma”, in S. Schmidtke and K. Rouayheb (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming) and A. Ehtashami and S. Rizvi “Beyond the Letter: Explanation (tafsīr) versus 
Adaptation (taṭbīq) in Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s al-Mīzān”, in A. Keeler and S. Rizvi (eds.) The Spirit and the Letter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
436 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 133. 
437 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. 
438 See Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī 
KhurāsānƮ,̄ 11; and BadƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ,̄ Dar asmān-i maʿrifat, 20-21. MƮr̄zā Hāshim AshkivarƮ ̄taught in the madrasah Sephasālār 
until he became the head teacher in transcendental philosophy. He has writings in ḥikmat and his gloss on 
Misḅāḥ al-uns has been published. 
439 Mullā Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ ̄was a student of Sayyid ʿAlƮ ̄ShushtarƮ ̄who was a student of Mullā QulƮ ̄Jūlan. 
His chain of teachers ends here and Jūlan’s teacher and to a large extent Jūlan himself was unknown even to 
ShushtarƮ.̄ ShushtarƮ ̄ was a scholar in Shushtar and when he met Jūlan he was confused about a conflict 
concerning land that was disputed as waqf as both sides seemed to have valid arguments. At that time Jūlan came 
to ShushtarƮ’̄s house and told ShushtarƮ ̄to go to Najaf and told him where to find the agreement proving that the 
land was indeed waqf. ShushtarƮ ̄went to Najaf and after some time met Mullā Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ ̄looking 
for guidance. After a while Mullā Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄ HamadānƮ ̄ took on the role of spiritually training students 
including Sayyid Aḥmad KarbalāʾƮ,̄ Shaykh Muḥammad TaqƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄and MƮr̄zā MalikƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ ̄who was one of the 
164  
  
ʿAllāmah takes a philosophical approach to interpreting and explaining Mullā Ṣadrā in all of 
his important works but it is the accounts of his students that betray his more ʿirfānī side.440 
While he was clearly involved in practical ʿirfān he preferred not to discuss philosophical 
issues from an ʿirfānī perspective in his works but rather spoke about ʿirfān in private. The 
meetings in Tehran between ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Henry Corbin441 over a period of twenty 
years displayed a new method of interaction between the Eastern and Western philosophical 
traditions, where the Islamic tradition was respected as a rich tradition in its own right. Such 
a meeting of minds had not been recorded before. Due to this approach Corbin was one of the 
first Orientalists to write about Shiʿi ʿirfān in a depth and therefore one of the pioneers of 
academic interest in the field today. Others included Toshihiko Izutsu, who contributed 
provided a rigorous analysis of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as well as a critical edition and translation 
of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma. Henry Corbin was introduced to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī by 
another important academic; Sayyed Hossein Nasr, who at that time was the director at the 
Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy. 
 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī wrote a number of important works in philosophy. Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ ̄relates 
the story of the genesis of Bidāyat and Nihāyat, in his lectures on Nihāyat al-ḥikma. These 
books were the result of courses he taught to a select number of philosophy students. 
 
                                                          
teachers of Imām KhumaynƮ,̄ see BadƮ ̄ʿ Ʈ,̄ Dar asmān-i maʿrifat, 39-41. See Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel, xvii for a 
diagrammatic representation of his chain until Mullā Ḥusayn-QulƮ ̄HamadānƮ.̄ 
440 For example see Tihrani, Shining Sun, 8-9. 
441 For more information on his life and an annotated bibliography of his works on Islamic topics see D. Shayegan, 
“Corbin, Henry”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica [online], 1993, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/corbin-henry-b 
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Although Mullā HādƮ ̄SabzavārƮ’̄s work Sharḥ gurar al-farāʾid, better known as Sharḥ 
al-manẓūma had been used as the introductory text to the study of philosophy until 
that time, ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄was approached to write an introductory book which 
would be suitable for students of all disciplines as well as exclude some of the more 
ʿirfānī content in Sharḥ al-manẓūma. The Sharḥ al-manẓūma is a poetical rendition of 
transcendental philosophy, based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s magnum opus known as the Asfār. 
Therefore ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄set about writing a work based on Sharḥ al-manẓūma. 
Once he had finished the book was taught for the first time by A৴ yatullāh JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ,̄ 
after which he suggested some improvements that were subsequently incorporated 
into the text. This book was called Bidāyat al-ḥikma. After a while ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄
was approached a second time and was asked to write another book which would be 
suitable for more advanced students of philosophy. This time ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄wrote a book 
directly based on the Asfār, which was subsequently taught by A৴ yatullāh JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄
and became known as Nihāyat al-ḥikma. These two books enabled a large variety of 
students to have a good understanding of philosophical concepts, without having to 
specialize in the study of philosophy.442  
 
Although the Manẓūma and Nihāyat both draw directly on the Asfār, Bidāyat acts as an 
introduction to both of these texts. Its comparatively simple phraseology and summarized 
entries make it a good introductory book to the study of metaphysics as a whole. The lack of 
distinction between the various philosophies included in Bidāyat under the general 
assumption of it being an introductory text in transcendental philosophy leaves room to 
                                                          
442 FayyāżƮ,̄ “Dars 1”, in Tasjīlāt-i durūs-i Nihāyat-i ḥikmat (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi amūzish-i narmafzāʾƮ-̄yi Quds, no 
date) 00:38-06: 27. 
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confuse the beginner. ʿAllāmah’s selection of ideas that he incorporated into Bidāyat and 
Nihāyat offer an insight into some of his views on philosophy. Firstly he was careful to separate 
philosophical, ʿ irfānī and scriptural discussions. So in both books there is no mention of ʿ irfānī 
concepts, nor are there quotes from Qurʾān and aḥādīth. ʿAllāmah believed that these 
discussions all had their own principles and so mixing them would result in inaccurate 
conclusions.443 Secondly, he departs from Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles in some concepts and 
prefers the ideas of the Peripatetic philosophers due to the strength of their demonstrative 
proofs. ʿAllāmah Ṭihrānī summarizes ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s views on philosophy as follows: 
 
Our teacher truly revered Ibn Sina and regarded him as stronger in philosophical 
arguments and demonstration than Mulla Sadra. Meanwhile, he was a proponent of 
Mulla Sadra’s philosophical approach in transforming Greek philosophy, and his new 
and original views in discussing subjects like principality, unity and gradation 
(tashkƬk̄) of being…ʿAllāmah Tabataba’i regarded Mulla Sadra’s philosophy as superior 
to others, and the closest to reality… Moreover, ʿAllāmah maintained that most of the 
objections made against Mulla Sadra and his philosophy were due to failing to 
understand what he really meant in his discussions…ʿAllāmah considered him [Mulla 
Sadra] the reviver of Islamic philosophy…444      
 
Usụ̄l-i falsafa va ravish-i riʾālƬs̄m is a work of comparative philosophy which resulted from 
meetings initiated by Ṭabāṭabāʾī held on Wednesday and Thursday nights.445 In this book 
                                                          
443 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 27. 
444 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 28-29. 
445 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 45. 
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ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄critically analyzes western philosophy and Marxism which at that time was widely 
influencing the worldview of seminary students. At the same time, ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄presented 
Islamic philosophy in a new way.446 He wrote an important treatise on guardianship called 
Risālat al-walāya which has been rendered in English several times. His other treatises include 
a treatise on tawḥīd; a treatise on the Names of God; a treatise on proof; a treatise on error 
(mughālaṭa); a treatise on dreams; and a treatise on potential and action.   
 
TafsƬr̄ al-mƬz̄ān is a work of Qurʾānic hermeneutics which presents a medium between the 
purely intellectual hermeneutical works on the Islamic scriptural sources, presented by a host 
of philosophers, ḥukamāʾ and ʿurafāʾ and the traditional approach to Qurʾānic commentary. 
The work, in parts, successfully uses a self contained hermeneutical method, where the Qurʾān 
is used to explain itself. Since Muslims consider the Qurʾān as the only completely infallible 
source, this method ensures interpretations endorsed by the Qurʾān itself and therefore stays 
away from baseless personal opinion (raʾy).  It is perhaps this breath of appeal that made the 
work so popular and effective. While those not versed in the intricacies of philosophy are able 
to access deeper meanings, those acquainted with the intellectual sciences can appreciate the 
finer ideas ʿ Allāmah presents. ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s step towards spreading philosophy to a wider circle 
of scholars was carried through by one of his most important students; Murtażā MutạhharƮ.̄ 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī traced the inspiration for his method of hermeneutics to his spiritual teacher 
Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī, who had written his own partial commentary using this method,447 saying: 
                                                          
446 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 118-9. For the book itself see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 
Usūl-i falsafa va ravesh-i riʾālīsm, introduced and glossed by Murtaẓā Muṭahharī, 5 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
ṣadrā, 1387-1389 Sh/2008-2010) 
447 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 45-46. 
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It was the late Qadi who taught us this style of interpreting the verses of the Qur’an by 
one another. We follow his method and style in Qurʾānic hermeneutics. Moreover, he 
was very bright and open-minded on the traditions reported from the Infallible 
Imams. We learnt method of comprehension of traditions, called fiqh al-hadith, from 
him.448 
 
iii. Murtażā MutạhharƮ ̄
 
MutạhharƮ ̄arrived in Qum in 1944 after completing his introductory studies in Mashhad.449 He 
attended KhumaynƮ’̄s classes in the Asfār and Sharḥ al-manẓūma as well as his classes in 
jurisprudence and its principles before attending the classes of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ.̄450 He 
became ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s most significant student and wrote an important commentary on Usụ̄l-i 
falsafa explaining ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s more complicated insights in an accessible way. MutạhharƮ’̄s 
clear style — which betrays a sound understanding — is seen in all of his numerous works 
which were all originally composed in FarsƮ.̄ He wrote commentaries on Ibn SƮn̄ā’s Najāt; parts 
four, eight and nine of Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt; on the ilāhīyāt section of the Shifāʾ; on the Asfār; and 
on Sharḥ al-manẓūma.  
 
                                                          
448 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 18. 
449 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 119. 
450 He also attended the classes of MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄for some time see AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-
i muʿāsịr”, 119. 
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MutạhharƮ ̄ did not limit himself to the traditional books of philosophy. Aside from his 
commentary on Usụ̄l-i falsafa he wrote other works on philosophy in a wider sense such as a 
four volume work on the philosophy of history; a criticism of Marxism;451 on practical 
philosophy where he includes the views of Kant; and the philosophy of ethics. He wrote books 
in ʿirfān on the perfect man; on spiritual freedom; and on the ʿirfānī points in Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry. 
He was also possibly the first452 traditional philosopher to pay serious attention to the history 
of philosophy in his book Khadamāt-i mutaqābil-i Islām wa Irৄān. The works he wrote in other 
subjects such as prophethood, justice and the purpose of the human derive from his 
philosophical outlook which was heavily influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā and his understanding of 
the Islamic scriptural sources. His clear style and numerous writings and speeches on various 
subjects greatly contributed to the dissemination of ḥikmat amongst other scholars and lay 
Muslims.  He thereafter moved to Tehran in 1952 where he was intellectually and politically 
active until he was assassinated.453  
 
iv. MahdƮ ̄ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ ̄
 
MahdƮ ̄(d. 1420/1999) was the son of ʿ Abd al-KarƮm̄ ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ who had established the ḥawza 
in Qum. MahdƮ ̄ studied philosophy with MƮr̄zā MahdƮ ̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ Sayyid Aḥmad KhunsārƮ,̄ 
                                                          
451 Muṭahharī disusses Marxism in a variety of contexts but for his critique of materialism in general where he 
also discusses Marxism see M. Muṭahharī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ustād shahīd Muṭahharī, 27 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-
i ṣadrā, 1378 Sh/ 1999) (3) 23-54.  
452 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 121. 
453 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 119. He taught at the MarwƮ ̄school while JavādƮ ̄Āmulī was 
there and that is how they became colleges. MutạhharƮ ̄would seek JavādƮ ̄Āmulī’s help in finding sources in the 
library as he was new to the school, see JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 92. 
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Sayf-Allāh I৴sƮ ̄and Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ ̄with who he studied the Manẓūma and the Asfār for 
more than ten years.454 He maintained scholarly connection with KhumaynƮ ̄ via written 
correspondence and would ask him about problems he was having understanding ʿirfānī 
texts.455 After completing his traditional studies and obtaining a doctorate from the University 
of Tehran he traveled to America and wrote a book on the epistemological notion of 
knowledge by presence.456 He spent about ten years studying and teaching at western 
universities, including Harvard and Oxford, before returning to teach at the University of 
Tehran.457 He is one of the earliest ḥukamāʾ to experience Western thought first hand, perhaps 
preceded only by Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r.458 He has written works on universal science, pure 
reason (ʿaql-i naẓarƬ)̄, practical reason (ʿaql-i ʿamalƬ)̄ comparative notions of existence in his 
work Haram-i hastƬ ̄ (The Pyramid of Existence), and a Arabic commentary on the Shifāʾ.459 
Some of his courses have been transcribed including his classes on analytic philosophy, the 
fourth journey of the Asfār in a book called Safar-i nafs (The Journey of the Soul), and 
philosophical investigations.460 
 
v. Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄
 
                                                          
454 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 122. 
455 ḤāʾirƮ ̄Yazdī, Justārhā-yi falsafƬ,̄ 482 
456 See ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ Knowledge by Presence. 
457 ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ Knowledge by Presence, x. 
458 ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ Knowledge by Presence, x-xi. 
459 ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ Knowledge by Presence, xi. 
460 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 123. 
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Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ traveled to Qum from Ashtiyan in 1944, where he received his preliminary 
education. Whilst studying the other traditional subjects, he studied philosophy with Shaykh 
MahdƮ ̄ MāzandarānƮ.̄461 He travelled to Najaffor two years in 1956 to strengthen his 
jurisprudence and then returned once more to Qum where he joined the philosophical and 
hermeneutical classes of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ.̄462 He was also a student of Abū-l-Ḥasan RāfiʿƮ ̄
QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄for some time,463 and studied parts of the Asfār with MƮr̄zā Aḥmad A৴ shtiyānƮ.̄464 He 
finally settled down in Mashhad where he taught philosophy and ʿirfān for eleven years. 
 
Sayyid Jalāl al-DƮn̄ is one of the figures better known in the West due to his collaboration with 
Henry Corbin,465 and he has significantly contributed to writing the history of this period in 
the Persian language through the writing of introductions to major works and the publication 
of critical editions of key texts.466 These texts include many of the most important classical 
                                                          
461 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 124-5. 
462 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 125. 
463 Qazvīnī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshƬ,̄ 31.  
464 LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 70, nt. 1. 
465 H. Ziai, “Recent Trends in Arabic and Persian Philosophy”, in P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 422, nt 8. 
466 Other titles not included in the referenced paragraph, many of which he also wrote introductions and glosses 
upon include: AflūtƮ̣ ̄n̄. Uthūlūjīyā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Qum: Intisārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992); ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ Sih 
rasāʾil-i falsafƬ;̄ ʿAlī b. Aḥmad, Mashrʿa al-khusụ̄s ̣ ilā maʿānƬ ̄ al-nusụ̄s,̣ ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: 
Markaz-i tablƮḡhāt-i islāmƮ ̄ḥawza-yi ʿilmīya-yi Qum, 1379 Sh/2000); Saʿīd al-Dīn FarghānƮ,̄ Mashāriq al-darārƬ,̄ ed. 
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Markaz-i tablƮḡhāt-i islāmƮ ̄ ḥawza-yi ʿilmƮȳa-yi Qum, 2000); Muḥsin Fayḍ 
KāshānƮ,̄ Usụ̄l al-maʿārif; Ṣadr al-Dīn QūnawƮ,̄ Iʿjāz al-bayān fƬ ̄ tafsƬr̄ umm al-Qur’ān, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn 
Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 2008); Ṣadr al-Dīn QūnawƮ,̄ Risālat al-nusụ̄ṣ, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī 
(Tehran: Markaz-i nashr-i dānishgāhƮ,̄ 1983); LāhƮj̄Ʈ,̄ Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir; Muḥammad Mahdī NarāqƮ,̄ Al-
lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya fī al-ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya wa al-kalimāt al-wajƬz̄a, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: 
Anjuman-i falsafa va ḥikmat-i I ৴rān, 1978); No author, TafsƬr̄ sūrah fātiḥaḥ al-Kitāb; and J. A৴ shtiyānƮ ̄ (ed.) 
Consciousness and Reality: Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu (Leiden: Brill, 2000). He also wrote introductions 
for other books including: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān JāmƮ,̄ Naqd al-nusụ̄s ̣fƬ ̄sharḥ naqsh al-fusụ̄s,̣ ed. William C. Chittick 
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texts in philosophy and ʿirfān such as Sharḥ fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam of QaysạrƮ ̄and of Muʿayyid al-DƮn̄ 
JandƮ;̄ Tamhīd al-qawāʾid with the glosses of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Maḥmūd 
Qummī, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Shawāhid al-rubūbīya; al-Maẓāhir al-ilāhīya; and al-Mabdaʿ wa al-
maʿād; as well as selected texts from the time of Mullā Ṣadrā  to Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄including texts 
by Muḥammad MahdƮ ̄ NarāqƮ,̄ Muḥammad Bīdābādī, Mullā IsmāʿƮl̄ KhwājūʾƮ,̄ QāḍƮ ̄ SaʿƮd̄ 
QummƮ ̄and Fayḍ KāshānƮ ̄in Muntakhābātī az āsār-i ḥukamā-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān comprising of four 
volumes. He also published and introduced works produced by the school of Tehran such as 
ʿAbd Allāh ZunūzƮ’̄s Anvār-i jalƬȳa dar kashf-i asrār-i ḥaqƬq̄a-i ʿAlawīya and his Lamaʿāt al-
ilāhīya; a collection of Mullā HādƮ ̄Sabzavārī’s treatises; Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r’s collected works; 
and MahdƮ ̄A৴ shtiyānƮ’̄s Asās al-tawḥƬd̄.  
 
The breadth of his publications means that the history of ḥikmat and especially its history after 
Mullā Ṣadrā can barely be studied without reference to A৴ shtiyānƮ’̄s valuable contribution. He 
was a prolific writer and produced important works in ḥikmat and ʿirfān such as NaqdƬ ̄bar 
Tahāfat al-falāsifa-i GhazālƬ ̄(Criticisms on the Incoherence of GhazālƮ)̄, Sharḥ-i ḥāl va ārā-yi 
falsafƬ-̄i Mullā Ṣadrā (A Commentary on the State and Opinions of Mullā Ṣadrā), Sharḥ Zād al-
musāfir-i Mullā Ṣadrā (A Commentary on the Provision of the Traveller of Mullā Ṣadrā), Sharḥ 
muqadima-i Qaysạrī (A Commentary on Qaysạri’s Introduction [to the Fusụ̄s]̣) and HastƬ ̄az 
naẓar-i ʿirfān va falsafa (Being According to ʿirfān and Philosophy). He was more inclined 
towards ʿirfān than pure philosophy.467 
                                                          
(Tehran: Anjumān-i ḥikmat va falsafa-i I ৴rān, 2001); M. Fāḍil, Sharḥ duʿāʾ ʿarafa (Mashhad: Bunyād-i pazhūhish-
hā-yi IslāmƮ ̄āstān-i quds-i RażawƮ,̄ 2002); Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ,̄ Misḅāḥ al-hidāya ilā al-khilāfa wa al-walāya, ed. 
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi tanẓƮm̄ va nashr-i āsār-i Imām KhumaynƮ,̄ 2007). 
467 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 126-127. 
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vi. ʿAbd Allāh JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄
 
JavādƮ ̄Āmulī was born into a family of scholars and after completing his studies in Amul and 
Mashhad to a reasonable level at the hands of capable scholars,468 he travelled to Tehran in 
1950 and studied at the MarwƮ ̄school under teachers such as Abū-l-Ḥasan ShaʿrānƮ ̄with whom 
he studied part of Manẓūma, part of the Ishārāt of Ibn SƮn̄ā and part of the Asfār;469 Muḥyyī al-
DƮn̄ IlāhƮ ̄ QumshihƮ ̄ with whom he studied the ʿirfānƬ ̄ points in the Ishārāt;470 Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Fażil TūnƮ ̄with whom he studied the Fusụ̄s ̣of Ibn ʿ ArabƮ ̄with QayṣarƮ’̄s commentary;471 
and Muhammad TaqƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄who had been one of the students of Sayyid ʿAlƮ ̄QāḍƮ.̄472 He then 
travelled to Qum in 1955 and studied in the Madrasa-yi Ḥujjatīya attending the classes of 
ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ in philosophy, ʿirfān and Qurʾānic hermeneutics while furthering his 
studies in jurisprudence and its principles.473   
 
JavādƮ ̄Āmulī preferred ʿ Allāmah’s private classes, where ʿ Allāmah gave his opinions on various 
important topics.474 ʿAllāmah also gave lessons on resurrection, commented on the poetry of 
                                                          
468 In his autobiography, Mahr-i ustād, JavādƮ ̄Āmulī includes some points about the teaching style of his teachers 
in Amul, which encapsulate the style of teaching in the traditional ḥawza, JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 39-48. For 
his experience in Mashhad see Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 51-53. 
469 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 60; 63-65. 
470 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 60; 65-71. He was a spiritual character and never went to Mashhad unless he was 
invited by Imām Riḍā. When JavādƮ ̄Āmulī asked him what this meant, he said that sometimes he sees himself in 
the ḥaram or its courtyard in a dream and then he goes to Mashhad see Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 69. 
471 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 60; 78-87. TūnƮ ̄studied the Fusụ̄s ̣under A৴khund KāshƮ ̄in Isfahan for two years. 
472 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 73-78 
473 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 133 
474 Even though he did not attend these particular sessions see JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 117.  
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Ḥāfiẓ and taught some of the classical texts at a high level in these gatherings such as TamhƬd̄ 
al-qawāʾid.475 During the course of his studies JavādƮ ̄ Āmulī realized the ʿAllāmah was no 
ordinary teacher but a true ḥakƬm̄.476 JavādƮ ̄Āmulī continues his teaching activities until today 
with classes in Qurʾānic hermeneutics, which are transcribed and published in a voluminous 
work entitled TasnƬm̄; classes in ethics and insights into Nahj al-balāgha; and baḥth al-khārij 
in jurisprudence and its principles. During his long teaching career he has taught the 
important texts in philosophy and ʿirfān including Bidāyat, Nihāyat, the Shifāʾ, the Asfār, 
TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʾid and the Fusụ̄s ̣ all of which have available recordings. 
 
vii. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄
 
Originally from Amul, Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄traveled to Tehran in 1950 to further his studies at 
the Ḥājj Abū-l-Fatḥ school and then proceeded to the MarwƮ ̄school and studied with many of 
the same teachers as A৴ yatullāh JavādƮ.̄477 Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ’̄s career is distinguished by the 
numerous teachers whom he studied and maintained close connections with. While in 
Tehran he was a notable student of Abū-l-Ḥasan RāfiʿƮ ̄ QazwƮn̄Ʈ ̄ and a student of Aḥmad 
A৴ shtiyānƮ.̄478 Then he proceeded to Qum in 1963 where he studied Qurʾānic hermeneutics, 
philosophy, ʿirfān and the occult sciences under masters such as ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn IlāhƮ ̄and Sayyid MahdƮ ̄QāḍƮ.̄479  
                                                          
475 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 117-120. 
476 JavādƮ ̄A৴mulƮ,̄ Mahr-i ustād, 127. 
477 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. 
478 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. 
479 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. 
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Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄has scholarly works in almost every field of ḥikmat including mathematics, 
astronomy and medicine and is a prolific writer (with about two hundred works primarily in 
ḥikmat and ʿirfān) in both Arabic and Farsi and is a teacher in all of those fields.480 He displays 
incredible depth and grasp of the subjects he comments on and is also a poet. Most of his 
works are tainted with ʿirfānī language and concepts.481 As opposed to some of the other 
ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum, Ḥasanzāda has not written any work dealing with Western 
philosophy. In his view the West has advanced in the sciences, but is not on a level playing 
field in the inner sciences dealt with in the ḥikmat and ʿirfān tradition.482 Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄
believes that the Qurʾān, philosophy and ʿirfān are in perfect harmony and cannot be 
separated from each other.   
 
viii. Muḥammad TaqƮ ̄Misḅāḥ YazdƮ ̄
 
Misḅāḥ Yazdī was a student of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ in both philosophy and Qurʾānic 
hermeneutics, and gained a reputation for his insightfulness, precision, critical analysis and 
new ideas.483 He taught the important philosophical texts including Nihāyat, sections of the 
Shifāʾ and sections of the Asfār. Among his works are two new texts in philosophy (Aৄmūzish-i 
falsafa) and theology (Aৄmūzish-i aqāʾid) taught at the introductory level in the ḥawza. 
                                                          
480 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. For a list of his works, most of which have been published, 
see http://www.hekmateislami.com/showdata.aspx?dataid=5126&siteid=1 
481 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 131. 
482 See Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ʿUyūn masāʾil al-nafs (Tehran: Intishārāt-i AmƮr̄ kabƮr̄, 1371 Sh/1992) 116-121.  
483 AshkivarƮ,̄ “Falsafah-i islāmƮ ̄dar I ৴rān-i muʿāsịr”, 135-6. 
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Aৄmūzish-i falsafa (Philosophical Instructions) is studied before Bidāyat and includes 
important sections on the history of Western philosophy, which was an innovative 
introduction to traditional education which usually focuses on the Islamic view alone. It 
indicates Misḅāḥ Yazdī’s view on the importance of being aware of Western philosophy.  
 
Apart from his hermeneutical works including MafāhƬm̄ al-Qurʾān (Qurʾānic Concepts), 
Akhlāq dar Qurʾān (Ethics in the Qurʾān), Qurʾān dar āyina-i Nahj al-balāgha (The Qurʾān in 
the Mirror of Nahj al-Balāgha), KhudāshanāsƬ ̄dar Qurʾān (Knowledge of God in the Qurʾān) 
and Jang va jihād dar Qurʾān (War and Struggle in the Qurʾān). Misḅāḥ Yazdī has written works 
on the philosophy of ethics, ethics, ʿirfān, politics, theology and beliefs and the history of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran. Like MutạhharƮ ̄his works apply philosophical skills to new areas of 
research, thereby increase their depth and persuasiveness.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the discussion on the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā has been contextualized by 
examining the historical development of the schools of Tehran and Qum. The chapter has also 
introduced the most important ḥukamāʾ who contributed to the development of Sadrian 
philosophy over the last two centuries. An attempt has also been made to analyze lines of 
transmission in the teaching of both a more philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and an ʿ irfānī 
one. The pivotal role of Muḥammad Bīdābādī in the transmission of ʿirfānī teachings to both 
the schools of Tehran and Najaf was discussed as his students dispersed and became teachers 
in both centers. While Bīdābādī’s expertise in ʿirfān and the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā may 
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have originated in his interaction with the Dhahabīya order through Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī, 
Āshtiyānī suggests that these expertise were transmitted through Sadrian lines as Mullā Ṣadrā 
was an ʿārif in his own right.  
 
An important finding of this chapter was the interactive relationship between the schools of 
Najaf and Qum in the transmission of ḥikmat in recent times. Ḥukamāʾ moved freely between 
these two centers and student teacher relationships were established during the time Iranian 
ḥukamāʾ spent perfecting their jurisprudential skills in Najaf. On the other hand, a more 
philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā was transmitted and developed through ḥukamāʾ such 
as Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī and ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī. 
 
The chapter has contributed to current research on the schools of Tehran and Qum by 
introducing many ḥukamāʾ in terms of their biographical details, works and the links between 
various ḥukamāʾ within the context of a larger trend of philosophical and ʿirfānī activity. By 
introducing these relationships, it opens a further area for study as only the most relevant 
relationships between ḥukamāʾ for this study were explained. The chapter also presented 
numerous important works, commentaries and glosses many of which are worth of further 
research and analysis. 
   
While ḥukamāʾ may have preferred one reading of Mullā Ṣadrā over another, both of the 
readings discussed were mastered by various ḥukamāʾ throughout the generations of ḥukamāʾ 
who studied and taught in the schools of Tehran and Qum. An attempt was made to classify 
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the ḥukamāʾ according to which reading they preferred based on the biographical literature 
concerning them and the works they wrote. Both readings continue to be taught, studied and 
discussed in the modern ḥawza. At the same time, due to an increase in the amount of 
students who will study ḥikmat but not necessarily specialize in it; there are a larger number 
of students who do not experience the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā due to the factors 
discussed in the chapter. Those factors include the expansion of the teaching of ḥikmat to a 
much larger sphere of students both within Qum and through distance learning; the 
introduction of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s twin seminal texts Bidāyat and Nihāyat; the use of philosophy in 
the prinicples of jurisprudence and the nature of the critique of westernization and Marxism 
which is more of a philosophical critique than an ʿirfānī one. It was the practical use of 
philosophy in these last two areas that made it essential for the modern scholar to have a good 
understanding of Islamic philosophy, but not necessarily any type of ʿirfānī understanding. 
This has widened the split in the teaching of the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and the 
ʿirfānī one. 
 
In the following chapters the thesis will examine the impact of these two readings on the most 
important areas of theological discussion addressed in ḥikmat. The first is wujūd (existence) 
which from a philosophical perspective discusses the nature of the world around us in order 
to create a framework from which the existence of the Necessary Existent can be established. 
The second discussion is that of walāyah (guardianship) which seeks to understand the reality 
of prophethood and sainthood. It is a discussion that has particular significance to Shiʿism as 
it contributes to the esoteric understanding of the Infallibles including the twelve Shiʿi Imams. 
The third investigation is maʿād (resurrection) according to ḥikmat and ʿirfān to which Mullā 
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Ṣadrā devoted much effort to elucidate in the background of Ghazalī’s critique on philosophy 
as being contradictory with the Islamic scriptural sources. Sadrian philosophers made various 
attempts to reconcile this contradiction based on the principles of ḥikmat, even if they did not 
fully accept Mullā Ṣadrā’s view as expressed in the Asfār. It is in this chapter that the vibrancy 
of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā is perhaps seen the most as well as the ḥukamāʾ use of ḥikmat to 
explain the scriptural sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180  
Chapter 2: Wujūd (Existence) 
 
How do we understand the reality484 that we find ourselves in? What is its and our relation to 
the Creator and how do we understand His Unity (tawḥīd)? These questions are implicitly at 
the heart of philosophical and ʿirfānī discussions concerning wujūd and from the answers to 
these questions many theoretical and practical implications result. While philosophy seeks to 
understand reality and its implications on human behavior partly in order to form more 
perfect societies,485 ʿirfān seeks to understand reality and the relation between God and the 
wayfarer. Both sciences therefore seek to understand reality.  
 
It is therefore somewhat natural that these sciences should intermingle and that is what links 
Sadrian philosophy to ʿirfān and in turn results in different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā as he made 
use of the overlap. The same link was established by Suhrawardī in his Illuminationist 
philosophy, but his explanation which indicated towards primacy of quiddity did not sit well 
with the ʿurafāʾ of the school of Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Turka’s Tamhīd al-qawāʾid is a refutation 
of Illuminationist philosophy.486 There are some fundamental differences in the way wujūd is 
                                                          
484 One of the primary building blocks for both Islamic philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān is that there is a reality 
(wāqiʿīyah) which needs to be understood. This is not an issue that can be proven but something that has to be 
agreed upon before pursuing those sciences. A relative philosophy that did not start on the premise of an 
underlying reality would not be considered Islamic. It is then the nature of reality that is discussed and this is 
where the sciences differ both in method and in conclusion.  
485 For Mullā Ṣadrā’s views on political philosophy see S. K. Toussi, The Political Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (New 
York: Routledge, forthcoming). 
486 See SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (2) 67, nt. 10. Even if 
Suhrawardī was misrepresented by his critics, see Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence 
Distiction? Suhrawardī’s visionary hierarchy of lights”. 
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conceived and explained in ḥikmat and theoretical ʿirfān. While ḥikmat juxtaposes wujūd to 
quiddity following the distinction made by Farābī and Ibn Sīnā building upon Neoplatonic 
thinkers;487 ʿirfān sees wujūd as a single reality and does not discuss quiddity, following Ibn 
ʿArabī’s concept of the oneness of Existence. While admittedly transcendental philosophers 
agree that in the extramental there is indeed only one reality which is wujūd, much of the 
discussion of wujūd includes the discussion of quiddiy’s place within it to deal with another 
issue. That is the concern of how oneness turns to manyness, as all contingent existents must 
come from God who is the Necessary Existent and is One.  
 
The meeting point of ḥikmat and ʿirfān is the concept of a flow of existence that contains 
multiplicity within it. That multiplicity is explained in ḥikmat by gradation (tashkīk) and in 
ʿirfān by self-disclosure (tajallī) and both of these concepts find their origination in the 
conception of wujūd. Why do these positions matter? The simple answer is that wujūd is reality 
in transcendental philosophy and ʿirfān and so a ḥakīm’s understanding of wujūd is his 
understanding of reality. Since wujūd is the cornerstone of these sciences, most if not all 
positions taken on the other discussions within them directly depend on the position of the 
ḥakīm on wujūd. Understanding these discussions is therefore fundamental to a serious 
understanding of more complex Shiʿi beliefs as they try to approach a better understanding of 
God and His interaction with His creation.  
                                                          
487 Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distiction? Suhrawardī’s visionary hierarchy of lights”, 
219. See also P. Morewedge, “Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Essence-Existence’ Distinction”, in Journal of 
the Americal Oriental Society, 1972, (92/3), 425-435. Although Bizri has argued that there has been an 
overemphasis on the place of Avicenna’s existence-essence distinction in his metaphysics, see N. Bizri, “Avicenna 
and Essentialism”, in The Review of Metaphysics, 2001, (54/4), 753-778. 
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What influences a ḥakīm to adopt a philosophical or an ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā? No 
doubt the ḥakīm’s personal journey and training is an important factor. Intellectual arrival is 
more universal than ʿirfānī experience as a person only requires a philosophical approach and 
obedience to the rules of philosophy and logic to attain an understanding of existence based 
on those foundations. But to properly grasp what is being explained from experience the 
reader must also have a level of experience. Experiencing existence requires a different kind 
of effort, whereby they seeker undertakes a path of wayfaring and self-purification.488  A 
successful philosophical ḥakīm moves from the concept (mafhūm) of wujūd to the referent 
(misḍāq) of wujūd by moving from intellectual comprehension to experience; whereas the ʿ ārif 
moves from the referent of wujūd to its concept, by experiencing and then intellectualizing. 
But there may be ḥukamāʾ that are not able to move beyond the realm of concept, or see a 
benefit in confining their reading of Mullā Ṣadrā to concept.  
 
Since both types of thinker actually seek to understand the referent of wujūd or in other words, 
Being qua Being (wujūd bi-mā huwa huwa), the sciences share a common goal and a basis for 
dialogue. At the same time, philosophers are agreed that the essence of existence cannot be 
completely grasped especially by intellectual means. As Sabzavārī says regarding the self-
evident nature of existence in his Sharḥ al-manẓūma: “Its notion is one of the best-known things, 
but its deepest reality is the extremity of hiddenness.”489 Therefore all can recognize wujūd as it 
is “one of the best known things”, but ʿirfān becomes necessary for the complete ḥakīm and for 
                                                          
488 See M. Mutahharī, “Irfān” in Majmūʿat āsār shahīd Mutahharī, 28 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i sadrā, 1377 Sh/1998) 
(23) 31. 
489 Sabzivārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 31. 
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a full grasp of ḥikmat as witnessing the reality of wujūd with the heart is as important, as the 
hidden nature of its deep reality requires a type of enquiry suitable for that kind of knowledge.  
 
This chapter is split into two key parts; one discussing wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān and the other 
discussing wujūd in al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah from a philosophical perspective. 
Understanding these two approaches to comprehending wujūd will help us understand the 
two readings of Mullā Ṣadrā discussed in this thesis as a ḥakīm could read Mullā Ṣadrā from 
either one of these perspectives or indeed both of them. Deciding which of these traditions to 
explain and analyze first was an interesting dilemma as that decision influences from which 
tradition the other tradition is understood. Whichever reading is presented first can play a 
role in the approach of the reader while analyzing the other reading.  
 
Although philosophy explains wujūd in a step by step manner, guiding the reader through a 
set of separate concepts until they have an overall picture of wujūd, ʿirfān explains wujūd by 
linking various overall concepts and assumes a level of experience on the part of the reader. 
From whichever concept you want to explain in ʿirfān, you can extract a plethora of other 
concepts. For example, the discussion of wujūd and walāyah in theoretical ʿirfān are not 
entirely separate discussions and during the course of explaining one concept, the other is 
repeatedly referred to. Rather one has to understand the levels of wujūd and the issue of self-
disclosure (tajallī) to understand walāyah. However, walāyah needs to be comprehended 
properly for an understanding of wujūd as the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil) is the secret 
of the effusion of wujūd and the key to understanding God’s Unity to the extent it can be 
comprehended by man; as God can never be known completely and is above all efforts and 
descriptions.  
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In the modern ḥawza, philosophy is considered an introductory science to a proper 
understanding of theoretical ʿirfān and should therefore be taught first, however, at the same 
time, the origins of some of the most important philosophical concepts in ḥikmat are to be 
found in theoretical ʿirfān. The approach in itself shows a preference for a philosophical 
mindset. This kind of graded approach of the ḥawza is also found in the Neo-Platonic tradition 
where the student studies the works of Aristotle — especially logic — before moving on to 
reading Plotinus’s works.  
 
Using transcendental philosophy as a tool to understand ʿirfān is an approach seldom found 
in modern studies of transcendental philosophy, and so using this method may significantly 
add to current research into the thought of Ibn ‘ArabƮ ̄ and other ʿurafāʾ in his school. 
Explaining the concepts in theoretical ʿirfān is somewhat facilitated by comparing them with 
the philosophical ideas in ḥikmat and this is where analysis can produce many fruitful results. 
However, this goal can be achieved without ordering the chapter as such, as long as both 
readings are compared throughout. I therefore decided to start with theoretical ʿirfān in order 
to chronologically order the flow of ideas through the school of Tehran and Qum and to 
illustrate the impact of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s twin seminal texts in shaping a more philosophical 
reading in the modern school of Qum. 
 
The first part of this chapter discusses wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān and is split into several 
sections. The first section explains how the term wujūd in theoretical ʿ irfān only concerns God, 
while the term for the rest of creation is kawn. The ʿurafāʾ are more careful in maintaining the 
principle of unity and so find other ways to describe other than God’s Essence with terms such 
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as manifestation (ẓuhūr) and self-disclosure. It is also because that is the way that the ʿārif 
perceives reality as his attention is focused on God alone, while it is also a more accurate 
expression according to the ʿārif on the intellectual plane.  
 
Wujūd is completely separate to quiddity and so God has no quiddity. It is the Breath of the 
All-Merciful (al-nafas al-Raḥmānī) which brings creation out of the hidden knowledge of God, 
and it is through this concept that levels of manifestation are specified. From the degree of 
Non-dualistic Unity (al-martabah al-aḥadīya) to the degree of Dualistic Unity (al-martabah 
al-wāḥidīya) to the permanent archetypes (al-aʿyān al-thābitah) to the external archetypes (al-
aʿyān al-khārijīyah), which are the realms of the intellect, the Imaginal world or the isthmus 
(ʿālam al-mithāl) and the material world. If something ceases to exist in the outward (ẓāhir) 
plane it returns to the inward (bāṭin), and all that has ever existed or will exist is in the 
knowledge of God.  
 
The discussion then turns to how the ḥukamāʾ analyzed the oneness of Existence, wujūd by 
something else and then on to the permanent archetypes. The permanent archetypes are the 
side of the Names that face existence, and as such represent everything that exists in the 
knowledge of God. But not the knowledge that exists in an undefined manner in the Essence 
in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, nor the Attribute of Knowledge itself in the degree of 
Dualistic Unity, rather the determination (taʿayyun) of that knowledge for every created thing. 
It is their link to God’s everlasting knowledge that makes them permanent, while they do not 
enter the plane of creation. Gradation in ʿirfān starts with God who is the true existent and 
also incorporates gradation of the Names. Gradation is to do with the differing levels of 
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capacity among created beings, and not wujūd in itself as wujūd only applies to God who is not 
graded.  
 
The second part of the chapter analyzes wujūd in transcendental philosophy.490 The order of 
the discussion follows the order of many books produced in the schools of Tehran and Qum 
and indeed those books were based on the order of issues discussed in the Asfār. I have used 
ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s Nihāyat al-ḥikma and Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma to aid the shape the flow of 
the discussion and the order of the topics, with offshoot discussions into the more interesting 
points brought up in various works, commentaries and glosses produced by the ḥukamāʾ of 
the schools of Tehran and Qum. Ṭabāṭabāʾī was an important teacher in the establishment of 
the school of Qum and Sabzavārī was a contemporary of the school of Tehran. These 
discussions at times overlap ʿirfānī concepts from the ḥukamāʾ that consider these concepts 
as contributing to a better reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and at other times reference the scriptural 
sources using ḥikmat to comment upon it. Using Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Nihāyat will provide a good 
insight into the philosophical reading of ḥikmat when placed within the background of the 
other discussions concerning the same issues.  
 
The reason for laying out this part of the chapter using this method is that it is precisely what 
a student of ḥikmat in the ḥawza would do as well. After attending classes on an advanced text 
like Nihāyat, the Manẓūma or the Asfār, they would return and read the other opinions of the 
previous and current philosophers, spend time thinking and formulating their own ideas, and 
then have a discussion with a classmate(s) on the issue, which is called mubāḥatha. The final 
                                                          
490 See M. Abdul Haq, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Being”, in Islamic Studies, 1967, (6/3) 267-276 for a brief rundown 
of the main concepts in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of being. 
187  
step is to teach the text and to write articles and books dealing with specialized topics. Using 
this method the student is expected to grow with the text, rather than just memorize its 
contents without thinking, researching and discussing. Taking this approach in this chapter 
provides the reader with a glimpse of the first two actions taken by the student, whereas 
thinking, discussing and teaching cannot be comprised within written prose. The step by step 
approach taken in explaining ḥikmat is one of the tools that aid its study and comprehension. 
The study of wujūd is the most important cornerstone of transcendental philosophy and while 
the depth of the discussion is vast the key conclusions, such as the principality of wujūd and 
gradation, are agreed upon by most of the ḥukamāʾ of the Sadrian school. 
 
After differentiating wujūd from quiddity (māhīyah), as well as distinguishing between mental 
comprehension of wujūd and wujūd as it is in the extramental (al-khārij) and the types of 
predication suitable for each plane; the discussion starts by explaining the self evident nature 
of wujūd and that there is no need to define it, as any definition of it is more complicated than 
its initial conception. To further grasp the issue another distinction is made between 
knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) and knowledge by acquisition (ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) and that 
distinction is brought back to the aḥādīth which discuss how God is known. Then the 
discussion moves to the meaning of words discussing homonymy (ishtirāk lafẓƬ)̄ and univocity 
(ishtirāk maʿnawƬ)̄.  
 
Both of these discussions are introductory to the more important ideas in transcendental 
philosophy, and the next idea to be discussed is the principality of wujūd and the mentally 
posited nature of quiddity. That is that although both exist together in the extramental, it is 
wujūd that really exists, and quiddity exists by wujūd, not vice versa. Thereafter a few 
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implications of the principality of existence are discussed before the chapter moves on to the 
issue of gradation in existence. Whilst all existents exist within the realm of wujūd, there are 
differences between these existents in terms of limitation. While the material world (ʿālam al-
māda) is limited by time and space, the world of intellects (al-ʿālam al-ʿuqūl) is not, and so 
existence is graded. From gradation another form of predication called the predication of 
reality on its shadow (ḥaml al-ḥaqƬq̄a ʿalā al-raqƬq̄a) is derived. This is when a cause and its 
effect are predicted to each other. Linked to the predication of reality on its shadow is the 
concept of something that exists by the existence-in-something-else and this issue is the next 
major turn in the discussion of wujūd in transcendental philosophy.  
 
Mullā Ṣadrā considered motion a property of wujūd and not of quiddity. He elucidates that 
notion in his theory of motion in the category of substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah). This 
motion is involuntary and has implications that are especially important for development of 
the human soul and Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of resurrection. Therefore, transubstancial motion 
is introduced at this point in its appropriate section as a factor of wujūd as a building block for 
later discussions. Finally, mental existence (wujūd al-dhihnī) is with its implications; such as 
the fact that quiddity in the mind is different to the quiddity in the extramental and that 
mental existence imitates external existence and so anything that exists mentally has its basis 
in the extramental. That is that we cannot imagine something that is completely divorced 
from anything we have sensed.  
 
Throughout this chapter and those that follow the English words for philosophical and ʿirfānī 
terminology will be used primarily although some key words such as wujūd will remain in their 
original Arabic transliteration. Both the Arabic and English terms are provided when they first 
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appear and a glossary of terms has also been appended to the thesis for ease of reference. 
Translations of Qurʾānic verses use the rendition of M. H. Shakir.491 
 
I. Part 1: Wujūd in Theoretical ʿIrfān 
 
It was theoretical ʿirfān that arguably first gave wujūd such importance in response to the 
Illuminationist school of philosophy while Mullā Ṣadrā distilled those ideas into a coherent 
philosophical system. Therefore, the way wujūd is explained in both subjects somewhat varies. 
While ḥikmat uses a step by step approach to lead to an overall concept of wujūd, proving and 
discussing each issue along the way, and extracting other issues and answering other 
philosophical problems at each stage and then perhaps offering an insight based on ʿirfānī 
principles; theoretical ʿirfān opts for a more direct approach as understood by the experience 
of the ʿārif.  
 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, the key texts in the ḥawza used to teach theoretical 
ʿirfān are TamhƬd̄ al-qawāʿid of Ibn Turka Isf̣ahānƮ,̄ Dāwūd al-QaysạrƮ’̄s commentary on Ibn 
ʿArabƮ’̄s Fusụ̄s ̣al-ḥikam and Ḥamza FanārƮ’̄s Misḅāh al-uns, which a commentary on Ṣadr al-
Dīn Qūnawī’s Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. These texts are specifically chosen in order to present the 
student with the key concepts of theoretical ʿirfān, after which the student should be well 
equipped to delve deeper into the subject.  
 
                                                          
491 Muhammad Habib Shakir (tr.), The Qurʾan (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qurʾan, 1982) 
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It is interesting to note that the Shiʿi ḥawza has not produced its own texts in theoretical ʿirfān 
in the same manner as it has for transcendental philosophy and still relies upon medieval 
texts. Rather the focus has been on expanding and explaining older texts. Perhaps an 
exception to this general trend was Khumaynī’s Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya, which has many facets of a 
taught text. This phenomenon is perplexing, especially since there are some issues in Shiʿi 
ʿirfān that are not expounded in the medieval texts, such as the station of the Shiʿi Imams. It 
may be due to the secretive nature that ʿirfān has developed within the ḥawza system, as for 
many years the study of ʿirfān was frowned upon and in the modern ḥawza it is still viewed 
with some skepticism by a number of clerics.492  
 
I. Revisiting the Subject of ʿIrfān 
 
The difference between the subjects of ḥikmat and ʿirfān was discussed in the epistemology 
and definitions section of the introduction. There an important distinction was made between 
two types of nondelemited wujūd. Philosophy discussed wujūd in its nondelemited sense 
when compared to other sciences, like medicine, where wujūd was discussed with the 
condition of something. In the case of medicine it is wujūd with the condition of the human 
body. Nondelimition was a condition for the wujūd studied in philosophy. However, the 
subject of ʿirfān was nondelimited wujūd without the condition of nondelimitation. While 
these distinctions may seem rather abstract, they are actually at the core of the difference in 
the approach to understanding the nuances of how Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on wujūd can be read. 
                                                          
492 Euben and Zaman (eds.) Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, 156 nt 1 
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It is the difference in these two types of nondelimited wujūd that will be unfolded in this 
chapter. The subject of a science is that which links all of the issues within that science and so 
this classification of the types of nondelimited wujūd affects all of the issues within ḥikmat and 
ʿirfān. 
  
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī of the school of Tehran further explains the intricate positions on 
wujūd in ʿirfān in his commentary of the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam: 
 
The possessors of the heart from among the leaders of the ʿurafāʾ have differed — after 
agreeing on the oneness of existence, rather [the oneness of the] existent…— concerning 
the reality of the Necessary. Is it wujūd without the condition of things or their 
nonexistence [i.e. without any condition]? Meaning the actual nature of wujūd as it is, 
expressed by them as the ipseity flowing through the Necessary, the contingent, the 
unknown unseen (al-ghayb al-majhūl)…or whether it [wujūd] is taken with the condition 
of the nonexistence of things known as the degree of Non-dualistic Unity (al-aḥadīya), 
the first unseen (al-ghayb al-awwal), the first determination (al-taʿayyun al-awwal) or 
wujūd with the condition of no……wujūd without any condition is the Essential Necessary 
Truth. [He is not wujūd] taken with the condition of no…also the general wujūd which 
connects with all things is the shadow of wujūd without condition…as the condition of 
no prevents connection with things.493 
                                                          
493 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 33-34. 
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In Qumshihī’s analysis wujūd without condition is the nondelimited wujūd of the ʿurafāʾ, but 
this time that nondelimited wujūd is not in comparison with wujūd with the condition of 
something. Rather it is compared to another analysis of existence which is existence with the 
condition of the nonexistence of anything else. Both of these analysis are within the science 
of ʿirfān as they concern God and Qumshihī later clarifies that the view that wujūd with the 
condition of the nonexistence of things is an interpretation of a ḥadīth.494 However, for 
Qumshihī the problem with this analysis of wujūd is that its shadow cannot be consolidated 
with manyness or things. Ruḥ Allāh Khumaynī of the school of Qum explains that this is the 
level that is sometimes referred to in the scriptural sources and that should not confuse 
someone into rejecting the theory of manifestation as that theory deals with a different 
aspect.495 Qumshihī wants to avoid the idea that the Essence of God does not contain the 
perfections of the Names.496 While there certainly is a level of existence where there is no 
thing, oneness and manyness needs to be consolidated. It is therefore the flowing ipseity that 
is existence.  
 
Later Qumshihī also clarifies what he means by the flow of the ipseity. He means 
manifestation (ẓuhūr).497 This is what makes his analysis of wujūd ʿirfānī as it is not wujūd as a 
graded reality that pervades all of existence.498 For something to be graded it must be 
                                                          
494 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 37. The ḥadīth being “God was and there was nothing with Him.” 
495 KhumaynƮ,̄ Misḅāḥ al-hidāya, 14-15.  
496 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 37-38. 
497 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 37. 
498 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 40. 
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universal. However, the nondelimited wujūd is neither universal nor particular.499 Rather 
wujūd has different manifestations and this will be elucidated further when analyzing the 
Breath of the All-Merciful (nafas al-Raḥmānī). Wujūd manifests itself to itself and this is within 
the Necessary; it manifests in the clothes of the Names on the plane of God’s knowledge and 
it manifests in existents, which is its manifestation in contingent beings.500 
 
In his twelve-part introduction to his commentary on the Fusụ̄s ̣al-QayṣarƮ ̄deals with some of 
the most important concepts in theoretical ʿ irfān. The first part of his introduction specifically 
deals with wujūd. As QaysạrƮ ̄points out, ʿurafāʾ are careful to restrict the term Wujūd to God 
as He is the only true existent, and use the word kawn (creation) to describe anything other 
than God’s Essence.501 Hence he calls the chapter: “About Being; and that It is the Real.” Here 
Wujūd refers to God alone who is One, making every individual thing in the blanket of 
multiplicity (kathrah), a task (shaʾn) from the tasks (shuʾūn) of God, rather than separate 
existences described as existent.502 Wujūd is therefore not in dichotomy with essence. For 
ʿurafāʾ understanding Wujūd means understanding tawḥƬd̄; a concept which cannot be fully 
grasped by the intellect.  
 
So Wujūd (meaning God) is the subject of theoretical ʿ irfān in the same way as wujūd (meaning 
existence) is the subject of ḥikmat. ʿIrfān starts from the Necessary Being and then discusses 
contingent beings, whereas ḥikmat starts with contingent beings and finds its way back to the 
                                                          
499 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 40. 
500 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 37. 
501 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 33. 
502 See Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i ʿirfānī va falsafī, ed. Majīd Dastyārī (Qum: Kitābsarā-
yi ishrāq, 1386 Sh/2007) 48-49 and QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 21. 
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Necessary Being, who is the ultimate cause. To explain this using the idea of gradation, ʿirfān 
starts at the top, with the most intense level of being and ḥikmat starts at the bottom, 
discussing beings in the corporeal realm, which is the lowest world of existence.  
 
ʿIrfān starts with nondelimited existence (wujūd al-mutḷaq) and adds the conditions or 
limitations of manifestation and self-disclosure to create an intellectual separation between 
the unknowable Essence of God and His creation, whereas ḥikmat starts with accidental 
necessity and removes real limitations until it reaches nondelimited existence. Nothing 
except God has any existence in ʿirfān as everything that is other than God’s Essence is His 
manifestation, whereas ḥikmat finds the existence that is common to all contingent beings, 
meaning that existence is to be found in that being itself. ʿIrfān starts with the Absolute, who 
cannot be known in any way as any attempt to define Him immediately necessitates otherness 
by which to define, and ḥikmat starts with wujūd whose existence is known by self-evidence 
but whose reality can never be fully grasped. 
 
II. The Univocity (ishtirāk maʿnawī) of Wujūd 
 
Wujūd is univocal for the ʿurafāʾ but not in the same way as it is for Sadrian philosophers. The 
philosophical reading analyzes the concept of the wujūd to be a common concept (i.e. 
univocal on the level of its concept), however, when the ʿurafāʾ discuss wujūd they are 
referring to Wujūd as it is in the extramental (i.e. the referent). While the direct experience of 
the oneness of Wujūd is at the heart of fully realizing the core principle of tawḥƬd̄ in Islam, its 
expression remained elusive until the school of Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄ and particularly in SaʿƮd̄ al-DƮn̄ 
FarghānƮ’̄s commentary on the Taʾīyah of Ibn Fāriḍ al-MisṛƮ.̄ As Ibn Turka clarifies: 
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Do not say it is clear from his [Abū-l-Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Isf̣ahānƮ]̄ other books that 
the univocity of wujūd is as in the terminology of the Peripatetics, as his words are 
according to their way and therefore there is no need for the explanation of the sharing 
of existence by meaning that we are currently elucidating. For the difference in 
meaning becomes clear according to the different terminologies as we say: What the 
author [Abū-l-Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Isf̣ahānƮ]̄ has chosen for the meaning of wujūd is 
the real (ḥaqƬq̄Ƭ)̄ that the realizers (muḥaqiqūn) have chosen, not the conceptional 
(iʿtibārƬ)̄ as is the view of some of the later scholars.503 
  
The difference highlighted in this passage is one that springs from the different ways of 
knowing. Understanding happens on the plane of the mind, but experience is more directly 
associated with the soul or the heart. While the mind finds terminology to describe concepts 
accurately, the terminology used in ʿirfān indicates incomprehensible realities. The 
modification of terminology is a theme found in a number of ʿirfānī writings and is an 
important aspect of the debate in this thesis. Such concern in clarifying the use of terminology 
is less oftern found in writings on ḥikmat, perhaps in order to make use of the different 
hermeneutics that can be extracted by the mindful reader. ʿAlƮ ̄Mudarris Zunūzī of the school 
of Tehran discusses the difference between knowing by the heart and the mind in the 
beginning of his Persian treatise on the oneness of Existence and then summarizes the view 
of theoretical ʿirfān in the following way: 
 
                                                          
503 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-tawḥīd, ed. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 51. 
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To explain the saying of the Sufis is that they have said that wujūd rather the existent 
(mawjūd) is one, and that this multiplicity that we see is all Him. This multiplicity is 
our imagination and in reality there is no multiplicity.504 
 
It will become clearer during the course of this chapter that this is only one possible 
explanation of the oneness of Existence and perhaps not the most accurate one. Here ʿAlƮ ̄
Mudarris Zunūzī brings the theoretical understanding of unconditional wujūd to what the ʿ ārif 
actually experiences on a practical level. That is that the ʿārif does not see multiplicity as he is 
completely absorbed in the One without specifications. At the end of the treatise he 
summarizes the view of the ʿurafāʾ a second time: 
 
In summary they say that the existent and existence is one thing which is God Himself, 
the Most High. Then the clothes of the creation became manifest and its specifications 
by quiddities of accidents and archetypes in many ways. The self-disclosures of every 
one of those clothes are fresh states and conceptions imposed on them. They have 
mentioned clarifications of that with many examples such as the waves and the ocean, 
or the sun, light and shadow, or [the number] one and numbers...505    
 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s explanation shows a philosophical approach at work trying to decipher 
the terminology of the ʿurafāʾ. The oneness of Wujūd as explained by Qumshihī above is 
neither wujūd in the extramental nor mental existence, as unconditional wujūd is not even 
                                                          
504 See Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 501. 
505 See Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 503. 
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limited by nondelimitation. It is therefore wujūd which is non-conditional as the source of 
division. Rather when these descriptive aspects are applied to God they are by necessity, as 
His position and level do not allow access to the mind except by creating approximate ways 
of understanding. The one who theorizes at this level must be aware of his limitations. In the 
same way as wujūd is completely separated from quiddity and its rules in philosophy, so God 
does not have any quiddity and therefore none of the rules of quiddity can apply to Him.  
 
III. The Breath of the All-Merciful (nafas al-Raḥmānī) 
 
According to the ʿirfānī worldview there is nothing that is detached from God and so the 
ʿurafāʾ reconcile the manyness experienced in the corporeal world with the oneness of God 
by viewing the Essence in different ways. This is expressed as conditions, manifestations, self-
disclosures or tasks which are manifest through the Breath of the All-Merciful.506 Yet the 
starting point is to understand that these conditions are only in terms of analysis. There is 
never any departure from the pure Essence as the source of manyness which is the Names are 
at once the Essence.     
 
Wujūd without any mode (ḥaythīyah) is at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, where all 
opposites are brought together as all the Names are brought together in the simple Essence. It 
                                                          
506 See Izutso Sufism and Taoism 7-282 for a breakdown of the Breath of the All-Merciful based on the Fuṣūṣ al-
ḥikam and S. H. Rizvi, “The Existencial Breath of al-raḥmān and the Munificent Grace of al-raḥīm: The Tafsīr 
Sūrat al-Fātiḥa of Jāmī and the School of Ibn ʿArabī”, in Journal of Qurʾanic Studies, 2006, (8/1), 58-87. 
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is a stage where nothing is known about God as referred to in the Prophetic ḥadƬt̄h when a 
person asked the Prophet where God was before creating the creation, to which the he replied: 
“He was in a Cloud (ʿāmā), there was nothing above Him nor under Him.”507 Then with the 
effusion of existence, which is also called the Breath of the All-Merciful, multiplicity occurs 
and with multiplicity, opposites. Hence opposites find their roots in different aspects of the 
Essence, not in any extra actor. So for an ʿārif the coming together of two contradictories is 
not impossible even though it is intellectually impossible in the extramental on the material 
plane. MƮr̄zā Maḥmūd QummƮ ̄elucidates this point in his gloss on Tamhīd al-qawāʾid on the 
third question regarding that that Necessary Reality is nondelimited with real comprehensive 
nondelimitation (al-itḷāq al-ḥaqƬq̄Ƭ ̄al-iḥātƬ̣)̄ saying: 
 
Know that nondelimitation is like oneness regarding the Necessary, the Most High. So 
in the same way as His singularity is essential oneness, which comes together with 
multiplicity without effecting His oneness, His nondelimitation, which is the same as 
His Essence, which is expressed as His comprehension (iḥātạ) of everything and His 
comprehensiveness by His oneness, due to the reality of bringing together [all] things, 
and its essence, its outward and its celestial. So He, on the level of His Essence is 
neither necessary or possible, rather what is necessary is the essential manifestation 
which is achieved by His self-disclosure to His Essence by His Essence. The possible is 
from His self-disclosure by a perfection from among His perfections. So glory be to 
                                                          
507 ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 26. 
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Him who is not a thing from among things, and at the same time as not being a thing 
from among things, is everything.508 
 
Maḥmūd QummƮ ̄of the school of Tehran elucidates the fact that on the level of God’s Essence, 
or more accurately, at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, God is above every condition, even 
the conditions of oneness and nondelimitation. In fact, he goes one step further to say God is 
above the condition of Necessity. That does not mean that He is no longer Necessary, but that 
the condition of Necessity cannot be applied to Him as what exists on at the degree of Non-
dualistic Unity is a Necessity which is greater than the condition of Necessity can comprehend. 
At this stage the mind and words are incapable of rational understanding and intellectual 
description. It is the level of the unseen of the unseen (ghayb al-ghuyūb).  
 
QummƮ ̄ uses different terminology from Qumshihī to explain nondelimitation. 
Nondelimitation for Qummī means comprehension (iḥātạ) of all things as all things are 
brought together in His Essence and emanated from His Essence by the Breath of the All-
Merciful. He also clarifies what he means further by specification regarding the Essence and 
essential manifestation later in his gloss. The Attributes are the same as each other and the 
same as the Essence. The first manifestation of the Essence is an essential manifestation to 
itself as so He is even above Necessity. Qumshihī continues:  
 
In summary, these meanings are that the Divine Perfections and the Essential Names 
such as Knowledge, Will, Power and Life are all on the way of the Essence. So in the 
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same way that the Essence, by the regulation that His specification is the same as His 
Essence, and He, in terms of His specification in the second meaning, He does not have 
anything opposite to Him and He is not opposite to anything [in terms of direction]. 
In the same way, the perfections mentioned. So His Knowledge is not opposite to His 
Will, and His Will in not opposite to His Life. Rather every one of them is the other and 
comprehensive for Him. So if He is Knowledgeable He is Powerful, and Alive and so 
on for all the Names and Unknown Qualities in Him, the Most High. This regulation is 
by the regulation of “Say: Every one acts according to him manner...” (17:84) pervading 
all of the manifestations of the Names. Those manifestations are all one. So Knowledge 
is the same as Oneness...509 
 
The final line of the QummƮ’̄s gloss on the third question he says: “So glory be to Him who is not 
a thing from among things, and at the same time as not being a thing from among things is 
everything” refers to the idea that God is distinguished from things by comprehensive 
specification (al-taʿayyun al-iḥātƬ̣)̄ rather than differential specification (al-taʿayyun al-
taqābulƬ)̄. That is that with comprehensive specification there is no distinction between God 
and His creation, because distinction is either by that which is opposite or by the specification 
of two things that are the same but can be viewed differently. QummƮ ̄is not pantheistic, but 
is elucidating the oneness of Existence which needs to be experienced to be fully 
comprehended. As Muḥammad Ḥusayn NāʾƮj̄Ʈ ̄explains: 
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...That is because comprehensive specification is in the language of non-specification. 
Similarly, singularity and nondelimited existence are problematic issues. Hence a few 
people who have taste (dhawq) are needed, until the human can extract himself from 
his normal limited intellect...for an intellect overcome by desires and fantasies this 
cannot be imagined or confirmed...understanding of these issues is for those who have 
delicate secrets (sirr).510 What is meant by secret is the connection of man with whom 
he worships. To express it another way the secret is the connection between each 
person and nondelimited existence according to the terminology of this group.511  
 
After the level of the undifferentiated Essence and the level of the differentiation of the Names 
the creative act moves through God’s knowledge which is expressed as the permanent 
archetypes. These permanent archetypes are then reflected in the external archetypes and this 
process is known as the Breath of the All-Merciful. It is what Qumshihī meant by the flowing 
ipseity, but there is no physical flow. Rather it is through the process of manifestation or self-
disclosure. Below is a diagrammatic representation of the Breath of the all-Merciful which is 
an expression of how the existents came into existence. The most holy effusion (al-fayḍ al-
aqdas) is the self-disclosure of God within His own Essence from being completely unknown 
to the level of the individual Names in the degree of Dualistic Unity and thereafter in the 
permanent archetypes. Then the holy effusion is from the permanent archetypes to the 
                                                          
510 Here secret (sirr) refers to a level of the soul, not a matter that they cannot disclose. In some traditional 
classifications the sequence is the outward (i.e. the body), then the inward, the heart (qalb), the spirit (rūḥ), the 
secret (sirr), the hidden (khafi)̄ and the more secret (akhfā). 
511 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, TamhƬd̄ fƬ ̄sharḥ qawāʾid al-tawḥƬd̄, tr. with commentary by Muḥammad Ḥusayn NāʾƮj̄Ʈ,̄ (1) 
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external archetypes. Although the perfect human is an external archetype he is represented 
separately as he is the reason for the whole action of effusion. The representation of the perfect 
human also shows the difference between effusion and emanation. The levels in the Breath of 
the All-Merciful are not emanated levels of graded wujūd. They are expressions of wujūd with 
different conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: The Breath of the All-Merciful. 
 
The degree of Non-dualistic Unity (al-
martabah al-aḥadīyah) 
The degree of Dualistic Unity (al-
martabah al-wāḥidīyah) 
The permanent archetypes (al-aʿyān al-
thābitah) 
The external archetypes (al-aʿyān al-
khārijīyah): 
 
1) The world of the Intellects (ʿālim al-
uqūl) 
2) The isthmus (ʿālim al-mithāl) 
3) The corporeal world (ʿālim al-mādda) 
The most holy effusion (al-
fayḍ al-aqdas) 
The holy effusion (al-fayḍ 
al-muqaddas) 
The perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil) 
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The ʿurafāʾ have somewhat complicated the terminology in the first stages of the Breath of the 
All-Merciful. In essence there are three stages. The first is that when God is completely 
unknown and unknowable, that is the stage of the Absolute. The second is where God’s Names 
are manifest in one Name, Allah. The Name Allah contains all the other Names and is known 
as the comprehensive Name (al-ism al-jāmiʿ). The third stage is the dispersion of all the other 
Names from the comprehensive Name into different Names such as the Hearing, the Seeing, 
the Giver of Life, and so on. In the explanation above stage one is the degree of Non-dualistic 
Unity and stages two and three are together in the degree of Dualistic Unity.  
 
According to another classification stage one is termed the unseen of the unseen (al-ghayb al-
ghuyūb), the second stage as the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and the third stage as the 
degree of Dualistic Unity. Therefore, the reader of these texts and commentaries must take 
care to observe the context of the terminology in order to understand which set is being used 
or indeed if the writer switches from using one set of terminology to using another. This 
complication is typical of texts taught in the ḥawza and highlights the importance of learning 
under a qualified teacher who can save the student from misconceiving the ideas expressed 
in more complicated writings. 
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IV. The Oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-Wujūd) 
 
The discussion of the nature of tawḥid and the oneness of Existence is a multifaceted one and 
much has been written about Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology.512 Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī of the school of 
Tehran in his gloss on the Manẓūma provides an interesting breakdown of the different ideas 
and attributes them to the various ḥukamāʾ. He states that there are four levels of tawḥīd. 
There are those that see multiplicity in both wujūd and existent beings and from this 
multiplicity one is the Necessary Being. This he states is the tawḥīd of most of the common 
people. Then there are those that see oneness in both wujūd and existents (i.e. that they are 
one thing). This idea he attributes to the Sufis and is further split into two conceptions. The 
first is what is attributed to ignorant Sufis who say that wujūd has only one real referent which 
does not have an abstract reality behind it and the multiplicity witnessed is conceptual and 
so has no affect on oneness. This was the explanation of the oneness of Existence given by ʿAlī 
Mudarris Zunūzī a few paragraphs ago.  
 
The second concept he attributes to the Sufis who say that wujūd has an abstract reality behind 
the self-disclosures, but that both the abstract Wujūd and the self-manifestations are the 
                                                          
512 Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas are discussed in a variety of contexts in modern literature, including their reception in the 
Sufi tradition, but for some of the most comprehensive works see W.C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989) 77-145; W.C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God: Priniciples of Ibn ʿArabī’s Cosmology 
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(38/2) 149-192. See also N. Heer, “al-Jāmī’s Treatise on Existence”, in P. Morewedge (ed.) Islamic Philosphical 
Theology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1979) 223-257; A. Ansari, “Shah waliy Allah Attempts to Revise “waḥdat al-wujūd””, 
in Arabica, 1988, (35/2) 197-213; A. Ansari, “Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī’s Doctrine of “waḥdat al-shuhūd””, Islamic 
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Necessary Being. That is that it is not only the abstract that is Necessary, but rather both 
aspects of abstract Wujūd and its manifestations, while at the same time the manifestations 
are fully in need of the abstract. The poverty of the manifestations does not affect its necessity 
as it is poverty to the same reality that it is. It is this idea that Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī finds 
this to be the apparent belief of Mullā Ṣadrā especially in his Asfār.  
 
The third idea is that of the oneness of Existence and the multiplicity of existents and this is 
the idea of many philosophers including figures such as Dawānī, Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā 
for part of his intellectual life. It means that Wujūd is one without any multiplicity at all not 
even in terms of gradation, whereas the existents are many which is due to their quiddity. The 
fourth idea is that of the oneness of Wujūd and the existents while at the same time 
maintaining their manyness, which again is the idea of the ʿurafāʾ and Mullā Ṣadrā himself.513 
This idea finds its basis in the poverty of existents which do not own any wujūd for themselves 
and are only mirrors for the manifestation of God. 
 
Abu-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī of the school of Tehran also breaks down the oneness of Existence 
into four possible meanings in a treatise on the oneness of Existence as this is a term oft quoted 
in the works of ḥukamāʾ and ʿurafāʾ alike.514 The first meaning is that what is meant by oneness 
is the oneness of God himself as an existent in wujūd and there is no other existent like Him. 
In fact everything else perceived in existence is an imagination and all that exists is God. Like 
the waves in the sea. The waves are nothing but the water and it would be incorrect to assign 
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them a separate existence to the water.515 This explanation corresponds to ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī’s as well as to the first part of the second explanation given above and according to 
both Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī and for Qazvīnī this explanation is  also very much mistaken. 
Qazvīnī refutes this idea by saying that the explanation denies the degree of Non-dualistic 
Unity and the rules of ḥikmat such as causality.516  
 
The second explanation given by Qazvīnī is that there is unity between all the levels of wujūd 
from the perspective that they are all wujūd. However, there is a difference in the level of wujūd 
and its modes. He says that this explanation is neither entirely correct nor entirely incorrect. 
Rather it is an essential foundation of causality.517 It is also the philosophical explanation of 
gradation which is one of the cornerstones of ḥikmat. The third explanation is that while 
wujūd is one, manyness also exists in reality. An example of this is the relationship between 
the human soul and its faculties. While the soul is one, manyness is observed in its faculties. 
Qazvīnī assigns this explanation as the choice of Mullā Ṣadrā. The fourth explanation is that 
the witness sees oneness by only seeing God behind the various manifestations and self-
disclosures. This explanation is the one that he chooses as the most correct as it is the most 
devoid of criticism.518  
 
From the explanations of both Qazvīnī and Āmulī the use of ḥikmat to explain and analyze an 
ʿirfānī concept is observed. While Āmulī gives a clearer picture of the different views and then 
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opts to use ʿirfānī principles to explain the meaning of wujūd-in-something-else, Qazvīnī is 
more active in using the philosophical reading of ḥikmat to judge between the various ideas 
and chooses the most coherent according to that analysis. Qazvīnī’s examination is from a 
philosophical perspective which gives a reality to manyness and he is very concerned with 
maintaining the laws of ḥikmat such as causality and gradation. At the same time, his analysis 
did not examine the meaning of the oneness of Existence according to the ʿurafāʾ but rather 
discussed the different possible meanings of the term and judged between them according to 
the one that had the least philosophical criticism. This method of analyzing terminology leads 
to a more philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, as opposed to Āmulī, whose description of the 
view of the ʿurafāʾ and whose explanation of the reality of existence by something else is 
perhaps more faithful to the principles in theoretical ʿirfān.     
 
In his treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd, Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r of the school of Tehran indicates that 
much confusion, incorrect attribution of heresy, and ultimately the rejection of the concept 
of the oneness of Existence occurred due to the unclear nature of the terms used to express 
this complex issue. He then proceeds to give a commentary on some poetry attributed to Ibn 
ʿArabƮ ̄which is deemed heretical. ʿAsṣạ̄r solves the apparent problem by firstly pointing out 
that there is an obvious and outward meaning to the words used, and another poetical 
meaning, and those who attack the idea of the oneness of Existence have only understood the 
concept according to the literal meaning of the words. He then proceeds to draw a distinction 
between two different types of relation (iżāfa) and by that distinction shows that the words of 
Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄are from a completely different perspective to that what has been understood by 
his critiques:   
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...In some of the poetry of Muḥyī al-DƮn̄ he said: “So He praises me and I praise Him, 
and He worships me and I worship Him.” The outward of these words indicates to the 
oneness of the creation and the Creator, the worshiper and the Worshiped and the 
praiser and the Praised. This meaning is clear in [the concept of] the oneness of 
Existence, the unity of the worshiper and the Worshiped and the praiser and the 
Praised and a rejection of everything except the apparent world. It is from this that 
many have rejected [this poetry] in the language of curses, taunts...[however,] it is that 
the difference in the pronoun of the speaker and the one who is not present in poetry 
is above the indication of multiple existences of the worshiper and the Worshiped and 
the praiser and the Praised...to express it another way, the relation between praise and 
worship to the servant is opposing relation (iżāfah-i qābulƬ)̄ but with the Truth, the 
Most High, it is agent relation (iżāfah-i fāʿilƬ)̄. It is obvious that the relation of a thing 
to its agent is more complete than the relation with its opposite. With this meaning 
and the rule of “there is no affecter in existence except God”, the Truth, the Most High, 
brings worship into existence in the servants. Hence He in reality is the Worshiped, 
the Worshiper and the One who brings into existence worship. [He is also] the Praiser, 
the Praised and the Creator of praise...519 
 
Any type of relation which involves separation is the relation between two opposites such as 
the servant and the Lord. Agent relation expresses who the real actor is. That is that the reality 
of any action cannot be attributed to the servant, as he stands in the position of complete 
poverty. It is not the case that God worships Ibn ʿ ArabƮ ̄but that there is no separation between 
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God and servant, as that would make the servant a God too (i.e. an independent existent). 
Rather God is manifested in Ibn ʿArabƮ ̄and in everything else that is created, and therefore to 
worship God is to worship yourself. Not with the meaning of opposing relation, as this is the 
essence of polytheism. Rather with the understanding that there is nothing in existence and 
no affecter except God. The ʿārif realizes this idea within himself, not through thought, but by 
presence which is attained by cleansing the soul and the grace of God. ʿAsṣạ̄r continues to 
explain other possible meanings for Ibn ʿArabƮ’̄s utterance and summarizes the discussion as 
the unification of each level of existence. That is that each lower level of existence is the 
servant of the higher level of existence, but at the same time they are unified as what separates 
them is self-disclosure, not separation in the ordinary sense: 
 
The summary of this clarification is that the worshiper and the Worshipped, the 
witness and the Witnessed, the praiser and the Praised are all one picture, self-
disclosure and manifestation of each other in levels. Hence the picture that is below 
the presence of the Worshipped and the descending self-disclosure from the 
Praised and the Witnessed are all the existence of the worshipper, the praiser and 
the witness. Because the higher picture and the ascension of the worshipper and 
the praiser are one with the existence of the Worshipped...520   
 
The idea of the oneness of Existence did not sit as well with Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, another ḥakīm 
of the school of Tehran, who discussed the issue in some of his classes recorded in the form of 
notes by his student Sayyid ʿAbbās Shahrūdī.521 Jilva discusses some outcomes of the theory of 
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the oneness of Existence that he considers rationally inconsistent. He starts by discussing the 
impossibility of every specification of wujūd, when considered individually, and nondelimited 
wujūd being the same thing. If they were it should mean that all specifications could be 
extracted from any individual specification. That is from the existence of a man, the quiddity 
of a horse could be extracted and all other quiddities that were not that of a man. He rejects 
the idea that some of these quiddities are manifest and the others hidden as they should all 
exist by one existence and so need a cause for one manifestation to be preferred over another.  
 
Furthermore, he argues that the understanding of a limited existent, such as a man, comes 
from the limit of existence, and something that is limited cannot be Necessary. The quiddities 
cannot all be one either, rather they are disparate. Additionally, if the wujūd that is Necessary 
is not abstract, that necessitates neediness, and that the Essence of the Necessary can be 
described by the attributes of lack, beginning and possibility. In fact, the Necessary would have 
an infinite number of quiddities. Rather there are two levels of existence, that of the Necessary 
and that of the possible beings. If the oneness of Existence was accurate, then what is the 
difference between the most holy effusion from the degree of Non-dualistic Unity to the 
permanent archetypes and the holy effusion from the permanent archetypes to the external 
archetypes?522  
 
The essence of these concerns is that the oneness of Existence stands opposed to the concept 
of gradation as various existents cannot be graded and have the same level of intensity at every 
grade. This is because each grade necessitates further limitations as they descend, all of which 
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cannot be attributed to the Necessary Being who is unlimited. This problem finds its roots in 
a difference of perspective, as although the maintenance of the same intensity of wujūd for 
each graded level may be impossible intellectually, the outcome of this concern raises another 
problem which is also unacceptable. That is that if the intensity of wujūd varies on each level, 
it follows that the Necessary Being is not present with the same intensity throughout His 
creation. Rather while Jilva is right to point out the disparity between the different levels 
described by the ʿurafāʾ in the Breath of the All-Merciful and the same level of intensity of 
wujūd at every level, the concept of the oneness of Existence is more refined.  
 
It can be explained using the similitude of a jigsaw puzzle. A piece of the puzzle may be 
examined and one may ask: “How can there be one picture throughout the puzzle, while this 
piece is not the final picture?” However, when the puzzle is completed, the individual pieces 
are forgotten, as it is the picture that is the most manifest. In the same way the ʿārif, after 
removing the veils through self purification, sees God in existence and different grades 
become one, while maintaining specification. This is indicated in a famous tradition 
attributed to Imam ‘AlƮ:̄ “I have not seen anything except that I saw God before it, with it and 
after it.”523  
 
In Miṣbāḥ al-uns Fanārī points out that the experience of this comprehensive vision is at the 
peak of ʿirfān and that very few ʿurafāʾ have actually reached this level with perfect balance. 
Most ʿurafāʾ see one aspect more than the other; either they see more unity then multiplicity; 
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or more multiplicity than unity.524 It is only the perfect man that has the balanced constitution 
to see both with perfect balance as he is the isthmus between unity and multiplicity as will be 
explained further in the chapter on walāyah. It was perhaps this type of criticism that gave 
Jilva the reputation of a more philosophical ḥakīm. 
 
V. Wujūd-by-Something-Else 
 
The reality of this existence-by-something-else is explained by Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī in 
another part of his gloss on the Manẓūma where he explains the concept according to three 
levels of manifestation. The first level is the manifestation of the Essence upon itself which is 
the degree of Non-dualistic Unity. The second manifestation is the manifestation of the Names 
and Attributes and what they necessitate in terms of the permanent archetypes. Since these 
archetypes are a necessary part of the manifestation of the Names they cannot be said to have 
their own independent existence. Rather they are existent by the existence of God not by His 
creation. This level is the degree of Dualistic Unity. The third manifestation is that of the 
permanent archetypes and all of the levels of creation.525 From this explanation it is clear that 
all of the levels of manifestation have no independence in terms of their wujūd from God, 
rather they are completely poor and exist by God’s existence.  
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Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil Tūnī of the school of Tehran explains in his gloss on Qayṣarī’s 
commentary on the Fuṣūṣ that Wujūd has no opposite and is unlike anything as this would 
require another existent being besides Wujūd that could be its opposite or that could be 
compared to it.526 So wujūd is on every level of existence as God manifests on every level and 
at the same time nothing exists independently of Him. This is incongruent with the concept 
of wujūd which will be explained in transcendental philosophy, as in ḥikmat contingent 
existents have a level of wujūd in themselves. Their wujūd is by the Necessary (i.e. wujūd-by-
something-else) but they are then existent in a real sense. In ʿirfān only the Necessary is 
existent in any real sense. There is nothing like Him according to the verse of the Qurʾān: 
“...nothing like a likeness of Him...”527 Wujūd is such that no second wujūd can be imagined with 
it.528 Nor can it be split due to its simplicity (basạ̄tạh) except when mentally distinguishing the 
Names.529 
 
Qayṣarī explains that Wujūd has no beginning, as that would make God needy of a cause for 
His existence making Him contingent and not Necessary.530 Wujūd has no end as it would be 
juxtaposed to nonexistence and so the end of Wujūd would be described by its opposite.531 It 
would also violate the law of identity,532 as Wujūd has no other, but placing a limit on Wujūd 
necessitates another (even if that other is nonexistence). There are two interpretations of the 
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idea that God has no beginning and no end. One is related to time, meaning God has no 
beginning or end in time. There was no time period where He did not exist and no time period 
will come where He will not exist. But there is no meaning to time when speaking about 
abstract beings. Time is a variable of the material world.  
 
The other interpretation is that when it is said that God has no beginning what is referred to 
is the depth of His Essence. That is that His Essence has no beginning or end. When it is said 
He has no End, what is referred to be His manifestations, which will never cease as due to the 
depth of His Essence, He will never run out of manifestations. Due to His depth His Reality is 
only known to Himself.533 “Vision comprehends Him not, and He comprehends all vision...”534 He 
is therefore the Manifest in terms of the outward world,535 which either refers to the material 
and imaginal world, or to all the levels of existence except the Degree of Non-dualistic Unity, 
and the Inward which refers to all the other levels of existence except the material and the 
imaginal, or never ending Essence depending on which of the two interpretations is taken.  
 
If a contingent being becomes nonexistent in ḥikmat, it is wiped off the face of wujūd. 
However, in ʿirfān a thing becoming nonexistent does not mean that it ceases to exist. Rather 
it reenters the hidden realms, in the same way it manifested from them in the first instance.536 
That is something that becomes nonexistent, does not become completely nonexistent, but 
becomes hidden from the corporeal world, as the reality of anything except God is 
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nonexistence. The misinterpretation of the philosophers according to the ʿurafāʾ comes from 
their attributing existence to each individual thing as those existences are different to 
Existence. Like the existence of individuals from a common species (nawʿ).537 In ʿirfān 
individual existences are exist by an illuminated relation (iżāfah ishrāqīyah), like the 
relationship of the rays of the sun to the sun. That is that existents are in no way separate from 
Wujūd, as relation is conceptual. 
 
VI. The Permanent Archetypes (al-aʿyān al-thābitah) and Quiddity 
 
Quiddity for Sadrian philosophers is similar to the permanent archetypes in the terminology 
of the ʿurafāʾ as it is a things permanent archetype that gives it its characteristics. The 
permanent archetypes are the Names but with a face towards creation, therefore they never 
enter the world of creation themselves. The following rough example can be used to 
understand this idea and the permanent archetypes themselves. If a person was to ask another 
person a philosophical question, before the event of the question, the person who is being 
asked has the attribute of being a philosopher, but that attribute is mixed with all the other 
attributes the person has, such as being a linguist, a jurist, a ʿārif and so on. Then when he is 
asked the question, the attribute of being a philosopher presents itself in his essence. With 
that attribute he creates an answer in his mind. Then after the creation of the answer in his 
mind, he expresses the answer in the extramental with words and the question is answered.  
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In this example the stage of nondelimited attributes of the person who is asked, is likened to 
the level of God’s Essence which has no specification even in terms of His Names. This level in 
the Breath of the All-Merciful is the degree of Non-dualistic Unity. Then when the Names 
become specified it is another level of God’s Essence which is the degree of Dualistic Unity. In 
our example this is when the attribute of philosopher becomes specified in the essence of the 
person answering the question. Then in the Presence of God’s Knowledge [before existence] 
(al-ḥaḍarah al-‘ilmīyah) — the Attributes manifest as the permanent archetypes, which is like 
the formulation of the answer in the mind of the philosopher. The mind of the philosopher, 
although an internal faculty, is differentiated from his essence. In the same way although the 
permanent archetypes exist in the unseen realm they are different from the pure Essence and 
are therefore classified as quiddity instead of wujūd.  
 
The permanent archetypes, like the essences of the quiddities in ḥikmat, are neither existent 
in themselves nor non-existent, as their existence depends on the manifestation of the 
Essence. Then when those permanent archetypes manifest in the extramental they become 
the external archetypes. The external archetypes therefore find their truth in the permanent 
archetypes and this is the meaning of actuality (nafs al-amr) in ʿirfān. Hence all things in 
outward existence including quiddity find their reality in inner existence and are all simply 
manifestations of the Pure Essence.  
 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī disagrees with the similitude drawn between the permanent 
archetypes and quiddity in his gloss on Qayṣarī’s introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ. 
He argues that the permanent archetypes are not even in the system of wujūd for them to be 
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like quiddity. Rather the permanent archetypes are in the knowledge of God before coming 
into existence: 
 
They mean by the reality of the human the permanent archetype of the perfect human in 
the knowledge of God. For every archetype of the external archetypes there is a 
permanent archetype in the knowledge of God which is the origin (aṣl) of what it is in the 
external. What is in the external world is a shadow of this origin. By this the imagination 
that the permanent archetypes of things in the knowledge of God is the quiddity of things 
and that they are opposed to a things wujūd. This is because the world of knowledge is 
before the world of existents…538 
 
The clear response to this argument of Qumshihī is that the external archetypes are in the 
system of wujūd as the shadow of the permanent archetypes. What is meant by saying that the 
permanent archetypes are similar to quiddity it is that quiddity can either be existent or not 
and so it can be understood outside of the system of wujūd and therefore compared with the 
permanent archetypes rather than the external archetypes. Yet this whole discussion is from 
a philosophical perspective as Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī points out when criticizing a later 
comparison Qumshihī makes in the same gloss between the permanent archetypes and the 
Names, with wujūd and quiddity: 
 
So comparing wujūd and quiddity, even though it is with a difference, is not correct for 
that which they are being compared with [the permanent archetypes and the Names] in 
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terms of what he [Qumshihī] said — may God sanctify his secret — according to the 
lords of insight and the people of taste and wayfaring. For attributing effects to quiddity 
is either from the perspective [of] oneness in manyness and that wujūd while being 
detached from specification is manifest in it and is everything; or from the perspective of 
the people of philosophy as they see the world…[actually] existing. Not the ʿirfānī 
perspective as for the free [i.e. the ʿurafāʾ] it is imagination within imagination.539 
 
Here Khumaynī criticizes Qumshihī’s analysis as being a philosophical reading of the concept 
of the permanent archetypes as opposed to maintaining his stance from an ʿirfānī perspective. 
Quiddity should be not be taken as anything other than a conceptual distinction and to 
attribute any real affect to quiddity would be — as Khumaynī points out — from the 
perspective of real manyness. The permanent archetypes on the other hand have nothing to 
do with quiddity as they are part of God’s knowledge. As such the permanent archetypes are 
always part of Wujūd, not outside of it.    
 
VII. Gradation (TashkƬk̄) 
 
Gradation in wujūd is a major concept in transcendental philosophy as will be discussed. 
Philosophers seek to explain gradation by starting with what they have in front of them and 
gradually removing delimitation, until they reach the level of the Necessary Being. For 
example, wujūd in an element has a certain level of existence, which is lower than the wujūd 
in a plant. The wujūd in that plant is at a lower level then the wujūd in an animal, which in 
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turn is at a lower level then wujūd in an intelligent being and so on until the wujūd of the 
Necessary Being, whose wujūd is at such a level that it is necessary. Therefore, gradation and 
the attribution of wujūd to the Necessary Being are arrived at through examining contingent 
beings. In ʿirfān gradation must be understood in the light of the oneness of Existence. That is 
that gradation is not real in the sense that it is real in ḥikmat. Gradation occurs not only for 
wujūd but also for modes related to wujūd such as knowledge, life and desire. These are present 
in all the levels of wujūd, but at the intensity or weakness of that level. So the knowledge, life 
and desire in a plant are at a lower level then in an intelligent being for example.  
 
The ʿārif starts with God who is the only true existent. Then since His manifestations are 
nothing except Himself, He is manifest on all levels of creation. He also gave each level of 
creation and each created being on each level, their own capacity. So each thing reflects Him, 
through His Attributes, according to their own capacity. For example, the sun manifests God’s 
attribute of the Light, however, only to the extent of its capacity, which God through His 
Wisdom created at a certain level. Here it is the issue of capacity that explains gradation, 
rather than the intellectual exercise of removing delimitation. At the same time, Wujūd 
meaning God has no gradation as it is not God who is at different levels according to the level 
of existence. What is graded is His manifestation according to the capacities of His created 
Beings. Otherwise a God whose own existence can be described by intensity and weakness is 
a God that can be described by place, as He would exist with more intensity in the angelic 
world for example, then in the corporeal world. This is a problem that the transcendental 
philosopher falls into with his explanation of wujūd as a chain with the Necessary Being is at 
the end of that chain, in order to prevent infinite regress (tasalsul). ʿAsṣạ̄r explains this point 
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when discussing two different ways multiplicity can be viewed, one from the perspective of 
quiddities and their capacities, and the other being the different levels of wujūd: 
 
[The second type of multiplicity is] multiplicity in terms of perfection and 
imperfection, intensity and weakness, precedence and delay, needlessness and 
poverty and necessity and possibility, are in the essence of the reality of wujūd. His 
essential states (shuʾūn) and that which follow from what is necessary from the 
perfections of wujūd should not become separate from His Essence. The reality of 
wujūd and the pure reality from the perspective of nondelimited perfection (itḷāq-i 
kamālƬ)̄ and flowing emanating perfection (kamāl irsālƬ ̄ sarayānƬ)̄, possesses 
perfections that not in terms of the essence of wujūd, nor from the perspective of 
mentally posited intellectual specificity (nawʿƬ ̄ iʿtibārƬ ̄ ʿaqlƬ)̄, is there any separation 
from those perfections. To summarize, this type of multiplicity is called gradation...540  
 
ʿIrfān is a subject concerned with how multiplicity comes from the One, how that multiplicity 
will return back to the One and what the purpose of the creative action is. Does the One 
become many? Or is the multiplicity all in the One? The answer lies in between these two 
extremes and is expressed in a phrase narrated from Imam ‘AlƮ ̄and also in other instances541 
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from the other Shiʿi Imams: “He is not close to things by connection and not distant from then by 
separation.”542 There is a difference between oneness and connection. The idea of the effusion 
of existence by manifestation and self-disclosure bridges the gap between God and His 
creation, as nothing emanates from the Truth except the Truth. But His manifestations and 
self-disclosures make Him knowable in some way, while simultaneously acting as veils of light 
and darkness that block true knowledge of Him. It is easy to see how such a refined discussion 
is easily misinterpreted by those without significant background in philosophy and ʿirfān. 
Consequently the ʿurafāʾ have often been accused of polytheism and pantheism (neither of 
which are intended by ʿurafāʾ as the above discussion shows) by more traditionally trained 
scholars. Conversely the ʿurafāʾ were careful to keep their teachings secret, only disclosing 
them to who they considered worthy.  
 
To summarize the previous sections in this part, Wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān is a term used for 
God as He is existence, while everything else is a manifestation of Him. This focus on God’s 
Oneness is the view of the oneness of Existence where there is no real wujūd except God. Other 
terms for this concept include nondelimited wujūd and wujūd which is non-conditional as the 
source of division. This view of Wujūd explains the seemingly heretical utterances of the 
ʿurafāʾ. The univocal nature of Wujūd is the Wujūd which is understood in the experiences of 
the ʿurafāʾ. Wujūd manifests with its modes and has no opposite. The permanent archetypes 
are similar to quiddities according to some, while others disagree with drawing comparisons 
in this way. The source of gradation is the capacities of created beings to manifest God. The 
next part will discuss wujūd in ḥikmat. 
                                                          
542 See al-Raḍī (compl.) Nahj al-balāgha, 40. 
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II. Part 2: Wujūd in Transcendental Philosophy 
 
According to a distinction made by Farābī and Ibn Sīnā543 when a person considers the 
extramental they are able to mentally divide each existent thing into two distinct 
metaphysical concepts; its wujūd and its quiddity or what-ness.544 The conception of each of 
these principles is completely separate, which means wujūd cannot be described with any of 
the categories of quiddity. Division between the two concepts is possible as the mind is able 
to view quiddity independently of wujūd; even though in the extramental the two cannot be 
separated. Quiddity is the limit of wujūd by which we comprehend different existents and does 
not have a separate existence, as will be explained further later. This gives rise to two distinct 
planes when understanding wujūd; the mind and the extramental. If the concept of wujūd in 
the mind has no relation to wujūd in the extramental, all efforts to understand wujūd would 
be pointless. But if there is a relationship between the concept of wujūd and wujūd in the 
extramental, then philosophy has meaning. This is a key question dealt with in the section on 
mental existence, and is a point of intersection with Western philosophy. 
 
                                                          
543 T. Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009) 49-51. 
544 Quiddity has two meanings: 1) in a specific sense (bi maʿanā al-akhasṣ)̣ which is the response to the question: 
What is it? And 2) in a general sense (bi maʿanā al-aʿam) which is also known as the individual quiddity (māhīyah 
innīyah) or the thing as it actually is. For this reason philosophers say that God has an individual quiddity even 
if it cannot be grasped, but as pure Existence, does not have quiddity in the first sense. For a further explanation 
of māhīyah innīyah see Ibn Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing, ed./tr. M. E. Marmura (Provo Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press, 2005) 383, nt. 1. 
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The different planes give rise to different types of predication when formulating sentences, 
which are valid or invalid, depending on the plane the sentence is tested against. In 
propositional logic, primary essential predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalƬ ̄al-dhātƬ)̄ occurs when 
there is unity in the concept of the subject and the predicate. For example, the proposition 
“man is a rational animal” is a valid primary essential predication as the concept of man is the 
same as the concept of a rational animal. Since the rule to distinguish this type of predication 
is unity of concept it concerns the plane of the mind. On the other hand, common technical 
predication (al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-sịnāʿƬ)̄545 occurs when there is unity of the subject and 
predicate in the extramental. So for example, in the proposition “man laughs”, although the 
concept of man and laughter are two distinct concepts they are brought together in the 
laughing man in the extramental, making predication by common technical predication in 
the proposition “man laughs” valid. But in this case predication by primary essential 
predication is invalid as man and laughter are two separate concepts. The distinction becomes 
important when solving the problem of some tricky propositions which will be tackled in the 
section on mental existence. 
 
Although the separation between wujūd and quiddity can be traced back to Neoplatonic 
forerunners, Islamic philosophers discussed the issue in more depth and gave it much more 
importance when formulating their philosophical frameworks. Ibn SƮn̄ā deals with the issue 
in his most important works and SuhrawardƮ ̄ proposed a rival framework based on the 
                                                          
545 Common technical predication is also known as oft-used predication (al-ḥaml al-mutaʿārif, as it is used so 
often) and accidental predication (al-ḥaml al-ʿarḍƬ)̄ (as opposed to essential predication (al-ḥaml al-dhātƬ)̄ see 
Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ al-Nūr al-mutajallƬ ̄fƬ ̄al-ẓuhūr al-ẓillƬ ̄(Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 35-37. 
224  
primacy of quiddity before Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy which gave primacy to 
wujūd.546 
 
I. The Self-Evident Nature of Wujūd 
 
In both ṬabātạbāʾƮ’̄s Bidāyat and Niḥāyat and SabzavārƮ’̄s Manẓūma the foundations for an 
understanding of wujūd begin at the obviousness of wujūd and the consequent uselessness in 
defining it with a definition, as any definition of the term wujūd results in a more complex and 
incomplete definition then an intuitive understanding of the concept.547 A person intuitively 
knows the difference between something that exists and something that does not, as when 
they want to fulfill their needs they seek existent things that have the effect they are searching 
for. For example, a thirsty person seeks water, but not just any water, he seeks water which is 
existent, not imaginary water, and this fact is obvious to every person once they have been 
informed of it and their attention has been turned to it. Conversely a child who is scared of a 
monster under their bed is comforted by explaining that this creature has no real existence 
outside of imagination. Intuitive knowledge can also be termed as knowledge by presence and 
it is contrasted with knowledge by acquisition.548  
 
                                                          
546 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 87. 
547 The obviousness of wujūd is found at least as far back as Ibn SƮn̄ā see Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, 22-
24. Therefore all definitions of wujūd are in fact admonitions (tanbƬh̄āt) that point the seeker back to what he 
already knows through his own experience. 
548 For an in depth analysis of the concept of ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrƬ ̄ in Islamic philosophy and ʿirfān see ḤāʾirƮ ̄YazdƮ,̄ 
Knowledge by Presence. The other view is that intuitive knowledge is by acquisition when a person interacts with 
their environment over a period of time. 
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Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄of the school of Qum in his gloss on the Manẓūma brings this discussion 
back to a report from the Prophet when he was asked: “How did you know your Lord?” The 
Prophet replied: “By God I knew things.” Ḥasanzāda comments saying it is due to the 
manifestness of God and the hiddenness of things.549 That is that God can be known by 
presence. Yet when one knows the Source of things, he knows all things, which is a more ʿ irfānī 
approach to this issue as explained previously. From a philosophical perspective this tradition 
may also be an indication to an ontological proof for the existence of God (burḥān al-ṣiddīqīn), 
where the knower of existence knows existence by existence and not through intellectual 
arguments. In any case the type of knowledge referred to is not one of acquisition, but is a 
clear vision of what is known by presence, albeit at different levels depending on the purity of 
the knower. A similar tradition is quoted concerning Imam ʿAlī, when someone asks him if he 
has seen his Lord. He responds by saying that he would not worship a lord he had not seen. 
The questioner then asks how he has seen God and he answers by saying that the type of sight 
is not with the eye, rather it is with the sight of the heart.550  
 
After establishing wujūd Ṭabāṭabāʾī continues to argue that all that we know of wujūd is by 
moving from one necessary aspect of wujūd to another rather than either an argument from 
an effect to uncover its cause (burhān al-innī) or an argument from the cause to establish the 
effect (burhān al-limmī). He classifies this third type of proof as another type of burhān al-innī 
                                                          
549 See Hādī SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, ed. Masʿūd Ṭālibī with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ 5 vols 
(Tehran: Nashr-i nāb 1380 Sh/2001) (2) 60. This ḥadƬt̄h also has an ʿirfānƮ ̄ interpretation which reflects the 
Prophet’s station of witnessing. 
550 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 242.  
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argument even if it is not one in its strict sense.551 This type of reasoning is possible because 
differentiating aspects of wujūd is purely a mental exercise. Wujūd and all of its modes are 
unified in the extramental. While Muḥammad Shāhābādī, another ḥakīm of the school of Qum 
who is the son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī agrees that the proofs concerning wujūd are 
strictly of neither category he disagrees with Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s classification of it being an extension 
of the first category of proofs as he argues that there is no effect when discussing pure wujūd. 
What can be understood of wujūd are the necessary aspects of wujūd itself and so he argues 
that these proofs are better classified as an extension of limmī arguments. At the same time, 
what is established from moving from the cause is not an effect, but a necessary attribute of 
the cause itself. Shāhābādī says in his gloss on the Asfār: 
 
I say: The ontological proof for the existence of God (burhān al-ṣiddīqīn) is neither a limmī 
proof or an innī proof according to the terminology, except if we say that the limmī proof 
is wider then what has been mentioned in logic in terms of establishing the effect by 
means of the cause. Rather it includes the establishment of the cause from itself to 
establish something else, not itself so that it would necessitate a circular argument. As 
Mawlawī said: “The sun rising is the proof of the sun [existing].552 
 
He further clarifies his point when commenting on Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s gloss on the Asfār when 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues that arguing from the perspective of gradation to establish the Necessary 
Being is an argument from the effect to the cause by saying:  
                                                          
551 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ 4 vols (Qum: 
Muʾassasa-i āmuzishƮ ̄wa pazhūhishƮ-̄yi Imām KhumaynƮ,̄ 1378 Sh/1999), (1) 30-32. 
552 Shāhābādī, Rashaḥāt al-ḥikma, 3-4. 
227  
 
I say: Firstly gradation is not a necessary aspect of wujūd. It [gradation] is wujūd itself as 
it [wujūd] is simple in all of its levels…so it is not an innī argument from this aspect in the 
same way that necessity is not a necessary aspect of wujūd, rather it is also the reality of 
wujūd itself…553  
 
While Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues from the perspective that gradation is a real effect of the Necessary 
Being, Shāhābādī argues that gradation is part of the Necessary Being as it is the Essence that 
indicates towards the Essence. The split in views is very much an illustration of the different 
readings of Mullā Ṣadrā. While Ṭabāṭabāʾī has adopted a more philosophical approach in 
preferring the separation of the cause and the effect, Shāhābādī has taken a more ʿirfānī 
approacheven though his interpretation of gradation being essential to wujūd is consistent 
with a philosophical reading. 
 
It follows from the distinction between wujūd and quiddity that wujūd cannot have a 
definition based on a complete genus and differentia, but why can wujūd not be defined in an 
incomplete fashion using a description (rasm) like the categories (maqūlāt) which also cannot 
be given a complete definition? SabzavārƮ ̄commenting on the Asfār answers:  
 
The intended meaning [of rasm] is logical description, that is, definition by accidental 
properties that pertain to the quiddity. It is clear that wujūd does not have a definition 
in this sense. Additionally, the reality is not attained by the mind except under a term 
                                                          
553 Shāhābādī, Rashaḥāt al-ḥikma, 4-5. 
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and this necessitates tautology. The understanding of a thing is equal to it in 
knowledge and ignorance and the thing being defined is better known [then by its 
definition].554  
 
That is that since both necessary and accidental properties are from a things quiddity, they 
cannot be attributed to wujūd. Therefore, wujūd has no definition as it does not fall under any 
of the categories of quiddity and any attempt to define it necessitates an attempt to 
conceptualize it. However, that conceptualization is not as clear as the initial experience of 
wujūd before theorization. In other words, wujūd is self-evident and there is no need to define 
it. Existence is therefore the starting point of all discussions as it is proved in of itself and from 
this base other concepts can be proved. With the intuitive character of existence established 
the nature of that existence can be discussed further in terms of its primacy and gradation. In 
some way the discussion on the self evident nature of wujūd shapes the flow of the more ʿ irfānī 
discussions incorporated in the study of ḥikmat. To accept something as self evident one has 
to accept that some things are left better unexplained and experienced with a clear vision of 
the self. It means that the philosopher does not rely only on his intellectual prowess, but has 
to return to himself at times as well to understand what his intellect cannot define.  
 
II. Ishtirāk lafẓƬ ̄and ishtirāk maʿnawƬ ̄
 
When we say “man exists” or “this tree exists” or “God exists” or other phrases similar to this, 
is existence univocal (ishtirāk maʿnawƬ)̄ in all of these sentences? Or is the word existence a 
                                                          
554 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 53, nt. 1. 
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homonymy (ishtirāk lafẓƬ)̄? Or does the word existence share the same meaning for some 
existents and a different meaning (tafsƬ̣l̄) for God? Transcendental philosophy bases its 
understanding of wujūd on the idea that wujūd is only one reality and so carries one meaning 
on whatever it is predicated to (i.e. it is univocal). That is existence in all three of the above 
sentences has the same meaning. For philosophers, sentences are not considered simply for 
their linguistic value in a particular language, so that one could say that the philosophers argue 
that wujūd has only one linguistic meaning. Rather the abstract concept of wujūd, 
independent of which ever language it is expressed in, is univocal. The meaning of wujūd in 
each sentence must be the same as that is the point of the sentences. That is the sentences 
seek to express whether something has existence or not, where existence in each case means 
the same thing.  
 
Another argument for the oneness of meaning of wujūd is that when we doubt about the 
quiddity of something but are sure that it exists, the meaning of that existence does not change 
as we change our idea of what that existent could be. For example, if something is seen from 
a distance, the object may be thought to be a tree, but as one draws closer they find that the 
object was actually a man. Although what was known of the quiddity of the existent has 
changed, the knowledge of the existence of an object has remained.  
 
As for the third possibility, which is a shared meaning among existents and a different 
meaning concerning God, Sabzavārī says it is true in the extramental but not true of our 
concept of existence,555 as everything related to God cannot be grasped by the intellect. 
                                                          
555 SabzivārƮ,̄ The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 42. 
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However, the intellect can verify that God’s existence with the self-evident meaning of 
existence explained above and also verify that God’s existence is more intense than other 
existences and it is that intensity that cannot be understood. There must be some relationship 
between the existence of God and the existence in contingent beings which is different to the 
relationship of wujūd and nonexistence (ʿadam).556 Although God’s existence cannot be 
comprehended and is certainly different form the existence of what He has caused to exist, 
He still exists in the univocal sense of the word applied to His creation, as it cannot be said 
that He does not exist.  
 
The distinction between God’s existence and that of other existents is distinguished by various 
terms. For example, God’s existence is necessary whereas all other existence is contingent. Or 
God’s existence is essential and real, whereas the existence of others is accidental and subtle. 
This point finds its roots in the aḥādīth which from one perspective completely deny any 
possibility of comparing God with His creation, but at the same time affirming His existence 
and the human’s intuitive grasp of His existence.557 The existence of the contingent is not 
outside of God’s existence and so a paradox remains. This paradox is further elucidated in the 
oneness of Existence in theoretical ʿirfān. 
 
ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī of the school of Tehran dedicates a chapter of his book Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya 
to the very issue of Gods Essence being known to only Himself. After an epistemological 
categorization of the different types of knowledge, he shows that knowing God as He is does 
                                                          
556 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (2) 78, nt. 1. 
557 For an example of this distinction see Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh, al-Tawḥīd, ed. ʿAlī Akbar Ghaffārī 
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamī li-l-maṭbūʿāt, 2006) 94-95. 
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not fall into any of these categories while Gods knowledge of Himself is knowledge by 
presence.558 It is impossible to know God through knowledge by attainment as God does not 
have a form that can be imagined.559 But for one to know God through knowledge by presence, 
he must fully comprehend Gods Essence, which is impossible for an imperfect existent.560 
Zunūzī explains what can be known of God in the concluding section of his argument entitled 
“A Fine ʿirfānī Point.” Here he explains that what can be known of God is in proportion to the 
effusion (fayḍ).561 Therefore the Essence is not knowable in itself, but God is known by what 
He manifests, which is an incomplete knowledge of Him. Zunūzī’s method of discussing the 
issue of knowing God from a purely philosophical perspective and thereafter moving on to 
conclude using an ʿirfānī framework is commonly seen in the works of Sadrian philosophers 
in the school of Tehran as many ḥukamāʾ were well versed in both readings of Mullā Ṣadrā.  
 
In his gloss on the Asfār, Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄traces Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion on the univocality 
of wujūd back to Fakhr al-DƮn̄ RāzƮ’̄s comments in al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqīyah, including 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s observation that the univocality of wujūd is close to being self-evident.562 He 
comments that the reason that the univocality of wujūd is not self-evident is that some have 
disagreed with it. “And surely he [Mullā Ṣadrā] said close to self-evident as if it was self-evident 
from every perspective, the AshʿarƬs̄, al-BasṛƬ ̄ and those who followed them, would not have 
disagreed.”563 In his discussion Mullā Ṣadrā’s points out that those who reject the univocality 
                                                          
558 Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 82. 
559 Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 92. 
560 Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 93. 
561 Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 95. 
562 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 58. 
563 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 58. 
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of wujūd have actually accept it without realizing; as if wujūd was different for each thing, 
there would not be one concept that could be discussed. Rather this discussion would involve 
a never ending number of concepts of wujūd that would have to be enumerated to understand 
whether or not they shared a meaning or were just named the same thing. Since nobody 
claims separate meanings for the wujūd of each existent, and since they discuss wujūd as 
though it is one reality, they subscribe to the univocality of wujūd without realizing.564 
 
III. The Principality of Wujūd 
 
It is from this point the transcendental philosopher asks: Of these two metaphysical ideas, that 
is wujūd and quiddity, on which is the object in the extramental really dependent.565  Although 
they are one reality in the extramental, they are certainly completely separate concepts, as 
wujūd is shared among all existents and quiddity is different for each existent. Similarly, 
quiddity can exist or not exist and this would be impossible if quiddity was the same as wujūd, 
as the wujūd would be essential to quiddity and therefore it would be impossible for it to not 
exist. So which one of these metaphysical modes (ḥaythīyāt) is real and which one is simply 
our expression, as one reality in the extramental cannot emanate from two separate 
realities?566  
                                                          
564 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 59-60. 
565 On the question of principality see M. Moris, Mullā Ṣarā’s Doctrine of the Primacy of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2003). 
566 If both wujūd and quiddity were fundamentally real, it would result in each thing being two things. Shaykh 
Aḥamd Aḥsā’Ʈ ̄believed in the fundamental reality of both, where wujūd was the origin of all good and quiddity 
the origin of all bad. Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ ̄points out that this shows that he did not fully comprehend the rules of 
philosophy as evil is a lack of perfection and has no separate existence within itself. The lack of perfection is due 
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The question of principality is important because it is at the heart of understanding reality, as 
another way of expressing principality is to ask which of these concepts is real. The 
philosophers have differed on whether it is wujūd or quiddity although to say it is both goes 
against the grain of the question, which specifies one of the two. The traditional explanation 
is that the transcendental philosopher opts for wujūd and this is what is meant by their belief 
in the principality of wujūd (asạ̄lat al-wujūd), whereas Illuminationist philosophers believe in 
the principality of quiddity (asạ̄lat al-māhīya). Although this explanation may not be 
incorrect, it is a simplified one as it seems Illuminationist philosophers were using a different 
basis to discuss wujūd and in fact believed in the principality of light which is a mode of 
wujūd.567 Wujūd is considered primary as when we ask if something exists we mean is it 
predicated with the quality of existence. Hence it is that quality that existence stems from, 
that is wujūd. Additionally, oneness between two things (such as man and writing) would 
never be achieved in the extramental if quiddity was the principle as all quiddities (māhīyāt) 
are differentiated without any relationship between the different quiddities. 
 
According to Mullā Ṣadrā’s summarization of Suhrawardī’s opinion,568 one of SuhrawardƮ’̄s 
attempts to invalidate the primacy of wujūd was by claiming that it leads to infinite regress. 
                                                          
to the level of existence, not that each existent except God has a quiddity, see Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses 
of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (2) 65 nt. 3 and in further detail nt. 4. 
567 Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distiction? Suhrawardī’s visionary hierarchy of lights”, 
222-225. 
568 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 65. I have referenced the problems of 
the interpreters of Suhrawardī previously, see note 481. The basic contention with what Ṣadrā and Nūrī have 
done here is that they did not criticise Suhrawardī according to his own philosophical principles and as a critique 
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This is because if wujūd is in the extramental then wujūd itself exists. Everything that exists 
has wujūd so the wujūd that brings something to existence needs another wujūd to give that 
wujūd existence and so on until infinite regress. Mullā ʿAlƮ ̄NūrƮ ̄one of the most important 
teachers of the founders of the school of Tehran, in his gloss on the Asfār, rejects this 
contention as it assumes that wujūd can be separated from itself and then predicated to itself, 
as the extramental is existence and not the plane where existence comes to exist:  
 
What is meant here [by this contention] is that the extramental is a container (ẓarf) 
for the existence of wujūd. Not that the extramental itself is the sphere for wujūd. 
Because this last aspect is not the issue being discussed at present, so understand! We 
prove that the extramental, in itself, is the sphere for wujūd by its being a sphere for its 
own wujūd. As if wujūd itself is existence for other than wujūd, in relation to attaining 
it [wujūd] for it [existence of wujūd], then attaining it [wujūd] for itself is preferred and 
more correct in its attaining something for something, due to the impossibility of 
separating a thing from itself.569   
 
Hence wujūd exists in itself and there is no meaning to separating wujūd from itself and then 
claiming that existence needs existence to exist, while at the same time existence is existence 
itself. SuhrawardƮ’̄s argument uses the framework of the principle of quiddity, as in principle 
of quiddity, wujūd is predicated to quiddity. The predication of wujūd is also possible in the 
view of the Peripatetics, so SuhrawardƮ’̄s point was not completely off the mark and presents 
                                                          
of Peripatetic philosophy. Rather they use their own conception of wujūd to critique his argument. So the 
summarisation of his view plays an important part in the critique as it takes his argument out of context.  
569 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 65, nt. 1. 
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a strong criticism of the Peripatetic view. Rather, logical predication is not the issue at hand 
for the Sadrian philosopher as they are discussing wujūd in the extramental. That is that Mullā 
Ṣadrā rebuts Suhrawardī’s criticism on his own principles, not on Suhrawardī’s or from the 
perspective of the Peripatetic philosophy Suhrawardī was criticizing.  
 
 
IV. The Mentally posited Nature of Quiddity 
 
For the proponents of primacy of wujūd, existence is what is really experienced in the 
extramental and the quiddity of a thing is a limit of wujūd from which we extract intellectual 
definitions of disparate things. From this limit the mind creates an image which corresponds 
with the extramental and we can distinguish what we consider separate realities from the 
blanket of wujūd. Hence quiddity does not really exist but is a mental construct derived from 
the limits of existence which in itself is not existent (mawjūd) or nonexistent (maʿdūm). If it 
exists in the extramental, that is not due to its own essence but the attribution of wujūd to it 
making it necessary as long as wujūd is attributed to it (wujūb bi al-ghayr). Quiddity is 
completely dependent on wujūd.  
 
It follows that anything necessary (lāzim) to a certain quiddity in the mind such as being-a-
species (nawʿīyah) in relation to man are also established by wujūd but that wujūd itself is not 
described by any of the rules of quiddity. This is because all of these rules are developed for 
quiddity after the initial separation of quiddity and wujūd. Hence wujūd has no definition as 
definitions are dependent on a genus (jins) and a differentia (fasḷ) which are both attributes 
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of quiddity, taken from the limits of wujūd. This was discussed previously in the section of the 
self-evident nature of wujūd and it relates to the referent of wujūd (i.e. wujūd in the 
extramental); however, the concept of wujūd can follow the rules of quiddity as a mental 
construct and not wujūd qua wujūd. This point will be further clarified further when mental 
existence is discussed. 
 
Although many would struggle to separate an attestation to the concept of the principality of 
wujūd and the mentally posited nature of quiddity from a transcendental philosopher, even 
this cornerstone of Sadrian philosophy is critically discussed by some contemporary ḥakīms. 
Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ ̄of the school of Qum proposes the concept of the principality of wujūd 
and quiddity (asạ̄lat al-wujūd wa ʿaynīyat al-māhīya), but in a different manner then those 
who have been refuted in the ḥikmat tradition when establishing the principality of wujūd. In 
his gloss on Nihāyat he states: 
 
The truth is that in this question [of the principality of wujūd] both wujūd and quiddity 
are existent, meaning that both are reality in itself. Not meaning that each has a reality 
that is specific to them — as some that have been attributed [with the opinion] of the 
principality of both of them have said — rather meaning that the outside reality, 
which is one real referent for the concept of wujūd, in the same way that it is one true 
referent for the concept of quiddity. The first [referent] narrates what is shared with 
others and the second [referent] narrates that which distinguishes from others, while 
what is shared is the same as what distinguishes in the extramental. Quiddity is 
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mentally posited in the meaning that if it is considered by itself it is not existent and 
it only becomes existent by wujūd, not by itself.570  
 
Here FayyāżƮ ̄returns to the point where the concepts of wujūd and quiddity are extracted from 
one single referent in the extramental. That existent never loses its oneness, and so therefore 
principality should not be attributed to one concept in exclusion of the other. But here is 
where the discussion stops short, as the concept of principality has to be attributed to one 
concept as two complete concepts cannot be the principle for one referent as established by 
the proponents of the principality of wujūd. Fayyāḍī is criticing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s exposition of the 
concept of wujūd by reanalyzing the referent in the extramental. 
 
V. Consequences of the Principality of Wujūd 
 
There are many implications that result from accepting the principality of wujūd. The first is 
that the terms wujūd, being-a-thing and being-a-individual are synonymous (musāwiq) 
because they share a referent and their semantic content overlaps. This means that although 
wujūd, being-a-thing and being-a-individual are separate concepts they have the same 
referent and the same mode of reference (ḥaythīyat al-sịdq) from which the referent becomes 
a concept. Nobeing-a-thing does not exist in the extramental as being-a-thing is necessarily 
related to existence.  
 
                                                          
570 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 43-44, nt 9. 
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This idea is clarified when considering other possible relationships that wujūd and being-a-
thing can have. The relationship could be exclusive (tabāyun), synonymous (tarāduf) or 
equivalent (tasāwƬ)̄. In an exclusive relationship the two aspects do not share the same 
concept, referent or mode of reference, like man and stone. In a synonymous relationship the 
two aspects share the same concept, referent and mode of reference, like two different words 
for the same thing. In an equivalent relationship although the referent is one, the concept and 
the modes of reference are different, like a man and his knowledge. In this last case the man 
is one reality in the extramental with his knowledge and so the referent is one. But the concept 
of “man” and the concept of “knowledge” are two separate concepts that do not share in any 
aspect; hence the concept is different.  
 
At the same time, the way in which each of these concepts is related to the referent is different 
and so the mode of reference is different. One concept relates to the essence of the referent 
and the other is a mode of that referent. However, the mode of reference when referring to 
wujūd, being-a-thing and being-a-individual is the same. This is true of all the necessary 
implications (mulāzamāt) of wujūd such as the relationship between wujūd and oneness or 
wujūd and actuality; and the relationship between each of the necessary implications, such as 
the relationship between oneness and actuality.571 
 
Another implication is that there is nothing similar to wujūd as for something to be similar to 
something else; the two must share their quiddity in some way. Yet wujūd has no quiddity as 
it has no definition as established previously. In a similar vein wujūd has no opposite as 
                                                          
571 Sayyid Kamāl ḤaydarƮ,̄ Sharḥ Bidāyat al-ḥikma, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-HādƮ,̄ 2007) (1) 107-109. 
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opposites are existent and therefore part of wujūd. Nonexistence is not opposite to existence 
as nonexistence has no being-a-thing whatsoever and so cannot be the opposite of anything 
in the extramental. Rather when something is described with existence it means that 
existence is necessary (ḍarūrƬ)̄ for that thing. When something is nonexistent it means that 
nonexistence is necessary for that thing. The opposite of necessity is possibility which is the 
negation of both the necessity of existence or nonexistence. Therefore, anything with 
subsistence (thubūt) attains that subsistence by wujūd as nonexistence has no subsistence or 
being-a-thing.  
 
But there is also some level of subsistence for propositions that have no direct reference to 
ascertain their truthfulness in the mind or in the extramental (qaḍāyā nafs al-amrīya) such as 
the phrase “the nonexistence of a cause is the cause of the nonexistence of an effect.”572 Since 
nonexistence has no subsistence in the extramental or the mind, this phrase has no direct 
reference against which to test its truthfulness. However, because the mind accepts that “the 
existence of a cause is the cause for the existence of an effect” it is forced to accept its opposite 
even though there is no referent to prove the opposite. This forced acceptance is its 
subsistence. 
                                                          
572 The secondary intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thānīyah) i.e. the concepts not extracted directly from the outside 
world, but are understood through thinking about necessary relationships, such as opposites, pairs, ownership, 
causality, oneness etc, are all nafs al-amrīya issues, see Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of 
Ghulāmriżā FayyāḍƮ,̄ (1) 75, nt. 97. Nafs al-Amr can be translated as actuality meaning that which corresponds 
with reality. In theoretical ʿirfān, the nafs al-amr is explained as that which corresponds to the permanent 
archetypes, which is another way of saying what is truly real as it is what exists in God’s knowledge. In logical 
terms the nafs al-amr is that which corresponds to the nature (ṭabīʿa) of a thing, whether that thing exists in the 
extramental or is conceptualized in the mind or is in neither of these spheres. Ṭabāṭabāʾī deals with the nafs al-
amr in more detail in his Bidāyat see ḤaydarƮ,̄ Sharḥ Bidāyat al-ḥikma, (1) 96-106. 
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Wujūd does not have parts so that it can be split into other than itself. It is simple (basƬ̣t̄)̣. 
Hence the adjectives used to describe wujūd are modes and not separate parts that make up 
wujūd. The only reality in the extramental is wujūd and the quiddities are the limits of wujūd, 
which do not have an existence independent of wujūd except by mental construction. Like a 
blanket of existence with creases of quiddity. In this example the only thing that really exists 
is the blanket, but we may conceptually construct realities for its creases. The limits in wujūd, 
or the creases in the blanket, are those realities that we can separate from each other. For 
example, a man sitting on a chair in the extramental has sensory limits and from those limits 
we are able to mentally construct a separate quiddity for the man and another quiddity for 
the chair. So the limit of an existent helps us to separate different kinds of limit so that we 
know that a chair or a tree is not a man. 
 
Wujūd does not have a cause, but exists by the fact that it is pure existence that in itself deflects 
nonexistence and it is this property that gives it principality. Hence wujūd deflects 
nonexistence from itself and from anything that is described with the property of existence. 
Like the sun, which deflects darkness from itself and from other things that come under its 
rays, or knowledge which deflects ignorance itself and deflects ignorance from the person who 
possesses it.573 Though wujūd in itself deflects nonexistence, it is possible for some levels of 
existence to depend on others for their existence. For example, a contingent existent (mumkin 
al-wujūd) depends on the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) for its existence.  
 
                                                          
573 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (2) 67, nt. 12. 
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A contingent existent neither necessitates existence or nonexistence in its essence, and 
therefore it only can be existent when existence it attributed to it. But when existence is 
attributed to it, existence is necessary to it as long as it is still described as existent. This type 
of necessity is accidental necessity (wujūb bi-l-ghayr). However, pure existence in itself has no 
cause. Although there is no specific argument put forward regarding this, it is part of a 
foundationalist approach to wujūd as well as a derivation from theological arguments 
concerning God’s Needlessness. According to His Needlessness, God does not have a cause, is 
the principle of all creation and is not decreased in any way when He creates.   
 
The Necessary Existent is superabundant and so the giving of existence does not decrease the 
Necessary Existent in any way as it is not the case that the Necessary Existent gives a part of 
its existence to a contingent existent. Here the example of the sun no longer applies, as the 
sun loses its light as it is distributed and has to create more light within itself to maintain its 
level of light. In contrast to the sun, knowledge increases when taught, so also cannot be 
directly compared to wujūd. Furthermore effusion does not imply loss or gain of perfection, 
but rather like the casting of a shade it has no effect on the one who casts. As SabzavārƮ ̄in his 
gloss on the Asfār warns: 
 
Be cautious of understanding the apparent meaning of transfer from [the word] 
descent, for surely effusion from a thing is not an expression of evacuation from its 
position or its withdrawal from its level. Rather its meaning is casting of a shade or a 
picture. In summary it is something that is originated from something [else] in such a 
manner that it does not decrease from the perfection of that [first] thing at all. If we 
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hypothesize its return to it [the original thing] it would not increase its perfection at 
all.574  
 
VI. Wujūd is a Single Graded Reality 
 
According to the Sadrian school, the Peripatetics claimed that although wujūd is the principle, 
the existents are separated completely by their essences, like the separation of the highest 
genera (al-ajnās al-ʿālīyah) from each other.575 Yet this idea is clearly invalid due to the 
impossibility of deriving a general meaning of wujūd, applicable to all existents, whilst also 
claiming that the existents share in no aspect at all.576  Rather it would mean that every instant 
of existence linked to an essence should have a different meaning for wujūd. Mullā Ṣadrā 
solved the issue of distinctiveness in existence by referring differentiation in existence to 
differences in the level of wujūd in terms of intensity (shidda) and weakness (ḍaʿf) or 
perfection (kamāl) verses imperfection (naqs)̣. This was his principle of gradation.  
 
When we look at the world around us we find that realities are different to each other in many 
aspects. Two objects may have different quiddities; or one object may be in the state of 
potential whereas the other may be in action; or one may be necessary and the other possible 
and so on. However, all of these differences are within the sphere of wujūd as wujūd does not 
                                                          
574 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 86, nt. 1 
575 See S. Rizvi, “Process Metaphysics in Islam? Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā on Intensification of Being”, in D. C. 
Reisman and A. H. al-Rahim (eds.) Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna 
Study Group (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). 
576 See Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn A৴ shtiyānƮ,̄ Hastī az nazar-i falsafa va ʿirfān (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 28. 
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have any parts and anything outside of wujūd does not have existence. So wujūd comprises 
differences within its own sphere whilst being one simple reality. How can this be explained? 
The concept of gradation answers this question stipulating that wujūd is a single reality with 
different levels. All the differences in each level and between each existent return to what is 
similar to them; which is wujūd.  
 
The example of movement helps to understand the concept of gradation. If an object is 
moving fast, another at a medium pace and the third at a slow pace, we notice that all the 
objects have different speeds but all share in the fact that they are moving. The movement is 
at different levels but at the same time they are all essentially doing one thing; moving. 
Another example is the different shades of a certain color. If an apple starts of as light red, 
then changes to a medium shade of red and then changes to a deep shade of red; then the 
colour has remained the same whereas what has changed has been the intensity of the colour. 
 
The levels of wujūd are separated by nondelimitation (itḷāq) and delimitation (taqyīd) such 
that the Necessary Being is pure existence without any limitation and other existents move 
away from the Necessary Being through increasing amounts of delimitation. So the first 
effusion (al-sạ̄dir al-awwal) is not the same as the Necessary Being as it adds a level of 
delimitation from the level of the Necessary being whilst being relatively nondelimited with 
regard to the second effusion (al-sạ̄dir al-thānƬ)̄. In the same way the angels are closer to pure 
existence then material beings as material beings are limited by corporeality in a way that 
angels are not and so on for all the levels of wujūd. This spectrum between nondelimitation 
and delimitation is also expressed as a spectrum between intensity and weakness in wujūd or 
perfection verses imperfection, as every delimitation is an imperfection and the more a thing 
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is nondelimited the closer it is to perfection.  ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄when commenting on Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
division of wujūd as either the pure reality of wujūd or a level of that pure reality in the Asfār 
says: 
 
What is intended here by the actual reality is the reality taken with the condition of 
being negated (bi shart ̣lā) [i.e. in of itself] which is the highest level of gradation, as 
wujūd for him [Mullā Ṣadrā] is graded with levels. It is known that the reality taken 
without any condition (lā bi shart)̣ includes all of the levels. To explain this further, if 
the levels you hypothesis rising from weakness to intense and from intense to more 
intense, then every lower level is limited in relation to what is above it, due to their 
lack of what is in the higher level in terms of perfection and not the opposite [i.e. that 
the lower level is more perfect]. So the higher level is nondelimited in relation to it 
[the lower level], containing all that is in it in terms of perfection. The lower level is 
limited in relation to the higher levels, and in this way upwards it ends with the level 
that is nondelimited without any limitations at all. If you like you could say: “It has no 
limit except that it has no limit.” It is the actual pure reality except that it is taken with 
the condition of being negated (bi shart ̣lā). It is one of the levels if it is taken without 
any condition (lā bi shart)̣ it includes all the other levels and there is no opposite level 
to it among all the other levels.577 
 
As well as explaining gradation, ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ differentiates between the various ways the 
philosopher can look at wujūd, which were explained in the introduction when explaining the 
                                                          
577 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 69-70, nt. 2. 
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difference between the subject of philosophy and the subject of theoretical ʿirfān. The 
essential difference between the two subjects was that while ʿirfān discussed nondelimited 
wujūd without condition as the source of division (lā bi shart ̣ al-maqsamƬ)̄, philosophy 
discussed nondelimited wujūd without condition as a division (lā bi shart ̣al-qismƬ)̄. Sayyid 
Kāẓim ʿAsṣạ̄r traces the use of these terms back through one of his teachers to scholars in the 
school of Tehran such as Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī, Muḥammad Riżā QumshihƮ ̄ and Hāshim 
RashtƮ.̄578  
 
But to say that each level of existence not on the level of the Necessary Being is composed of 
wujūd and increasing levels of nonexistence as things move further away from the Necessary 
Being is inaccurate as existence cannot be compounded with nonexistence. The difference 
between the levels of existence has to be explained within existence itself. This is because 
wujūd is simple and so no level of wujūd can be composite (murakkab) of existence and 
nonexistence. Therefore, all differentiation in wujūd in the extramental must return back to 
wujūd itself and not to anything outside of wujūd, such as nonexistence. 
 
Gradation gives rise to a fourth type of predication not discussed in the classical books of logic 
but propounded by the Sadrian school called the predication of the reality up its shadow 
(ḥaml al-ḥaqƬq̄a ʿ alā al-raqƬq̄a). For something to be predicated to something else it must have 
an aspect of similarity and an aspect of difference, so that the subject and predicate are related 
but the predicate also says something new about the subject. Therefore, due to gradation in 
                                                          
578 ʿAsṣạ̄r, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 25-26. 
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wujūd it is possible to predicate the cause to its effect and vice versa. When the cause is 
predicated to the effect, this is the predication of the reality on its shadow.  
 
However, with this type of predication what must be recognized is that the shadow is 
predicated to the reality as a manifestation of that reality, and the reality can be predicated to 
its shadow, because the reality contains everything that its shadow contains. The reality and 
its shadow are not the same thing. So if someone says “man is existence” or “existence is man” 
they are not claiming that man and existence are the same thing. Rather in the first sentence 
the real is predicated to its shadow meaning that man is a manifestation of existence, and in 
the second sentence existence contains everything man does in a more perfect and complete 
sense. 
 
The whole issue of gradation raises the question of how wujūd can be stronger on one plain 
and weaker on another. Is it really wujūd that is stronger and weaker? Or is it the capacities of 
the quddities and essences of what exists on each plain in terms of nondelimitation and 
delimitation? While it is possible to theorize the levels of existence as graded to further grasp 
the increase in perfection through the rising levels of existence, theoretical ʿirfān takes the 
difference in the levels back to the quiddities, while wujūd remains one throughout all of 
existence. Graded existence explains our concept of existence in terms of the arch of ascent, 
whereas the different capacities of the essences explain gradation in terms of the arch of 
decent. 
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VII. Nonexistence 
 
This view of existence has implications for the concept of nonexistence as well. It has already 
been discussed above that nonexistence has no being-a-thing. Opposed to wujūd there are no 
levels of nonexistence such that something would be closer or further from “pure 
nonexistence.” This is because a relative relationship is between two things and nonexistence 
has no being-a-thing nor does it have any essence (dhāt). The only way nonexistence can have 
levels is if it is mentally attributed to wujūd.579 So we can say the nonexistence of an angel is 
different from the nonexistence of a material being. It is clear in this example that the 
differentiation is in wujūd and not in nonexistence. Or we can limit nonexistence with a 
condition to mentally differentiate kinds of nonexistence such as essential nonexistence 
(ʿadam dhātƬ)̄ or temporal nonexistence (ʿadam zamānƬ)̄.  
 
Essential nonexistence refers to a possible existent which does not exist by common technical 
predication (i.e. in the extramental). Temporal nonexistence which refers to nonexistence in 
time such as the nonexistence of the world before it came into existence. Hence both terms 
express the reality of nonexistence which is the same in the extramental, even though adding 
mental conditions to nonexistence helps us to differentiate different types of nonexistence in 
the extramental.  
 
Distinguishing the concept of nonexistence in the plane of the extramental from nonexistence 
in the plane of the mind therefore helps in understanding clearly the various issues related to 
                                                          
579 For further detail see Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulāmriżā FayyāḍƮ,̄ (1) 102. 
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nonexistence. For example, there is a contradiction in the proposition “nothing can be said 
about nonexistence” as the proposition in itself says something about nonexistence. But if we 
distinguish the extramental and the mind this paradox is solved. That is the proposition is 
invalid in the extramental (i.e. by common technical predication) as for something to be 
expressed it has to exist first. Hence the part of the proposition stating “nothing can be said 
about” has no subsistence in the extramental. Yet in the mind (i.e. by primary essential 
predication) this proposition is acceptable as nonexistence is given a hypothetical level of 
subsistence so that the proposition is valid. 
 
One of the contributions of ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ to the discussion of wujūd was his 
specification that there is no repetition (tikrār) in wujūd.580 It is an important point as wujūd 
is a single simple reality, not a disparate reality that can be broken into sections of existence 
and nonexistence and this affects various discussions in philosophy such as the issue of time 
and movement. The discussion is related to the idea that there is no repetition in nonexistence 
but talking about wujūd is more suitable to transcendental philosophy, as its subject is wujūd 
and nonexistence is discussed as a result of wujūd.581 Repetition means that the same existent 
thing cannot be existent again a second time, with the same existence as the first existent so 
that they are both in fact the same existent. In other words one existent thing cannot be two 
existents things at the same time as being one existent thing. Hence if there are two separate 
things they must be different in some aspect no matter how insignificant. So when a thing is 
designated it cannot be repeated.  
 
                                                          
580 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 109-117. 
581 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 109, nt. 1. 
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Some might question this rule by hypothesizing a gap of nonexistence in the existence of a 
certain thing. In such a situation one thing repeats its existence as it exists before the gap of 
nonexistence and then exists again after the gap; which is repetition, while at the same there 
is only one thing. ʿAllāmah answers this question by saying that the nature of nonexistence is 
not such that a thing can be described by it and then when nonexistence is lifted the thing 
becomes existent. This possibility is only in the mind where nonexistence can actually be 
attributed to something (as discussed above).582 Hence if something exists and then ceases to 
exist and another thing comes into existence with the same quiddity as the first existent, they 
are two separate existents and not the same existent thing. Furthermore, if something could 
be nonexistent by nonexistence it would imply principality for nonexistence while the 
principality of existence has been established, which necessitates the coming together of two 
contradictories (ijtimāʿ al-naqƬḍ̄ayn).583 From here ʿAllāmah moves onto the impossibility of 
the repetition of nonexistent things (iʿādah al-maʿdūm) which is a principle considered to be 
obvious bearing in mind the above discussion. 
 
VIII. Existence-in-Something-Else (wujūd al-rābit)̣ 
 
Existence-in-something-else directly affects the human and his view of his place in the system 
of wujūd.584 He is an existent who is completely connected to the Necessary Existent in order 
for him to exist and continue to exist. How this relationship is conceptualized and explained 
can either take a philosophical form or an ʿirfānī one. Whilst the philosophical reading gives a 
                                                          
582 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 112. 
583 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 112. 
584 See Gh. I. Dīnānī, Wujūd-i rābiṭ va mustaqil dar falsafa-yi islāmī. 
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real level of existence to existents other than the Necessary Being, ʿirfān takes a more subtle 
approach in order to preserve the principles of tawḥīd as was explained above. According to 
the philosophical approach wujūd can be categorized as that which exists-in-itself (wujūd al-
mustaqil also named wujūd al-nafsƬ ̄and wujūd al-maḥmūlƬ)̄ and existence-in-something-else.  
 
ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ arrives at this distinction by analyzing the relationship of truthful 
sentences about the extramental to the extramental itself. Since the subject and predicate are 
existent in the extramental, that which links the subject and predicate (i.e. the relation or 
nisba) must also exist in the extramental. The relation does not independently exist in the 
subject or the predicate but exists because of the existence of both of them. If either the 
subject or the predicate was to cease to exist so would the relation, showing that it has no 
independent existence. The relation therefore exists wherever, and as long as, the subject and 
predicate exist, be they in the mind or the extramental.585 This means that the subject and 
predicate are unified due to the relation as the relation is one thing that is shared by the 
subject and the predicate.586 
 
Sentences with primary essential predication (such as “man is man”) or al-hillīyāt al-basƬt̄ạh 
(sentences with “exists” as the predicate such as “man exists”) or those sentences concerning 
nonexistence (except when nonexistence is given some sort of existence in the mind) do not 
have any relation between their subjects and their predicates as it is meaningless to talk about 
the relation between a thing and itself or between a thing and nonexistence.587 The relation 
                                                          
585 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 125 and 130-131. 
586 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 126. 
587 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 127-129. 
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does not have a quiddity as something needs to have an independent concept to have a 
quiddity.588 Hence from this relation a second type of wujūd can be said to exist in the 
extramental, which is existence-in-something-else.589 
 
This proof for the existence of existence-in-something-else is not without criticism. FayyāżƮ ̄
points out that the truthfulness of a statement is the unity of the subject and the predicate in 
both primary essential predication and common technical predication. The former it is unity 
in concept and the latter unity in the extramental. Separation of the subject and predicate 
occur only in the mind, which is where the creation of a relation occurs, and therefore the 
truthfulness of a statement in the extramental has nothing to do with the relation.590 Misḅāḥ 
YazdƮ ̄ of the school of Qum somewhat removes the confusion by separating between two 
terminological meanings of existence-in-something-else according to Mullā Ṣadrā: 
 
Ṣadr al-MutaʾallihƮn̄ mentioned that existence-in-something-else has two 
terminological meanings among the philosophers: One of them is the connection 
between predicates, which would be a type of incomplete meaning (lit. lettered 
meanings al-maʿānƬ ̄al-ḥarfīya)...the second of them is of the meaning of existence-by-
something-else (wujūd bi al-ghayr), that is wujūd that is realized in something, like 
blackness in a body, or for something like the existence of an effect due to its cause, or 
in the presence of something like the existence of the mental forms (al-sụwar al-
                                                          
588 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 129. 
589 Muḥammad Taqī Misḅāḥ YazdƮ,̄ TaʿlƬq̄ah ʿalā Nihāyat al-ḥikma, (Qum: Salmān-i FārsƮ,̄ 1984) 57. 
590 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 121-122, nt 2.  
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ʿilmīya) in the soul...and what is opposite [to this type of existence] is independent 
existence.591 
 
Mullā Ṣadrā distinguishes between existence-in-something-else in the sense explained by 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the term existence-in-something-else which is another term for existence-by-
something-else. Mullā Ṣadrā continues to explain that there is no independence for the cause 
from its effect ontologically. This conclusion is philosophical, based on the establishment of 
one side (i.e. the cause), whereas the first classification is a logical one based on the 
formulation of sentences (i.e. the subject and the predicate),592 and this is the essence of the 
confusion on the need for relation in the extramental for truthful sentences. 
 
To clarify existence-in-something-else in its philosophical sense further (i.e. in the second 
sense), the case of a continual cause and its effect can be examined. The effect continues to 
exist due to the continual existence of its cause, like a speaker and speech. In this example if 
we look at the effect in and of itself — the speech — we can assign an independent existence 
for it in the mind. However, in reality it is continually dependent on its cause. There is only 
one truly independent existent in reality and that is the Necessary Being. All other existents 
are completely dependent on Him for their existence.593 The word wujūd therefore, is not 
applied to the term existence-in-something-else in the same way as has been discussed until 
now. That is there is homonymy between the use of the word wujūd in the general concept of 
wujūd in contrast to quiddity and the use of the word wujūd in the term existence-in-
                                                          
591 Misḅāḥ YazdƮ,̄ TaʿlƬq̄ah ʿalā Nihāyat al-ḥikma, 57-58. 
592 Misḅāḥ YazdƮ,̄ TaʿlƬq̄ah ʿalā Nihāyat al-ḥikma, 57-58. 
593 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 134. 
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something-else as Muḥammad b. Maʿsụ̄m ‘AlƮ ̄al-HƮd̄jƮ ̄al-ZanjānƮ ̄594 of the school of Tehran 
clarifies in his gloss on the Asfār:  
 
For surely existence-in-something-else due to its being connection cannot be, by this 
expression, wujūd or a thing from among things. As if wujūd is applied to it in this state, 
then it is homonymy only and this is the truth. Then if the intellect directs its attention 
to it [existence-in-something-else] and wants to judge it or judge by it, it becomes 
predicated existence (wujūd maḥmūlƬ)̄ which is the state of non-substantive notions 
(al-maʿānƬ ̄al-ḥarfƬ)̄, in their state as a connection or tool rather than a thing among 
things which is complete.595 
  
Wujūd which exists-in-itself can be further categorized as that which exists-in-itself-for-itself 
(wujūd li-nafsihƬ)̄ and that which exists-in-itself-for-something-else (wujūd li-ghayrihƬ)̄. 
Examples of wujūd which exists-in-itself-for-itself are any complete species such as “man” or 
“cat”.596 Wujūd which exists-in-itself-for-something-else expels nonexistence from itself and 
from something else without taking on the quiddity of that other thing.597  
 
                                                          
594 Muḥammad b. Maʿsụ̄m ʿAlƮ ̄HƮd̄jƮ ̄ZanjānƮ ̄taught the intellectual sciences at Madrasah al-Munirīya in Tehran 
for 25 years after completing his initial training in Zanjān. He wrote a gloss on Manẓūma where he included a 
biography of his friend Bahman ShƮd̄ānƮ ̄at the end of the work. He learnt classical theology and mathematics 
with Mirzā Ḥusayn SabzavārƮ ̄and learnt philosophy from Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva. He also has a collection of works on 
various subjects in various languages and also wrote a simple table of contents on a copy of the Asfār. See Āghā 
Buzurg TihrānƮ,̄ Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shƬ ̄ʿ a, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 285-286; and Suhā, Tārīkh-
i ḥukamāʾ, 495-499. 
595 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 99, nt. 4. 
596 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 137. 
597 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 136, nt. 3. 
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An example of wujūd which exists-in-itself-for-something-else is knowledge, which when it 
comes into existence, exists within itself and also expels ignorance (which is like 
nonexistence) from its subject.598 In fact all accidental properties are wujūd which exists-in-
itself-for-something-else as when they come into existence they expel nonexistence from their 
own quiddity as well another nonexistence from the substance they attach to.599 Hence the 
addition of accidental properties signify an increase in the level of wujūd as they displace 
imperfections.600 By the same token the specific forms (al-sụwar al-nawʿīyah) when they 
attach to matter give both the matter and the form their existence.601 
 
IX. Motion in the Category of Substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah) 
 
The dichotomy of the conceptual and the real; quiddity and wujūd; the outward and the 
inward; the divine law (sharīʿah) and the reality (ḥaqƬq̄ah); and the world (dunyā) and the 
hereafter (ākhirah), is a dichotomy present in man himself, who possesses an outward body 
and an inward soul. All of these dichotomies are intellectual divisions of single realities. That 
is that although we may intellectualize an outward and an inward aspect to the human, he is 
in fact one reality. Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of motion in the category of substance further explains 
how the human’s whole reality develops, not just his external form. The theory is based on the 
primacy of wujūd and gradation. For Mullā Ṣadrā everything is in a continual state of 
                                                          
598 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 136. 
599 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 136. 
600 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1), 137. 
601 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1), 137. 
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movement and transformation in the space-time continuum, and the human evolves in this 
continuum from being a material existent to an abstract one.  
 
In other words, as the human develops he moves up the grades of existence, from the 
corporeal to the realm of the intellects. By virtue of the human’s existence he moves back 
through the ark of ascent to the Necessary Being. Any form that makes such a movement 
moves towards perfection and so each development includes all the perfections of the 
previous stage. The development is not just in the accidental properties of man. Rather since 
all accidental properties find their origin in the essence602, it is the human’s essence that 
moves. In this process philosophy, contingent beings are in continual movement and with this 
theory Mullā Ṣadrā answers important philosophical problems like the creation of the world 
and resurrection. 
 
The movement of the human’s whole essence may be better understood by questioning the 
definition of the human in traditional philosophy as a “rational animal.” Mahdī Ḥāʾirī Yazdī of 
the school of Qum disputes the differentia in this definition (i.e. rational) and claims that it is 
the soul itself that particularizes the human from other animals: 
 
Rational here is not the real differentia, rather it is a differentia that indicates to the 
real differentia…If rational has the meaning of comprehending, then that is also a 
                                                          
602 This is a philosophical rule: Kullu mā bi al-ʿaraḍ lā budda wa an yantahī illā mā bi al-dhāt. For more explanation 
of the rule see Dīnānī, Qawāʾd-i kullī-i falsafī, (1) 293-295. 
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psychic quality (al-kayf al-nafsānī), and a psychic quality is also an accidental 
property...therefore the soul is the real differentia of the human.603   
 
If the soul is the essence of the human, then it makes sense that as the soul develops it 
increases its level of existence by which it can have comprehension of the higher realms of 
existence outside of itself. Here it is not the faculties of the soul that develop but the existence 
of whole soul, which is one reality.  
 
In the Asfār motion in the category of substance is discussed in detail in the seventh stage (al-
marḥalah al-sābiʿ), where Mullā Ṣadrā, explains the classical Peripatetic stance on this issue, 
which specifies that a body has to be existent before it can be in motion, and that motion is 
an accidental property.604 He then moves on to assert his own ideas by saying that the cause 
of motion must itself be in motion, and therefore the body is intrinsically in motion in the 
same way as the agent of motion. That is motion is only conceptually separable from the 
moving body. Moving bodies occur in the corporeal world and so the corporeal world must 
also be in motion, meaning that there is no need for an external cause for motion.605 This 
avoids the infinite regress that occurs when a cause is needed to explain motion. The corporeal 
world has continual renewal, and by this meaning it is stable and dependent on the Necessary 
Being for that renewal; thus making the corporeal world a contingent existent.606 Change 
                                                          
603 ʿA. Naṣrī, Safar-i nafs: taqrīrāt-i ustād doctor Mahdī Ḥāʾirī Yazdī (Tehran: Naqsh-i jahān, 1380 Sh/2001) 40. 
604 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 49-51. 
605 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 51-53. 
606 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 53-56. 
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therefore, does not occur due to any accidental properties, but rather occurs essentially, or in 
other words, in the category of substance.607 
 
Any speculation on different points in the motion of an object is purely conceptual. For us to 
say the beginning, middle or end of the motion of an object is only an expression of what we 
perceive of the extramental through our limited senses. In fact, any analysis of motion in terms 
of quiddity necessarily places limitations on the concept of motion as to categorize is to lose 
motion. Rather motion must be understood in terms of wujūd, beyond the categories.608 The 
role of quiddity is to keep the object individual, in a general way, through the differentia. This 
allows for the object to change in all of its other aspects without becoming a different object 
altogether. For example, a human grows in all his different faculties, physical, mental and 
spiritual, in such a way that if he is viewed in the beginning of his life, he seems almost a 
completely different creation by the end of his life. Nevertheless, what keeps him as a single 
object, that is a human, is his differentia, which remains with him throughout the whole 
process of change. Hence those categories that have motion, such as quantity, quality, place 
and position, do so in relation to wujūd and not to quiddity.  
 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tihrānī of the school of Qum quotes a conversation with ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī where he asks Ṭabāṭabāʾī verses in the Qurʾān about motion in the category of 
substance. Ṭabāṭabāʾī responds by quoting a verse from the chapter of The Believers and 
explains his choice saying: 
 
                                                          
607 ShƮr̄āzƮ,̄ al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 56-57. 
608 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (3) 803. 
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Verily We created man of an extract of mud. Then We set him [as] a drop in a secure 
receptacle. Then We created of the drop a clot; then We created of the clot a tissue; 
then We created of the tissue bones; then We garmented the bones with flesh; 
thereafter we produced him as another creation. So Bounteous is Allah, the Best of 
the creators (23:12-14)  
 
Here Allah says that ‘We created man from an extract of mud,’ and obviously that 
mud is a body (jism). Thus, the origination (huduth) of man is from mud, which is a 
body. 
‘Then, after creating it from mud, We turned it [the creation of mud] into sperm.’ 
Here again it is observed that it turns into a body, for the sperm is a body. Therefore 
based on transubstantial motion (al-harakah al-jawharīyah), mud is turned into 
sperm. It means that one body turns into another. 
‘After that, We created the of the sperm ‘alaqah,’ which means blood clot, coagulum. 
Here again one body is turned into another. 
‘And then We created of the ‘alaqah mudghah,’ which means some crushed muscle 
tissue. Once again, a body is turned into another. 
‘And then We created of the mudghah bones.’ Here also one body is turned into 
another. 
And once Allah covered the bones with muscle, the verse says, ‘At this stage, We gave 
man another creation.’ It means ‘We turned the bodily man spiritual.’ The reality and 
spirit of these bodies turn into man’s rational soul (al-nafs al-natiqah, i.e. intellect). 
So ‘Thereafter We produced him as another creation’ indicates that matter us set 
aside, and the body turns into an immaterial and transcendent soul... 
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The ancient sages maintained that man is composed of spirit and body. However, 
the verse does not suggest composition (tarkib); rather, it explicitly talks about 
transformation (tabdil). It says that man is [made] from the extract of mud that 
becomes these things. So God’s creation carries on step by step and bit by bit in the 
material course, until it reaches a point where it jumps out of matter. ‘Thereafter We 
produced him as another creation’ is about the same matter, saying that it becomes 
another creation. Based on transubstantial motion, matter turns into a transcendent 
being; the body becomes the rational soul.609   
 
X. Mental Existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnƬ)̄ 
 
The issue of mental existence is an important one for philosophers as the mind is the main 
epistemological tool in philosophy.610 Mental existence has implications on issues such as 
what constitutes knowledge; the validity of philosophizing about the extramental; the identity 
thesis, which is the oneness of the intellector and the intellected (ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-maʿqūl); 
and even plays a role in the issue of resurrection. This section cannot comprise the whole 
discussion of mental existence but will just summarize some of the main issues according to 
the philosophical analysis given by Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Ḥasanzāda’s analysis which is more holistic 
and includes the ʿirfānī concept of shadows. For Ṭabāṭabāʾī wujūd in itself cannot enter the 
                                                          
609 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 184-185. 
610 Mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnƬ)̄ is different to the existence of the mind (wujūd al-dhihn) as the first 
relates to cognitive existence and the second refers to existence of the mind itself as something in the outside 
world. 
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mind as it is the actual reality in the extramental.611 Yet the mind is capable of constructing 
concepts that are compliant with the extramental without the extramental wujūd entering the 
mind. One indication of this is because existent things have certain effects and those effects 
are not realized in the mind. So if an existent had transferred from the extramental to the 
mind, its effects should have also transferred, otherwise it would be a violation of the law of 
identity (inqilāb).  
 
For example, fire in the extramental burns and releases smoke. But when we imagine fire we 
do not feel hot and smoke does not come out of our ears. Hence fire qua fire does not enter 
our mind. But when we imagine fire there are other effects that result from our imagination 
different from the effects of fire in the extramental. One of the key differences that help to 
differentiate the planes is the difference in effects. While metal existence does not have an 
effect except on the soul, extramental existence affects other things in the extramental. It 
follows that the categorization of wujūd as either in the extramental or in the mind is 
conceptual, as wujūd has no separate existence in the mind.  Fire does not exist in the mind, 
but an image (sụ̄ra) of it exists in the mind. That image has the effects of an image in the 
extramental, not the effects of fire in the extramental. So using the expression wujūd regarding 
the mind means that our knowledge of the quiddities is diverted from nonexistence and this 
is what is meant by cognitive existence. The mind is not a separate plane of existence but an 
action of the soul. Existence is only in the extramental and is synonymous with the 
extramental; of which the human’s soul is a part. 
 
                                                          
611 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 151. 
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ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄offers a proof for mental existence saying that we imagine various things such as 
“man” and when we imagine them we know that they have some level of subsistence and are 
therefore existent in some way, even though that existence is not the same as the existence in 
the extramental. Hence since we know that they exist but not in the extramental, we must 
accept that they exist on another plane, which is the mind. At the same time, we are able to 
imagine nonexistent things (such as pure nonexistence) and other impossible things (such as 
the coming together of contradictions) even though they are not present in the extramental 
in any way. So they also have some level of subsistence. Since that subsistence is not in the 
extramental it must be in another plane which is called the mind.612 Here, there is no 
contradiction between the mind being a cognitive plane, separate to the extramental, and the 
fact that everything in the mind actually exists in the extramental. This is because what 
actually exists in the extramental are the mental images and not the contents of those images. 
The cognitive plane is not a separate plane of existence, but exists within the world of 
existence.  
 
ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄then extracts the implications of this concept of mental existence in a fashion that 
is distinctive of his style when explaining philosophical issues in Nihāyat. Although Mullā 
Ṣadrā also extracts the implications ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄is more rigorous in doing so and makes each 
implication clear in a number of separate points. The first implication is that the quiddity in 
the mind is different to the quiddity in the extramental and so the quiddity in the mind can 
only be categorized in categories (maqūlāt) in the mind without any affect on the 
extramental.613 So there are two sets of categories. The first is related to the extramental, and 
                                                          
612 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 147-151. 
613 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 152. 
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if anything is categorized under a certain category, it has the effects associated with that 
category. The second are categories in the mind, which do not have any effect on the 
extramental. The distinction between the two planes solves many philosophical issues related 
to mental existence using the distinction between primary essential predication and common 
technical predication explained previously.  
 
For example, someone may say that a substance (jawhar) in the mind is an essential property, 
but at the same time, its conception is an accidental property of the soul, making a substance 
both essential and accidental and it is impossible for one thing to be both essential and 
accidental at the same time. The question is answered by saying that the substance is essential 
by primary essential predication in the mind and accidental by common technical predication 
as an action of the soul in the extramental. Similarly, someone may say that when a substance 
is intellected it has its own category in the mind, but since its intellection is knowledge it falls 
under the category of a quality of the soul (al-kayf al-nafsānƬ)̄ which is another separate 
category to that of substance; and it is impossible for the same thing to be categorized under 
two separate categories as the categories are essentially and completely separated. The 
problem is answered by saying that the substance in the mind falls under the categories of the 
mind, whereas the action of the soul is related to the extramental and so related to the 
categories in the extramental.614 
 
The second implication of mental existence is mimesis (hikāyah) meaning that nothing can 
exist in mental existence without having its basis in external existence. It is impossible to 
                                                          
614 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 152-157. 
263  
imagine something that is completely unlike anything we have sensed in the extramental. 
Mental existence has its own affect on the soul, while cognitive forms that affect the soul are 
abstract (mujarrad) and unrelated to matter.615 Thirdly, since the quiddities in the extramental 
come to the mind without the effects they have on the extramental, it is impossible that those 
quiddities are themselves attained in the mind. Similarly, it is impossible for any nonexistent 
quiddity to enter the mind.616 That is that these realities in the extramental do not enter the 
mind, but that the soul creates concepts for these quiddities. 
 
In his treatise on mental existence called al-Nūr al-mutajallƬ ̄ fƬ ̄ al-ẓuhūr al-ẓillƬ,̄ Ḥasanzāda 
A৴ mulƮ ̄explains that knowledge is light and the manifestations of that light are in the cognitive 
forms which are manifested in the locus of mental existence. Hence the cognitive forms are 
the shadows of the knowledge which is light as true knowledge is a property of the wujūd in 
the extramental and at its highest level knowledge is an Attribute or Mode of the Necessary 
Being. By the same token mental existence is a shadow of wujūd in the extramental. 
Knowledge in the mind is therefore attained knowledge as opposed to knowledge by presence 
even though in truth attained knowledge finds its origins in knowledge by presence.617 The 
separation of a shadow from that which casts a shadow, clearly indicates the difference 
between mental existence and what is meant by wujūd in the extramental which is the 
principle; even though things — such as fire for example — can be in both planes. Rather it 
                                                          
615 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 159. 
616 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ (1) 163-164. 
617 Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ Al-Nūr al-mutajallƬ,̄ 8. 
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is the quiddity of that thing that is the same in both planes. This is what makes knowledge 
possible, as the quiddity connects the two planes.618  
 
On the other hand, the higher intellects above the mind experience realities without the use 
of the mind but by knowledge by presence and so the discussion of mental existence does not 
concern those intellects.619 Knowledge in mental existence is of a weaker level then higher 
levels of reality, as knowledge in the mind is a creation of an aspect (i.e. the limit) of what 
really exists in the extramental. The mind itself is a level of the soul and so in reality it is the 
soul which creates the cognitive forms not another separate entity.  The mind is the power of 
the soul to attain knowledge that is not present within itself.620 Similarly the cognitive forms 
themselves are not separate entities but are illuminative relations (iḍāfāt ishrāqīya), like the 
relation of the sun to its rays.  
 
To summarize the previous sections, wujūd is a simple single graded reality from which all 
things are able to exist. It is the principle as opposed to a thing’s quiddity, which is a mental 
construct derived from the limits of wujūd. At the same time, both wujūd and quiddity exist 
without differentiation in the extramental. While the initial comprehension of wujūd is self-
evident, reaching the reality of wujūd is a difficult task. Although existence in the extramental 
cannot be completely fathomed by the mind, the mind is able to understand existence 
through creating corresponding images. By the same token existence in the extramental is not 
the same as God’s existence, but it is not opposed to His existence as He exists. Differentiating 
                                                          
618 Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ Al-Nūr al-mutajallƬ,̄ 12. 
619 Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ Al-Nūr al-mutajallƬ,̄ 12. 
620 See S. DaghƮm̄, Mawsūʿat musṭạlaḥāt Ṣadr al-DƬn̄ ShƬr̄āzƬ ̄(Qum: Dhawi-l-qurbā, 2007) (1) 436. 
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the mental sphere from the extramental solves many philosophical problems to do with the 
different types of predication.  
 
Gradation and of existence-by-something-else create a fourth type of predication, which is the 
predication of the reality on its shadow. Pure wujūd deflects nonexistence from itself and the 
sphere of wujūd is infinite, leaving nonexistence without subsistence. Mental existence is the 
shadow of existence in the extramental, just as the cognitive forms are shadows of God’s 
knowledge. This brings to close our discussion of wujūd in transcendental philosophy. After 
summarizing the main conclusions from both parts the thesis will move onto the subject of 
walāyah.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the key questions and issues on the topic of wujūd from both the 
philosophical reading of ḥikmat tradition and by using concepts in theoretical ʿirfān to 
understand an ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. The ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran and Qum 
took different positions on the spectrum of these two readings and at times disagreed with 
each other’s interpretations and elucidations of concepts in ḥikmat based on their reading of 
Mullā Ṣadrā. There were ḥukamāʾ that had a more philosophical reading such as ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Ghulam-Riżā 
Fayyāżī; and there were ḥukamāʾ with a more ʿirfānī approach such as Muḥammad Riżā 
Qumshihī, Kāẓim ʿ Aṣṣār, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Shāhābādī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī.  
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At times those with an ʿirfānī reading would criticize others who also had an ʿirfānī reading 
but who might have discussed ʿirfānī issues from a philosophical perspective like Khumaynī’s 
criticism of Qumshihī. There were also times where a ḥakīm would use ḥikmat to decipher the 
meaning of an ʿirfānī concept as in the case of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī’s analysis of the 
oneness of Existence. Many a time an ʿirfānī concept was introduced at the end of a 
philosophical analysis like in ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī’s analysis of what can be known of God. A 
disagreement on the reality of gradation between the Peripatetic and ḥikmat philosophical 
readings caused Muḥammad Shāhābādī to disagree with Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s classification of proofs. 
Overall one notices an intricate picture of different readings, explanations and analysis by 
different ḥukamāʾ due to the mixing of these two traditions which was also characteristic of 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to introduce a holistic framework of thought in his Asfār and other works. 
 
There are no text books which teach the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and there are also no 
text books in the ḥawza curriculum which teach Shiʿi ʿirfān, so the discussion of the main 
principles for Wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān was constructed using the works produced by 
ḥukamāʾ in the schools of Tehran and Qum. From these works a wider discussion of issues 
such as the oneness of Existence, the Breath of the All-Merciful and the permanent archetypes 
was produced based on the glosses and treatises written by the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Qum 
and Tehran. This exercise not only brought to light the two readings discussed in this thesis 
and the manner by which they would be attained by a student of ḥikmat in the modern ḥawza, 
but it also brought forth the intricacy of the ḥukamāʾ discussions on such crucial and evasive 
topics.   
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The works that shaped the flow of the discussion in the ḥikmat section were the works used 
to teach these readings in the modern ḥawza and so another aspect of this chapter was an 
insight into this type of study offered to modern students of ḥikmat. Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Bidāyat and 
Nihāyat are perhaps the most important text books for ḥikmat in the modern ḥawza as they 
are studied by the largest number of students. But both of these books, and indeed Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
gloss on the Asfār in the majority of cases, offer a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. This 
point was illustrated by comparing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s approach to more ʿirfānī or scripturally 
sourced based glosses by other ḥukamāʾ in the schools of Tehran and Qum. At times there was 
direct criticism by those ḥukamāʾ on Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophical approach to commenting on 
ḥikmat.  
 
A whole host of philosophical and ʿ irfānī terms were introduced and discussed in this chapter, 
many of which will be referred to in the upcoming chapters as both the topics of walāyah and 
resurrection build upon the positions taken on the issue of wujūd. Indeed the preferred 
reading of the ḥakīm of wujūd very much affects the way they analyse the next two topics and 
the conclusions that they prefer to adopt. The term wujūd is used differently in ḥikmat and 
ʿirfān. While in ḥikmat it is used to explain the existence of something, in ʿirfān it is a specific 
term for God as He is the only true existent. These differences find their origin in the various 
conditions that can be applied to wujūd and form the subject of both sciences.  
 
This distinction affects almost every aspect of the discussion of wujūd and was indicated by 
Sabzavārī in the section on univocal nature of wujūd, when he stipulates that wujūd has a 
different meaning for creation and a different meaning for God. Although the reason for that 
separation was that God cannot be fathomed, that is not what is meant by the ʿurafāʾ when 
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designating wujūd for God alone. Rather the ʿurafāʾ do not consider the existence of existents 
as real Existence and claim the oneness of Existence and the oneness of the Existent. The 
concepts of self-disclosure and manifestation which also find their roots in the applications of 
conditions stand opposed to the concept of emanation in philosophy, even though the same 
Arabic term is used in the Breath of the all-Merciful. The self-evident nature of wujūd in ḥikmat 
is that the existence of a contingent is obvious, whereas in ʿirfān it is that the existence of God 
is self-evident.  
 
The univocal nature of wujūd in ḥikmat is that the word wujūd when predicated to a quiddity 
always means the same thing, whereas in ʿirfān it is that all ʿurafāʾ experience the same wujūd 
and so speak of the same thing. Existence is the principle from which is the basis of the effects 
of a contingent in ḥikmat, whereas in ʿirfān God is the principle of all things. Quiddity is 
mentally posited in ḥikmat, while the philosophers agree that in the extramental there is no 
difference between the existence of wujūd and quiddity. However, in theoretical ʿirfān the 
permanent archetypes, which are the nafs al-amr, dictate the capacities of the external 
archetypes and while they themselves never come into existence, what exists is all a 
manifestation of God. Gradation in ḥikmat is a quality of wujūd, but in ʿirfān it is a quality of 
the capacities of things. 
 
Nonexistence in both subjects is not the opposite of wujūd, and does not have any subsistence. 
In ʿirfān something that becomes nonexistent in one plane, returns to the planes above and 
ultimately exists in the knowledge of God. The term wujūd-in-something-else holds a different 
meaning for existence than the term wujūd as differentiated from quiddity in ḥikmat. It is an 
expression of the complete need of the effect for its cause. Through the process of motion in 
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the category of substance all of creation involuntarily moves towards its perfection as 
movement is a quality of wujūd.  
 
Mental existence and differentiating the mental plane from the extramental is a key 
differentiation in ḥikmat when discussing wujūd, whereas in ʿirfān the discussion is about God 
and so there is no need to differentiate mental existence from external existence. The problem 
of separating the mental sphere from the extramental when understanding wujūd is avoided 
in theoretical ʿirfān which places more emphasis on experiencing with the heart, while it is an 
acute issue in philosophy as the mind is the main source of knowledge. The issue of gradation 
is also keenly discussed by the ḥukamāʾ as there is an issue of reconciliation between different 
levels in existence and the oneness of Existence. Actuality can be understood ontologically in 
theoretical ʿirfān as the permanent archetypes, which do not actually enter the extramental.  
 
The implications of all of these concepts on the human will be the subject of the next chapter. 
It is a topic of great importance to Shiʿi theology due to the idea of the perfect human (al-insān 
al-kāmil) which was also introduced in this chapter as the purpose of divine effusion in the 
Breath of the All-Merciful. He is the reason for the effusion of wujūd, the movement from unity 
to multiplicity and the creation of every grade of existence. 
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Chapter 3: Walāyah (Guardianship) 
 
After establishing and discussing wujūd, and discerning the human’s position as a contingent 
existent, in total need of God for his existence, both to exist and to continue existing, the 
question that may be asked is why did God create the creation whilst being completely 
needless of it? Or in philosophical terms, why did the Necessary existent emanate its wujūd to 
contingent beings? What is the purpose of creation? Why does multiplicity come from unity? 
And what causes the Unseen to become seen? It is in the topic of walāyah that these questions 
are given various answers according to the principles of thought that built the worldviews of 
different ḥukamāʾ.621 The answer given by the ʿurafāʾ is that God created the creation as He 
loved to be known, according to the ḥadƬt̄h qudsƬ:̄622 “I was a hidden treasure, so I loved to be 
known, so I created the creation.”623  
                                                          
621 There are many works that discuss walāyah both from within a Sufi context and within a Shīʿī context. For 
some of these works see G. T. Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time: Ibn ʿArabī’s Book of the Fabulous 
Gryphon (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 1999); A. T. Karamustafa, “Walaya According to al-Junayd (d. 298/910)”, 
in T. Lawson (ed.) Reason and Inspiration in Islam (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005) 64-71; B. Radtke and 
J O’Kane, The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism: Two Works by Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (Abingdon: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2006); and M. A. Amir-Moezzi, The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Belief and Practices (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2011) especially 231-277 
622 Ḥadīth qudsī is a term given to traditions that are narrated from God but not part of formal revelation. 
623 This tradition has been narrated with variations, but is not found in any canonical works of Sunni or Shiʿi 
aḥadƬt̄h. Nevertheless, it has emerged as one of the most important aḥadƬt̄h referred to by ʿurafāʾ due to its 
meaning rather than its chain of narration. It has been used to support the idea of effusion from the Unseen of 
the unseen (ghayb al-ghuyūb) due to Divine Love for the purpose of knowing Him. The references to this ḥadīth 
are too many to be cited but an example of some of the earlier sources around the sixth and seventh century hijri 
are given below. It seems that although the tradition appeared in some Sufi works before Ibn ʿArabī, it became 
canonized with his school perhaps due to his use of it in the Fuṣūṣ and also due to its appearance in the Mathnawī 
of Rūmī where he explains some facets of this ḥadīth. Rūmī quotes the ḥadīth in some of other works as well, see: 
ʿAbd al-Karīm Qushayrī, Sharḥ asmāʾ Allah al-ḥusnā, eds. ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿīd and Saʿd Ḥasan Muḥammad ʿAlī 
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Since God is known by other than Himself, He created the creation for those from among the 
creation that would know Him. God did not need to be known, but out of His Generosity and 
Mercy He created a creation that could know something of Him. That creation is the human 
and therefore the human’s perfection is in his knowledge of God. In the terminology of ʿirfān, 
this knower is the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil).624 The perfect human reflects God’s 
perfection as he is the locus of the manifestation of God’s Names. He is the perfect servant 
who owns nothing within himself but his heart is a mirror for the self-disclosures of God. In 
philosophical terms he is someone who has reached the perfection of the soul with one of its 
key levels being the state of abstraction as “whoever knows his soul, surely knows his Lord.”625  
                                                          
(Cairo: Dār al-ḥarām li-turāth, 1422/2002) 31; ʿAbd Allāh Anṣārī, Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfīya (no place: no publisher, no 
date) 131, 133 and 134; ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, Shakwā al-gharīb ʿan al-awṭān ilā ʿulamāʾ al-buldān (Paris: Dār 
biblion, 1962) 19; Rūzbihān Baqlī, Tafsīr ʿarāʾis al-bayān, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, 3 vols (Beirut: Dār al-kutub 
al-ʿilmīya, 2008)  (1) 297, 345, 367; (2) 65; (3) 391, 532, the ḥadīth also occurs in some of his other books; Muḥyī al-
Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Abū al-ʿAlā al-Afīfī (Cairo: Dār iḥyāʾ al-kutub al-ʿarabīya, 1946) (2) 6, 61, 66, 
303, 326; the hādith is explained in a section by Rumī in his mathnawī see Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Balkhī, 
Mathnawi-yi maʿnawī, ed. Taufīq Ṣubḥānī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i chāp va intishārāt-i vizārat-i irshād-i islāmī, 1373 
Sh/1994) 589; Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Balkhī, Fīhi mā fīhi, ed. Badīʿ al-Zamān Firūzānafar (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
Nigah, 1386 Sh/2007) 96, 199, 201, 253; Muʾayad al-Dīn Jandī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn 
Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 2002) 45, 142, 457; ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Qum: 
Intishārāt-I Bīdār, 1370 Sh/1992) 161, 214; Qayṣarī, Rasāʾil-i Qayṣarī, 112. 
624 The use of the concept of the perfect human is observed in a variety of contexts including social structure in 
Sufism. In Morrocan Sufism see V. Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1998).   
625 This tradition is the inverse of the Qurānic verse 59:19: “And do not be like those who forget God, so He makes 
them forget their own souls...” Hence those who know themselves know God, and those who forget God, forget 
themselves. For the tradition see for example, Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (attr.), Miṣbāḥ al-sharīʿa, 13; Muḥammad b. 
ʿAlī Karājakī, Kanz al- fawāʾid, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Niʿma, 2 vols (Qum: Dār al-dhakāʾir, 1989) (2) 34; Muḥammad Bāqir 
Majliṣī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 111 vols (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī, 1982) (2) 32; ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Muḥammad 
Tamīmī Āmidī, Ghurar al-ḥikam, edited by Sayyid Mahdī al-Rajāʾī (Qum: Dār al-kitāb al-islāmī, 1410H/1989) 588; 
ʿAbd-l-Wāḥid b. Muḥammad Tamīmī Āmidī, Taṣnīf ghurar al-ḥikam, ed. Muṣṭafā Darāyatī (Qum: Maktab al-
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The concept of the perfect human was introduced in the previous chapter and his state of 
servitude was discussed by Kāẓim Aṣṣār while explaining Ibn ʿ Arabī’s poetry. It was mentioned 
in the discussion of the Breath of the All-Merciful that while the corporeal manifestation of 
the perfect human is in the corporeal world, the perfect human is mentioned as a separate 
stage in the Breath of the All-Merciful as he is the reason for effusion. He is also the only 
creation that is able to contain every level of the Breath of the All-Merciful. In this chapter the 
perfect human will be discussed in much detail both in terms of his ontological position in the 
world of existence which is termed as his existential guardianship (walāyah takwīnīyah) — 
which is linked to the perfect man’s ability to affect the universe in any way he chooses 
(walāyat al-taṣarruf) — and in terms of the person of the perfect human on the corporeal 
plane. Without the perfect man there is no reason for the effusion of wujūd and so walāyah is 
inextricably connected to the ʿirfānī conception of wujūd. The search for a cause of effusion 
links the question of walāyah to philosophy, as there is no meaning to purposeful action 
without a reason which is the final cause (al-ʿilla al-ghāʾīya).  
 
                                                          
ʿiʿlām al-islāmī, 1407/1987) 232; in these last two sources a host of variations to the ḥadīth with the beginning 
“Whoever knows himself…” (man ʿarafa nafsahu…) is offered. The ḥadīth with a slight variation occurs in many 
Sufi sources as early as the third Century hijri. See for example, Yaḥyā b. Maʿādh Rāzī, Jawāhir al-taṣawwuf, ed. 
Saʿīḍ Hārūn ʿĀshūr (Cairo: Maktabat al-ādāb, 1423/2003) 17 where the ḥadīth appears with the additional “surely” 
(qad) before “…knows his Lord” and in the same book on page 19 where the ḥadīth is quoted without the “surely.” 
See also al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Kayfīyat al-sulūk ilā rabb al-ʿālamīn, ed. ʿĀṣim Ibrāhīm al-Kayālī al-Ḥusaynī al-
Shādhilī al-Darqāwī (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, 1428/2007) 55; Abū Ṭālib Makkī, ʿIlm al-qulūb, ed. ʿAbd al-
Qādir Aḥmad ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, 1424/2003) 58. It therefore seems that this tradition with its 
variations was in circulation amongst Sufis and traditional scholars of Shīʿa aḥadīth well before Ibn ʿArabī and 
his school. I did not find this ḥadīth in either variation in any of the main sources of Sunni aḥadīth. 
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Mullā Ṣadrā subscribed to the view of the perfect human and the system of walāyah and 
indeed the search for the perfect human is a central theme in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works.626 He 
believed that the perfect man is the microcosm and the greatest sign of God.627 Another 
important concept introduced in the previous chapter is that of gradation. The idea of the 
perfect human necessitates the existence of the less than perfect human over whom the 
perfect human has guardianship. According to the philosophical reading of the perfect human 
the perfect human would have a greater level of wujūd than the less than perfect human. But 
for the ʿārif the oneness of Wujūd would prevail and so the difference between the perfect 
human and the less than perfect human would be the extent of his manifestation of the Names 
in their correct balance. Not a difference in the intensity of wujūd. The discussion of walāyah 
in ʿirfān offers different stations that the walī may hold which does not necessitate a direct 
comparison as to which walī is better in the sense of gradation.  
 
Returning to the discussion on the different ways of knowing in philosophy and ʿirfān 
concerning the topic of walāyah, while a philosopher discusses the perfect human and 
gradation in walāyah from an intellectual and theoretical perspective, an ʿārif first hand 
experiences the system of walāyah takwīnīyah as he occupies a position within it. There is no 
need to prove the existence of walāyah as it is indeed as self-evident to the ḥakīm as wujūd 
itself. The ḥakīm is the referent of the concept of walāyah even if he must theorize about the 
nature of the perfect human. This puts a great onus on the ḥukamāʾ that lack ʿ irfānī experience 
                                                          
626 J. W. Morris, Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981) 84. For a detailed exposition of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the Muḥammadan reality see his 
exposition of the chapter on intellection and ignorance in Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfī, (1) 
216-219.  See also M. Abdul Haq, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Man”, in Islamic Studies, 1972, (11/4) 281-296.  
627 M. Abdul Haq, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Man”, 281. 
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as it is much harder for them to get to the core of the issue. Other concepts of importance for 
this chapter which were introduced in the previous chapter include motion in the category of 
substance, existence-by-something-else, manifestation, self disclosure and the permanent 
archetypes. 
 
The position given to the perfect human of guardianship over the rest of creation is a key 
discussion point in theoretical ʿirfān. The Prophet Muḥammad is that creation who brings the 
unseen into the witnessed, by being the perfect manifestation of God. He is the keys of the 
unseen (mafātƬḥ̄ al-ghayb). The ontological position of the Prophet as the beginning of God’s 
creation whether termed as the first effusion or the beginning of the Muḥammadan light (al-
nūr al-Muḥammadī) as well as his position as the Seal of the Prophets (khātim al-anbiyāʾ) is 
undisputed. However, the issue of the person who holds the position of the Seal of the Saints 
(khātim al-awliyāʾ) is one of debate. That is due to the seeming incoherence in Ibn ʿArabī’s 
writing which the ḥukamāʾ tried to clarify as the chapter will show when discussing 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Mahdī Āshtiyānī’s treatises on the issue. Although the 
discussion of walāyah is primarily an ʿirfānī one, Mullā Ṣadrā repeatedly refers to the perfect 
human in the Asfār and in his other works such as his Rasāʾil. It consequently became a 
concept that Sadrian ḥukamāʾ had to be aware of and understand.  
 
Mullā Ṣadrā was not the first thinker to incorporate the ideas of Ibn ʿArabī on the perfect 
human into a Shiʿi framework of thought. Before him Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. after 
787/1385)628 also recognized the powerful implications of the theory for Shiʿi theology and 
                                                          
628 On Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī see A. Khālidī, Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī: guzārish-i zindagƬ ̄va ʿirfān (Tehran: Maʿārif, 1381 
Sh/ 2002); I. Mansūrī Lārijānī, MusāfirƬ-̄i gharƬb̄ : sharḥ-i aḥvāl va āsā̲r-i ʿallāma Sayyid Ḥaydar AৄmulƬ ̄va barrasƬ-̄i 
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much of his intellectual contribution was an attempt to introduce those ideas to a Shiʿi 
audience. With the Sadrian school there is a flurry of activity in terms of acceptance and 
development of the implications of the concept of the perfect human in understanding Shiʿi 
aḥādīth. Fayḍ Kāshānī’s al-Kalimāt al-maknūna is an important work that seeks to develop the 
concept of the perfect human to understand the more esoteric aspect of the Imams.629 Works 
by other Safavid thinkers such as Qāḍī Saʿīd al-Dīn Qummī (d. 1108/1696) in his treatise called 
al-Talāʾiʿ wa al-bawāriq; Mīrzā Rafīʿā Nāʾīnī (d. 1083/1672) in his works Shajara-i  ilāhīya and 
Thamara-i shajara-i ilāhīya; ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī in Gawhar-i murād; Mīrzā Ḥasan Lāhījī (d. 
1121/1709) in his Ẓawāhir al-ḥikam; all delve into the concept of walāyah and the Shiʿi Imams 
within the context of ḥikmat.630 Thereafter many separate treatises were written on the 
concept by the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum which will be examined in this 
chapter.  
 
                                                          
mawżūʿ-i vilāyat dar āsā̲rash (Tehran: Bayn al-milal, 1381 Sh/ 2002); Kh. A. Ḥamīya, al-ʿIrfān al-shƬ ̄ʿ Ƭ ̄: dirāsat fƬ ̄al-
ḥayāt al-rūḥƬȳah wa al-fikrƬȳah li-Ḥaydar al-AৄmulƬ ̄(Beirut: Dār al-hādī, 2004); ʿA. Salawātī, Sayyid Ḥaydar AৄmulƬ ̄
va tafsƬr̄-i MuḥƬt̄-̣i aʿẓam (Tehran: Khāna-i kitāb, 1389 Sh/ 2010). For his published ʿirfānī works see Ḥaydar Āmulī, 
Muqaddimāt min kitāb nasṣ ̣al-nusụ̄s ̣fƬ ̄sharh fuṣūs ̣al-ḥikam li-MuḥyƬ ̄al-DƬn̄ Ibn al-ūb nas, eds. Henry Corbin and 
ʿUthmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Departement d'iranologie de l'Institut franco-iranien de recherche qismat-i 
I ৴rānranologie d 1352 Sh/ 1974); Ḥaydar Āmulī, Kitāb jāmiʿ al-asrār wa manbaʿ al-anwār bih inḍimām Risālat naqd 
al-nuqūd fƬ ̄ maʿrifat al-wujūd, eds. Henry Corbin and ʿUthmān Yaḥyā (Tehran: Departement d'iranologie de 
l'Institut franco-iranien de recherche qismat-i I ৴rānʹshināsƮ,̄ 1969); Ḥaydar Āmulī, TafsƬr̄ al-muḥƬt̄ ̣al-aʿẓam wa-al-
baḥr al-khiḍam fƬ ̄taʾwƬl̄ kitāb Allāh al-ʿazƬz̄ al-muḥkam, ed. Muḥsin MūsawƮ ̄TabrƮz̄Ʈ,̄ 7 vols (Qum: al-Maʿhad al-
thaqāfƮ ̄nūr ʿalā nūr, 1422-1428/ 2001-2007); and Ḥaydar Āmulī, Asrār al-sharƬ ̄ʿ a wa atẉār al-tạrƬq̄a wa anwār al-
ḥaqƬq̄a, ed. Riḍā Muḥammad Ḥadraj (Beirut: Dār al-hādī, 2003). 
629 Muḥsin Fayḍ KāshānƮ,̄ al-Kalimāt al-maknūna, ed. ʿAlī-Riżā Aṣgharī (Tehran: Madrasa-yi ʿālī-i shahīd-i 
Muṭahharī, 1387 Sh/2008).  
630 See S. Rizvi, “‘Seeking the Face of God: The Safawid Ḥikmat Tradition’s Conceptualisation of Walāya 
Takwīnīya”, in F. Dantary and G. Miskinz (eds.) The Study of Shiʿi Islam: History Theology and Law (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013) 391-410 for a summary of the contents of these works in their relation to walāyah takwīnīya.   
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Ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum also wrote works providing an intellectual framework from 
which to analyze the scriptural sources. Some of these treatises and works include Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
Risālat al-walāya; Javādī Āmulī’s Ḥayāt-i ʿirfānī-i Imam ʿAlī; Ḥamāsat va ʿirfān; Walāyat dar 
Qurʾān; and Waḥdat-i jawāmʿ dar Nahj-i Balagha amongst others; Ḥasanzāda Āmulī’s Insān-i 
kāmil az dīdga-yi Nahj-i Balagha; Murtażā Muṭahharī’s Insān-i kāmil and Jāziba va dāfiʿa-yi ʿ Alī; 
Saʿādāt Parwar’s631 Jilva-i nūr and Furūgh-i shahadat and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tihrānī’s ten 
volume work Maʿrifat al-Imāma. Most of these works are outside the remit of this thesis as 
they are more concerned with interpreting the scriptural sources however, some reference 
will be made to them when appropriate. 
 
For Shiʿi scholars the discussion of walāyah is an issue close to heart as it distinguishes them 
as a sect. Although their belief in the walāyah of twelve Imams after the death of the Prophet 
(saw) is based on scriptural sources, such as the interpretation of various Qurʾānic verses, 
aḥādƬt̄h and historical events, the discussions concerning walāyah in theoretical ʿirfān and 
transcendental philosophy add a deeper intellectual framework to what was already accepted 
from the Islamic scriptural sources. Therefore, the issues of wujūd and walāyah are two of the 
most important interrelated concepts in Shiʿi intellectual discourse.632 
 
This chapter discusses the issue of walāyah using the ʿirfānī texts of the ḥawza as a basis from 
which to delve into the important glosses and treatises written by the ḥukamāʾ of the school 
of Tehran and Qum. In a similar fashion to the previous chapter the method follows the 
journey of the modern ḥawza student as walāyah is not dealt with in Bidāyat, Nihāyat or the 
                                                          
631 ʿAlī Saʿādat Parwar Pahlawānī Tihrānī was an important student of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. 
632 See S. Rizvi “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 113-127. 
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Manẓūma. Rather the modern student of ḥikmat would only encounter this issue if he 
continued his studies and moved onto texts such as al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya and the Asfār or 
indeed began his training in theoretical ʿirfān. However, as indicated above the issue of 
walāyah is a key issue in ḥikmat, so one may ask why it is introduced at such a late stage in a 
modern ḥakīm’s training? Part of the answer certainly returns to the issue at the core of this 
thesis which is the preference of some ḥukamāʾ for a certain reading of ḥikmat over another.  
 
The issue of walāyah is quintessentially ʿirfānī and very much linked to the ʿirfānī conception 
of wujūd and therefore is not part of a solely philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. It is 
therefore not included in a teaching text that presents a philosophical reading, interpretation 
and explanation of transcendental philosophy. A natural result of this method of teaching is 
a wider separation between the two readings as most students of ḥikmat would approach the 
Asfār with a philosophical approach alone. However, a philosophical approach still needs to 
interact with these concepts and this interaction produces a philosophical reading of the 
perfect human and a philosophical explanation of walāyah takwīnīyah. The chapter will also 
discuss human perfection in philosophy which is the abstraction of the soul. Abstraction is 
linked to walāyah and wujūd but falls short of the much deeper discussions of walāyah in 
ʿirfān. Indeed, it is the ʿirfānī reading of this topic where the soul reflects the unity of God 
termed as a Shadow of True Unity (al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah) and the unity of the soul 
mirrors the oneness of Existence that reconnects the two subjects as will be shown. 
 
The chapter therefore discusses two issues: the first is an investigation into the ʿirfānī and 
philosophical readings and explanations of the perfect human and the concept of walāyah; 
and the second is a philosophical approach to the perfection of the soul. A key aspect of the 
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discussion in this chapter is the investigation of treatises written by ḥukamāʾ where they 
attempt to use ḥikmat to add depth to Imamology. The chapter begins by differentiating 
between the philosophical readings and explanations of the perfect human by discussing a 
gloss of Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī on the section concerning the perfect human in Tamhīd al-
qawāʾd where he identifies the different readings in the works of the ḥukamāʾ. The chapter 
then moves on to discussing the relationship between the Name of God, Allah, and the perfect 
human which is a deeper discussion into the ʿirfānī reading presented in the previous chapter.  
 
Such a seemingly outrageous examination is possible in the light of Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār’s discussion 
on the “heretical” poetry of Ibn ʿArabī discussed in the previous chapter as all that exists in 
any of the worlds including the corporeal is a manifestation of God. In this discussion since 
the Name Allah is the most comprehensive Name, capturing the realities of all the other 
Names, it produces the most comprehensive permanent archetype when the Name faces 
creation and that archetype is that of the perfect human. Perfection here is linked to 
comprehensiveness or the ability of the perfect men to manifest all of the Names in their 
correct fashion. A philosophical reading of comprehensiveness would take the issue back to 
the intensity of wujūd. The reality which comprises all things is the Muḥammadan reality 
which necessitates the existence of a living perfect friend of God (walī) in every time period 
so that the Breath of the All-Merciful has a place of descent. Since the Name Allah manifests 
on three planes; the perfect human; the cosmos as a whole; and the Qurʾān, the chapter 
continues to explain the concept of the three books and shows how these concepts were used 
by the ḥukamāʾ to strengthen the arguments for the Imamate of ʿAlī by tying these issues to 
the scriptural sources. 
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The chapter moves onto one of the most important issues discussed by the ḥukamāʾ of the 
school of Tehran which was that of the different Seals of the Saints. In his influencial book Seal 
of the Saints, Chodkeiwicz, while showing that the Seal of the Saints may not be exclusive to 
Ibn ʿArabī also disagrees with Corbin’s interpretations that would make Ibn ʿArabī a Shiʿi.633 
Chittick claims that at least three types of Seal can be distinguished from Ibn ʿArabī’s 
writings.634 The ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran offered a different interpretation of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s works to this commonly held understanding of the Seals of the Saints. That 
interpretation was not only more palatable for traditional Shiʿi scholars but also brought into 
question the theory of walāyah propounded by Ibn ʿArabī as being quintessentially Shiʿi.635 
This section is therefore of great interest for researches studying the ideas of the Shaykh al-
akbar. The interpretation carries great importance as the same charges leveled at Ibn ʿArabī 
by traditional scholars were also leveled at Mullā Ṣadrā and Sadrian philosophers as Mullā 
Ṣadrā acknowledges his intellectual debt to Ibn ʿArabī. There was therefore a vested interest 
for ḥukamāʾ to present Ibn ʿ Arabī in a Shiʿi light. The work of the school of Tehran in this aspect 
was so thorough that similar works are not found in the school of Qum. Rather the school of 
Qum concentrates more on the implications of the theory of walāyah in applying an 
intellectual framework to interpret aḥādīth on the reality of the Imams.  
                                                          
633 M. Choldkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ʿ Arabī (Cambridge: Islamic 
Texts Society, 1993). 
634 Chittick, “Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshaʾī”. 
635 The debate of Ibn ʿArabī’s Shiʿism or Sunnism is perhaps not the most important as he probably does not 
neatly fit into either denomination in its strict sense. While Ibn ʿArabī did not consider himself a Shiʿi, the system 
of walāyah has little doctrinal compatibility with traditional Sunnism. It is the placing of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib at the 
top of that system by his being the closest person to the Prophet that turns Ibn ʿArabī’s system of walāyah 
evermore towards Shiʿism as shown by the Qumshihī and the school of Tehran. Ibn ʿArabī was perhaps more of 
a product of his varied context, see M. Ebstein, Mysticism and Philosophy in al-Andalus: Ibn Masarra, Ibn al-ʿArabī 
and the Ismāʿilī Tradition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014). 
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After establishing the position of the Seal of the Saints the discussion moves back to the 
knowledge of God in light of the concept of walāyah and that all that can be known of God is 
through the Seal. The chapter then discusses the relationship between the perfect human and 
the Truth. The Breath of the All-Merciful is also called The Real Through Whom Creation 
Takes Place (al-Ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi) which is another expression of the oneness of Existence 
using the Name of God, the Truth. Javādī Āmulī uses this key ʿirfānī terminology and expands 
the discussion to include Shiʿi scriptural sources. His discussion is therefore outside of what 
would usually be found in the glosses and treatises on the classical texts. Rather what he does 
in his treatise Ḥayāt-i ʿirfānī-i Imam ʿAlī is use an intellectual framework based on ʿirfānī 
principles from which to understand the Shiʿi scriptural sources.  
 
After discussing Javādī Āmulī’s ʿirfānī approach to the issue of the perfect human the chapter 
moves on to discuss a more philosophical approach adopted by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī in his 
Risālat al-walāya in a section concerning the interplay between the outward and the inward. 
The final part of the analysis of walāyah discusses the role of the perfect woman. While the 
concept of walāyah does not leave out women nor does it imply their exclusion from 
existential walāyah or the journey to perfection, recent works produced by the school of Qum 
begin to discuss the station of Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet who is considered one of 
the fourteen infallibles. This discussion is still in its early stages in the school of Qum but it is 
an area where Shiʿi ḥukamāʾ can certainly add to the topic of walāyah within the wider ʿirfānī 
tradition. 
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The second issue discussed in the chapter is the perfection of the soul for philosophers. 
Perfection is the abstraction of the soul from its corporeal body and this is what links the 
theory of the soul to resurrection and the discussion on bodily resurrection (al-maʿād al-
jismānī) which will be discussed in the next chapter. The negative view of the body in 
philosophy is not entirely reflected in ʿirfān which sees the body as a natural part of the 
completeness of the perfect man to reflect every world including the corporeal. But all that is 
known to man is known through his soul and so the topic of the soul is very intriguing as the 
soul mirrors wujūd itself. Therefore to know the soul is to know wujūd and knowing wujūd is a 
key aspect of ḥikmat. Indeed the soul reflects the unity of God (al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-
ẓillīyah) and this is what connects this discussion to the perfect man who reflects the degree 
of Non-dualistic Unity and therefore all of the Names. Using the concepts of motion in the 
category of substance and al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah we return to a discussion linked to 
the philosophical reading of the perfect man and discuss the possibility of the soul unifying 
with an Intellect. The concept of abstraction is then explored as another introductory issue to 
the topic of resurrection before discussing some concluding observations. 
 
1. The Philosophical and ʿIrfānī Readings of the Perfect Human 
 
Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī in his gloss on Tamhīd al-qawāʾid provides a useful summary on the 
views concerning the reality of the human which will aid the discussion in this chapter. While 
one view finds its context in a philosophical reading and understanding of wujūd, the 
perspective that Āshiyānī chooses as the more correct is that which corresponds to an ʿirfānī 
reading. He says: 
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Concerning the reality of the human in terms of his comprehensiveness…and the relation 
between the human and the world of existence there are three views…: [For] the 
philosophers as the last stage in the perfection of the human is the station of the first 
intellect they say: The human in terms of his existential comprehensiveness contains the 
corporeal, imaginal and intellectual worlds. That is that the human has a compound 
disposition in a general sense. He contains the levels of the elements, plants and 
animals…the end of his journey is the first intellect as in the ḥadīth “The first thing that 
God created was my light.” They understand created here as brought into existence, not 
decreed.636  
 
This is a clearly philosophical reading and explanation of the perfection of the human. Here 
there is separation between the first intellect and the person of the perfect human. The human 
is striving to reach the level of the first intellect and so is secondary to it. There is no concept 
of manifestation or self-disclosure which is a prominent facet of the ʿirfānī reading. While the 
view referred to in the quote above is that created in the ḥadīth above refers to existence, the 
second view is that it means decreed, which is also a philosophical view. Āshtiyānī at a later 
point in his gloss shows that the implication of both of these philosophical views is that the 
first intellect must be more perfect than the perfect human.637 Though it is a third view that 
Āshtiyānī finds the most compelling: 
                                                          
636 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 356, nt. 1. 
637 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 358, nt. 1. 
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The locus of inspiration (mashrab) of the perfect ones among the Muḥammadan friends 
[of God] is that…the station of the Muḥammadan reality is the degree of Non-dualistic 
Unity in wujūd…it means that [it is] the final stage of the wayfaring of the perfect 
Muḥammadan human after annihilation in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and 
accepting the self-disclosures of the Outward Names…[and after he] reaches the level of 
manifesting the Inward Names. After wayfaring in the Inward Names one after the other 
he accepts to manifest a mixture of Names from the Inward and the Outward in the 
Names comprehensive of the Outward and Inward…[until] he reaches the level of 
balance in comprehensiveness…638   
 
The implication of the ʿirfānī view is that the perfect human is the reason for existence and 
the existence of all else in creation is introductory to his appearance in the corporeal realm.639 
He manifests the Names of God and so the issue here is different to that in a philosophical 
reading where the perfection of man is seen in his increase in wujūd or unifying with the first 
intellect. Therefore the first intellect exists for the perfect human whose reality is in the 
knowledge of God before the act of creation. Āshtiyānī also explains that the station of the 
perfect human is unknown to anyone except the perfect human himself and his inheritors as 
this position is an explanation of the level of the unveiling of tawḥīd that he has reached.640 
                                                          
638 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 356, nt. 1. 
639 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 358, nt. 1. 
640 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd 
Qummī, 358, nt. 1. 
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This is a concept that will be discusses further in the chapter. With the categorization of the 
views of the ḥukamāʾ identified by Āshtiyānī it is possible to classify the approaches of various 
ḥukamāʾ in the schools of Tehran and Qum as either philosophical or ʿirfānī. 
 
2. The Name Allah and Its Manifestation 
 
In the previous chapter the Name Allah was discussed as the Name that encompassed all of 
the other Names represented by either the degree of Non-dualistic Unity or at the apex of the 
degree of Non-dualistic Unity depending on which set of terms was used. That is that the 
degree after the level of the unseen of the unseen where nothing is known of God, the 
manifestation of all of God’s Names occurs with comprehensiveness in the Name Allah. 
Therefore the Name Allah contains all the other Names and manifests before the other Names. 
The external archetype which manifests the Name Allah therefore also takes priority over the 
other archetypes which manifest other Names.641 QaysạrƮ ̄ discusses how the Name Allah is 
related to the other Names, and splits the types of relationship into two. The first is the 
relationship between the manifestation of the essence of a Name and all of the Names. Here 
the comprehensiveness of the Name Allah is like a single reality which comprises individuals 
in the same way as wujūd and quiddity are a single reality in the extramental, only separated 
on the level on the intellect.642 That is that the other Names of God are like modes of a single 
reality, so although Qayṣarī chooses to use wujūd and quiddity as an example, a better example 
                                                          
641 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 140. 
642 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 141. 
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according to the Sadrian school would have been wujūd itself. It is important to note here that 
Qayṣarī did not have Sadrian language with which to explain his concepts.  
 
The second type of relationship is its comprehensiveness over all the other Names in the same 
way that a universal (kull) is related to a particular (juzʾ), where the particular is the same as 
the universal in terms of manifestation as a universal cannot manifest except in a particular.643 
Here the dependence of the universal on the particular is not what Qayṣarī intends. Rather it 
is that a Name which is at the height of nondelimitation needs delimitation in order to 
manifest on a delimited plane. Therefore the Names that are more delimited manifest the 
Name that is more nondelimited. That means that everything that exists in the world is the 
manifestation of the Name Allah, as this Name comprehends all the other Names. Here 
Qayṣarī is using a philosophical explanation for an ʿirfānī concept and so there is room for 
error when reading these issues in his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ.  
 
The perfect human is the archetype that is the manifestation of the Name Allah as he is the 
manifestation of that which comprehends all the Names, which is the same nondelimitation 
that is found in the Name Allah. This is the ontological position of the perfect human as the 
level of Non-dualistic Unity in the Breath of the All-Merciful. The reality of the perfect human 
is the Name Allah as he comprises anything that is not the pure, nondelimited, 
undifferentiated Essence. As QaysạrƮ ̄says: 
 
                                                          
643 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 141. 
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And for this reason it is said that the perfect human must flow in all of the existent beings, 
like the flow of the Truth in them, which is the third journey, which is from the Truth to 
the creation by the Truth. In this journey his perfection is completed, and by it he attains 
the truth of certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqƬn̄). From here it becomes clear that the last is the same 
as the first, and from that the secret [of the verse] becomes apparent: “He is the First and 
the Last and the Ascendant (over all) and the Knower of hidden things, and He is Cognizant 
of all things”644,645  
 
According to this passage the reality of the perfect human, which is also known as the 
Muḥammadan reality or the creation by the Truth, pervades all of existence and it is through 
him that God is known, as God is known through His manifestations. But his reality does not 
comprise God, while God comprises the reality of the perfect human. Deciding the boundaries 
between the reality of the perfect human is a tricky and dangerous area, while safety is found 
in understanding that God and the perfect human are not the same and that the perfect 
human is a creation of God and dependant on Him. The reality of the perfect human is only 
completely known to himself and God, as Āshtiyānī pointed out above. Those who move 
closer to his reality may understand more, but this discussion is far beyond the realm of 
intellectualization. It is beyond the realm of pure philosophizing and only the realm of 
unveiling and experiencing can open the door of discussion and certainty. In this paragraph 
QaysạrƮ ̄ refers to the third journey of the wayfarer in the same way as the third journey 
according to Mullā Ṣadrā. Although the immediate influence on Mullā Ṣadrā concerning the 
four journeys was the Dashtakī family there is a point of intersection between the height of 
                                                          
644 Qurʾān 57:3 
645 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 143. 
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the spiritual journey as expressed in theoretical ʿirfān and ḥikmat. This is because Ṣadrā basis 
his four intellectual journeys is the journeys of the ʿurafāʾ and writes his Asfār “…according to 
their way of their movement.”646  
 
Fāżil Tūnī explores the relationship between the prophets and the Names in more detail in 
his gloss on Qayṣarī’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ. The friend of God that manifests the Name 
Allah is only the perfect human or someone who holds the position of his successor.647 Tūnī 
explains that even at this position there is gradation and proves his point by linking it back to 
a saying of Imam ʿ Alī when he says that he is a servant from among the servants of Muḥammad 
(anā ʿabd min ʿabīd Muḥammad).648 So while the successors of Muḥammad are greater than 
the other prophets, they are below the level of the Prophet himself.649 Regarding the Names 
Tūnī says: 
 
“The holder of general walāyah is a manifestation of the comprehensive Name, the 
Beneficent (al-Raḥmān) and the rest of the prophets are manifestations of the particular 
Names such as the Compassionate (al-Raʾūf) and other [such Names]. The holder of 
nondelimited walāyah is the manifestation of the Name Allah as he is the manifestation 
of the [degree of] Non-dualistic Unity. Therefore the Seal of the Prophets emanates from 
the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and is called the first specification (taʿayun-i awwal)…in 
the same way that the Name Allah comprises all of the other Names, the permanent 
                                                          
646 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 44.  
647 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil,113. 
648 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113. For the ḥadīth see Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, (1) 90. 
649 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113 
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archetype of Muḥammad comprises all of the permanent archetypes and therefore all of 
the realities are particularities of the Muḥammadan reality.”650 
 
According to the Breath of the All-Merciful there are stages of manifestation before the Names 
manifest in this material world. The external archetypes in this world have an original form in 
the permanent archetypes, and since the Muḥammadan reality is the form of the all-
comprehensive Name it is also the form of all of the external and permanent archetypes. This 
kind of lordship is not comprehensible without justice, which is commonly defined in the 
ḥawza as giving everything its due according to its capability. This concept will be explained 
further in the section concerning the perfect man and the Truth. In the corporeal world the 
external archetypes compete with each other due to being veiled from the other’s reality 
therefore requiring a manifestation of justice to judge between them.651 This judgment is also 
an aspect of the Muḥammadan reality in the hidden realms,652 as it was a function of the 
person of Muḥammad in the corporeal world. In another part of his gloss Tūnī explains this 
concept by explaining that the perfect human contains all the worlds within himself in the 
perfect balance so that one internal world does not overcome another. He says: 
 
So the perfect human contains all of the levels of existence in such a way that the 
manifestation of one level is not prevented or veiled by the manifestation of another level. 
For example, the manifestation of [the] animalistic [level] does not prevent the 
                                                          
650 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113 
651 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 166. 
652 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 165. 
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manifestation of [the] intellectual and spiritual [levels]. [He] is qualified to [posses the 
level of] divine vicegerency.653     
 
In the same way that the Names are not truly differentiated at the degree of Non-dualistic 
Unity they are not differentiated in the reality of the perfect human: 
 
Each [Name] is not other than the other Names, while some are greater than others. In 
the same way the perfect human who is a manifestation of the Name Allah has different 
manifestations…which are one with the perfect human…each manifestation is one with 
the other manifestations and there is no difference between them.654 
 
The perfect man may have deficiencies related to the corporeal world and related to his 
human nature such as tiredness or being limited by sense perception. But if those deficiencies 
are part of his comprehensiveness and correspondence with the corporeal world then they 
are not really deficiencies. Rather they are perfections that allow him to contain the outward 
and the inward aspects of every level of existence and capture the whole effusion of the Breath 
of the All-Merciful.655 This vicegerency is necessary in every time as the perfect man is the 
connection between God and his creation. Each vicegerent is the manifestation of the 
Muḥammadan reality, as there must always be a perfect human on earth to capture the full 
Breath. The perfect man manifests with the particularities of his own time, and so the 
                                                          
653 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 108. 
654 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i ʿirfānī va falsafī, 109. 
655 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 147. 
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vicegerents vary significantly when analyzing their outward aspect alone.656 However, if they 
are analyzed by the oneness that prevails the higher levels of the Breath of the All-Merciful it 
becomes clear that they are all that same reality.657  
 
The vicegerents before Muḥammad were messengers (rasūl) or prophets (nabī) and after his 
death prophethood (nubuwwah) was sealed and vicegerency became walāyah. Rather 
walāyah is the inner aspect of prophethood and so it is more comprehensive as it concerns 
every friend of God, which is inclusive of the prophets. Hence God has the Name al-Walī (the 
Friend) rather than a Name related specifically to prophethood.658 Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī 
discusses the Name al-Walī in his important treatise on walāyah saying: 
 
Walāyah is from al-Walī meaning closeness and it is either general which covers all of the 
believers…or specific which is only for the people of the heart and the people of God who 
are annihilated in His Essence…this walāyah also has levels: The first level [is] the 
annihilation of the servant in His Essence with the divine self-disclosure and his 
subsistence by Him by taking off the clothes of possible existence and wearing true wujūd 
at the end of the first journey and the beginning of the second journey of the four 
journeys…So the specific walāyah which is the Muḥammadan walāyah…may be 
delimited by a Name from among the Names and a limit from among the limits, or it could 
be nondelimited…659  
                                                          
656 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148. 
657 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148. 
658 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 169. 
659 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 111-112. 
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The difference in manifesting the Names is not due to the self-disclosure as Qumshihī 
explains. Rather the obstruction is from the locus of manifestation and not the self-
disclosure.660 The friends of God do not attain these high positions through their own actions 
rather they are bestowed by God on His chosen servants, due to their permanent archetypes.661 
Those who are bestowed with such high stations of walāyah are deserving of them, due to 
Gods knowledge of them. Qumshihī continues to say that the Name al-Walī is the inner of the 
Name Allāh: 
 
The two Names are vertically related and the Name al-Walī is the inner of the Names 
Allah as walāyah is more hidden than divinity…divinity is the inner aspect of the 
Muḥammadan reality…so walāyah is the inner aspect of the Muḥammadan reality [as 
well] and that reality is the outward of both of them…the outer is the inner and the inner 
is the outer so the difference is in mental separation while they are one in the necessary 
existence.662 
 
Divinity is the inner aspect of the Muḥammadan reality because the Muḥammadan reality is 
a full manifestation of the Name Allah. Qumshihī returns to explain the difference between 
the outward and inward aspects of the Muḥammadan reality in the same way that Qayṣarī 
first explained it to be mentally posited. However, since Qumshihī was able to use Sadrian 
terminology he relates the difference to wujūd alone and not to wujūd and quiddity as Qayṣarī 
                                                          
660 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 115. 
661 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 169. 
662 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 118. 
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did. The Name Allah therefore manifests within the Muḥammadan reality which is the whole 
of creation as well as in the person of the perfect human. Still there is a third aspect to this 
relationship which is the Qurʾān. 
 
3. The Three Books 
 
Since the Name Allah manifests in the creation as a whole and in the perfect man specifically, 
there is a relationship between the world and the perfect human. The perfect human is the 
microcosm and the world is the macrocosm, and it is the comprehensiveness of the perfect 
human that allows him to be the vicegerent of God over the rest of creation, as he contains 
everything that is contained by anything else. Therefore in the same way that there are 
manifestations of the Names in the worlds in a differentiated manner, there are 
manifestations of the Names in the human in a general sense.663 Here the relationship between 
knowing the self and knowing God becomes apparent yet again. If one knows the 
manifestations of the Names of God within themselves then they understand the 
manifestations in the extramental as well. The perfect human witnesses all of the Names 
within then he witnesses the whole of creation, as all that is manifested in the extramental is 
manifested within his own soul; “Do you think you are a small seed, while within you is folded 
the greatest world?”664  
 
                                                          
663 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 144. 
664 This poetry is attributed to Imam ‘Alī although some scholars have concluded it belongs to another person 
with the same name.  
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The relationship between microcosm and macrocosm is also expressed in terms of different 
books, so that a third entity can be incorporated. The microcosm is the book of the soul (kitāb 
al-anfusƬ)̄, the macrocosm is the book of the horizon (kitāb al-āfāqƬ)̄665 and the Qurʾān is the 
recorded book (kitāb tadwƬn̄Ƭ)̄. JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄explains the relationship between the cosmos and 
the Qurʾān when elucidating the kind of knowledge possessed by Imam ʿAlƮ:̄ 
 
The Qurʾān is God’s verbal book, the cosmos being His existential book. These two books 
are entirely consistent, such that should the Qurʾān become manifest in an existential 
form, it would take the shape of the cosmos, and should the cosmos transform into verbal 
expression, it would appear in the form of the Qurʾān. Thus the one who comprehends 
the Qurʾān immediately in its diverse aspects is ipso facto aware of the secrets and 
mysteries of the cosmos.666    
 
The relationship between the Qurʾān and the perfect human is expressed by Imam ʿAlƮ ̄in his 
own words as he is reported to have said phrases such as “I am the speaking Qurʾān”667 and “I 
am the Word of God that speaks.” JavādƮ ̄ĀmulƮ ̄goes on to explain such phrases: 
                                                          
665 The two books relating to the microcosm (kitāb al-anfusƬ)̄ and the microcosm (kitāb al-afāqƬ)̄ are termed as 
such due to  the Qurʾānic verse: “We will soon show them Our signs in the Universe [āfāq] and in their own souls 
[anfusihim], until it will become quite clear to them that it is the truth. Is it not sufficient as regards your Lord 
that He is a witness over all things?” [Qurʾān, 41:53] 
666 ʿA. JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis: A Mystical Study of Imām ʿAlī’s Life, tr. D. D. Sodagar (Qum: Isrāʾ Center of 
Publication, 2011) 31. For the original Farsi see ʿA. JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Ḥayāt-i ʿirfānī-i Imām ʿAlī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Isrāʾ, 
1380 Sh/2002). I have quoted the passages from the English translation which are faithful to the original Farsi 
text. 
667 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 35. For the ḥadīth see Sulaymān b. Ibrāhīm Qandūzī al-Ḥanafī, Yanābīʿ al-mawadda 
li-dhawi al-qurbā, ed. Sayyid ʿAlī Jamāl Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī (Qum: Dār al-uswa li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr, 1416/1996) (1) 
213. 
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The summit of the Qurʾān is “with Us in the Mother Book, sublime and wise.”668 This apex 
of the Qurʾān subsumes by way of hierarchical consummation all the lower levels of its 
manifestation. As such, one who is the “speaking Qurʾān,” the incarnate divine revelation, 
comprehends immediately the secrets of the cosmos. As God possesses immediate 
knowledge of the hierarchical levels of the Qurʾān essentially and independently, so too 
does His viceroy and righteous slave as His manifestation and exemplification of His 
knowledge possess it but in a dependent mode that owes to His grace.669 
 
While elucidating the intimate connection between the Qurʾān, God’s knowledge and the 
perfect human, JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄is careful to point out the difference between God and the perfect 
human, which is the essential servitude in the perfect human and the transcendence and 
independence of God as the Creator of the perfect human and his Benefactor. Yet the extent 
of the knowledge of the perfect human is astonishing at first, but since the ʿirfānī view sees the 
true perfect human as the vicegerent of God not only for the material world but for all the 
created worlds, one may grasp the general comprehensiveness that such a position requires. 
The value of the human therefore in the Islamic world view becomes apparent from this 
discussion, as the perfection of the human is attainable in various degrees by all people and 
indeed that is the philosophy of revealed religion. God reveals to mankind the path he needs 
to pursue in order to reach his perfection. Perfection in its ultimate sense may be attainable 
only by a very small elite, but as that perfection becomes less perfect, more people would be 
                                                          
668 Qurʾān, 43:4 
669 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 35. 
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able to attain the subsequent lower levels of perfection. So perfection in this sense is relative 
and graded rather than ultimate for the friends of God in a more general sense.  
 
There are many statements and situations narrated in the scriptural sources concerning Imam 
ʿAlƮ ̄and the other Imams elucidating the extent of their knowledge and this is why knowledge 
of the Imam became an important tenant of Shiʿi theology.670 It was especially significant for 
the establishment of the Imamate of the ninth Imam, Muḥammad b. ʿAlƮ ̄ al-Jawād, who 
became an Imam at the age of nine upon the death of his father AlƮ ̄ b. Mūsā al-Riḍā. Shiʿi 
scholars who wanted to assess which of the claimants to the office of Imamate were authentic, 
both for leadership and in order to give them the khums, would ask the claimant a series of 
questions to assess the claimant's knowledge. Since knowledge of the Imam is such an 
important factor, it is easy to see the importance of the ʿirfānī discussions on the perfect 
human are for Shiʿi scholars. It is not that the ideas of the perfect human were imposed on the 
Imams like some would argue, rather there seems to have been an innate consistency between 
what emerged as the vision of the Imam based on scriptural sources and the investigations of 
the ʿurafāʾ. A good example of this is seen in another tradition from Imam ʿAlƮ ̄where he says: 
 
                                                          
670 The scriptural sources contain many traditions of this nature and so any quick glance in the kitāb al-ḥujja in 
the important sources of Shiʿi aḥādƬt̄h will be sufficient for the reader to get a general picture of the importance 
of the knowledge of the Imām in the Shiʿi scriptural sources. Some examples include: Narrated from Imam al-
Bāqir: By Allah! We are the treasurers of Allah in His heaven and earth, not over gold nor over silver, but over His 
Knowledge, see Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 474; In part of a long ḥadīth narrated from Imam al-Riḍā he says: …The Imam 
is single in his time, nobody can approach him [in excellence], no scholar is equal to him, nobody can replace him 
and nobody is like him or is his peer…, see Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 495; and narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq in reference 
to Qurʾān 3:8: We are the firmly rooted in knowledge, and we know its [the Qurʾān’s] original meaning (taʾwīl), see 
Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 529.  
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I have been granted seven privileges in which no one exceeds me. I have been taught the 
Names, governance of creatures, interpretation of the Book, and distribution of booty 
among the children of Adam according as their due. There is no knowledge but that God 
has taught me. And I have been granted a word that discloses a thousand words. And my 
wife671 has been granted a codex, in which there is knowledge such as no one else has 
attained to and which is from God and his Prophet as her exclusive right.672 
 
It is interesting that the first privilege is exactly the characteristic most important in the 
perfect human, which is his knowledge of the Names, as his reality is the comprehensive 
Name, Allah. The second privilege and some of the other privileges are the job of the 
vicegerent, which involves governing the creatures and giving them their rights. Here it is clear 
that Imam ʿAlƮ ̄is not referring to the outward political role of the Caliphate, as that would not 
be a privilege that was reserved for him alone. Rather this governance is more general, being 
not only over the Muslims, but over the all creatures.673 Such general governance is unlikely to 
be in the political sense but rather of a spiritual nature. There is also reference to knowing the 
interpretation of the book, being the Qurʾān. All of the characteristics are to do with 
knowledge, either in its theoretical or practical sense.  
 
4. The Muḥammadan Reality (al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadīyah) 
                                                          
671 Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet is the female prototype of the al-insān al-kāmil and this will be discussed 
further in the chapter. 
672 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 36. For the ḥadīth see Muḥammad b. Ḥasan Ṣaffār, Baṣāʾr al-darajāt, ed. Muḥsin 
Kūchabāghī al-Tabrīzī (Qum: Maktabat Āyātallah Marʿashī Najafī, 1404/1984) (1) 200. 
673 Here the word used is al-ʿibād which literally means servants. Since all created beings are servants of God the 
translator has used creatures. 
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The Muḥammadan reality is the manifestation of the Name Allah, and from this reality all 
realities in the rest of the world are produced.674 The part of the reality that is outward 
produces the outward world and the part that is inward produces the inward worlds, as the 
Prophet — in his reality — is the possessor of the greatest Name (al-Ism al-aʿẓam) which had 
lordship over all of the other Names. This lordship necessitates that everything in creation is 
given its correct proportion according to its capacity and potential. So the lordship of the 
Muḥammadan reality cannot be imagined without justice.675 Here justice does not mean 
equality, but rather means giving everything what it deserves. In philosophical terms it means 
that the amount of existence and perfection given to a stone in the material world should not 
be the same as the level of existence and perfection given to an angel in the world of the 
intellects.  
 
To implement justice, the power to implement is necessary and this is the basis of walāyah 
takwīnīyah and walāyat al-taṣarruf.676 At the same time, since everything in existence has 
different needs, that which gives everything its right must also possess everything and this is 
why the Muḥammadan reality must contain all of the Names. Therefore, the Muḥammadan 
reality has two aspects; servitude and lordship.677 That is that the ability that is required to 
administer justice is not essentially possessed by the Muḥammadan reality, but rather it is 
                                                          
674 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 145. 
675 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 146. 
676 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 146. 
677 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 145 
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present within the Muḥammadan reality by the virtue of it being the manifestation of the all 
comprehensive Name, which is the reality of vicegerency.  
 
A vicegerent in the corporeal world is required in all ages since he is responsible for sustaining 
the creation,678 and this necessitates the existence of a various number of vicegerents through 
the course of time. This is because the material nature of the world necessitates birth and 
death, creation and destruction and the deterioration of things with passing of time. Since the 
perfect human is in the body of a human, that body must deteriorate and eventually die. 
Therefore, the perfect human must also pass away from this world and another perfect human 
must take his place. The Muḥammadan reality manifests in different ages according the Name 
that governs the age in the form of the prophets who lived in each individual age.679 Indeed it 
was not possible for the Muḥammadan reality to manifest completely at one time,680 so it 
manifested gradually. It also manifested in the different prophets in different ways according 
to their own capacities. All of the realities of the prophets originate from the degree of Non-
dualistic Unity and this is what unifies them.  
 
Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī in a book expounding the vicegerency of the Prophet and the walāyah 
of ʿAlī called Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya ilā al-khilāfa wa-l-walāya expounds the manner in which their 
realities permeate the whole of existence. After explaining the degree of Non-dualistic Unity 
and establishing the existence of a veil between the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and the 
                                                          
678 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 147; 148-149. 
679 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148. 
680 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148. 
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manifestation of the Names in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, he continues to describe the 
need for the divine vicegerent in lamp nine of the first niche as follows: 
 
When it is unveiled to you that this unseen reality is too majestic to be attained by the 
hands of the waders, nor does anyone procure from the precinct of holiness, nor is any 
of the names or attributes, including their entifications, the intimate of its secret, nor 
has any of the forgoing been given the permission to enter its arena, there must be, for 
the sake of the manifestation of the names and their prominence as well as the 
unveiling of the mysteries of their treasures, an unseen divine vicegerent to succeed it 
in manifestation in the names and reflect Its light in the mirrors, so that the gates of 
blessings may open up, the fountainheads of boons may gush forth, the morning of 
beginninglessness may break, and the last may link with the first.681 
 
The vicegerent is the intermediary which is also known as the most holy effusion with one 
face towards the level of Non-dualistic Unity and the Unseen and another face towards the 
multiplicity of the Names, which is not like the multiplicity that is understood in the corporeal 
world, as every Name is all-comprehensive while some of them are outwardly specific.682 The 
first manifestation of the most holy effusion is the Name, Allah, after which the other Names 
are manifested and therefore vicegerency is manifested in all the Names.683 It is through the 
                                                          
681 See Rūḥ-Allāh Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance into Vicegerency and Sanctity, tr. Salam Judy (Tehran: Uruj 
Publishing Center, 2010) 10-11. For the original Arabic see Khumaynī, Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya. I have used the 
translation by Salam Judy for these quotes as the translation is faithful to the original Arabic. 
682 Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance, 11; 14-15. 
683 Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance, 11-12. 
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multiplicity of the Names that there multiplicity in the creation.684 Khumaynī continues in 
lamp twenty seven of the same niche: 
 
This vicegerency is the spirit, lord[ly] origin and source of the Muḥammadan 
vicegerency. There from grew the root of the vicegerency in all the worlds, or rather, 
the root of vicegernecy, the vicegerent and the one whom it represents. And this 
became manifest, to the greatest degree of manifestation, in the Presence of the 
Greatest Name ‘God’, the Lord of the absolute Muḥammadan reality, the origin of the 
divine universal realities. Based on this it is the origin of vicegerency, and 
vicegerency is its manifestation. Or rather, it is the outwardly manifest in this 
presence, because of the unification of that which is manifest and the locus of 
manifestation, as He has alluded to with a fine allusion in the Divine revelation, with 
His words, 
 
ردقلا ةليل يف هانلزنأ انإ 
Indeed, We revealed it on the Might of Measuring out.685 
                                                          
684 Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance, 13. 
685 The night of measuring out (also translated as the night of power, the night of fate, the night of decree and the 
grand night) is referred to in chapter 97 the Qurʾān: In the Name of Allah the Beneficent the Merciful. Surely We 
revealed it on the grand night. And what will make you comprehend what the grand night is? The grand night is 
better than a thousand months. The angels and Gibreel descend in it by the permission of their Lord for every affair. 
Peace! it is till the break of the morning. It is historically the night on which the Qurʾān was revealed to the Prophet 
in its complete sense before being revealed over the course of 23 years, verse by verse. However, the the night of 
measuring out has more than this historical significance. Ṭabāṭabāʾī comments that the apparent meaning of the 
term qādr in this instance is taqdīr and so it is a night of measuring out which occurs every year when the life, 
death, sustenance, success and failure and other affairs are decreed, see Muḥammad Ḥusayn ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ TafsƬr̄ 
al-MƬz̄ān, 20 vols (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamƮ ̄li-l-matḅūʿāt, 2006) (20) 592. 
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Our Shaykh and teacher in divine knowledge and teachings, the perfect gnostic, 
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī Isfahanī, may God make the days of his blessings 
last, in reply to my question about the manner if divine revelation, in the first 
meeting I was honoured with his presence, said, among other things, thus, The ءاه 
(it) in His words...is an allusion to the unseen reality sent down in the Muḥammadan 
structure, which is the reality of ‘the Night of Measuring out’.686    
 
Another aspect of the effusion is the effusion of knowledge, which is represented by the asking 
of questions to the Prophet in the well known ḥadīth of Miʿrāj (the night ascension). While 
explaining a long ḥadīth where Imam ʿAlī asks the Prophet whether he or the angle Gabriel is 
better, Khumaynī says that it was not that Imam ʿAlī did not know the answer to this question 
as he was the inheritor of the inner knowledge of the Prophet which made him party to 
knowledge before its formation in words. Rather the purpose of his question is to unveil the 
realities for others. This is an outward manifestation of an existential flow of knowledge from 
the heaven of Aḥmad’s mystery (samāʾ sir al-Aḥmadī) through the ʿAlawī Cloud (al-ʿamā 
ʿAlawīyah) which is also the reality of the famous ḥadīth: “I am the city of knowledge and ʿAlī is 
its gate”.687 
 
While the Muḥammadan reality in ʿirfān is explained by the manifestation of the Name Allah, 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī uses a philosophical approach in his treatise on the Muḥammadan 
reality. He begins by classifying the different types of existent until he comes to the Platonic 
                                                          
686 Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance, 24-25. 
687 Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance, 97. 
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Forms. Some of these forms have nondelimited lordship and receive from the nondelimited 
Truth and are annihilated and subsist by It.688 It is from here that the walāyah of every prophet 
comes from and there is no walāyah without annihilation and subsistence.689 From a 
philosophical perspective Forms are separate entities unlike the Names which are all modes 
of the same reality. He thereafter links the issue of walāyah though the stations of annihilation 
and subsistence to the four journeys in the Asfār.690 Those existents that are lacking perfection 
in the origin of their existence must move to find those perfections either by accidental 
movement or by motion in the category of substance.691  
 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī explains the position of different existents through the concept of 
gradation in terms of their closeness or distance from God and their level of delimitation.692 
Then in his description of the most perfect existent he returns to the ʿirfānī issue of the perfect 
man manifesting all of the Names and the Muḥammadan reality as the creation by the Truth 
before beginning a philosophical explanation of the corners of the Throne (al-ʿarsh) and a 
commentary on a ḥadīth concerning the intellect.693 He then finishes his treatise with a usual 
ʿirfānī commentary of the ḥadīth “I was a hidden treasure…”694 
 
                                                          
688 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 114. 
689 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 114-115. 
690 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 115. 
691 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 116. 
692 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 117. 
693 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 118-122. 
694 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 123. 
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One of the most important modes of God is His Unity and the unitarian (muwaḥḥid) is the 
perfect manifestation of God’s Unity. At the apexall possible spiritual levels is the station of 
the Seal of the Saints who is the perfect human. The ontological position of the Prophet as 
being the beginning of God’s creation, whether termed philosophically as the first effusion (al-
sạ̄dir al-awwal) or in ʿirfānī terminology as the beginning of the Muḥammadan reality, as well 
as his position as the Seal of the Prophets is undisputed. However, there is debate about the 
person who holds the position of the Seal of the Saints after him. A vicegerent or Qutḅ is 
required in each age on the material plane and that position before the Prophet was occupied 
by various prophets. After the death of the Prophet, according the Shiʿi theology that position 
was given to Imam ʿAlƮ ̄and the other Imams after him and is currently held by the MahdƮ ̄who 
is in the greater occultation. Yet according to some statements of Ibn ‘ArabƮ,̄ the Seal of the 
Saints in an absolute sense will be Jesus,695 and he claimed the Seal of the Muhammadan saints 
himself. 696 Shiʿi ʿ urafāʾ took much effort to reinterpret these views commonly attributed to Ibn 
ʿArabī by writing treatises on the issue of the Seal of the Saints, and in turn formulated an 
alternative interpretation of the words of the Shaykh al-akbar. It is this interpretation that will 
now be discussed. 
 
5. The Types of Walī 
 
The discussion of the different types of walī and specifically the different types of Seal (khātim) 
occurs in the background of Ibn ʿArabī’s claim to be the Seal of the Saints. Deciphering what 
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he meant by that assertion was an important issue for Shiʿi ʿurafāʾ to explain as it seems to go 
directly against the Shiʿi belief in the Imams as the spiritual successors of the Prophet. The 
distinction is found in the difference between the Seal of nondelimited walāyah and the Seal 
of delimited walāyah in the community of Muḥammad. Since Muḥammad was the Seal of 
nondelimited walāyah, after his death only another Seal of nondelimited walāyah can take his 
place in the corporeal plane and that is his successor. This was not the Seal that Ibn ʿArabī 
claimed to be according to the interpretation elucidated in the school of Tehran. Rather he 
was a Seal of delimited walāyah which is a position available to all of the friends of God in the 
community of Muḥammad. The confusion concerning Jesus’s position as the Seal of Saints as 
asserted by Qayṣarī was also an issue that needed to be addressed.697 
 
In his Risālat al-walāyah, after explaining the manifestation of the Attribute of walāyah in 
existence, Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī explains a classification of different kinds of walāyah. 
Walāyah can be split into nondelimited (muṭlaq) walāyah and delimited (muqayyad) 
walāyah. Nondelimited walāyah is the walāyah that is related to God, who has no limitations, 
whereas delimited walāyah is the walāyah of the friends of God. “Delimited walāyah exists by 
nondelimited walāyah, and nondelimited walāyah is manifested by delimited walāyah.”698 The 
walāyah of the friends of God is then split into general and specific. General delimited walāyah 
belongs to all believers according to their different levels of faith. Specific delimited walāyah 
belongs to the wayfarers when they reach the levels of annihilation (fanāʾ) and subsistence 
(baqāʾ), and this is his definition of a friend of God.699  
                                                          
697 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 351. 
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Later in the same treatise Mīrzā Aḥmad explains nondelimited and delimited prophethood. 
Nondelimited prophethood belongs to the Prophet Muḥammad who has always been a 
prophet before the creation of Adam. The inner aspect of nondelimited prophethood is 
nondelimited walāyah, which in this case is an expression of the attainment of these 
perfections in terms of the bāṭin for eternity, as expressed in a tradition: “I and ʿAlī are from 
one light.”700 Delimited prophethood belongs to all of the various messengers who were sent 
to explain the realities, the way and the divine law to the human; and delimited walāyah is the 
inner aspect of this function.701 Therefore when walāyah is analyzed as an Attribute of God it 
is delimited when regarding the prophets and saints, but when it is considered solely referring 
to the prophets and saints it carries another meaning, where nondelimitation is used to 
describe the walāyah of the Prophet and his successors as explained above. Qumshihī, in a 
treatise on walāyah penned by his student ʿAlī Akbar Ṭabāṭabāʾī as a gloss to the Ringstone of 
Seth, provides a simpler breakdown of the friends of God from among the community of 
Muḥammad saying: 
 
Muḥammadan walāyah…is [either] nondelimited or delimited. For each of them there 
are levels; for the delimited it is in terms of numbers and for nondelimited it is in terms 
of intensity. For each of them there is a Seal (khātim). So it is possible for a scholar from 
                                                          
700 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh, al-Amālī (Tehran: Kitābchī, 1376 Sh/1997) 236; Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn 
Shahrāshūb Māzandarānī, Manāqib āl Abī Ṭālib, 4 vols (Qum: Intishārāt-i ʿAllāma, 1379 Sh/2000) (1) 27; (3) 269; 
Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (33) 480; (35) 34; (37) 150.  
701 Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342. 
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amongst the scholars of his community for be the Seal of delimited walāyah and for a 
successor from among his successors to be the Seal of nondelimited walāyah.702 
 
In this passage Qumshihī immediately differentiates between two types of walī. One is a 
scholar from amongst the community of the Prophet and the other is a successor, by which he 
means an Imam as only the Imams are spiritual successors of the Prophet in a nondelimited 
sense. Mīrzā Aḥmad continues to discuss the issue of the Seal of the Saints in his treatise and 
begins by specifying that Seal in this title does not mean that there can be no other saint at 
this level after a Seal of the Saints in a specific time. Rather what is meant here is that the 
position of the Seal of the Saints is the highest position of the friends of God.703 According to 
Mīrzā Aḥmad, this position can either be possessed as a state (ḥāl) or as a station (maqām). 
Possession of the station of the Seal of the Saints belongs only to Muḥammad and his 
successors who inherit this position because of him. If other prophets possessed this station it 
was possessed as a temporary state and not a permanent station.704  
 
Specific walāyah (al-walāyah al-khāṣṣah), which is the Muḥammadan walāyah, may be 
delimited by a Name of God, or may encompass all the names of God. Therefore 
Muḥammadan walāyah can be split into nondelimited and universal (kullī) in terms of the 
universality of the spirit of Muḥammad, which is known as the First Intellect (al-ʿaql al- 
awwal); and delimited and particular (juzʾī) in terms of his particular spirit that administered 
his body. Within both of these categories are levels with nondelimitation indicating 
                                                          
702 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 113. 
703 Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342. 
704 Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342. 
307  
intensity,705 in a similar fashion to the discussion of tashkīk in wujūd. After explaining the 
different categories Mīrzā Aḥmad arrives at the explanation of who these categories may refer 
to: 
 
...It is possible for a knowledgeable one (ʿālim) from among the knowledgeable ones of 
the community of Muḥammad to be a Seal of Muḥammad’s delimited walāyah, and for a 
successor of Muḥammad’s successors to be a Seal of Muḥammad’s nondelimited 
walāyah...by what we have mentioned the confusion in their words is solved, and their 
expressions are no longer contradictory. So we say — branching from and confirming 
what we have mentioned — that the Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, is the 
Seal of the Saints with nondelimited Muḥammadan walāyah, with the first type of 
nondelimitation, which encompasses the manifestation of all of the Names and 
Attributes found in the aspects of self-disclosures, and the Seal of delimited 
Muḥammadan [walāyah] with the second meaning, which is specific walāyah. Jesus the 
son of Mary is the Seal of the Saints in the nondelimited sense according to its second 
meaning, which is general [walāyah]. The Awaited Riser al-Mahdī (may God, the Most 
High, hasten his reappearance) is the Seal of nondelimited walāyah with the first 
meaning, and the Seal of walāyah in the second meaning. The difference between him 
and his grandfather, Amīr al-Muʾminīn will be explained later. I say: From this 
explanation the intended meaning of the writer of the Futūḥāt, Muḥyī al-Dīn al-‘Arabī is 
known...706    
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The Mahdī and Imam ʿAlī share in nondelimited walāyah as they are one light that manifests 
differently in different times. “The first of us is Muḥammad, the last of us is Muḥammad, the 
middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us are Muḥammad!”707 Mīrzā Aḥmad then goes on to 
further prove his point using some of the aḥadīth that confirm that the Imams and the Prophet 
are all from one light including this ḥadīth from Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī: 
 
From what has been narrated in the chapter concerning the Imams being the light of God, 
from Abū Khālid al-Kālibī who said: I asked Abā Jaʿfar about the words of God: “Therefore 
believe in Allah and His Messenger and the Light which We have revealed…”708 He said: O 
Abū Khālid, the light, by God, is the light of the Imams from the progeny of Muḥammad 
until the day of resurrection. And they, by God, are the light of God that descended. And 
they, by God, are the light of God in the heavens and the earth. By God O Abū Khālid, the 
light of the Imam in the hearts of the believers is more illuminated then the shining sun 
in the day. They, by God illuminate the hearts of the believers, and God, the Most High, 
veils their light from whoever He wishes, so their hearts become dark. By God, O Abū 
Khālid, no servant loves us or befriends us until God purifies his heart. And God does not 
purify the heart of a servant until he submits to us and is submissive to us. And if he is 
submissive to us God makes him safe from the intense accounting and makes him safe 
from the fear of the great day of resurrection. 709 
 
                                                          
707 Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (26) 6 and 16. 
708 Qurʾān, 64:6 
709 Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, (1) 478.  
309  
But how does Mīrzā Aḥmad’s categorization render the words of Ibn ‘Arabī clear, when he 
referred to himself as the Seal of the Saints? Shaykh Fāżil Tūnī in his gloss on the Fuṣūṣ 
provides a clear, concise and simple explanation. Specific walāyah in a nondelimited sense is 
only for the Prophet and the Imams, whereas general walāyah is for the other prophets. 
General walāyah is achieved at the end of the first journey when the wayfarer reaches the 
station of annihilation.710 The Seal of specific walāyah in terms of station is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib 
and in this time it is the Mahdī; the start of general walāyah is Adam and its Seal is Jesus who 
is a manifestation of the first intellect and all of the prophets emanate from him.711 Specific 
walāyah occurs after the first journey and emanates from the degree of non-dualistic Unity.712 
From this walāyah all of the friends of God including the prophets receive a share of walāyah.713 
In a delimited sense specific walāyah belongs to the community of the Prophet,714 so the claim 
of Ibn ‘Arabī is not a claim to be of a station higher than the Imams as the peak of Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
walāyah is that of the community of the Prophet excluding the Imams, who are the inheritors 
of nondelimited specific walāyah. 
 
Qumshihī also considers the tradition of “The first of us is Muḥammad, the last of us is 
Muḥammad, the middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us are Muḥammad”,715 by using a 
philosophical example first to guide a reader with a philosophical approach to understand an 
ʿirfānī conclusion. The example he gives is that if a person intellectualises the concept of 
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amount with his abstract intellect and then imagines that same meaning with his imagination, 
the abstract understanding becomes a form. Nothing of the concept has changed but its 
manifestation in the realms of the intellect and the imagination differs according to its plane. 
He then counters his own philosophical objection in that the manifestation in both levels is 
not the same by asking the philosopher to take the meaning of the example rather than the 
specifics to understand that one archetype can have many archetypes without a change in its 
essence or its accidents. He concludes by saying that the permanent archetype of Muḥammad 
is the archetype of his successors: 
 
So the permanent archetype of Muḥammad is the permanent archetype of his 
successors...so if the walāyah is one and there is no difference in the manifestation of the 
hidden essential attributes then he was truthful when he said: “The first of us is 
Muḥammad, the last of us is Muḥammad, the middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us 
are Muḥammad”...and from here there is no difference or contradiction in our saying at 
times the Seal of the Muḥammadan walāyah is Amīr al-muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, and at 
other times saying it is the Mahdī...as both of them rather all of them [the twelve Imams] 
are one light and one reality in essence and in attributes but the difference is in tasks 
(shuʾūn) and manifestations...716 
    
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī further explains the different types of walāyah by rejecting two 
categorizations, one made by the ʿurafāʾ and another made by the philosophers in his treatise 
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Risālah fī al-khilāfah al-kubrā. He then proceeds to answer the question of how this walī should 
be known and appointed by using the concept of hidden or unmanifested Names, saying: 
 
Khilāfah cannot be split into outward vicegerency and inward vicegerency as some of the 
ʿurafāʾ have said, nor can there be many vicegerents according to the most knowledgeable 
or the most intellectual, as some of the philosophers have said; as the khalīfah is the quṭb 
and there cannot be many [in the position of the] quṭb. If this is accepted and you have 
known that then we say: Specifying that vicegerent is either done by the community 
(ummah), or by the Prophet, or by God, the Most High. The first is invalid as they [the 
community] do not have knowledge of his station, from the table he is taking from, or his 
capability, let alone their lack of knowledge of the Exclusively possessed Names (al-asmāʾ 
al-mustaʾtharah) with God. The second possibility is also invalid due to the existence of 
the Exclusively possessed Names with Him, the Most High, and the Prophet’s lack of 
knowledge of them and their rules. So the third possibility becomes specified [as the 
answer] which is that the specification of the khalīfah is from Him, the Most High. 
Therefore it is compulsory that God specifies him, and not every person is spoken to by 
God, except by revelation or from behind a veil, and that person is the Prophet. So it is 
necessary for God to reveal the affair of the khilāfah and its specification to his Prophet 
and it is necessary for the Prophet to convey that message...but there has been nobody 
specified for the khalāfah of the Muslims among the companions — as agreed by all of 
the Muslims — except ʿAlī... 
 
…Then know that in the same way that it is not up to the Prophet to judge with a rule 
except with the permission of Him, the Most High, as he is unaware of the Exclusively 
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possessed Names and their rules, in the same way it is not upon the khalīfah to judge with 
any rule except by following the Prophet, as although he takes his knowledge from the 
divine realm, he does not know the Exclusively possessed Names and these are not 
revealed to him unless he is a prophet. So he must judge following the Prophet and he 
cannot forbid what the Prophet allowed, nor can he allow what the Prophet forbade.  
Then, as you have known the khalīfah is the quṭb of his time, and the quṭb is better than 
all of the people in his time. So there is nobody in his time that is better than him. Hence 
the forbidding of al-Fārūq al-aʿẓam [i.e. ʿUmar al-Khaṭṭāb] of the two types of mutʿah, and 
the admittance of al-Ṣiddīq al-akbar [i.e. Abū Bakr] that he was not the best of the 
community whilst ʿ Alī was among them, are proofs for the invalidity of their khilāfah after 
what you have known that the specification of the khalīfah is not upon the community.”717   
 
This quintessential Shiʿi proof for the necessary existence of a specific appointment for the 
vicegerent of the Prophet — who would be the vicegerent not only in political and social 
spheres, but more importantly the inheritor of prophetic knowledge and the interpreter of the 
Qurʾān — is expressed in a new way by Qumshihī using concept of the Exclusively possessed 
Names which invokes all of the ʿirfānī principles developed in theoretical ʿirfān in support. 
The explanation of the position of the Prophet and the requirements of his vicegerent are no 
where better explained then in ʿirfān as the science is concerned with expounding the highest 
positions of the Saints. When those theoretical positions are reflected back in history and 
compared with the Islamic scriptural sources Shiʿi scholars find a strong proponent in the 
personality of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and do not find the same characteristics mentioned for those 
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who claimed the outward Caliphate. One of the most important parts of Qumshihī’s argument 
is the existence of exclusively possessed Names. The Exclusively possessed Names are Names 
of God that are only known to Him and which concern His Essence. Their existence is derived 
from expressions that stress that God cannot fully be known. Some of these Names can be 
known by the wayfarer, but there is always something that he does not know.  
 
Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī clarifies what is meant by these Names in his gloss on Miṣbāḥ al-uns. He 
narrates his teacher’s (presumably Shāhabādī) explanation saying that the manifestation of 
the worlds springs from the specified Essence and not the nondelimited Essence. That is from 
the degree of Unity not the unseen of the unseen. Hence when the term Name is used to 
describe the nondelimited Essence is not altogether accurate. Rather it is with the 
understanding that there is no specification in this level of Essence and so there are no 
Names.718 Khumaynī proceeds to criticises Fanārī’s interpretation of Qūnawī’s text in the same 
gloss where Fanārī says that the exclusively possessed Names are not manifested as opposed 
to the other Names, because their tasks are never ending and anything that is manifested has 
to have contact with that which is finite. Rather Khumaynī explains that what Qūnawī means 
is that the exclusively possessed Names do not manifest because they are unable to manifest 
as they are part of the unknown. So even if their tasks were finite they would still not manifest 
as the reason for their not manifesting is that they are part of the unknown.719 But Khumaynī 
had his own opinion on the issue as well. He believed that the exclusively possessed Names 
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are manifested in the world, but their manifestation is also unknown to any except God and 
that the side of the essence which is unknown has a manifestation which is also unknown.720  
 
Qumshihī was not satisfied with only showing how the ʿ irfānī framework supports the concept 
of walāyah in Shiʿi theology. He also tried to show that the same belief was held by Ibn ʿArabī 
thereby not only strengthening the basis of his interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s works but also 
tackling sectarian bias against theoretical ʿirfān among traditional scholars. He quotes a 
passage from the Futuḥāt:   
 
After mentioning our Prophet...“...and he [the Prophet] is the first manifest in existence and 
the closest of people to him is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib — may peace be upon him — the Imam of the 
world and the secret of all of the Prophets.”721...I say: His words here indicate that the Seal 
of nondelimited divine walāyah according to him — as it is according to us — is ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib and not Jesus for three reasons. Firstly he has made a clear statement that he 
[ʿAli] is the closest of people to him [the Prophet]...and by its [the statement’s] 
nondelimitation it covers closeness in terms of [outward] form and spiritual — that is 
hidden (ghaybī) and manifest (shahādī)...so whoever is closest to him [the Prophet] — 
that is that there is none other closer to him — [then] he is the Seal of that walāyah and 
the Seal is only one...secondly he [Ibn ʿArabī] clearly stated that he is the Imam of the 
world and Jesus — may peace be upon him — is part of the world. So he [ʿAlī] is the Imam 
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of Jesus...thirdly he clearly stated that he [ʿAlī] — may peace be upon him — is the secret 
of all of the prophets and Jesus is a prophet so he [ʿAlī] is his secret and the secret of the 
prophets is their walāyah. So he [ʿAlī] with his walāyah flowed in him [Jesus] and in the 
other prophets. So his [ʿAlī’s] walāyah is the nondelimited walāyah flowing in all of the 
delimitations and the delimitations are affairs, manifestations and takings (maʾkhūdhāt) 
from him. So he [ʿAlī] is the Seal and everyone takes from him...if you say the Shaykh [Ibn 
ʿArabī] has clearly stated in other places that Jesus is the Seal of the friends of God, I say: 
He meant by that the Seal of general walāyah...722  
 
In this passage Qumshihī shows how his grasp of the works and ideas of Ibn ʿArabī lead him 
to his own conclusion on what Ibn ʿArabī really means for each level of the Seal of the Saints. 
The coherency of his arguments provides an alternative explanation to a critical issue in the 
thought of the Shaykh al-akbar, even though Chittick finds his interpretation streatched.723 
Some ḥukamāʾ attempted to claim that Ibn ʿArabī was indeed Shiʿi as the whole issue of 
walāyah takwīnīyah is at odds with the outward system of the khalifat.724 
 
6. What is known of God is Known is Through the Seal of the Saints 
 
The previous chapter discussed the extent of the knowledge of God that was possible for man 
according to ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī in his Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya. He concluded that while God cannot 
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be known in Himself by either knowledge by acquisition or by presence, what can be known 
of God is in proportion to His effusion. Qumshihī brings this discussion back to the issue of 
walāyah and shows that all that is known of God is what is known through the nondelimited 
Seal: 
 
When he [Qayṣarī] mentioned that this knowledge [of God] is for none other except both 
of them [Muḥammad and ʿAlī] and he mentioned that the servant sees the Truth in the 
mirror of himself, rather he sees his form in the mirror of the Truth, he wanted to mention 
that this vision is from their niche. Rather from the niche of the Seal of the Saints. That is 
from what you have understood that everyone that sees the Truth sees Him in the form 
of his archetype. So the prophets see Him in the form of their permanent archetypes and 
their permanent archetypes are from the affairs of the Muḥammadan permanent 
archetype…so they see the Truth from the niche of his [Muḥammad’s] prophethood and 
messengership…and in the same way every friend of God…sees Him through the niche of 
the Seal of the Saints. Then the messengers do not see the Truth from the perspective that 
they are messengers, rather they see Him from the perspective of being friends of God. So 
they see Him from the niche of the Seal of the Saints.725    
 
All that can be known is the Muḥammadan reality as that comprises the whole effusion. 
Therefore anything that is known of God is known through the Seal of the Saints who is a full 
manifestation of that reality. Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī explains the same issue from the 
perspective of the Names in his gloss on the Fuṣūṣ.  
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The difference between the friends of God in this station and in the other stations is 
according to the difference in the Names that self-manifest upon them. So the 
nondelimited walī is the one who manifested from the Essential presence according to 
the all-comprising station and the Greatest All-Encompassing Name which is the Lord of 
the Names and archetypes…the rest of the friends of God are manifestations of his 
walāyah and the locus of his self-disclosures…so in the same way that there is no self-
disclosure…except the self-disclosure by the Greatest Name…there is no prophethood, 
walāyah or Imamate except by his prophethood, walāyah and Imamate.726  
 
Since the Seal of the Saints experiences the self-disclosures of the Greatest All-Encompassing 
Name it is through him that the rest of the friends of God experience their self-disclosures. 
That is that the self-disclosures of the friends of God other than the Seal of the Saints are not 
direct. They experience self-disclosures through him in the same way that their very existence 
is by God acting through his reality. 
 
7. The Perfect Human and the Truth 
 
JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄examines the relationship between Imam ʿAlƮ ̄and the Truth. Expressing God 
through His Name, the Truth, is common practice in ʿirfānī literature, and this is the first 
meaning that JavādƮ ̄A৴ mulƮ ̄assigns to Truth out of the various other meanings that the word 
                                                          
726 Rūḥ-Allāh KhumaynƮ,̄ Taʿlīqāt ʿalā Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-uns, ed. Ḥasan Raḥīmīyān (Qum: 
Pāsdār-i Islām, 1410/1990) 40-41. 
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can have. That is Truth which is “the absolutely undifferentiated essence of existence.”727 The 
second interpretation of Truth is that which comes from God; the effusion of existence; or in 
other words the Muḥammadan Reality: 
 
The truth in this second sense is either the First Effusion or its consequent qualities 
and properties. Now this First Effusion is God’s viceroy, the perfect human being, the 
“noble microcosm.” the “universal being;” as he is the embodiment of God’s Name and 
its Logos...Within the matrix of human society such a knowing and willing subject 
functions as a paragon and standard-bearer...so as to distinguish the extent of truth or 
the level of falsehood of his [the one who is comparing himself to the perfect human] 
personal beliefs, conduct and deeds.728 
 
Although the Truth has a metaphysical and ontological reality in the perfect human, it also 
has a practical role in developing and perfecting society. Those who seek perfection use the 
perfect human as their benchmark and accordingly adjust their view and practices to become 
more like the perfect human. “Certainly you have in the Messenger of Allah an excellent 
exemplar for him who hopes in Allah and the latter day and remembers Allah much.”729 The 
perfect human is therefore the Truth by which falsehood is tested and eradicated. JavādƮ ̄
A৴ mulƮ ̄continues to remark that the Truth is inseparable from the perfect human as it is part 
of his existential reality and indeed this is the concept of the creation by the Truth: 
 
                                                          
727 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 87. 
728 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 87-89. 
729 Qurʾān, 33:21 
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This means that the Truth in the second sense, which constitutes the realm of 
plurality, revolves around the perfect. infallible human being. He is neither prior or 
subsequent to the truth; he, rather, concurs with it...In this light we may assert that the 
concurrence between the truth and the perfect human being is due exclusively to the 
latter’s existential identity, not to any third entity...It is in this way that we may 
interpret the already quoted phrase from the Prophet: “ʿAlƮ ̄is with the truth, and the 
truth is with ʿAlƮ.̄” Truth (in the second sense) centers round ʿAlƮ:̄ In the realm of divine 
actions and manifestations, he embodies truth, functioning as a locus wherein true 
knowledge and virtue are displayed...[in another tradition the Prophet prays for ʿAlƮ ̄
saying] “O God, center the truth on him in whatever position he may take.” The 
Prophet in effect is asking to place ʿAlƮ ̄as the fulcrum of truth, to make his opinions 
and conduct expressions of the truth, thus interminable connecting the two. This 
indicates ʿAlƮ ̄is the criterion, not some other reality that would require him to abide 
by it.730 
 
The usefulness of theoretical ʿirfān and the concept of walāyah to elucidate the position of 
Imam ʿAlƮ ̄are clear from the discussion above. From a theological perspective Shiʿi scholars 
might prove the rightfulness of ʿAlƮ ̄as the successor of the Prophet on a textual or historical 
basis. But the rational and experiential underpinnings of philosophy and ʿirfān significantly 
strengthen those earlier theological efforts and provide a deeper insight into some of the 
traditions which were perhaps left unexplained previously. Rather not only do implications of 
the traditions affect the theoretical basis of ʿirfān, they also affect the method of wayfaring, 
                                                          
730 JavādƮ ̄AmulƮ,̄ Life of Gnosis, 89-90. 
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and here is where Shiʿi ʿirfān practically takes a more defined place in the background of 
Sufism as a whole. It is then through attaining certitude found in experiencing the levels of 
tawḥīd and walāyah that ʿ irfān becomes the axis of religion by taking the wayfarer through the 
levels of certain knowledge (ʿilm al-yaqīn) certain witnessing (ʿayn al-yaqīn) and experiencing 
the reality with certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn).  
 
At the same time, the philosophical approach to understanding walāyah is an important part 
of the ḥikmat tradition. ‘Allāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄in his treatise concerning divine philosophy and 
the personality of ʿAlƮ ̄b. AbƮ ̄Ṭālib, recognizes the first Shiʿi Imam as the best example of the 
practical realization of the highest goals that philosophy seeks to achieve:  
 
Surely our aim in pointing to some of his [Imam ʿAlƮ’̄s] traits, and some of the matters of 
his life is to draw the attention of the researcher to carry out a psychological and ethical 
research into all of his character traits. Then compare on [trait] to another and compare 
them to find out whether he was given true perfection in the bodily and spiritual faculties. 
As he also accorded valuable perfection to comprehend the realities and attain the 
knowledges, for himself...This in reality the goal that philosophy is conditioned with, 
especially divine philosophy (al-falsafah al-ilāhƬȳah)...731 
 
 
 
                                                          
731 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, al-Insān wa al-ʿaqƬd̄a, eds. Ṣubāḥ al-Rubayʿī and ʿAlī al-Asadī (Qum: Maktabat 
Fadak li-iḥyāʾ al-turāth, 2007) 294. 
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8. The Outward and the Inward 
 
ʿAllāmah ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄ in his Risālat al-walāya applies primarily a philosophical approach to 
explaining the journey of the human to annihilation in God. He starts by discussing the 
conceptual (iʿtibārƬ)̄ in relation to reality, and how in the same way that the conceptual has 
rules and ways, so does reality.732 In this work what ʿAllāmah means by conceptual are 
concepts that are extracted from reality, such as ownership and marriage, which are called the 
secondary intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah).733 Although these constructs have no 
reality in themselves, they have effects which are real. This is similar to wujūd and quiddity 
where wujūd is the only real phenomenon and quiddity is conceptual.   
 
ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄then relates the conceptual and the reality to the outward (ẓāhir) and the inward 
(bātịn).734 While the divine law elucidates the way the human should live his conceptual life, 
the stipulations it makes are based on the reality. That is that the outward and the inward are 
harmoniously related. This is in accordance with ʿirfānī literature which traces the path 
towards the inner realms, starting with the divine law then moving on the path (tạrƬq̄ah) until 
                                                          
732 See Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Return to Being: A Translation of Riṣālat al-Walāyah, trs. F.A. Amjad 
and M.D. Bozorgi (London: ICAS Press, 2009) 3-6. For an alternative translation of the text see, Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Vicegerency, Risālah al-Wilāyah: A Treatise on Islamic Mysticism and Spiritual Wayfaring, tr. 
Z. Al-Salami (Qum: IslamIFC, 2009). 
733 All of the concepts that we have about the world are al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah as by definition they are 
concepts about the world and not the world itself. These constructs allow us to analyze the world and live an 
ordered life. There are two types of al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah; those related to philosophy and those related to 
logic. 
734 ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ The Return to Being, 6. 
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one reaches the reality.735 It is also part of the concept of gradation. The divine law can never 
be bypassed, as it is by virtue of it that one finds its reality. But the conceptual is only required 
for the material realm, as the worlds to come are worlds closer to reality, where the conceptual 
has no role to play. The friends of God practice the divine law due to the fact that it is the truth 
that is the full manifestation of the Muḥammadan unveiling and out of thankfulness. As 
ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄clarifies this issue one of his speeches, where he discusses the importance of the 
performance of the divine law even when one has reached the experience of the reality: 
 
It has been heard from some people who say that after the wayfarer reaches advanced 
stations and enjoys Lordly effusions and blessings, he is free from all obligations [to 
observe the divine law]. This is a prevarication and a false assertion. For even the 
Prophet, who was the most perfect and noblest of all creation observed all sacred 
precepts [of the divine law] until the last moments of his life. Therefore, exemption 
from religious obligations in this sense is false and an inaccurate assertion. But one 
can interpret this statement in a different manner, which those who make such an 
assertion do not understand. That is, performing rites and rituals of worship is a means 
for the human soul to grow to perfection. The human’s faculties and capabilities are 
transformed from potentiality to actuality through his commitment to prayers and 
observation of rites of worship. Therefore, for those who have not yet actualized all 
their potentials in every respect, rites and prayers are necessary in their quest for 
perfection. But for those who have already achieved complete actualization of all their 
potentials, performance of rites for the sake of perfection and proximity [to God] is no 
                                                          
735 See for example, Ḥaydar Āmulī, Asrār al-sharīʿa wa aṭwār al-ṭarīqa wa anwār al-ḥaqīqa. 
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longer relevant. Rather, for this group of people, observing the SharƮ ̄ʿ ah and 
performing the rites are required precisely because of the very station they have 
attained. Hence, when A৴ ʿishah asked the Blessed Messenger [Peace be upon him] why 
he bothered to pray so much when God had declared to him: 
. . . that God may forgive thee of thy sins that which is past and that which is to come 
(48:2), 
the Prophet (Peace be upon him) replied, “Do you want me not to be a grateful servant 
for God?’’ This statement makes it abundantly clear that performance of the rites of 
worship for some human souls is not for attaining spiritual perfection, but is purely for 
the sake of expressing gratitude and appreciation to Almighty God.736 
The people that witness reality are those that have full intellection and understanding of the 
divine law as the divine law is a manifestation of that reality. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī quotes 
various traditions from the Imams that show that the reality of religion is not only deep, but 
difficult or even impossible for most to bear.737 As for other than the Infallibles, ʿAllāmah 
believes that those that struggle can reach the highest levels of proximity to God and witness 
the some of the deep secrets of existence.738 That is for ʿAllāmah it is possible for people to 
enter in to the system of walāyah that exists in the extramental (i.e. existential walāyah), as 
they purify and improve themselves.  
                                                          
736 Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel, 37-38. 
737 ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄The Return to Being, 8-13. For example, see a tradition narrated from the Prophet: We the prophets 
speak to people according to the level of their intellects, see Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 51; and narrated from Imam al-
Ṣādiq: Surely our discourse is difficult and is considered difficult, it is not borne except by a close angel or a prophet 
who has been sent or a believing servant whose heart Allah has tested for faith, see Kulāynī al-Kāfī, (2) 333. 
738 ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄The Return to Being, 29-32. 
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Reaching the position of the Prophet or the Imams is a different issue, and considered 
impossible by Shiʿi scholars. Therefore, there are different levels of perfection and what 
ʿAllāmah is alluding to is the possibility for all those who strive to reach a level of perfection. 
These stations are impossible to fully apprehend,739 and even those that are recorded by some 
who have defined certain stations in the stations (manāzil) literature in ʿirfān, do not claim to 
have charted every station. Rather what they have recorded are some common stations, or 
indeed the stations that that particular ʿārif passed through. Annihilation and subsistence are 
sometimes regarded as the final or highest stages, but a ʿārif lives a life after subsistence and 
continues his never ending journey, and there is no end to God’s Grace or indeed His self-
disclosures. 
 
It is the poverty of the contingent existent and the Absolute needlessness of the only true 
Existent that is the door through which religion enters into metaphysics. With the idea of 
existential poverty (al-faqr al-wujūdƬ)̄, the human is no longer the independent existent which 
detaches him from a relationship with God. Rather he is in complete need of God’s existence 
and guidance and only through His servitude can he attain salvation from his lower self. As 
although God created every human with the potential to reach a level of perfection, that 
potential remains dormant unless it is acted upon and activated. This is the place for divine 
legislation, making clear to the servant how to move on the path of his own perfection. For 
this reason, following the divine law is an essential part of ʿirfān, as without it one is not 
treading the path God has ordained and so cannot reach the desired goal.  
                                                          
739 ṬabātạbāʾƮ ̄The Return to Being, 84-85. 
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In fact, what is more accurate is that following the divine law in its spirit and with attention 
to its purpose rather than dogmatically is an essential part of ʿirfān. Since not every human is 
able to reach these understandings by themselves, it is God’s Mercy that He sends those that 
have reached perfection, charged with guiding others and that He gives them proof of the 
authenticity of their claim of being sent by Him. The cornerstone of al-faqr al-wujūdƬ ̄found in 
both ḥikmat and ʿirfān has key implications for theology and the philosophy of religion. 
Without al-faqr al-wujūdi Existence or Being remains detached from human existence where 
Being exists and the human exists too, both in their own unrelated spheres. 
 
9. The Perfect Woman 
 
Much of the discussion concerning walāyah is concerned with deciphering the reality of the 
prophets and the Imams who were all male. Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ deals with different prophets 
and the treatises on walāyah mostly build from the conclusions in theoretical ʿirfān that 
implicitly discuss the role of the male friends of God. But while it is clear that there were many 
outstanding female personalities in the history of Islam that occupied stations in the system 
of walāyah,740 the question is that it possible for a woman to reach the station of the perfect 
human? Is a woman able to be the Seal of the nondelimited Saints? Ibn ‘Arabī did not write a 
section in his Fuṣūṣ on any woman despite the example of Mary and the wife of Pharaoh in 
the Qurʾān.741 Shiʿi theology offers an answer to the question of the perfect woman while the 
                                                          
740 See S. Shaikh, Sufi Narratives of Intimacy: Ibn ʿ Arabī, Gender and Sexuality (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2012) where she attempts to reconstruct the role of women’s narratives in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings.  
741 Qurʾān 66:11-12. 
326  
same scriptural basis is somewhat lacking in other sects, as within the fourteen infallibles, 
which includes the Prophet and the twelve Imams, one infallible is a woman.742 If the Prophet 
and the twelve Imams are all Seals of nondelimited Sainthood then what is the position of 
Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet?  
 
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī attempts to address the issue in a treaties upon which he himself wrote a 
commentary called Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, which is intended to be an 
appendix to the Fuṣūṣ. However, his explanation of the topic is philosophical and while he 
offers an ʿirfānī commentary on some aḥādīth and stresses the importance of knowing her 
station by unveiling, the ringstone leaves many questions unanswered and especially that of 
the Seal of nondelimited Sainthood. At the same time, he discusses her stations with reference 
to her being one of the five people of the cloak743 and in the wider context of the infallibles and 
so implies her inclusion in their stations of the Seals. Whilst acknowledging Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
blamelessness for not adding a section in a book that he was given in a dream, Ḥasanzāda 
                                                          
742 One of the most important verses used to prove the infallibility of Fāṭimah is Qurʾān 33:33: “…Allah only desires 
to keep away the uncleanness from you, O people of the House! and to purify you a (thorough) purifying.” Here 
thorough purification is interpreted as infallibility and there are traditions from narraters accepted by both Sunnī 
and Shīʿī scholars of ḥadīth that state that the intended people of this verse are Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan 
and Ḥusayn, see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān, (16) 516-517. For a discussion on whether the wives of the Prophet 
are also included in this infallibility see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān, (16) 517-518. 
743 Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn are referred to as the people of the cloak (Ahl al-Kisāʾ) due to a 
number of traditions where the Prophet would wrap them and himself in one cloak and state that these were the 
people of his house (Ahl al-Bayt). This is taken by Shīʿī scholars as an indication of the exclusivity of that term. 
For an example of a tradition like this see Furāt b. Ibrāhīm Kūfī, Tafsīr Furāt al-Kūfī, edited by Muḥammad Kāẓim 
(Tehran: Muʾassasa al-ṭabʿ wa al-nashr fi wizārat al-irshād al-islāmī, 1410/1990) 336: …He [the Prophet] took the 
cloak from under us and spread it [over the people of the cloak] then gathered it in his hand and said: “O my God 
these are the people of my house, remove from them all impurity and purify them with a thorough purification!..”  
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argues that there was a gap that needed to be addressed.744 Women are not given the 
responsibility of the station of prophethood.  
 
The traditional explanation for this is that although man and women are created equal in the 
eyes of God, they are also created with different natures and consequently different roles. This 
is a natural part of the system of creation where everything is created in pairs and with the 
coming together of those pairs, new creation is born. Both sides of that pair have their own 
specifications and that is beautiful in creation. The woman is the natural pair of the man and 
she is like the pure and good tree which bears the fruit of creation. That is that the perfect 
human, who fulfils the purpose of knowing God, is created within the woman.745  
 
Ḥasanzāda explains that if a man is the perfect human then he is a manifestation of the 
universal intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī) and if she is a woman she is a manifestation of the universal 
soul (al-nafs al-kullī).746 Ontologically the universal intellect is precedent over the universal 
soul, and the same station is given to man in the scriptural sources.747 Both of these stations 
are never-ending oceans and the prioritisation of one over the other does not concern most of 
creation, as nobody can fully manifest either of these two realities with the full manifestation 
that were ʿAlī and Fāṭimah; ʿAlī as the same soul as the Prophet and Fāṭimah as the only 
woman in the event of mubāhalah, indicating her superiority over all of the women in the 
                                                          
744 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya (Tehran: Intishārāt-i nasr-i tūbā, 1379 
Sh/2000) 8-10. 
745 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, 91. 
746 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, 119. 
747 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, 124-125. 
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community of the Prophet.748 So as every man moves towards the universal intellect, every 
woman moves towards manifesting the universal soul, each to the extent of their capacity as 
dictated by their permanent archetype. However, all must respect the womb (raḥim) of the 
woman, as it is derived from the Name the Beneficent (al-Raḥmān), and due to its role in the 
story of creation as explained above.749 Regarding the more specific issue of the derivation of 
Fāṭimah’s name, in a tradition it is reported:  
 
This is Fāṭimah and I am the Maker (Fāṭir) of the heavens and the earth, and the Detacher 
(Fāṭim) of My enemies from My Mercy on My Judgement Day. I am the detacher of My 
saints from that which disgraces and shames them. Therefore I derived for her one of My 
Names.” The Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.) said: “O Fāṭimah! Allah has derived a name for 
you from one of his own. He is the Maker (Fāṭir) and you are Fāṭimah.750 
 
Fāṭimah was a name that existed among the Arabs before the event of Islam. Therefore this 
tradition is specific for Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet who represented the reality of 
this Name. The relation of God’s Name the Maker with Fāṭimah is explained by the 
relationship between the body and the extramental, or in other words, the relationship 
between the microcosm and the macrocosm. In the same way as the women’s body produces 
                                                          
748 See Qurʾān 3:61. 
749 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, 131. 
750 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, The Bezel of the Wisdom of Infallibility in the Word of Fatimah, tr. Z. Al-Salami, (Qum: 
Salman Azadeh Publications, 2007) 29. I could not find this exact version of the ḥadīth with the saying of the 
Prophet at the end, but the first part of the ḥadīth has many instances such as: ʿAlī Astarabādī, Taʾwīl al-āyāt al-
ẓāhira fī faḍāʾil al-ʿitra al-ṭāhira, ed. Ḥusayn Ustādvalī (Qum: Muʾassasat al-nashr al-islāmī, 1409/1988) 38; Sayyid 
Hāshim b. Sulaymān Baḥrānī, al-Burhān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān, 5 vols (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi biʿtha, 1995) (1) 196.  
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the fruit of a child, so too do the universal intellect and the universal soul produce the world. 
The marriage of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah is one of the perfect man to the perfect woman, and were it 
not for ʿAlī there would have been no suitable match for Fāṭimah as the sixth Imam al-Ṣādiq 
is reported to have said: “Had not Allah created the Commander of the Faithful for Fāṭimah, there 
would not have been an equal for her on the face of the earth.”751 
 
Ḥasanzāda’s student ʿĀdil ʿAlawī is more direct in proving Faṭimah’s position as a Seal of 
nondelimited Sainthood and the reality of wujūd. In one of his transcribed lectures he shows 
that Fāṭimah is the reason for existence in the same way that the Prophet and ʿAlī are the 
reasons for existence.752 That is that the Fāṭimah is also a perfect knower of God. He proves his 
point by referring to a number of aḥadīth including “…and was it not for Fāṭimah I would not 
have created either of you [Muḥammad andʿAlī]”753 and “We are the proofs of God upon His 
creation and Fāṭimah is a proof upon us.”754 Rather he goes further using this ḥadīth to say that 
if the Seal of nondelimited walāyah is the secret of existence and the Quṭb then Fāṭimah is the 
secret of the secret of existence as her station is unknown.755  
 
 
                                                          
751 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1), 486. 
752 ʿA. al-Fatlāwī, al-Nūrān al-Zahrāʾ wa-l-Ḥawrāʾ: min muḥāḍarāt al-ustādh al-Sayyid ʿĀdil al-ʿAlawī (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-aʿlamī, 2009) 34. 
753 Fatlāwī, al-Nūrān al-Zahrāʾ wa-l-Ḥawrāʾ, 34. For the ḥadīth see ʿAbd Allāh Baḥrānī Iṣfahānī, ʿAwālim al-ʿulūm 
wa-l-maʿārif wa-l-aḥwāl min al-āyāt w-l-akhbār wa-l-aqwāl, 11 vols (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi Imām-i Mahdī, 1413/1993) 
(11/1) 44. 
754 Baḥrānī Isfahanī, ʿAwālim al-ʿulūm, (11/1) 7. 
755 Fatlāwī, al-Nūrān al-Zahrāʾ wa-l-Ḥawrāʾ, 39. 
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10. The Human Soul in Transcendental Philosophy  
 
The knowledge of the soul is the fruit of philosophical discussions due to its connection with 
the practical wayfaring of the human to his ultimate goal; knowing God through knowing 
himself. This is because the soul has an outward and inner aspect, related to the indescribable 
and similar aspects of the knowledge of God. It is this dichotomy found in the soul and in what 
man can know about God that makes the soul man’s best tool in knowing God.756 The 
metaphysical perfection of the soul reminds the philosopher that the corporeal world is not 
the only world and the perfect happiness that the human should strive for is not to be found 
in it. Rather the human should strive for the perfection of his soul in order to achieve ultimate 
pleasure, while the body will at some point deteriorate and disappear. The soul lasts forever, 
and here there is a link between the topic of the soul and resurrection, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. Ḥasanzāda summarizes the importance of knowledge of the soul 
and its link with the next world in the following way: 
 
It is not unknown to one who does not forget or neglect his soul, that the best 
knowledge is mans knowledge of his own self. Its knowledge is one of the ways — 
rather all of the ways — of establishing the Necessary Being by His Essence. It is the 
door to the unseen that opens for us the knowledge of the rational soul (al-nafs al-
                                                          
756 See SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄(5), 13, nt. 1. There are many traditions 
concerning the knowledge of God lying between the two extremes of complete detachment and complete 
connection. On the same page Ḥasanzāda provides one for Imām al-Ṣādiq which says: “Connection without 
detachment is unbelief and detachment without connection is the inability to grasp; the way between them is 
tawḥƬd̄.” 
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nātịqa), and the establishment of the resurrection that leads to the attainment of the 
eternal happiness that is linked to its establishment. And [the door to establishing] 
that it [i.e. the soul] is neither a body, a substance, nor a constitution (mizāj), rather it 
is an independent genus, away from the senses, imaginations and unmixed with 
material. It is spiritual in fabric and conduct, [completely] withdrawn from bodies. It 
is separate in essence in subsistence and intellect, and does not degenerate with the 
degeneration of the mineral body. In fact it does not die, but lasts forever. And [the 
door to establishing] that the knowledge and action of man are two independent 
genuses, which are existentially unified — which is that man is nothing more than his 
knowledge and action — and that his knowledge forms his spirit (rūḥ), while his 
action forms his otherworldly body (badan ukhrawƬ)̄. His recompense [in the other 
world] is according to his knowledge and action, rather his knowledge and action are 
the recompense itself. And [the door to establishing] that knowing (maʿrifah) is the 
door to witnessing (mushāhadah)...757 
 
The link between ḥikmat and Islamic beliefs is clear from this paragraph.758 The knowledge of 
the soul establishes the Necessary Being and from that branches His qualities of simplicity and 
perfection that in turn establish His Unity. Discussing the perfections of the soul, in terms of 
knowledge and action, coupled with the knowledge that there must be practical examples of 
the attainment of such traits leads to the establishment of the prophethood. The everlasting 
nature of the soul, leads to the conclusion that it must abide after the disintegration of the 
                                                          
757 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ 114, nt 1. 
758 Ḥasanzāda champions this view, see Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ Qurʾān va ʿirfān va burhān ham judāyī nadārand 
(Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim, 1374 Sh/1995) 55-65. 
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body and that the actions it commits in this world must have an effect on it, in the same way 
that actions that are related to the body, affect the body, leading to the establishment of 
resurrection. The independent nature of the soul also sheds light on the possibilities for 
human perfection in this world, and a door into the world of ʿirfān. So the discussion of the 
soul is of key importance to Islamic philosophers as it provides an independent rational basis 
that can be used as a framework to discuss the realities of Islam. It is for this reason that the 
topic of the soul is the fruit of philosophy leading to the knowledge of God Himself.759 
 
The existence of the soul is proved by knowledge by presence where an essence is known by 
its own essence (ʿilm al-dhāt bi al-dhāt) and where the knowledge is the same as the known.760 
That is that our knowledge of our soul is our soul. Such knowledge does not require proof as 
any intellectual exercise would change the type of knowledge of the self to one where the 
knower and the known are different. This is because theorizing and proving the existence of 
the soul involves creating mental pictures and content of these pictures are different to the 
pure experience of the soul.761 Rather all that is required is an indication (tanbīh) so that one 
can return to his own reality and witness the truth of the claim himself. This is similar to the 
self evident nature of wujūd. The human contains the capabilities of those creations below 
him, and this is expressed as him containing the souls of those things. Therefore man is said 
to contain the mineral soul (al-nafs al-jamādīya), the plant soul (al-nafs al-nabātīya) and the 
animal soul (al-nafs al-haywānīya) but is specialized in having a rational soul. 
 
                                                          
759 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5), 114, nt. 1. 
760 Naṣrī, Safar-i nafs, 19.  
761 Naṣrī, Safar-i nafs, 20. 
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The human soul can be explained as the soul that contains a rational soul as well as containing 
the mineral, plant and animal souls, and it is by the rational soul that man knows God. Or the 
human soul can be expressed as the rational soul without attention to other levels of the soul 
as in reality man only has one soul, and its animal, plant or mineral aspects are modes within 
that higher soul. This second expression of the levels of the soul is like a fire, which increases 
in its heat and light. As it rises in degrees, each new level contains all the light and heat of the 
previous levels while at the same time adding new heat and light.762 In the same way the 
beginning of the fire of the soul is the mineral soul. Then the plant soul contains all of the 
perfections of the mineral soul, and adds further abilities. All of what the plant soul contains 
is present in the animal soul, which also adds further abilities from those present in the plant 
soul, and the same is the case for the rational soul and for its own levels through which human 
is able to rise.  
 
Therefore, there is one soul which is every faculty of man from the senses to the intellect, and 
that is why man refers to any action that comes from him or thought that is within him to one 
entity, not multiple entities. The nature of this unity of the soul has been disputed. While some 
classify the soul with numerical oneness, there are similarities between the above theory and 
gradation. SabzavārƮ ̄says that the soul has a simple unity which is the shade of the unity of the 
Necessary Being (al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah).763 This idea offers a correspondence with 
the explanation of the ʿurafāʾ where the perfect human is the complete manifestation of every 
Attribute of God. Al-Waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah is the reason as to why man can understand 
tawḥƬd̄ by knowing his own soul. Yet the unity that is envisaged in this concept is reliant on 
                                                          
762 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 118. 
763 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 121. 
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the reading of wujūd. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī explains this waḥdah further in his gloss on the 
Asfār: 
 
This is an indication to the unity of the soul that is the same as its existence, which 
is another type of unity. It [that unity] is the complete collection of all of the planes 
of existence in terms of multiplicity in unity on the one hand, and unity in 
multiplicity on the other hand. As it [the soul] has a comprehensive unity in terms 
of the original essence…and a differentiated existence in terms of the branches of its 
origin and those aspects which follows its essence; which are the same as it [the soul] 
in terms of its flow (sarayān) and decent (nuzūl)...so it is low in its highness, and high 
in its lowness; holy in its abasement, abased in its holiness; abstract with its 
attachments, attached with its abstraction; internal with its branches, which are the 
levels of its actions and the watering places of its light. Not like the entering of a thing 
into a thing. External from them, not like the separation of a thing from a thing, 
whoever knows himself knows his lord!764   
 
The discussion concerning the soul is a discussion that concerns the reality of man. According 
to the concept of motion in the category of substance the soul is corporeal in its beginning 
(jismānƬȳah al-ḥudūth) and spiritual in its subsistence (rūḥānīyah al-baqāʾ), even though its 
origin (manshaʾ) is outside of time (qadƬm̄). Therefore, the corporeal beginning discussed here 
is not the origin of the soul, but its beginning in this world, which is signified by its attachment 
to a body. That is that the soul had a spiritual existence before this world. But upon entering 
                                                          
764 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 5-6 nt. 2. 
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the world it became one with its body, which is the material extension of the soul. Like a 
catalyst which interacts with a gas under certain conditions and solidifies, then with other 
conditions the solid becomes a completely different type of gas due to its interaction with the 
catalyst. For Sadrian philosophers the soul and body are not two things attached to each other; 
rather the body is a level of the soul. Therefore it is not the case that the soul is perfect and 
simply hindered from manifesting that perfection though and inconvenient connection with 
the body as a Peripatetic may argue. Rather the body is the vessel by which the raw soul can 
perfect and refine itself, through following the realities of religion, until it becomes separated 
from the body again to continue its journey.  
 
The human is also capable of developing a rotten soul if his actions while connected to the 
body chase the material and he becomes forgetful of the Real. The human’s comprehension 
cannot remain on the level of the corporeal, rather he has to work up the ladder of his own 
soul, whilst living in a suitable world that will enable him to act and be tested. He therefore 
must live in a world blind from the direct witnessing of realities, which is the material world. 
Then as he improves he moves in his cognizance of the other worlds which are perceived by 
the faculties of the soul. His ability to deal with the affairs of the corporeal world justly and 
effectively is another aspect of his perfection as this is not possible for any other of God’s 
creations.  
 
This idea seems to go against the ideas of previous Islamic philosophers who viewed the soul 
as spiritual both in its beginning and in its end, with the body as a cage that holds it to the 
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world for a short period of time.765 If the soul is spiritual in its beginning it would be accidental 
to the body, as it would be fully formed before the existence of the body and then attached to 
it. This conception intuitively goes against the oneness that is perceived in the human.766 The 
soul is perceived as individual from the body, but according to the philosophers of 
transcendental philosophy, this abstraction is the abstraction of the intellect, which is only 
one of the faculties of the soul and should not be mistaken for the soul in its entirety.767 It is 
also the intellect that is eternal (qadƬm̄), as opposed to the soul in its entirety which is material 
in its beginning.768 With this distinction the two opposing views on the relation of the soul to 
the body come together as the soul is in fact eternal and abstract in its reality —on the level 
of the intellect — whereas when it is considered with the body in this world it has a material 
beginning. 
 
By applying the concepts of al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah and motion in the category of 
substance, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī solves the contention of some previous philosophers, 
including Ibn Sīnā, who claim that it is impossible for the soul to become one (muttaḥid) with 
the active intellect. The reason given by those philosophers for this impossibility is due to the 
simplicity of the active intellect and the composition of the soul. Therefore if they became one 
then either the active intellect would become composite, or the soul would become simple, 
                                                          
765 For Ibn Sīnā see L. X. López-Farjeat, “Body, Soul and Sense in Nature”, in R. C. Taylor and L. X. López-Farjeat 
(eds.) The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2015) 172-173. The 
others also cited the metaphor of the cage such as Suhrawardī and Ibn ʿArabī, see S. H. Rizvi, “Theologia 
Aristotelis”, in I. R. Netton (ed.) Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilisation and Religion (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008) 653. 
766 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 117, nt. 5. 
767 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 120. 
768 SabzavārƮ,̄ Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 187. 
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and both of those conclusions are unacceptable to those philosophers. For Sadrian 
philosophers this problem can be solved as the soul can be simple. ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī explains 
that in reality motion in the category of substance is a movement of love towards perfection 
as each effect moves towards its cause.769 The Essence of God is the final goal for motion in the 
category of substance 770 and each existent no matter which level it is on moves up the ladder 
of existence to finally reach the never ending Essence. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī takes another 
approach to solving Ibn Sīnā’s conundrum: 
 
The contention of the Shaykh [Ibn Sīnā] (may God have Mercy on him) is not valid 
for a variety of reasons [including] his heedlessness of the secret of nondelimited 
unity (vaḥdat-i iṭlāqī), and confusing this kind of unity with numerical unity; as well 
as his rejection of essential transformation (taḥvīl-i dhātī)…as we explained before 
the soul in its primary manifestation is the same as material and body. After 
transformations he reaches the spiritual position and his body is revolutionized due 
to the intellectual forms and pure meanings. Any form that comes to the soul enters 
its existence and the external existence and the soul become one. The soul by 
attaining abstraction is able to act in the worlds of isthmus and the intellect. Due to 
these factors, the soul while in the station of intellection of meanings and forms 
becomes the same as them.771    
 
                                                          
769 Zunūzī, Anvār-i jalīya, 220-222. 
770 Zunūzī, Anvār-i jalīya, 222. 
771 See Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, Sharḥ-i ḥāl va ārā-yi falsafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 
174. 
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the rational soul is its abstraction (tajarrud) and Sadrian 
philosophers have focused their attention on proving it. Linked to this issue are the issues of 
the abstraction of the imaginative faculty and the abstraction of the intellect. Ḥasanzāda has 
devoted a work to proving these three issues called al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha ‘alā tajarrud al-nafs al-
nātq̣a and within it he seeks to prove that the abstraction of the rational soul is a higher level 
than the abstraction of the intellect. But the soul is unified as explained above by al-waḥdah 
al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah, meaning that the rational soul, intellect and imagination are all levels of 
the same reality.772 Abstraction in this discussion means being separate and unmixed with 
matter or bodies, which means that it does not deteriorate with the deterioration of the body. 
Rather the soul continues to live beyond the physical death of the human.  
 
The issue of abstraction is therefore key to the issue of resurrection, which is a fundamental 
tenet of Islam. There seems to be a contradiction between the vision of the soul as a unified 
reality, and the claim that the soul is abstract from the body. But the soul can be viewed in 
different ways. Sometimes it can be examined with its relation to the body, and at other times 
it can be examined in itself without relation to the body. The body is the lowest level of the 
soul, however, the soul is much more intricate than this level and contains levels that are not 
comprehendible. Therefore when examining the abstraction of the soul, the discussion 
concerns the essence of the soul and the levels above the physical body, such as the 
imagination, the intellect and the rational soul. 
 
                                                          
772 See Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha ʿalā tajarrud al-nafs al-nātq̣a (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 
Sh/2008) 11. 
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But as Ḥasanzāda explains, the intellectual soul has levels above abstraction, and the more 
one delves into the soul, deeper are the pearls that one finds.773 Since the soul has no defined 
boundaries or limitations, its rules are also undefined and limitless. The soul is the shade of 
the unity of the Truth in al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah, and since the Truth has not limit, 
neither does its shade have any perceivable limit. The human is always the servant of the 
Truth, but is also His vicegerent. A ḥadƬt̄h of the Prophet indicates towards this expansiveness 
where he is reported to have said: “The heart of the believer is Gods greatest throne.”774 
Ḥasanzāda explains this further in a gloss on some statements in the Asfār, where Mullā Ṣadrā 
explains the limitless nature of the soul: 
 
It means that it does not have a level in existence that it stops at, and this meaning is 
expressed by saying that the soul has a level above abstraction. The theosopher 
SabzavārƮ ̄has said:  
 
Surly it is a pure part of the existence of the shadow of the Truth 
 
  With me and the possessor of [the level] above abstraction, unrestrained 
 
                                                          
773 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha, 269. 
774 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha, 271. I could not find this specific ḥadīth in any work of aḥādith although 
there are other variations such as “The heart of the believer is the throne of the Beneficent.” See Majlisī, Biḥār al-
anwār, (55) 39. 
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So reflect on His words: “Say: If the sea were ink...”775 and “And were every tree that is 
in the earth (made into) pens...”776 The Qurʾān is the banquet of God, and whatever is 
on that divine banquet, which is never ending, is your food “Then let man look to his 
food.”777 Your essence is a container which can encompass that banquet, as the leader 
of the people of unity, our master, the Commander of the Faithful has said: “Every 
container becomes confined with what is placed within it, except the container of 
knowledge, for surely it expands.” All of this indicates that the soul has no known level 
in its ipseity (huwīyah). The Commander [of the Faithful] has said in his will to his son 
Muḥammad: “Know that the levels of paradise are the amount of the verses of the 
Qurʾān. So when it is the day of Resurrection it is said to the reciter of the Qurʾān: “Read 
and Rise!”” So understand!778 
 
Conclusion 
 
Walāyah is the reason and the vehicle through which creation occurs and returns back to God. 
Understanding walāyah is therefore very much connected to the understanding of wujūd 
albeit from a different perspective as it concerns everything in creation other than God’s 
unknowable Essence. The variant readings of the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum 
were clear in their writings from how they chose to explain the topics of walāyah and the soul. 
In some cases the lack of writing on the issue of walāyah also betrayed a preference for a 
                                                          
775 Qurʾān 18:109. 
776 Qurʾān 31:27. 
777 Qurʾān 80:24. 
778 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha, 271. 
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certain reading. At the same time, there were ḥukamāʾ such as Fāżil Tūnī, from the school of 
Tehran and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī from the school of Qum who made use of both readings in their 
explanations. This method is perhaps the most faithful to the Sadrian effort of cohesion 
between the sciences. Ḥukamāʾ such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Aḥmad Āshtiyānī, both 
from the school of Tehran and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī of the school of Qum took a much more 
ʿirfānī approach and contributed greatly to the school of Ibn ʿArabī from a Shiʿi perspective. 
Others such as ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī all 
from the school of Tehran took a more philosophical angle and while they accepted the 
concept of the perfect human they did not seek to delve into its full implications.   
 
While the philosophical explanation of walāyah relies on concepts such as gradation and the 
First Intellect, an ʿirfānī approach is more concerned with the Names based on concepts such 
as waḥadat al-wujūd and self-disclosure. The discussion of the various types of Seal is also of 
key concern. Both approaches are directly informed by the ḥukamāʾ’s conception of wujūd. It 
is therefore not altogether surprising that those ḥukamāʾ with a more philosophical reading 
of wujūd tended to take a more philosophical approach to walāyah and vice versa.   
 
Qumshihī’s treatises were a key aspect of this chapter and an important part of the ḥikmat 
tradition of the school of Tehran, His treatises show a firm grasp of the works of Ibn ʿArabī 
which allowed him to deal with the more thorny issues and criticisms leveled against the ʿ irfān 
tradition within the traditional seminary. His exposition of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought also validated 
its use by Mullā Ṣadrā and the Sadrian tradition as a whole within traditional ḥawza circles. 
His reading of Ibn ʿArabī and the issue of the Seal of the Saints provides food for thought for 
those interested in the ideas of the Shaykh al-akbar. The thoroughness with which the topic 
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of the Seal of the Saints is dealt with by Qumshihī and others such as Aḥmad Āshtiyānī meant 
that the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum did not feel the need to revisit the same questions and 
instead embarked on a different route, attempting instead to explain the scriptural sources 
using ḥikmat in the field of Imamology.  
 
Perhaps the most outstanding ḥākim of the school of Qum to discuss Qumshihī’s ideas was 
Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī. His valuable treatise Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya is deeply rooted in ʿirfānī 
principles and is worthy of becoming a seminal text in Shiʿi ʿirfān. From his criticisms and 
ideas the strength of Khumaynī’s understanding of the difference between a philosophical 
reading and an ʿirfānī reading was clear as illustrated in his criticism of Qumshihī in 
comparing the permanent archetypes with quiddity and wujūd in the previous chapter and 
his criticism of Qumshihī regarding the al-asmāʾ al-mustaʾtharah in this chapter.    
 
The school of Qum dedicated works to applying the conclusions of ḥikmat to the scriptural 
sources specifically in the field of Imamology. Whilst works of this nature existed before the 
school of Qum and whilst many treatises written by previous ḥukamāʾ tied in ḥikmat to explain 
aḥādīth and Qurʾānic verses, the school of Qum develops this tendency into a trend of the 
writing of multiple full works. Another more recent effort is the writing of separate works 
discussing the station of Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet. This is a field which is still 
developing and expanding the discussion further to individually investigate all of the twelve 
Imams — especially the later Imams — may also be a powerful exercise in the establishment 
of ḥikmat as the principle intellectual framework in traditional Shiʿi scholarship. 
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Knowing God is the reason for existence and the perfect human is the perfect knower through 
whom all know God. His permanent archetype comprises all of the Names and therefore all of 
the other permanent and external archetypes. Every sign of God is through him as God can 
only be known through his manifestations and the perfect human contains all of those 
manifestations which are the Muḥammadan reality. He is the creation by the Truth (al-Ḥaqq 
al-makhlūq bihi) and is never separated from reality and Truth. The perfect human is the 
perfect servant of God who owns nothing within himself but rather mirrors God’s self-
disclosures. Therefore what God does not manifest to His creation is not known by his creation 
including the perfect man and these are the exclusively possessed Names. The corporeal world 
cannot continue to exist without a living Seal of the Saints or the Quṭb, who in its nondelimited 
meaning is either the Prophet or one of his successors. This is because he is the one who 
receives the full manifestation of the Breath of the All-Merciful. With his movement into the 
hidden he drags the whole of creation back up the arch of ascent through the event of 
resurrection and the life after this world. The soul is an everlasting entity which continues to 
exist after its abstraction from the body. The unity of the soul mirrors the unity of existence 
(al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah) and so “whoever knows his soul, knows his lord.” It is the 
theory of that next life that we now turn to in the final chapter of this thesis.  
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Chapter 4: Maʿād (Resurrection)   
 
With the death of the final nondelimited Seal of the Saints the corporeal world is no longer 
able to sustain itself and this leads to the beginning of its return through the arc of ascent. 779 
In the terminology of the Islamic scriptural sources this is the process of resurrection.780 It is 
the movement of walāyah back into the realm of the hidden that pulls the corporeal world up 
through the grades of existence. Although the intellect cannot establish all of the 
particularities of resurrection, as the intellect cannot grasp particularities that it has never 
witnessed, it can discuss the human’s intellectual perfections; the paths of happiness and 
despair; and establish some universal concepts concerning resurrection.781 While revelation 
provides more details on the happenings on the Day of Resurrection and the afterlife, the final 
                                                          
779 Kāshānī, al-Kalimāt al-maknūna, 124-125. 
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tradition. There have been a number of works comparing Christian and Islamic notions of resurrection and 
death. Some general works on Islamic eschatology include J. I. Smith, The Islamic Understanding of Death and 
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to Ibn Sīnā see T. Jaffer, “Bodies, Souls and Resurrection in Avicenna’s ar-Risāla al-aḍḥawīya fī amr al-maʿād”, in 
D. C. Reisman and A. H. al-Rahim (eds.) Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the 
Avicenna Study Group (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003) 163-174. According to Suhrawardī see L. W. C. Van Lit, 
Eschatology and the World of Image in Suhrawardī and its Commentators, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Universiteit 
Utrecht, 2014. Perhaps the only work on focused on Mullā Ṣadrā with a strong philosophical perspective is E. S. 
Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being (London and New York: Routledge, 2015). 
781 See ṬabātạbāʾƮ,̄ TafsƬr̄ al-MƬz̄ān, (1) 147. 
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resting place of each individual creation is known only to God.782 Revelation is the expression 
of the full Muḥammadan unveiling and therefore is the benchmark for the witnessing of the 
ʿurafāʾ. What is characteristic of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of resurrection is his use of a variety 
of intellectual principles he establishes in other discussions and his implicit and at times 
explicit attention to the scriptural sources on the issue of resurrection through which he 
formulates a radically different view of resurrection from his predecessors.  
 
While early Islamic thinkers took the Islamic scriptural sources at face value, discussions on 
resurrection developed in the light of philosophical discussions on the soul.783 The 
philosophers discussed two types of resurrection; bodily resurrection (al-maʿād al-jismānī) 
and spiritual resurrection (al-maʿād al-ruḥānī). Bodily resurrection is the resurrection of the 
same body that the human lived with during his time in the corporeal world through which 
he will experience the pleasures of the next world. Spiritual resurrection is the continual 
development of the soul and its return to its creator. While from a philosophical perspective 
the second type of resurrection is easy to comprehend, the first type of resurrection has been 
the cause of some discussion, as it seems to contradict some basic philosophical laws like the 
impossibility of the soul returning to a lower plane of existence after passing from it. Building 
on his ideas on the principality of existence and its individualization; the philosophy of the 
soul; motion in the category of substance and the gradation of existence as well as other 
                                                          
782 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 650. 
783 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being, 7-12. 
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aspects of his philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā creates a philosophy of resurrection from the necessary 
implications of all of these key concepts.784  
 
As the issue of resurrection rests on these principles, for a ḥakīm to completely reject Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s idea of resurrection they have to provide different views on the concepts that form the 
foundation of his analysis. While Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the notion of bodily resurrection as 
defined above, he offered a different version of bodily resurrection based on the unity of the 
soul and body. His stipulation that the human body when resurrected will be a subtle body 
created by the human soul, not a corporeal body to which the soul attaches itself has been the 
source of some disagreement. This contention is at the heart of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of bodily 
resurrection, while it is an idea that departs from philosophical discussion before it.  
 
I will show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the subtle body has roots in witnessing rather than 
intellectual stipulation and for that reason is more palatable with the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā 
Ṣadrā. It’s not that Mullā Ṣadrā simply copied the idea from the ʿurafāʾ or from philosophers 
who relied on witnessing, but rather it was this concept that corresponded to his own 
witnessing and it was from here that he was able to develop the notion and answer the 
question of bodily resurrection, which is primarily a philosophical issue.785 That is that Mullā 
                                                          
784 See Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 161-171, where he sets out twelve 
principles from which he bases his discussion. Much of the content in this section is discussed is other parts of 
the Asfār. 
785 Al-Kutubi provides a study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of eschatology from a philosophical perspective and he brings 
to light Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical prowess in arguing his view of resurrection. While this view is undisputed 
this thesis also seeks to show that this is only one of the primary ways in which Mullā Ṣadrā can be read and 
indeed some of the foundations upon which Mullā Ṣadrā basis his arguments are more suitable to an ʿirfānī line 
of enquiry. See Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology. 
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Ṣadrā used the epistemology of the heart rather than the epistemology of the intellect as the 
basis of his thought on bodily resurrection. By his own testament, the way to gain knowledge 
of resurrection is blocked (masdūd) for one who does not follow his method of combining 
unveiling and intellectual proof.786 In that sense Mullā Ṣadrā’s importance to the school of Ibn 
ʿArabī is once again highlighted. Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on bodily resurrection is an issue that 
clearly distinguishes the two readings discussed in this thesis as while some ḥukamāʾ accepted 
the idea others completely rejected it. In the ḥawza system, resurrection is not discussed from 
the Sadrian perspective until a student studies the last volume of the Asfār. While Sabzavārī 
includes a small section on resurrection in the Manẓūma, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s decision to leave out 
the study of resurrection from Bidāyat and Nihāyat is quite telling, as from a Peripatetic stance 
bodily resurrection is impossible to prove.  
 
The silence on the issue of resurrection from a Sadrian perspective in the teaching curriculum 
shows the preference for the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as it is only when Mullā 
Ṣadrā is read holistically, using both the philosophical and ʿirfānī readings, that Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
view on bodily resurrection can make sense. The discussion of this issue by the ḥukamāʾ of the 
schools of Tehran and Qum shows the independent thinking of some of the ḥukamāʾ as some 
of them did not fully agree with Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and provided different ideas while 
remaining faithful to his broader principles. An alternative interpretation was offered by ʿAlī 
Mudarris Zunūzī which corresponds better with a philosophical reading while not completely 
rejecting the rest of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of resurrection. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s work on 
bodily resurrection is therefore of great importance, making it one of the three main views on 
                                                          
786 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 211. 
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the issue alongside Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and Ibn Sīnā’s testimony that it is beyond the grasp of 
Peripatetic philosophy.787 
 
Resurrection in whatever manner it occurs is a natural consequence of the worldview 
established in the wujūd and walāyah sections. The intricacy of such as system seems too 
complex to end with the short life of the corporeal world and if that was the case such a 
complex system of worlds and levels of perfection would lack any meaningful purpose. Indeed 
the perfect man, who is the whole purpose of existence and the guardian of each level of 
existence, cannot be limited to the world of corporeality as this would negate his ability to 
contain all of creation. These are in themselves sufficient proofs of another life after death and 
indeed a higher purpose for the levels of existence. The philosophy of the soul is central to 
understanding the necessity of resurrection. The soul is suitable to a higher plane of existence 
and it is eternal, so the obvious question is what happens to it after it has left the corporeal 
body behind? Additionally the impossibility of something going into non-existence after 
being existent further calls towards an investigation of what death actually is and what 
happens to the reality of that existent that seems to have perished.  
 
Therefore, this chapter begins with an elucidation of the philosophy of resurrection as a 
continuation of the discussions on wujūd and walāyah. From the distinctions made in the 
previous chapters between the philosophical and ʿirfānī readings of Mullā Ṣadrā the 
distinction between the philosophical aspects and ʿirfānī aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s outlook will 
be easy to identify. Mullā Ṣadrā weaves these concepts into a comprehensive theory 
                                                          
787 Javādī Āmulī, ʿA. Manbaʿ al-fikr, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Isrāʾ, 1387 Sh/2009) 171. For Ibn Sīnā’s testament see 
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, 347.  
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significantly adding to the major philosophies that preceded him. The elucidation of Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s outlook is necessary to contextualize the ideas of the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran 
and Qum. The role of the Muḥammadan reality and the Shiʿi Imams is explained and linked 
back to the discussions in the walāyah section, while at the same time their role in resurrection 
completes the picture of their role on the physical and ontological planes. The philosophical 
roots of resurrection are then briefly discussed and specifically the importance of Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s theory of individualisation in existence to the concept of bodily resurrection.  
 
The next section discusses reincarnation which is a concept traditionally rejected in all of its 
commonly understood interpretations. There is a type of reincarnation that is accepted by the 
Sadrian school which is not reincarnation in the sense of the soul occupying another body, 
rather it is the soul that manifests a body that is suitable to itself. This is the concept of celestial 
reincarnation (al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī). The link between this concept and the concept of 
reincarnation is that some people will have acted more like animals in this world then as true 
human beings and so the form that their soul projects will be that of an animal. It is not strictly 
a type of reincarnation, as it does not involve the movement of the soul from one body to 
another.  
 
Thereafter the concept of the Return (rajʿa) is discussed which is a concept discussed in Shiʿi 
belief where after the rise of the Mahdī people who have either been exceptionally good or 
exceptionally evil will be raised and the good will emphatically overcome the evil on the 
corporeal plane. The event is found in a collection of Shiʿi aḥādīth and whether or not one 
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chooses to accept those aḥādīth as authentic, they do raise a range questions related to 
reincarnation and resurrection. An understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of the body and 
soul relationship is fundamental to understanding his ideas on bodily resurrection and so the 
next section discusses the subtle body and the isthmus. The concept of the subtle body finds 
its roots in witnessing and therefore is more palatable to an ʿ irfānī type of investigation. Indeed 
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī provides an insight into the ʿirfānī reading of the subtle body by linking it 
to the concept of the Abdāl. After these introductory discussions the chapter quickly discusses 
spiritual resurrection before moving on to a more detailed consolidation of spiritual and 
bodily resurrection. The view of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī that the subtle body at resurrection is 
an evolved corporeal body is elucidated before discussing some other ideas of the ḥukamāʾ of 
the schools of Tehran and Qum on the tricky issue of bodily resurrection. 
 
1. Existence, Guardianship and Resurrection 
 
There are three worlds that are most relevant to the human; the corporeal world, the isthmus 
(barzakh) and the intellectual world. The human is born in the corporeal world with pure 
potential to move in any direction he chooses. Once he has fulfilled his potential in the 
corporeal world and no longer needs the corporeal body to move from potential to action, he 
can move to a world that is less limited as he is also no longer as limited as when he started. 
This second world is the isthmus. The isthmus has some characteristics of the corporeal world 
such as shape and distance, but it is a world that is at a higher level of existence than the 
corporeal world and so the soul experiences everything in the isthmus on a higher level. It is 
the human’s inner senses that are at work in the isthmus. This is perhaps the place of the 
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“physical” heaven and hell as there is no pain in the intellectual world — due to the lack of 
shape, distance and time — and so hell cannot exist on the intellectual plane. 
 
There is also the possibility of development after this world in the isthmus known as al-
takāmul al-barzakhī.788 That development occurs due to the remaining good acts that a person 
has left behind in the corporeal world; or that his loved ones perform on his behalf; or due to 
the natural course of motion in the category of substance. The intellectual world on the other 
hand is a world of only light and goodness. The establishment of a metaphysical realm and the 
abstraction of the soul, give rise to an understanding of the outward and inward nature of the 
world we witness around us. The metaphysical worlds are vaster and more perfect than the 
corporeal world in the same way that the soul is vaster and more perfect than the body.  
 
The human’s experience of the material world is fleeting and will pass, whereas his experience 
of the metaphysical worlds is everlasting. Attachment to the fleeting world at the expense of 
everlasting happiness is the plight of those deprived of wisdom. Rather spiritual ascension to 
the metaphysical realm before physical death is the quest of true happiness in both worlds, as 
happiness has various levels. The shortness of the humans life in the corporeal world is 
contextualised when taking into account his beginning in the arch of decent (al-qaws al-
nuzūlī) and his return to the everlasting world in the arch of ascent (al-qaws al-sụʿūdƬ)̄. 
Resurrection is a movement from the exterior to the interior, which occurs both in terms of 
the world the human lives in and within the human himself. That is that from living in the 
                                                          
788 See Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ʿUyūn masāʾil al-nafs, 820-837. 
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exterior world, the human moves to live in the interior, metaphysical world and from only 
seeing the outward nature of himself he moves to witness his inner self manifested outwardly. 
It is not that the isthmus and the Day of Judgment occur after the material world in terms of 
time, as these planes already exist. Rather when it is said for example that the human moves 
from the material world to the isthmus after death it is in terms of his comprehension of the 
isthmus not that the isthmus did not exist while he was occupied with the material world. It 
is somewhat inaccurate to say that the worlds above the isthmus exist at the same time as the 
corporeal world as those worlds are outside of time. But due to their timelessness there is not 
a time when they did not exist in relation to the corporeal world and the isthmus.  
 
Death is therefore in no way the end of life. Rather it is the start of a completely new life, where 
happiness and despair are contingent on the way man lived in the comparatively fleeting 
corporeal world. The Qurʾān summarizes the direct relationship between the two worlds in 
the following verse regarding one who is spiritually blind: And whoever is blind in this, he shall 
[also] be blind in the hereafter; and more erring from the way.789 But the human’s vision of this 
reality only becomes truly sharp and undeniable when he directly experiences the 
metaphysical world and it is too late to return. The scriptural sources promise great 
forgiveness and mercy in the next world for those who attempted to take the path of truth. 
 
The word maʿād comes from the root m — ʿ — d which means to return. In a general sense, it 
is the return of any effect to its cause and in the Islamic worldview it can have one of two 
                                                          
789 Qurʾān, 17:72 
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connected meanings. The first is that all created beings, but especially the human, will be 
raised after their physical death and brought to account for what they have done in this world. 
This is the Day of Judgment or Resurrection, and the Qurʾān and aḥādīth are replete with 
descriptions of what will occur on that day and how every person will be in need of the 
intercession of the Prophet in order to enter heaven. According to Shiʿi aḥādīth the Imams 
and Lady Fāṭimah, the daughter of the Prophet, also play an important role on that day in 
interceding for their followers.790 The second meaning of return is the human’s return to his 
Creator, which is known as the meeting with God (liqāʾ Allah). That is that the human returns 
to his Cause as expressed in the Qurʾān: “O soul that art at rest!  Return to your Lord, well-pleased 
(with him), well-pleasing (Him), So enter among My servants, And enter into My garden.”791  
 
Not all humans return by the same path and therefore they do not reach the same end or arrive 
in the same way. In the ʿirfānī worldview, the paths to God are based on the Names that the 
human is a manifestation of, as every human is an expression of the realization of a 
combination of Names. Most of creation follows their own particular natural path to the Name 
from which they originated, however, the human has been bestowed with free will and so 
chooses his path. While the path of the Prophets corresponds to the Name Allah and the other 
Beautiful Names, other paths lead to other Names such as the Punisher if that is the choice 
                                                          
790 See the chapter on intercession in Biḥār al-anwār which has traditions that support the intercession of the 
believers for eachother as well, Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (8) 29-64. For an example of the intercession of the Imams 
it is narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq: “…And give good news to those who believe that theirs is a footing of firmness with 
their Lord.” [Qurʾān, 10:2] [Means] the guardianship of Amīr al-Muʾminīn [ʿAlī]. “…That theirs is a footing of 
firmness…” [is] the intercession of the Prophet. “…And he who brings the truth…” [Qurʾān 39:33] [is the] intercession 
of ʿAlī. “…these it is that are the truthful…” [Qurʾān, 57:19] [is the] intercession of the Imams, see Majlisī, Biḥār al-
anwār, (8) 43.  
791 Qurʾān, 89:27-30 
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that the human takes.792 The perfect human plays a key role in this return just as he played a 
key role in the original creation. In the same way that the Prophet was the isthmus which 
brought the Unseen of the Unseen out of being completely unknown and is the closest veil 
between God and His creation, tempering the strength of the effusion so that it was possible 
for creation to exist, all creation must pass back through him in order to achieve essential 
communion with God. This is the true meaning of his intercession793 and in the life before 
natural death he is the guide to the station of annihilation. It is not necessarily the case that 
all people will choose his way, but those that follow his way will end up at his destination, 
which is God. Rather whilst most people will be saved from eternally abiding in hell, fewer 
people will have taken the path of the prophets.  
 
The prophets before Muḥammad are all manifestations of his reality and the exemplary 
followers of his way. The same is the case for the Imams who are complete manifestations of 
the Muḥammadan reality, while the prophets are incomplete manifestations. Although Mullā 
Ṣadrā includes many of the concepts mentioned above in his Asfār, the discussion of the 
Names and the role of the perfect human in resurrection are ʿirfānī in nature.  
 
In the Asfār Mullā Ṣadrā describes the importance of the human in the eventual return of all 
beings to their Creator and the importance of the perfect human in the return of all of 
mankind to God. 794 Matter must become plant so that it is consumed by the human and plants 
                                                          
792 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 25. 
793 See Muḥyī al-Dīn Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshihī, Ḥikmat-i ilāhī ʿāmm va khāṣṣ (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hirmis, 1388 
Sh/2009) 324. 
794 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 21-23.  
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that cannot be consumed by the human must become other types of animal to be consumed 
by the human so that they can reach their perfection as part of the human body, which is the 
lowest level of his soul as the human moves towards his perfection. In turn, the human must 
take the path of the perfect human in order to reach his own perfection. That is that the 
human must annihilate himself in the Muḥammadan reality, which is itself annihilated in 
God.795  
 
The human must take a specific path, the path of walāyah, in order to reach his perfection. He 
must walk through the gate to reach the city and this carries a further significance for the Shiʿa 
who believe, according to aḥādīth, that gate to the limitless city of Muḥammadan perfection 
is ʿAli b. Abī Ṭālib. It is by following ʿAlī that one is truly following Muḥammad. The outward 
sense of religion, where the Imam is the political and legislative leader after the demise of the 
Prophet is perfectly reflected on the ontological plane, but perhaps more importantly the 
correspondence between outward and inward leadership is the best recipe for wayfaring and 
reaching the Muḥammadan reality. It is the method of return both in terms of wayfaring in 
this world and returning in the next, as the role of the Imams and Lady Fāṭimah in the origin 
of creation is also reflected in the return.796 Their ontological role is reflected in practical ʿ irfān 
and their role in wayfaring is reflected in the outward aspects of the religion of Islam. All are 
levels of one reality as it is the world of causes that dictates the world of effects, the 
metaphysical that dictates the world of the physical, and the world of pure existence that 
dictates the ways of the world of possibilities. A key characteristic of Shiʿi ʿ irfān that the inward 
is completely reflected in the outward, which is in correspondence with the Islamic scriptural 
                                                          
795 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 21-23. 
796 For more information on their role in the beginning of creation see Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (25) 1-36. 
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sources.797 That is that the ʿirfānī view of tawḥid, imamate and resurrection and the role of the 
Imam in each of these areas are testified in the Shiʿi aḥādīth.  
 
The death of the last Imam is the final cause for resurrection as the world cannot maintain 
itself without an Imam. As the God’s vicegerent on earth there are existential functions that 
the Imam performs and his existence is a balancing factor that prevents the destruction of all 
that exists. If there is no Imam in the physical plane the physical plane cannot maintain any 
order and falls into chaos. This view is emphasized in the Shiʿi aḥādīth literature798 and is also 
expressed in ʿirfānī cosmology. When all of the saints are sealed through the passing of the 
various Seals the Day of Resurrection must necessarily occur as the earth cannot continue 
without a khalƬf̄ah.799 The material world can only survive as long as there is a vicegerent that 
contains all of the Names of God living in the world. Resurrection becomes necessary as the 
time moves from being ruled by the Name, the Manifest to being ruled by the Name the 
Hidden. At this stage all that was hidden becomes manifest and what was hidden in the souls 
becomes manifest.800 So the death of the last Imam is the cause of the movement of the 
universe to its next stage which is the resurrection and accounting of all that was done in the 
world of free will. 
 
Resurrection does not actualize in the corporeal world until an appointed time, and that is 
due to the way the Names are manifested. Every era has a Name governing it, and it is the 
                                                          
797 This is the core thesis in Ḥaydar Āmulī, Asrār al-sharīʿa wa aṭwār al-ṭarīqa wa anwār al-ḥaqīqa. 
798 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 433-439, especially ḥadīth 10 onwards. 
799 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 149. 
800 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 149-150. 
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governance of that Name that dictates the happenings in the world. For the ʿurafā all that is 
in the world is not separate from God, rather it is His self-disclosure. Therefore there is no 
possibility of something that existed to become non-existent as it is a manifestation of the 
Truth. Rather what changes is the Name that governs it causing it to move from the plane of 
the manifest to the plane of the hidden. The resurrection occurs under the governance of the 
degree of Non-dualistic Unity, dictating the destruction of multiplicity.801  
 
Everything will annihilate in God, not in terms of the destruction of their archetypes, but the 
annihilation of the servant in the Lord, like the annihilation of a drop of water returning to an 
ocean.802 This annihilation may be one of overwhelming, where the servant still exists but God 
completely overwhelms his existence.803 Or it could be that the human attributes of the 
servant are transformed into lordly attributes.804 Therefore whereas the corporal world is 
currently governed by multiplicity, on the Day of Resurrection it will be governed by unity due 
to essential self-disclosures.805 Some of the other Names governing that period will be the 
Dominator (al-Qahhār), the One (al-Wāhid), the Unique (al-Aḥad) and the Needless (al-
Ghanī).806  
 
From a more philosophical perspective Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas on resurrection are based on some 
key philosophical foundations that he establishes earlier in the Asfār. The first principle which 
                                                          
801 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 161. 
802 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 160. 
803 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 162. 
804 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 162. 
805 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 161. 
806 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 161. 
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overrides his whole philosophy is the principality of wujūd and its gradation. Mullā Ṣadrā 
stipulated that the corporeal world was intimately connected to all of the worlds above it by 
a single all-pervading reality which was wujūd. The difference between these realms was 
therefore not in their existence but in the intensity of their existence. While the corporeal 
world was limited, the other worlds were less limited, but all the worlds were levels of wujūd. 
This view had key implications on individualization. Whilst previous philosophers had 
considered individualization to be a consequence of the specification and the attachment of 
the soul to a corporeal body, Mullā Ṣadrā viewed individualization as an issue of wujūd.807  
 
For Mullā Ṣadrā the body and the soul are one reality which has a presence on all of the levels 
of existence and so it is the individualization of this whole reality that is important rather than 
the body alone.  For Mullā Ṣadrā the body is a level of the soul and not something that the soul 
attaches to. This outlook simplified the problem of bodily resurrection for Mullā Ṣadrā greatly, 
as it is not a specific body which must be resurrected for an individual to maintain their 
individuality. Rather whatever body that the soul creates is sufficient for individualization as 
the body is not what individualizes the soul. That is why a person at the time of childhood is 
the same person at old age, even though most of their bodily matter may have changed.808 
Bodily resurrection is therefore something very natural, as the soul must manifest in a way 
suitable to the plane of existence. So while confirming bodily resurrection based on his own 
interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the previous conception of bodily resurrection as the 
resurrection of the corporeal body.  
 
                                                          
807 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 45. 
808 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 47. 
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Rather for Mullā Ṣadrā the annihilation of the corporeal body is a necessary step for the human 
to take on his imaginal body as his main body and live on a higher plane.809 The corporeal body 
is not the human’s real body; rather it is the body that is alive by the life of the soul.810 Mullā 
Ṣadrā was able to explain the body of Islamic scriptural sources on resurrection as his 
contention was simply concerning the type of body that would be resurrected.811 According to 
Mullā Ṣadrā the confusion of the other philosophers arose from giving accidents the role of 
individualization.812 His argument gains further validity when considering abstract beings, as 
while those beings are individual they are not connected to the body. Therefore the 
individualization of a being must be from something other than the body.813 The oneness of 
the body and the soul also avoids the issue of reincarnation as the soul does not attach and 
detach, but rather manifests from one individualized reality. The issue of the unity of the soul 
informed Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the soul in terms of its faculties as the soul in its unity is all of 
the faculties (al-nafs fī waḥdatihā kull al-qiwā).  
 
2. Reincarnation 
 
It was important for Mullā Ṣadrā to discuss reincarnation. Aside from the valuble analysis and 
arguments he provides using his own framework and his contribution to the discussions of his 
predecessors, Mullā Ṣadrā did not want to be accused of reincarnation in its regular sense. He 
                                                          
809 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 117, 
810 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 114. 
811 Javādī Āmulī, Manbaʿ al-fikr, 166. 
812 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 45. 
813 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 46. 
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had his own concept of celestial reincarnation (al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī) and that too was a 
part of his overall concept of how bodily resurrection would occur. Reincarnation for Mullā 
Ṣadrā is of two types; reincarnation in material world, known as corporeal reincarnation (al-
tanāsukh al-mulkī) and reincarnation on a higher plane of existence called celestial 
reincarnation (al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī). While corporeal reincarnation is completely rejected 
by Sadrian ḥukamāʾ, celestial reincarnation is acceptable. Celestial reincarnation is where the 
human will be resurrected in a shape according to the character traits he possessed in this 
world by a phenomenon called the embodiment of actions (tajassum al-aʿmāl).814 It is not only 
actions that will be embodied, but also character traits, beliefs and anything else that affects 
the soul. Few are resurrected as true human beings as most tended towards the base desires, 
anger and imagination, whilst the intellect remained dormant. He who was dominated by the 
animalistic desire will be resurrected in the form of a beast; he whose anger dominated him 
will be resurrected with the form of a predatory animal; and those whose imagination took 
control will be raised in the forms of devils. These forms will be revolting in the same way as 
the blameworthy traits that they reflect are ugly.  
 
There will also be those who were dominated by more than one of these principle 
blameworthy traits who will be raised in a combined form. On the other hand those whose 
intellect dominated them and who found balance between the faculties to attain praiseworthy 
traits will be raised as lights. Although such an explanation is commonly found in the books 
                                                          
814 See Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ʿUyūn masāʾil al-nafs,941-949 where he shows that concept is indicated by the scriptural 
sources the most important of which being the following verses: “And that man shall have nothing but what he 
strives for- And that his striving shall soon be seen.” (Qurʾān 53:39-40) Here the human seeing his striving is 
interpreted as tanāsukh malakūtī or tajassum al-aʿmāl. He goes on to show that tajassum al-aʿmāl was accepted 
by Bahāʾ al-Din Āmulī, Shaykh Mufīd (d. 413/1022), Fayḍ al-Kāshānī and Hādī Sabzavārī. 
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of philosophy, there is a clear crossover with ʿirfān. A necessary and introductory step in that 
journey is the purification of the soul; but its conclusion is knowing God, not on the level of 
the mind alone, but with the complete existence of the wayfarer so that he witnesses his 
subsistence by God. Along the journey the wayfarer experiences many things, and one of those 
that is commonly related is his witnessing of the embodiment of actions with those he 
interacts with.  
 
The various forms in which the human can be raised indicate a change in the definition of 
human as a rational animal, as with the embodiment of actions humans do not share the same 
form. It is not the case that those people with animalistic or devilish forms have become 
animals or devils. Rather their movement in this world has added another particular to their 
essence, where they have become a rational animal beast or devil. This situation is worse than 
beasts or devils as they did not possess the particular of rationality, whereas a human whose 
actions are like a beast to the extent that being bestial becomes an established trait in his soul 
while at the same time possessing rationality is much more blameworthy. Exploring the 
definition of rational, as the potential to understand universals (quwwa idrāk al-kulliyāt)815 
further clarifies the issue, as while the human raised as an animal had the potential to 
understand the universals, he chose not to and so this potential never reached actuality. 
Rather he actualized the potential of another animal and so he became a human animal and 
has the lost potential to be a true human.816  
 
                                                          
815 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 20. 
816 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 20. 
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Sabzavārī adds another category to the types of reincarnation which is that of the corporeal 
connected reincarnation (tanāsukh mulkī muttaṣil) as opposed to corporeal disconnected 
reincarnation (tanāsukh mulkī munfaṣil) — which is what is usually discussed in the general 
term of corporeal reincarnation. Corporeal connected reincarnation occurs in the movement 
of some matter to plant; some plants to animals; and some animals to humans. Corporeal 
connected reincarnation also occurs in a reverse sense when an intellect manifests in the 
imaginal or corporeal worlds with a form suitable to the world it manifests in. This is known 
as imaginalization (tamaththul) and an example of this type of occurrence in the scriptural 
sources is that of the archangel Gabriel who manifests as a man on the corporeal plane when 
he appears to the prophets. It also occurs for the wayfarer when he is absent from himself, in 
the forms that correspond with his wayfaring. Sabzavārī rejects the possibility proposed by 
some ʿurafāʾ of an ʿārif spiritually manifesting in the bodies of those who are alive.817 
 
Intellectually proving the invalidity of disconnected corporeal reincarnation is therefore an 
introductory step in establishing bodily resurrection, as if the soul does not continually move 
from corporeal body to corporeal body the answer to the question of what happens to an 
eternal soul after death is still unanswered. Another result of proving its invalidity is proving 
the invalidity of bodily resurrection as understood by some theologians who believe that the 
soul returns to a body after being separated from it. This leads the philosopher to seek for a 
more refined understanding of how exactly bodily resurrection will occur.  
 
                                                          
817 Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 449-450. 
363  
While Sadrian philosophers confirm bodily resurrection, it is not with the same meaning that 
is confirmed by theologians as returning to the material world in a corporeal form after 
completely detaching from the corporeal body is intellectually impossible. If the soul returns 
to the body it must return to the same body before complete abstraction (al-tajarrud al-tāmm) 
otherwise it is corporeal reincarnation. Therefore, the detachment of the soul experienced on 
death cannot be complete abstraction, but rather a type of incomplete abstraction — like that 
experienced when sleeping — if resurrection is to occur in the corporeal world with the same 
corporeal body. This is the view that Ṭabāṭabāʾī arrives at when explaining the reality of death 
and the possibility of the Return which will be dicussed in the next section. 
 
 A series of questions then arise on as to what happens to the corporeal body after death as it 
is required for resurrection. While ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī pursued this line of inquiry as will be 
shown later, Mullā Ṣadrā preferred the interpretation the resurrection of the imaginal body 
which is a natural reflection of the soul and this is what made his concept of resurrection 
controversial. There are many other discussions in the Islamic sciences where the intellectual 
understanding of the issue at hand refines a simplified understanding attained through a 
preliminary reading of the scriptural sources. Issues such as the interpretation of hands, or a 
face for God as being allegorical due to its impossibility confirmed both in the scriptural 
sources and by the intellect.818 Or another example is the issue of temporal origination (ḥudūth 
zamānī) which the theologians interpreted as existence after nonexistence but which 
                                                          
818 The verse “…nothing like a likeness of Him…” (Qurʾān 42:11) negates any kind of direct comparison between God 
and His creation. Therefore, expressions that liken God to His creation must be interpreted allegorically. For a 
more in depth discussion see Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān, (14) 380-385 where he discusses some of the relevant 
aḥādīth.  
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philosophers interpreted as the origination of contingency as opposed to necessity. This 
allowed for beings other than God to be eternal while at the same time being creations of God.  
 
Another factor that influences the philosophy of resurrection from the scriptural sources is 
the use of parables and examples for realities that are above common understanding. This is 
especially applicable to resurrection as it is a key component of Islamic belief and so has to be 
comprehensible to all the various intellectual levels of the Muslims. So explaining the heights 
of pleasure in paradise as the height of physical pleasure in this world, or explaining the 
torment of hell as the pain experienced by burning and other types of pain is suitable for an 
audience that can only comprehend these types of pleasure and pain. But that does not 
necessarily mean that this is exclusively what is experienced in the next world. Rather there 
are indications of higher pleasures and pains, such as the pleasure of God being greater than 
the physical pleasures, and the pain of embarrassment when the bad deeds of a person are 
exposed to all.  
 
Furthermore the acceptance of relating aḥādīth by meaning rather than by their specific 
words adds to the argument for preferring an intellectual stance over a literal one for issues 
such as bodily resurrection, as those relating the aḥādīth on the subject of resurrection may 
have interpreted them and related them by meaning according to their understanding. An 
overriding issue with resurrection is the possibility of the occurrence of something which is 
intellectually impossible as the rules of the next world may significantly differ to the rules of 
this world and this is what makes it one of the debatable issues in Islamic belief.  
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3. The Return (Rajʿa) 
 
According to the principles established in the concept of motion in the category of substance 
the body and the soul are unified together and move towards their perfection. The movement 
is essential not accidental. It is impossible for something to move back to the same potential 
after that potential has been actualized. The new state of actuality has a corresponding 
potential. So it is impossible for an old man to become a youth as he has passed that potential 
which was present when he was a child. That is because in order for an old man to become a 
youth he has to move in an opposite direction to his essential movement, which is impossible 
as then the movement would not be essential, it would be forced and forced motion is neither 
natural nor sustainable. Therefore it can be argued that while it is possible for the soul on 
death to be connected with a different type of body suitable for another realm, it is not 
possible for it to return to a physical body as it has passed the stage of requiring a physical 
body on its journey to perfection. Therefore corporeal reincarnation is impossible.  
 
While this proof may be useful in arguing against physical reincarnation it gives rise to another 
problem except that of interpreting traditions on bodily resurrection, which is the issue of 
how to understand the belief of some Shiʿa in the Return (al-rajʿa). The event of the Return 
occurs before the resurrection where those that were particularly good or particularly evil will 
raised again in this world and good will triumph over evil in the corporeal world, before the 
full enactment of God’s Justice on the Day of Resurrection. According to the proof mentioned 
above it would mean that those raised in the Return would return from a higher state of action 
to a previous state of capacity that they have essentially passed which, according to the laws 
of motion, is impossible.  
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ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī counters this problem in his discussion on the Return in Tafsīr al-mīzān 
by saying that death for these people is not the fulfillment of their potential and therefore they 
can return to a physical body in order to fulfill that remaining potential. That is that the 
natural course of motion in the category of substance is that a person should reach old age 
before dying. A person who does not do that still has potential that can be brought into action 
in this world. It is clear that the soul can return to the same body after a while of separation as 
it does in sleep. Since the soul returns to the same body and is not completely separated from 
it, Ṭabāṭabāʾī avoids the problem of reincarnation. He says: 
 
Now, we come to his argument that (1) All people die when they reach the perfection of 
the life, and when their potentialities are converted into achievements; (2) What has 
attained achievement cannot be turned back to potentiality; (3) Therefore, a dead man 
cannot be returned to this life. 
 
In this argument, the second premise is correct; the first is not. It is not ‘‘all’’ people, but 
only ‘‘some’’, who die after attaining perfection and converting their potentialities into 
achievements. A man, who completes his natural span of life and dies from old age, may 
be said to have reached the last stage of his perfection. But what about another man who 
prematurely dies of an epidemic or fatal sickness, or is killed? Can it be claimed that he 
had already reached the last stage of his potential perfection? The answer is ‘No’. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that it is impossible for such persons to be returned to the life 
of this world. Now it is obvious that his argument is neither comprehensive nor correct. 
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We can think of many cases where it might be possible for a dead person (even if he had 
died after attaining his perfection) to be sent back to this world; for example, a man in his 
first life had a potential for a perfection which was not available at that time; he died; then 
by the progress of society, that perfectness became possible. What is there to prevent his 
return to this world to achieve that perfection for which he had a potential in the first life? 
Because it will not be a step back-ward - from perfection to potentiality; it will be progress 
from potential to perfection.819 
 
Although this may seem like an argument against the Sadrian outlook and indeed contradicts 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s explanation of natural death,820 it is in fact in line with Sadrian principles as the 
soul only discards the body and cannot return to it by complete abstraction when it has 
reached its full potential and there is no need for the body as there is no capacity left in the 
body for the soul’s perfection. It is once the soul has completely left the corporeal world and 
exists in the isthmus that it cannot return. Here Ṭabāṭabāʾī is saying that for some people 
death is not the end of their potential and they still need the body in order to fulfill their 
remaining potential. Death is like a period of sleep where the soul returns to the body. The 
scriptural sources validate considering death as a period of sleep and resurrection as waking 
up from that sleep. However, questions are left unanswered such as an explanation of how the 
soul exists without attaching itself to a body? Another question of how the soul can return to 
a disintegrated body is discussed in a philosophical problem called the question of the eater 
and the eaten (shubhah al-ākil wa al-ma’kūl), which is discussed later in the chapter. 
                                                          
819 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Al-Mīzān: An exegesis of the Qurʾān, tr. S. S. A. Rizvi, 12 vols (Tehran: World 
organisation of Islamic services, 1982) (3) 141-142. 
820 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 47. 
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Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī takes a different approach in his attempt to provide an 
intellectual justification for the Return. He starts by establishing the strong connection 
between the body and the soul and that this relation is present between the corporeal world 
and the universal that governs it. The relationship between the body and soul comes under 
this greater relationship of the whole corporeal world and it’s universal, as the universal — 
which he says is the greatest soul (al-rūḥ al-aʿẓam) — is able to create the forms necessary for 
matter itself whereas the soul provides the forms of the body’s actions and not its matter. 
Another difference is that the greatest soul does not need matter to reach its perfection 
whereas the soul uses the body in order to develop itself as explained by motion in the 
category of substance. With the development of the soul, as it becomes more and more like 
the greatest soul, there comes a stage where it can provide the form necessary for matter.821  
 
It is therefore untrue to stipulate that the relationship between the body and the soul ceases 
at death, as in that case it would not be able to create its own matter and manifest in its own 
body. It is the soul that governs the body and this relationship does not become completely 
invalid on death. Rather the soul does not interact with the body in the sense that it did before 
death, where the body manifested the acts of the soul. It is therefore not an intellectual 
impossibility for the soul to manifest itself in the corporeal world after death as the body itself 
is simply the manifestation of the soul on the material plain rather than something separate 
from it.822 This manifestation of the soul is the same type of manifestation that the intellects 
are able to perform when they appear to man in the act of imaginalization. It is not 
                                                          
821 Qazvīnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 4. 
822 Qazvīnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 4. 
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reincarnation, which is the movement of the soul from one corporeal body to another 
corporeal body, but rather the soul creates its own form suitable for the corporeal world.823 
Qazvinī’s explanation is based on the Sadrian explanation of bodily resurrection and returns 
to the concept of individualization and the manifestation of the body as a lower level of the 
soul.  
 
In another attempt to explain the Return, Sabzavārī in his answer to a question from Mullā 
Ismāʿīl Bujnūrdī on how the Return will be, explains that the Return has an outward and an 
inward. As for the inward aspect Sabzavārī explains how the reality of man is his intellect and 
this is what is really intended by the definition of man as a rational animal (al-ḥaywān al-
nāṭiq). While man begins with the intellect in potential he develops until he reaches the 
universal intellect where the universal intellect is the intermediary in the effusion of 
existence. The universal intellect is manifested ontologically in the person of the prophet 
Muḥammad and the universal soul is manifested in the person of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Their lights 
illuminated the world but the world tried to put out their lights and while they returned to the 
higher planes where their light is undisputed, it is necessary for them to return and overcome 
the corporeal world. As for the outward aspect of the Return, Sabzavārī refutes the notion that 
it occurs on the imaginal plane as some philosophers have proposed; rather he believes that 
it will occur on the corporeal plane.824 
 
                                                          
823 Qazvīnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 18. 
824 Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 476-478. 
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4. The Isthmus, Witnessing and the Subtle Body 
 
The basis of the Sadrian philosophy of resurrection rests on the establishment of the imaginal 
world. It was perhaps the denial of an isthmus between the corporeal world and the 
intellectual world that caused some of Peripatetic philosophers to deny the possibility of 
bodily resurrection. Even though Ibn Sīnā accepted the role of imaginalization as a human 
faculty and discussed the issue of dreams, he did not assign an ontological role for it.825 It was 
Suhrawardī who first discussed the imaginal world an intermediary world between the 
corporeal and intellectual worlds as he did not find Ibn Sīnā’s explanation of dreams 
adequate.826 On the other hand, the ʿurafāʾ and especially Ibn ʿArabī strongly emphasized the 
role of the imaginal world and it is in the imaginal world that witnessing and unveilings occur. 
He differentiated between attached and detached imagination (al-khayāl al-muttaṣil and al-
khayal al-munfaṣil); where attached imagination is specific to the individual and detached 
imagination is the imaginal world.827   
 
Rabbānī lists fourteen arguments for the existence of the imaginal world; five according to the 
principles of the philosophers and nine according to the principles of the ʿurafāʾ.828 By the 
proof of the possibility of the nobler (al-imkān al-ashraf), since the isthmus is a superior world 
to the material world and we know that the material world exists, the isthmus must exist as 
well. Rather due to the effusion of existence the isthmus exists before the material world. 
                                                          
825 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 87. 
826 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 93-94. 
827 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 97. 
828 Rabbānī, Maʿād, 65-66. 
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Another argument is the impossibility of a gap in effusion (buṭlān al-ṭafira). Since all of the 
worlds mirror each other and the corporeal world does not mirror the intellectual world, there 
must be a world in between that has some characteristics of the material world and other 
characteristics of the intellectual world and that is the meaning of the isthmus.829  
 
In simple terms the gap between the completely spiritual and the entirely material is too large 
for a natural movement from one to the other and so a world, which is both spiritual and 
material, is required for a natural transition. The body that is resurrected is of the imaginal 
form for the ḥukamāʾ following Mullā Ṣadrā’s approach to resurrection, even if there is a 
difference of opinion on whether that imaginal form is an evolved corporeal body or not and 
what the exact make up of that imaginal body is. Without the imaginal world the only 
possibility for the body would be to remain absolutely corporeal and this would be much 
harder to prove using intellectual means.  
 
The isthmus mirrors the imaginative faculty of the human and so cognitive existence as a 
world in between the humans physical and spiritual existence goes some way to prove the 
existence of an imaginal realm between the outside world and the world of the intellects. The 
correspondence between the human and the extramental is a principle fully explained in 
theoretical ʿirfān as was elucidated in the previous chapter on walāyah. The imaginal realm is 
not a physical plane or an abstract one but rests in the middle of these two planes. One of the 
proofs of the existence of the soul is the use of different senses for different planes of 
                                                          
829 Rabbānī, Maʿād, 70-71. 
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existence.830 The senses are different as they must be suitable to interact with the plane they 
are experiencing, but at the same time they return to a unifying sense.  
 
For example, seeing in the material world is through the eye, seeing in the imaginal world is 
with the sense of seeing and seeing in the intellectual world is a type of comprehension as 
there are no forms to see. Hence the images seen in dreams are not in an entirely separate 
world but are linked to the soul through its perception of the imaginal world.831 The imaginal 
world is either a person’s own imaginal world disconnected from the outside imaginal world, 
or it is their perception of the outside imaginal world using their imaginal senses translated 
into imaginal forms which they can understand.  
 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of sight is different from the traditional views on sight, as he believes 
that sight is not a function of the eye itself.832 Sight is not caused by rays of light from an object 
reaching the eye; rather this process is introductory to sight itself. Sight is a function of the 
soul as it is an abstract faculty. The soul is an active principle and all the human faculties 
pertain to the soul. What the eye sees is a preparatory cause for the effusion of a form in the 
                                                          
830 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 65. 
831 As opposed to SuhrawardƮ’̄s opinion that the imaginal world is a separate world in which one sees independent 
images that are not linked to the person when the factors that prevent this sight are removed. Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ ̄
disagrees with this as it means that the bad or confusing things a person sees in dreams should actually be in that 
realm. He considers it more accurate to attribute these happenings to the soul itself, Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, al-Nūr 
al-Mutajalī 66-68. 
832 See M. J. Zarean, Sensory and Imaginal Perception according to Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, Mullā Ṣadrā, 1569-1640, 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1994. 
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mind, due to the presence of two abstract realities. That is that the form is not mixed with 
matter in any way as some philosophers had argued.833 Rather it is a level of existence.834  
 
While the soul is connected to the corporeal body, sight is separate to the imaginative faculty, 
as sight in the corporeal world needs the eye whereas the imaginative faculty does not.835 But 
when the soul leaves the body these two faculties unite and the soul sees with the imaginative 
faculty.836 There is no intellectual proof for this view, however, it is a view that can be verified 
by experience and this is why this view is more suitable to an ʿirfānī type of enquiry. Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s witnessing of a subtle body in the state of abstraction from matter is central to his 
notion that the resurrected body will be a subtle one rather than a corporeal one as a subtle 
body is more suitable to a higher plane of existence.  
 
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī devotes a chapter in his Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn fī sharḥ al-ʿuyūn to the imaginal body 
where he quotes the views of various ʿurafāʾ from the school of Ibn ʿArabī on the subject in 
their discussion of a category of ʿurafāʾ called the Abdāl.837 He moves on to show Ḥaydar 
Āmulī’s proof for the Abdāl in his Asrār al-sharīʿa and Fayḍ Kāshānī’s agreement on the 
existence of Abdāl in his ʿAyn al-yaqīn.838 After exploring the issue further in the writings of 
                                                          
833 See Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 107-108 for more explanation. 
834 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology, 112. 
835 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 166-167. 
836 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 167. 
837 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn, 761-776. 
838 Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn, 765-766. 
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Qayṣarī he references Shiʿi aḥadīth839 before explaining Sabzavārī’s view in the Manẓūma on 
bodily resurrection and passages from the Asfār.  
 
Ḥasanzāda’s approach to the reading of this issue is an ʿirfānī one par excellence as he uses 
theoretical ʿirfān as the basis from which he examines the philosophical text of the Manẓūma 
and Mullā Ṣadrā’s statements in the Asfār. The Abdāl have the ability to multiply their 
imaginal bodies and are therefore able to be in more than one place at the same time and are 
at once aware of all of their imaginal bodies. These imaginal bodies are present in the 
corporeal world not on the imaginal plane alone.840 That manifestation of the imaginal to the 
corporeal is not reincarnation, but rather it is imaginalization (tamaththul) like the 
manifestation of Gabriel to Mary in the form of a man.841 This ability stems from their 
nondelimitation and abstraction from the limits of both the corporeal and imaginal worlds.842 
It is the universal part of them that is constant whereas their manifestation in many situations 
does not affect the oneness of their universal aspect in any way.843 This view of the reality of 
the human and the way in which the soul is able to create its body or indeed various bodies is 
of great significance to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of bodily resurrection. 
                                                          
839 Such as It is narrated from Iṣḥāq b. ʿAmmār that he asked Imam al-Kāẓim whether a person who has died visits 
their family? He said: “Yes” I said: “When do they visit?” He said: “Every Friday and [then at various times] in the 
month and year according to their station.” Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (5) 570. 
840 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 586-587. 
841 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 113. 
842 QaysạrƮ,̄ Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 189. 
843 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda A৴ mulƮ,̄ (5) 337-340. 
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5. Spiritual Resurrection (al-maʿād al-rūḥānī) 
 
The reality of resurrection is the witnessing of God, which is spiritual resurrection. This kind 
of resurrection can occur before resurrection in the extramental in the same way that the 
wayfarer can experience voluntary death before compulsory death. When the wayfarer attains 
the station of walāyah and experiences annihilation and subsistence by God he has returned 
to Him. According to the Sadrian world view, perfection in existence is linked to 
nondelimitation. The higher a thing is in graded existence, the fewer limitations it has. 
Therefore a more perfect soul is a soul that has less limitations and annihilation is an 
expression of when the soul loses its limitations to such an extent that it is no longer a separate 
entity from the Necessary Existent. In other words the wayfarer realizes his own reality and 
the reality of tawḥƬd̄ on an experiential level. His soul loses its corporeal limitations before the 
forced separation from the body at death and becomes annihilated in God. This does not mean 
that the wayfarer becomes non-existent. Rather he becomes so absorbed in God that he 
forgets his own existence, and does not see his own existence as anything except God’s 
existence. His poverty — which is the basis of this vision — distinguishes him from lordship. 
 
Love drives the wayfarer in his pursuit to truly recognize the Beauty of His Lord and to 
experience true happiness and the pleasure of wayfaring. His whole motivation, purpose and 
existence is by God, for God and to God. At the station of one who has reached (wāṣil) the 
wayfarer can truly be called the ʿārif and it is an essential station to qualify the ʿārif to guide 
others if that is the purpose chosen for him. The same reason is the reason for all of creation 
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to return to its origin in the journey of love between the needy and the Perfect according to 
ʿAbd Allah Zunūzī. But it is the eternal love of God which creates the creation to return to Him 
through the route of discovery and that is where the place of the perfect man is understood. 
As the greatest knower of God, he is the purpose of creation. This is the secret of motion in the 
category of substance, which is the essential movement of love.844 
 
Mīrzā Mahdī Āshtiyānī in his treatise concerning tawḥīd and resurrection draws a parallel 
between the speech of the human and the creation of God. Speaking is something that does 
not essentially increase the human, even though it gives existence on the linguistic plane to 
the words spoken. In the same way if it was imagined that those words somehow returned to 
the speaker, that also would not increase him in any way. The same principle stands with God 
and His creation. Neither does the initial creation of existents decrease or increase anything 
from God, nor does their return to Him increase Him in anything.845 The idea of creation as 
words is also found in the writings of the ʿurafāʾ and is a key principle in Sufi tafsīr, as a parallel 
is drawn between the book of the souls (kitāb al-anfusī), the book of the horizon (kitāb al-
āfāqī) and the Qurʾān which is also known as the recorded book (kitāb al-tadwīnī). The other 
example Āshtiyānī gives is of a ray of light emanating from its source while at the same time 
not affecting the source,846 although this is an example more suited to a common 
understanding of the effusion of light from a source such as the sun rather than a scientific 
one.   
 
                                                          
844 Zunūzī, Anvār-i jalīya, 220-221. 
845 Āshtyānī, Bīst risāla, 182. 
846 Āshtyānī, Bīst risāla, 182. 
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The wayfarer traverses the external worlds within his own soul, and has a type of voluntary 
death known as the minor resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-ṣughrā). Die before you die,847 according 
to a famous ḥadīth attributed to the Prophet. The major resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā) is 
annihilation in God, which is only understood by those who possess the station. Ḥasanzāda 
lists the five types of resurrection as explained by Qayṣarī as follows: “[Resurrection] that 
occurs in every hour and moment; [resurrection] by natural death; [resurrection] by voluntary 
death; [resurrection] that is promised and waited for [i.e. the Day of Judgment]; [resurrection] 
that is the annihilation of the mystics.”848 Sayyid Yazdānpanāh further explains these different 
resurrections during the course of his lectures.849 The first type of resurrection occurs moment 
by moment, based on the interpretation of verses such as: “…every moment He is in a state (of 
glory)”850 and the general definition of resurrection being the return of something that was 
manifest to the hidden. Since the world is in a continual state of creation and decay, that 
which decays returns to the hidden and therefore resurrection occurs every moment. Natural 
death is also a type of resurrection as the actions of the person become manifest to him in 
imaginal forms in the isthmus.851  
 
Voluntary death is within the soul of the wayfarer while his body is still present in the 
corporeal world. The tradition from which this type of death and resurrection draws its 
inspiration from is the well known saying of the Prophet: “Die before you die.” At this stage the 
                                                          
847 Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (69) 59. 
848 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 152, nt 9. 
849 This is an increasingly popular method employed by traditional scholars who have a greater focus on teaching 
leaving them with less time for writing. Good examples are of Javādī Āmulī and Sayyid Kamāl Ḥaydarī. 
850 Qur’ān, 55:29. 
851 This is known as the minor horizonal resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-sughrā al-āfāqī). 
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wayfarer witnesses the realities of actions and other existential realities like a person who has 
died a natural death and has passed into the word of the isthmus. He is no longer veiled by the 
corporeal world. This is known as the minor resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-sughrā) in the 
terminology of the ʿurafāʾ.852 The resurrection explained in the Islamic scriptural sources are 
primarily the resurrection of all creation after its death for the important event of judgment.853 
It is the manifestation of the rule of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity as explained above. The 
final resurrection is for the person who has actualized tawhīd to the extent of annihilation and 
subsistence in the Truth. This occurs for the wayfarer before it occurs for the whole of creation 
and is known as the major resurrection in the terminology of the ʿurafāʾ.854 Yazdānpanāh links 
these resurrections to the Muḥammadan reality and the First Emanation as all manifestation 
is through this reality,855 as any witnessing of reality occurs before the level of the Unseen of 
the Unseen.856 
 
The return of man to God through the various worlds of delimitation and from manyness to 
oneness are expressed in verses of the Qurʾān such as “…as He brought you forth in the 
beginning, so shall you also return”857 and “On the day when We will roll up heaven like the rolling 
up of the scroll for writings, as We originated the first creation, (so) We shall reproduce it; a 
promise (binding on Us); surely We will bring it about.”858 However, if man returns to exactly the 
                                                          
852 Also more specifically known as the minor resurrection in the soul (al-qiyāmah al-sughrā al-anfusī). 
853 This is known as the major horizonal resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā al-āfāqī). 
854 Also more specifically known as the major resurrection in the soul (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā al-anfusī). 
855 Yazdānpanāh, Mabānī, 406. 
856 Amīnīnajād, ʿA. Ḥikmat-i ʿirfānī: taḥrīr az dars-hā-yi ʿirfānī-i naẓarī-yi ustād Sayyid Yad Allah Yazdānpanāh 
(Qum: Muʾassasa-yi āmūzeshī va pajūheshī-yi imām Khumaynī, 1390 Sh/2011) 576-583.   
857 Qur’ān, 7:29. 
858 Qur’ān 21:104. 
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same place he started after completing the circle of decent and ascent, or returning to his 
permanent archetype, then what was the point of creation? Is it that man returns in exactly 
the same way that he began, or is there something more to the issue?  
 
Fanārī explains in his commentary on Qūnawī’s Mafātīḥ al-ghayb in regard to the eighth 
question regarding the specific qualities on the perfect human, that man does return to the 
same level that he began, but not in the same way.859 That is that man returns to the level of 
the Cloud (ʿamāʾ) and all returns to God through the arch of ascent from where it began, but 
perfected and a real reflection of his actions in this world. This is not only a natural 
consequence of the effusion of wujūd, but also because of the changes in which Names 
dominate the different stages of man’s decent and ascent.860 This is not to say that the 
permanent archetype changes either, as then it would no longer be permanent. Rather all that 
man experiences are deeper levels of his own permanent archetype, facilitated by the creation 
of the different planes of existence. That is that man is created so that he can witness the 
manifestations of God, while at the same time being the locus of those manifestations.861 
 
The Qurʾān stresses the fact that the resurrection is corporeal as well as spiritual and therefore 
an interpretation that stops at only spiritual resurrection is incomplete and unacceptable in 
the eyes of Shiʿi scholars. The ḥukamāʾ also believed that a person who only established bodily 
                                                          
859 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 650. 
860 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 651. 
861 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 651-652. 
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resurrection without any aspect of spiritual resurrection had fallen short of the mark.862 Rather 
the aim is to find an interpretation that establishes both types of resurrection while at the 
same time does not limit itself to either type of resurrection at the expense of the other. 
Peripatetic philosophers, due to their belief of the attachment of the body to the soul during 
its stay in the material world but their essential separation, believed that the body becomes 
non-existent after death when the soul leaves it behind. Since something that becomes non-
existent cannot become existent again, the resurrection of the same body is impossible.863 The 
abstract soul only comprehends universals, so it cannot perceive the particulars described in 
the Qurʾān such as palaces, pleasures and delicious foods. Rather a body is required to 
comprehend these realities and since there is no body the resurrection must be spiritual, 
which renders the expressions of material pleasures in the scriptural sources as 
metaphorical.864   
 
6. Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection (al-maʿād al-jismānī wa al-rūḥānī) 
 
How are these two seemingly contradictory types of resurrection consolidated into one 
coherent philosophy of resurrection? Spiritual resurrection is easily understood 
philosophically and revelation confirms bodily resurrection, while neither completely 
necessitates the possibility of the others occurrence.865  One obvious way is to admit the 
limitations of the intellect, and while confirming that which the intellect has comprehended 
                                                          
862 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 306. 
863 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 306. 
864 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 306-307. 
865 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, Sharḥ al-hidāya al-athīrīya (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-tārīkh al-ʿarabī, 1422/2002) 
439. 
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— in terms of a spiritual plane of existence — one can also accept that this resurrection will 
have some kind of impact on the material. But not knowing has never satisfied philosophical 
pursuit.  
 
Another way to consolidate the resurrections is to revisit the idea of the arch of descent. The 
arch of descent views the material realm as the lowest realm whereby existence emanates 
from the realm of God to the realm of matter and then begins its rise once more with the arch 
of ascent. But if descent to the realm of matter is not considered a deficiency, but rather a 
stage of perfection as explained in the ʿirfānī interpretation of the comprehensiveness of the 
perfect human, then there is only an arch of ascent and the term descent is metaphorical and 
regards our intellection of the planes. For the ʿurafāʾ manifestation (ẓuhūr) is a type of 
perfection and not a deficiency, and God’s existence is unified on all planes.866 Therefore the 
issue is one of manifestation and not of return. From this perspective there is nothing to 
prevent manifestation on the physical plane after the material death as we know it.  
 
ʿAllāmah Ṭihrānī offers a similar solution in his ten volume work dealing with the subject of 
resurrection. Although the classical ʿirfānī view is that the body will not manifest in a 
corporeal sense but rather will manifest in a body suitable for the plain that it exists in,867 
Ṭihrānī sets out to prove the resurrection of the same corporeal body that man leaves behind, 
but rather than focusing on the resurrection of that body within a certain time span, he focuses 
                                                          
866 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 631. 
867 Dawūd Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Sharikat-i intishārāt-i ʿilmī va 
farhangī, 1386 Sh/2007), 490. 
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on the migration of the soul outside of time. That is that while the soul is limited by time it 
can only comprehend its corporeal and imaginal bodies which are both manifestations of the 
soul according to the world suitable for it. Once man passes the isthmus he enters the world 
of resurrection where time ceases to have any meaning. It is the plane of gathering as things 
are only scattered due to limitation.  
 
It is at this stage that man fully comprehends both the inner and outer aspects of his actions 
and therefore does not need any external force to bring him to account, rather the account of 
his actions is directly perceived by him. He perceives the corporeal body that he had, as he 
perceives past present and future, all of which have no meaning in a timeless existence. That 
is he perceives all that is below his level of existence, including the material body and the 
material plane. The spiritual resurrection is his returning to God and perceiving the 
intellectual world and the worlds of the Names and Essence and his bodily resurrection is his 
renewed perception of his corporeal body and of all that he has experienced but in terms of 
its reality. While most of the philosophical arguments focus on the issue of abstraction and 
resurrection within time after that abstraction, Ṭihrānī focuses on what is perceived after the 
stage of abstraction. He summarizes his view saying: 
 
The human reaches the stage of subsistence after the stage of annihilation and the lowest 
level of this is to attain complete knowledge and existential comprehension of his 
manyness. That is that he attains control over the knowledge of time and place and will 
witness his soul from the time of his birth until the time of his death which is his corporeal 
body along with all of the actions he performed…that is he will existentially comprehend 
his corporeal body, not for one moment only [as the human currently does] but every 
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moment of his life as well as all of the affects, peculiarities and necessities…the human 
will manifest with his actions in that world with a celestial form and the realities of things 
will be unveiled for him. The heaven and hell, reward and punishment are — on the other 
hand — the realities of the actions, their realities and the corprealization of their 
spirit…so the human will comprehend his entire corporeal body…and this 
comprehension is not only [on the level of] knowledge or form, rather it is existential 
comprehension…868    
  
While Ḥasanzāda also comes to the same conclusion, he shows that Mullā Ṣadrā indicated 
towards the remaining of the soul in matter as the soul imprints a form on the matter during 
its connection with it. Mullā Ṣadrā did not elaborate further. Ṣabzavārī also scratches the 
surface of the issue, but Ḥasanzāda makes clear that the comprehension of the body is to do 
with an eternal (dahrī) view.869  
 
 
The Qurʾān alludes to the fact that the body that is raised on resurrection day is exactly the 
same body that was connected to the soul in the corporeal world.870 Consequently proofs from 
the Sadrian school that do not establish this are of limited use in convincing literalists 
especially when removed from their overall philosophical framework, such as the proof based 
on being-a-thing (shayʾīyah). According to this proof since the being-a-thing of a thing is in its 
form rather than its matter, that is by its wujūd not its quiddity, then if we supposed that the 
                                                          
868 M. Ḥ. Ṭihrānī, Maʿrifa al-maʿād, 10 vols (Beirut: Dār al-maḥajja al-bayḍāʾ, 1997) (6) 155. 
869 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn fī sharḥ al-ʿuyūn (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008), 840. 
870 See for example, Qurʾān 75:3-4. 
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form of the world is detached from prime matter (hayūlā) then all of the forms would exist in 
the collective form of the world.871 That is a table is a table not due to the matter it is made of, 
but by its form. So if its specific form was attached to another matter it would still be the same 
table. Since the next world is the world of realities, all that does not exist are the necessary 
aspects (lawāzim) of prime matter such as decay or anything to do with potential or 
nonexistence.872 Therefore the body in the next life is a reflection of the soul, which is the form 
of man, according to his actions.873 So a person is recognized by his body in the next world in 
the same way that he is recognized in this world, such that someone who knew him in this 
world would also know him in the next world as the soul is the same. As Ḥasanzāda clarifies: 
 
The secret in that is that the matter is the thing in potential, as the potential of something 
is not that thing. However, the form is the thing in action, and the activeness of something 
is that thing, so understand!874 
 
An argument along similar lines is an argument based on individualization. The wujūd of 
something is its individualization. The individualization of a person is by his soul and not his 
material body. The material body has no real importance in the specification (taʿayyun) of 
wujūd and is not an essential factor in determining the existence of the soul. Rather whatever 
matter the soul connects to is the same body, as individualization is determined by form 
rather than matter.875  
                                                          
871 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 332-333. 
872 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 333. 
873 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 332, nt.2 
874 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 332, nt. 4. 
875 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 174. 
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Another argument is from the principle of gradation in wujūd, which allows for intensification 
in wujūd, whilst maintaining its oneness throughout each grade.876 Gradation also allows for 
essential change (tabaddul al-dhātī) by motion in the category of substance, which is a change 
in the substance of something whilst maintaining the principle wujūd.877 Therefore something 
can be connected to matter in one instance and disconnected in another instance whilst 
maintaining its wujūd and genus.878 Hence things can exist in reality in the higher planes which 
do not have time or space, whilst also existing on a material plane, as its material existence is 
a shadow of its reality.879 Therefore a second body has the same reality as the first body and 
with this principle the concepts of decent and ascent and the pre-existence of the souls in the 
world of the souls or in the world of particles (ʿālim al-dharr) is explained.880 While these 
arguments may explain how both a type of corporeal and spiritual resurrection can occur, they 
does not show how the body that is raised will be the composed of the same matter as at death 
as the explanations rely on deemphasizing the importance of what matter the form attaches 
to. 
 
There are many questions that arise at this point such as what if the matter that made one 
human, to which he must necessarily return, becomes recycled due to natural processes and 
is eaten by another human? Which human does this matter belong to and how can both 
humans be raised while that matter cannot repeatedly exist? Following on from this question, 
                                                          
876 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 333. 
877 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 334-335. 
878 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 334-335. 
879 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 335, nt 17. 
880 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 336. 
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what if one human was a believer and the other an unbeliever, if the believers will be taken to 
heaven and the unbelievers to hell, how can they both share the same matter?881 This question 
is known as the question of the eater and the eaten (shubhah al-ākil wa al-maʾkūl). Mahdī Ilāhī 
Qumshihī answers by saying that God will protect the matter of the believer so that it does not 
mix with the disbeliever.882 This answer is based on a ḥadīth as will be shown further on.  
 
Sabzavārī also answers these questions in his Manẓūma. He proposes that the perceived 
change in matter is in fact a change of form. But this change in form is not a change in the real 
form of a thing. For example, if water changes into steam, it is not the case that the real form 
of water has changed. Rather it is that the form of the water wore the clothes of matter in one 
way as a liquid, and then in another way as a gas. Although a different form is required for 
both the liquid and the gas, these are not the real form of water.883 If the form occupies a 
certain matter, it is impossible for that matter to be occupied by another matter.884 Therefore 
each person will be raised with the very matter they died with. The form of a believer can 
never be the form of a disbeliever. It is not eating the matter which occupies the matter; rather 
it is the form that occupies it.  
 
Another way to answer this problem is to consider a single nondelimited (muṭlaq) form which 
occupies the all of the prime matter. In this case all of the changes that occur to matter are 
accidental rather than essential. Each form changes as time progresses within eternity 
                                                          
881 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda A৴mulƮ,̄ (5) 344-345. 
882 Ilāhī Qumshihī, Ḥikmat-i ilāhī, 317. 
883 Sabzavarī, Manẓūma, (5) 354-346. 
884 Sabzavarī, Manẓūma, (5) 346, nt. 9. 
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(dahr).885 Therefore what changes with the changing of time and space, is everlasting with the 
Everlasting.886 ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī formulates the impossibility of matter taking two forms 
while interpreting a tradition from Imam al-Ṣādiq. The tradition explains that the dust of the 
good people is like gold amongst the other dust and is protected (i.e. from change). That is 
that this problem does not occur as either the matter is not eaten or if it is eaten it never 
becomes the constituent matter of another. Using this explanation and the impossibility of 
reincarnation Zunūzī finds evidence for his view that the body makes its own journey towards 
perfection before being rejoined with the soul, and at the same time solves the problem of the 
eater and the eaten.887 
 
7. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s Solution to the Problem of Bodily Resurrection 
 
Perhaps the most complete discussion of bodily resurrection produced by the school of 
Tehran was that of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī whose view somewhat correlated with Ghiyāth al-
Dīn Dashtakī.888 Although Mullā Ṣadrā does discuss Dashtakī’s ideas in his al-Shawāhid al-
rubūbiyya, Zunūzī debates the issue in more clearly in his treatise called Sabīl al-rashād fī 
ithbāt al-maʿād.889 The treatise starts with a discussion of the difference between real and 
conceptual composites (al-murakkab al-ḥaqīqī and al-murakkab al-iʿtbārī) in order to explain 
that the relation between soul and body is that of a real composite. That is that the soul and 
the body are one reality in the same way that the soul and its various levels are one reality. So 
                                                          
885 Sabzavarī, Manẓūma, (5) 347. 
886 Sabzavarī, Manẓūma, (5) 347. 
887 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 94-99. 
888 Dīnānī, Maʿād, 64. 
889 Dīnānī, Maʿād, 64-65. 
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when the soul and the body or the soul and its levels are discussed as separate entities it is 
only for the sake of analysis rather than an absolute reflection of the way they are. The soul is 
however, at a higher level of existence and it affects the body as it is what administrates it. 
Each body is therefore an intricate and specific reflection of the soul as the characteristics of 
each soul affect the body that it administrates in the most intimate way.  
 
When the soul leaves the body on death the soul returns to the universal soul and the body 
continues its development with a general motion towards perfection that encompasses the 
whole corporeal world. It is a collective movement towards the afterlife based on the motion 
in the category of substance of each individual part of the universe. When the body completes 
its movement towards oneness it unites with the soul that is specific to it with oneness which 
is more perfect then the oneness in this world. This is the meaning of everything returning to 
its origin as the soul is the origin of the body.890 The movement is of the body to the soul, not 
the soul returning to the body.891 The body will not be exactly the same as it was in this world, 
as due to its perfection it will reflect the reality of the soul, but at the same time those that 
knew that individual in this world will know them in the next world by some kind of similarity. 
This is similar to the changes that a person undergoes in this world, from a child to a youth to 
an adult to an old man.892 Although the body has various forms when pictures of the different 
stages of the person’s life are aligned, the same individual is recognized. The body becoming 
                                                          
890 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 88-92. 
891 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 105. 
892 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 106. 
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otherworldly also challenges the opinion that the resurrection occurs on the same corporeal 
plane as the life of the world occurred.893  
 
When the body rejoins the soul it is not the imaginal body that is a reflection created by the 
soul, but the corporeal body which gains characteristics that are suitable for the imaginal 
world.894 It gains new characteristics like the ability to speak and testify to the acts that a 
person carried out. Zunūzī likens the connection to the connection between the corporeal 
body and the imaginal faculty while sleeping. The sight of a person becomes wider and the 
person can see the imaginal realm but at the same time the corporeal body does not become 
the imaginal body.895 Zunūzī’s key proof for these individual movements is that all movement 
is towards its own goal that is suitable for it, whether that be the movement of the body, the 
soul or anything else.896 Therefore matter moves towards a goal which is suitable for itself and 
that will necessarily not be the same as something that starts out as abstract.  
 
Zunūzī quickly spots the obvious contention to this argument which is that all of existence is 
moving towards one goal which is the Necessary Being from which everything came from. He 
answers by saying that his explanation is from the perspective of manyness. He attests to the 
view that when one looks with the eye of oneness all is from Him and all will return to Him 
regardless of intermediary causes.897 But from the perspective of manyness that return does 
not have to be in exactly the same way. This is especially true of the Judgment Day, which is 
                                                          
893 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 92-94. 
894 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 108. 
895 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 108. 
896 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 111. 
897 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 111. 
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only a level amongst the ever increasing levels of oneness and as manyness is attested by the 
various occurrences that take place on resurrection.  
 
Abū al-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī concurs with Zunūzī’s view in his treatise on maʿād while 
criticizing Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of a resurrected imaginal body alone as it does not correspond 
with the Islamic scriptural sources.898 Sabzavārī concurs with Mullā Ṣadrā in that the body will 
be imaginal, but the imaginal body is the corporeal body itself after it has lost its corporeal 
characteristics. He therefore explains what the perfection of the corporeal body is.899 Sabzavārī 
continues to defend his position by saying that the opinion that an imaginal form is not a body 
is mistaken. The distinguishing factor for a body is its existence in three dimensions and this 
is true of the imaginal body.900 Proposing an imaginal body is not denying the bodily 
resurrection as those that have proposed a spiritual resurrection alone do not believe in any 
role for a corporeal or imaginal body, while also claiming that the physical pleasures and pains 
of paradise and hell are metaphorical. Rather resurrection of an imaginal body is a complete 
confirmation of bodily resurrection.  
 
In fact the denial of a bodily resurrection is due to the denial of an imaginal plane, whereas 
the confirmation of the imaginal plane allows for a more refined interpretation of bodily 
resurrection.901 This interpretation means that no corporeal body is required for resurrection 
in the corporeal world as the body at the time of resurrection is imaginal and not corporeal, 
                                                          
898 Qazvīnī, Majmuʿa-yi rasāʾil, 18 
899 Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 479-480. 
900 Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 481. 
901 Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 481. 
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even though its origin was the same corporeal body that was lived in before death. That is 
exactly what the likes of Zunūzī and Rafīʿī Qazvīnī disagree with; rather for them the 
perfection of the corporeal body will be corporeal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles of the principality of existence, gradation and individualization 
refined his conception of the relationship between body and soul which he considered to be 
one graded reality. This view departed from the traditional view of the body and soul being 
two separate realities forcefully connected to each other during the soul’s stay in the corporeal 
world. Mullā Ṣadrā also considered the imaginal to be a level of an individualized soul and 
showed the relationship between the imaginal and corporeal bodies. It is on the imaginal 
plane that comprehension occurs even if the necessary prerequisites were corporeal, such as 
the prerequisites of sense perception. When the soul leaves the corporeal plane the same 
comprehension that occurred in the corporeal world occurs in the imaginal world but at a 
higher level as sense and the imaginal unite. His contribution in this sense is very significant 
both to philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān where the idea of an imaginal body had been 
discussed in relation to the Abdāl. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī of the school of Qum provides a 
classical ʿ irfānī reading of the issue of the imaginal body by tracing the topic through the works 
of the ʿurafāʾ to Mullā Ṣadrā’s Asfār.  
 
Based on his philosophy of the soul Mullā Ṣadrā was able to solve the most challenging 
problems in Islamic philosophy concerning resurrection. The conclusions he reached on those 
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problems flowed smoothly out of the principles he had established. Reincarnation was 
impossible as each soul was individualized. There was no reason to separate between bodily 
and spiritual resurrection as they were both the resurrection of one soul manifesting in 
different planes. There was no need to insist on the same corporeal body as the corporeal body 
changes as a natural factor of the corporeal world is creation and decay. Rather it was 
individualization that was important in the resurrection of the same soul and that soul would 
manifest an imaginal body. This reflection of the soul is created by it and so is in no need for 
matter in the same way as the imaginalization of the angels. The reality of the soul is 
manifested, which is known as celestial reincarnation.  
 
This conclusion did not sit well with traditional scholars who insisted that the resurrected 
body must be corporeal and must be the same body that the individual left on death. It was 
also a difficult idea to comprehend without the aid of witnessing. Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī of the school of Qum, decided to leave out the discussion of resurrection in his 
seminal texts, showing a preference for the teaching of what can be comprehended 
intellectually over what needed witnessing at its start. This naturally leads to a preference for 
the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as Mullā Ṣadrā’s standpoint on the issue of 
resurrection follows intuitively from his principles, but is more powerful with an ʿirfānī 
insight. Indeed, both witnessing and philosophical speculation are required to fully appreciate 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas on resurrection as he himself testifies.  
 
393  
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, of the school of Tehran, developed Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas but focused on 
the concept of motion in the category of substance to solve the critique of traditional scholars 
concerning the corporeal body. Basing his analysis on a ḥadīth from Imam al-Ṣādiq, ʿAlī 
Mudarris Zunūzī showed that the same individual corporeal body of the deceased will become 
the imaginal body suitable for the imaginal plane with the natural movement of the universe. 
The body moves towards the perfection of the soul rather than an abstract soul returning to 
an undeveloped corporeal body. This is the resurrected body which is at once the same 
corporeal body and the imaginal body that Mullā Ṣadrā stipulated.   
 
The interplay between the Islamic scriptural sources and the topic of resurrection is 
significant in Sadrian works and ultimately returns to the method in which the scriptural 
sources should be interpreted. Is it a literal interpretation which is most accurate? Or does the 
intellect refine the interpretation of the issue even if that interpretation seems to contradict 
what is immediately understood from the text? ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s view became the last 
principle view of the subject with Mullā Ṣadrā’s and Ibn Sīnā’s views. His view skillfully 
addresses the concerns of those with a more literal tendency as the body resurrected is the 
corporeal body, but it’s evolved state fits into the Sadrian analysis of resurrection. ʿAllāmah 
Tihrānī offers an explanation based on ʿirfānī principles, which negates the need for the 
continual manifestation of a body on any plane. Rather the soul comprehends the body 
limited by time by being out of time. That is that when the soul becomes timeless it 
comprehends once again the body that it had previously as it comprehends past present and 
future all of which have no meaning for the soul anymore.  
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While criticism of an idea can be shown through the works of authors who expressed opinions 
on it, silence in debating an idea also tells us about its reception. While there were more 
ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran who saw Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of resurrection as an 
important aspect of his overall philosophy and therefore engaged with it, some of the ḥukamāʾ 
of the school of Qum separated Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of wujūd from his ideas on 
resurrection. As I have shown, this is partially because of the different readings of Ṣadrā as his 
concept of an imaginal body is more palatable to an ʿirfānī reading. With the shift in 
preference towards a more philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā in the school of Qum 
engagement with Mullā Ṣadrā’s eschatology visibly declined and is absent from Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
seminal texts on transcendental philosophy.   
 
The perfect human plays a key role in resurrection as the intermediary between God and the 
rest of His creation. In the same way that through his reality the world was able to come into 
existence, so too is it able to return to God. The roles of the Imams and Lady Fāṭimah are a 
branch of the role of the perfect human as they are the Seals of nondelimited sainthood. The 
rule of the Names over a particular time is also significant as the dictates of the Names 
manifest in the outward planes. A change in Names causes resurrection. It is the death of the 
final Seal of the nondelimited Saints that causes the rule of some Names, such as the Manifest, 
to end and the rule of others, such as the Hidden, to begin. Resurrection occurs under the 
governance of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, and so all will annihilate in God. 
Manifestation is a key ʿirfānī concept which is used heavily by Mullā Ṣadrā. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the development of the two specified readings 
and explanations of Mullā Ṣadrā in the schools of Tehran and Qum and study their interaction 
within the modern Iranian ḥawza. The thesis aimed to address two areas that were under 
researched and has contributed to modern research in both areas. The first was a detailed 
investigation of the interaction of philosophy and ʿirfān within a Sadrian context through 
examining the various readings of ḥikmat and the second was the lack of research about the 
intellectual activity of the schools of Qum and Tehran. The thesis therefore has contributed to 
our understanding of the development of ḥikmat in the last two centuries as part of a wider 
history of Islamic philosophy as it is an era which still lacks in significant research especially 
with regard to the school of Qum.  
 
The introductory chapter contextualised the thesis within larger academic fields such the 
Islamic intellectual tradition and Shiʿi studies, narrowing down to Sufism and philosophy in 
Iran. This discussion showed the wide variety of interest groups that this thesis aimed to 
engage as well as the gap in modern research in the historical study of the schools of Tehran 
and Qum. It identified the lack of research on the interplay between various readings of Mullā 
Ṣadrā and what implications those readings might have. It also discussed the framework of 
the thesis by defining the readings as well as discussing the interplay between the intellect 
and unveiling as epistemological tools and their role in ḥikmat. The methodology explained 
my assumptions and limitations in forming a web of beliefs on the interaction between 
philosophical and ʿirfānī reasoning during the period concerned. It also identified the key 
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hermeneutic of the interplay between oneness and manyness in the differentiation between 
philosophical and ʿirfānī readings.  
 
Chapter one then proceeded to detail the schools of Tehran and Qum by first discussing the 
idea of a school and its limitations before moving on to investigate key figures, texts and links 
between students and teachers. It shed light on the link between various ḥukamāʾ in Iran and 
in Najaf. This exercise contributed to a significant lack of detail in figures related to this period. 
During the course of the chapter different philosophical and ʿirfānī inclinations between the 
schools of Tehran and Qum already began to appear and these differences were investigated 
further in the following chapters.  
 
The first of these chapters focused on wujūd which is the area most ḥukamāʾ commented on. 
In this chapter the hermeneutic of oneness and manyness was examined in relation to the 
explanations of wujūd of the ḥukamāʾ from the schools of Tehran and Qum. A key aspect of 
the analysis was their views on gradation and its use in explaining the reality of wujūd. Was 
wujūd really graded? Or was gradation a stepping stone to understand the sheer oneness of 
existence? The discussions on the various aspects of wujūd betrayed a rich tradition of 
interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā which was hitherto understudied but presented in detail in this 
thesis. A spectrum of readings began to emerge as while the interpretive exercise could be 
broadly classified as either philosophical or ʿirfānī, the ideas of the ḥukamāʾ of the period were 
complex. Indeed, the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran were apt in their used of both systems 
of thought, whereas a more philosophical approach became more evident with the school of 
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Qum. This phenomena, I argued, was largely to do with the introduction of seminal texts in 
the school of Qum that preferred a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and indeed omitted 
many ʿirfānī concepts weaved into ḥikmat. The exclusion of ʿirfānī ideas to further 
philosophise ḥikmat was shown in the next two chapters. 
 
Chapter three examined walāyah is the purpose of creation and distinguished between a 
philosophical reading of human perfection and an ʿirfānī one. It then moved on to examine 
the thoughts of various ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum showing how these 
different readings present themselves in their works. A ḥakīm’s explanation of walāyah and 
the soul was linked to his understanding of wujūd, as wujūd was the subject of both philosophy 
and ʿirfān whereas walāyah is one of the issues examined under each subject. At the same 
time, the choice not to write on walāyah was an indication of a philosophical preference as 
walāyah was heavily discussed as a primarily ʿirfānī topic. The spectrum of readings continued 
to surface as while philosophical readings relied on concepts such as gradation, ʿirfānī 
readings relied on the Names of God and the oneness of Existence. Muḥammad Riżā 
Qumshihī’s treatise on walāyah was a key aspect of the chapter as an outstanding example of 
the intellectual contribution of ḥukamāʾ of the period. The subsequent discussion of his 
treatise by Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī showed that these contributions continue to be discussed 
and developed betraying an active intellectual tradition. 
 
The final case study was on maʿād which comprises the third foundational tenant of Islam. 
Mullā Ṣadrā formulated important ideas on resurrection and specifically concerning the 
398  
resurrection of a subtle body rather than a corporeal one. He did this as a natural follow 
through of his ideas on the gradation and individualisation of wujūd. However, the pull of his 
philosophical framework did not entirely convince some ḥukamāʾ of the correctness of his 
ideas on resurrection and this was shown by a lack of willingness of later ḥukamāʾ to engage 
with them. I argued that one of the reasons for this phenomena was that the concept of a 
subtle body relied on ʿirfānī experience rather than philosophical reasoning alone. Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s philosophy of resurrection was completely omitted in Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s twin seminal texts. Another important aspect of this chapter was the contribution 
of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, who wrote an important treatise which tried to find the middle 
ground between the criticism of more traditional scholars and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas. The 
treatise is another example of the understudied but extremely valuable works of the period. 
From this study many useful results have emerged as well as areas for future research.  
 
The first and perhaps most fundamental is the gathering of evidence for the existence of these 
readings which were often alluded to in historical accounts of the period. While the assertion 
of the different preferences of the ḥukamāʾ in the interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā are stipulated 
in the biographical literature, it was not the remit of this type of literature to provide detailed 
proof of these generally accepted assertions. However, this thesis has traced the interaction of 
the sciences of philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān from a historical and epistemological 
perspective and has shown the implications of both readings on the way Mullā Ṣadrā is 
interpreted. Philosophy and ʿirfān were interrelated subjects long before the emergence of the 
Sadrian school. ʿUrafāʾ would write texts in the language of philosophers (like Tamhīd al-
Qawāʾid and Qayṣarī’s introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ, for example) and 
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philosophers would incorporate practical self purification in their quest for reality. 
Illuminationist philosophy clearly stipulated the need for wayfaring and practical 
programmes and introduced the issue of light. Yet Qayṣarī validates al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah 
whilst criticising other forms of philosophy. Mullā Ṣadrā included principles from theoretical 
ʿirfān to a much greater extent and proposed a new philosophy based on those principles. 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s works therefore contained the potential to be interpreted from a philosophical 
or ʿirfānī perspective and this is what was witnessed in the writings of his interpretive 
tradition.  
 
Building on these findings the thesis then moved on to show exactly how the different 
readings affected the ḥakīm’s approach to ḥikmat by working through the topics of the greatest 
theological interest in the chapters of wujūd, walāyah and maʿād and was able to identify 
factors which have caused a wider gap between the philosophical and ʿirfānī readings as the 
school of Qum developed. While the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran benefited from a greater 
synergy from both readings of Mullā Ṣadrā, a greater separation between the philosophical 
and ʿirfānī readings occurred with the generalisation of the teaching of ḥikmat to the majority 
of ḥawza students in Qum. That separation was greatly influenced by the introduction of twin 
teachings texts, Bidāyat and Niḥāyat, which were both written by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the 
generalization of the study of ḥikmat to all ḥawza students.  
 
While modern methods such as recorded and transcribed lectures have changed the 
landscape for the teaching of ḥikmat, the centrality of the taught introductory texts in 
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formulating a student’s perspective on ḥikmat cannot be emphasised enough. Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
presents a Peripatetic reading of ḥikmat and does not include the issue of resurrection at all 
despite it being one of Mullā Ṣadrā’s major contributions to philosophy. Consequently the 
teachers within the current ḥawza system such as Gulam-Riżā Fayyāżī and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī are 
much more pronounced in their philosophical approach then the ḥukamāʾ that preceded 
them; whereas other ḥukamāʾ such as Ḥasan Ramażānī and Yad-Allāh Yazdānpanāh push for 
a more holistic approach. Walāyah and maʿād are understudied in the philosophical reading 
as while walāyah is rooted in ʿirfānī principles, Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on bodily resurrection was 
very different to the Peripatetic conclusion reached by Ibn Sīnā. However, to grasp Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s view properly the ḥakīm must use both his intellect and unveiling.  
 
By investigating the works of the ḥukamāʾ of this period, some significant contributions that 
were made to ḥikmat and ʿirfān during this time were elucidated, such as Qumshihī’s 
discussion of Ibn ʿArabī’s interpretation the Seal of the Saints in the Futuḥāt and ʿAlī Mudarris 
Zunūzī’s reinterpretation of bodily resurrection. Many ḥukamāʾ and their works were 
introduced in chapter one most of whom are worthy of separate studies both in terms of their 
ideas and their impact on the Sadrian interpretive tradition. Some key figures include 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Kāẓīm ʿ Aṣṣār, Muḥammad ʿ Alī Shāhabādī, Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshihī, 
and in the contemporary era figures such as Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī and ʿAbd Allāh Jawādī 
Āmulī. There is a lack of studies on the ideas of most of these figures in the Persian language 
as well as in English. 
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The ḥikmat and ʿirfān traditions of Qum and Najaf were linked by Iranian ḥukamāʾ who 
travelled to Najaf in order to complete their further studies in jurisprudence and its principles. 
At the same time, a parallel tradition developed from Tehran to Qum with ḥukamāʾ that did 
not travel to Najaf. This thesis traced this relationship through the students of Muḥammad 
Bīdābādī, many of whom were experts in ʿ irfān. It is through Bīdābādī’s students that the ʿ irfānī 
reading of Mullā Ṣadrā became available to other traditional scholars studying in Najaf. This 
is an issue that requires further study as although the link between these two centres of 
learning was relevant to the discussion of ḥikmat in Iran — as many of Bīdābādī’s students 
returned to Iran to become teachers in the school of Qum — much of the discussion 
concerning the development of ḥikmat and ʿirfān in Najaf was outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
Important students of Bīdabādī such as Ṣadr al-Dīn Dizfūlī were precursors to hukamāʾ such 
as Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī and Muḥammad Jawād Tabrīzī taught key teachers in the school of Qum 
such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī. Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī also studied 
under Bīdābādī and was the teacher of the at least three of the four ḥukamāʾ who established 
the school of Tehran as well as Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī. The ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā can be 
traced back to Bīdabādī from the second generation of the students of Hāshim Rashtī through 
Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī to Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Muẓaffar Iṣfahānī 
who was the student of Bīdābādī. Diagrammatic representations of some of these chains were 
presented in chapter one. Therefore two parallel chains of students of Bīdābādī continue the 
interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā; one in Iran in the schools of Tehran and Qum and the 
other in Najaf later returning to Iran and the school of Qum.  
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Iranian ḥukamāʾ went to Najaf in order to study jurisprudence and its principles at the highest 
level and this process took a good number of years. In those important intellectual years 
relationships were formed between ḥukamāʾ who studied the core ḥawza sciences but at the 
same time had an interest in studying and teaching ḥikmat. But with the decline of the ḥawza 
in Najaf the migration of scholars has all but ceased. Whilst the centres of Qum and Najaf and 
the relationship between them has received some academic attention, the ḥikmat aspect of 
this relationship is still under researched. This thesis has established some of the links in terms 
of teacher student relationships and readings of Mullā Ṣadrā. Studying the charismatic 
authority of these ḥukamāʾ in the post-revolutionary Iranian conscious within the ḥawza and 
outside of it, as well as the affect of that vision on Iranian culture is also an area of further 
research. 
 
The ḥukamāʾ studied in this thesis fall along a spectrum between a purely philosophical 
reading of ḥikmat and a purely ʿirfānī reading. While many found a middle ground between 
these two readings most displayed a preference for one kind of reading over another. The 
writings of ḥukamāʾ such as ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Abū-
l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī, Hādī Sabzavārī, Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
showed a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā where philosophical principles were primarily 
used to explain and analyse the topics of wujūd, walāyah and maʿād. They expounded a 
number of topics in a philosophical way and rarely delved beyond the surface of a more ʿirfānī 
approach. Their works were also skewed in this direction and some such as Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva 
have been critiqued by later ḥukamāʾ for the work they did on ʿirfānī texts whilst not being 
fully qualified to do so. While the writings of Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī had a 
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greater leaning towards Peripatetic philosophy, the other ḥukamāʾ in this category were more 
faithful to Mullā Ṣadrā’s synergistic philosophical framework and critiqued the Peripatetics 
and Illuminationists. While their explanation of the key topics in Islamic belief was more 
philosophical, they often included ʿ irfānī interpretations as part of those explanations, usually 
after more philosophical points.  
 
Philosophy therefore was important in preparing the mind of the reader for a more delicate 
ʿirfānī point which was often also presented as the truth of the matter at hand. This was 
illustrated in ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī’s treatment of how God’s creation knows him. After 
philosophising the issue he ends with and ʿirfānī point where he explains that God is only 
known in proportion to His effusion. This medium way perhaps reflects Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
approach most faithfully. What differentiates these ḥukamāʾ from the more ʿirfānī ḥukamāʾ is 
that philosophy was the basis from which ʿirfān was to be understood and not vice versa. 
Philosophy was the primary tool used for discussion and ʿirfān was secondary. This point was 
particularly apparent in the discussion in chapter two concerning the different interpretations 
of the oneness of Existence according to ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī and 
Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī. All three ḥukamāʾ discussed wujūd as opposed to Wujūd and 
approached the question of what the oneness of Existence really meant from a philosophical 
perspective rather than an ʿirfānī one.  
 
A spectrum also exists within this category of ḥukamāʾ as Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī took a 
more philosophical approach to understanding and evaluating the different possible 
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interpretations of the oneness of Existence then Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī. Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
approach on the other hand was to discuss the issue of wujūd solely from a philosophical 
perspective without reference to the oneness of Existence discussed by the ʿūrafāʾ. Indeed in 
Bidāyat and Nihāyat he discusses wujūd in a Peripatetic manner by focusing on the concept of 
wujūd rather than wujūd in the extramental. The difference between the study of wujūd as a 
concept and wujūd in the extramental was discussed in the beginning of the thesis when the 
different readings were analysed. This method has the potential to cause confusion for the 
reader as while the subject of ḥikmat is wujūd in the extramental, the explanation of wujūd as 
a concept can be misinterpreted if the reader is unclear on the subject or indeed approaches 
the study of ḥikmat with a Peripatetic approach. Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva’s critique of the oneness of 
Existence reflected this confusion in readings as he found it difficult to reconcile extramental 
oneness and conceptual manyness. On the other hand ʿAṣṣār defends the seemingly heretical 
poetry of Ibn ʿArabī in the light of his view of the oneness of Existence by explaining different 
types of relation. His was an approach that used philosophy to explain ʿirfānī concepts rather 
than using philosophy as the main tool of understanding. 
 
This difference was also seen in the discussion of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view on gradation by 
Muḥammad Shāhābādī, the son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī who was the spiritual mentor 
of Khumaynī. While Ṭabāṭabāʾī argued that gradation was a real effect of the Necessary Being 
and therefore using gradation to prove the existence of the Necessary Being was a type of innī 
(from the effect to the cause) argument, Muḥammad Shāhābādī argued that the meaning of 
gradation was that the Essence indicated the Essence and so gradation was existence and not 
a necessary aspect of it. Ṭabāṭabāʾī also opted for a philosophical explanation of the journey 
405  
of the human to annihilation in his Risālat al-walāya even though many issues discussed in 
the text are of an ʿirfānī nature. His method in such texts was use philosophical explanations 
and to link those explanations to the scriptural sources. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s treaties on the 
Muḥammadan reality opted for a philosophical analysis and left out the issue of the Names. 
Conversely and ʿirfānī reading of the same concept would be inconceivable without some 
reference to the Names and their relationship to the Muḥammadan reality. Rather ʿAlī 
Mudarris Zunūzī substituted the Names for the Platonic Forms which are separate entities 
unlike the Names. He returns to the issue of the Names only when expounding the reality of 
the perfect human. 
 
Other ḥukamāʾ such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār, Fāżil Tūnī, Aḥmad 
Āshtiyānī, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī, Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī and 
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī championed an ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā where ʿirfānī principles were 
preferred to interpret Mullā Ṣadrā. While these ḥukamāʾ also used philosophical 
interpretations at times there was a clear preference for using theoretical ʿirfān to get to the 
depths of ḥikmat. For these ḥukamāʾ the truth of what Mullā Ṣadrā wanted to explain was 
ʿirfānī and therefore in order to get to grasp Mullā Ṣadrā, to expand his ideas further and to 
elucidate and develop what Mullā Ṣadrā did not mention in his books the study of ʿirfān was 
key. Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical framework was extremely useful in getting to grasp with 
ʿirfānī concepts. While the first group of ḥukamāʾ used philosophy as the bases for 
understanding, this group of ḥukamāʾ found their basis in ʿirfān and understood Mullā Ṣadrā 
from that vantage point.  
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Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār demonstrated the usefulness of philosophy in explaining some of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
seemingly heretical poetry. He differentiated the different types of relation and then 
proceeded to explain the oneness of Existence from the perspective of gradation but 
differentiated between gradation in its philosophical sense and its ʿirfānī sense. He also 
skilfully differentiated the different types of relation in order to show how ʿirfānī relation, 
which he called agent relation, is different to philosophical relation, which he called opposing 
relation. Using the concept of the oneness of Existence he was able to defend the utterance of 
Ibn ʿArabī and reach a better understanding. His approach was as to use philosophy to aid his 
discussion of theoretical ʿirfān. Ḥasanzāda on the other hand reversed this approach and used 
classical works in theoretical ʿirfān concerning the issue of the Abdāl to explain Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
ideas on the imaginal body.  
 
A spectrum of views was displayed in this group of ḥukamāʾ as well when Khumaynī criticised 
Muḥammad RiżāQumshihī’s view on the comparison between the permanent archetypes and 
quiddity as inaccurate due to its philosophically inclined view of the permanent archetypes. 
While Qumshihī argues that the permanent archetypes cannot be considered quiddity as they 
do not even enter the system of wujūd, Khumaynī argues that the distinction between wujūd 
and quiddity is from the perspective of manyness and so therefore cannot be directly 
compared in the system of the oneness of Existence. It is these detailed discussions that throw 
light on the meaning of existence and its necessary implications in ḥikmat and ʿirfān and 
indeed highlight the similarities and differences between them. The view that the ḥakīm opts 
for has profound effects on his reading of ʿirfānī and ḥikmat texts. 
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In the process of answering the main research questions of this thesis a number of other 
interesting issues arose. The first was an insight into the method of study of a student of ḥikmat 
in the modern Iranian ḥawza. By using the taught texts of the seminary as a basis and then 
expanding the discussion of key concepts through the works of the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of 
Tehran and Qum the reader of this thesis followed the process of development of the thought 
of a seminary student. The stage by stage process through which the student goes through 
shows the method of gradual teaching based on texts and further research which is the 
method of traditional studies in the ḥawza. Through this method the student is expected to 
grow with the text; unlocking its meanings; thinking over its delicacies and problems; and 
eventually outgrowing the text and moving onto a deeper text and more intricate discussions 
until they are able to have their own opinions and contribute to the interpretive tradition or 
indeed invent a new framework.  
 
After studying a number of texts the student is able to read other texts within the field while 
having a benchmark from which to analyse those texts. Students are also taught how to read 
and write texts by carefully analysing the texts of others. Through discussing the glosses and 
treatises of the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum the latter aspects of this process 
was also shown as these are the mediums through which new ideas are presented in the 
seminary. Modern students of ḥikmat begin with a Peripatetic reading of ḥikmat where the 
issues of walāyah and maʿād are not even discussed. It is only at a more advanced stage where 
they would encounter the latter two and at this stage they would have already developed a 
Peripatetic approach. It is only through studying theoretical ʿirfān with a view towards a 
different reading of ḥikmat that a more holistic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā can be formulated. But 
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this requires time and the students who do not intend to specialise in philosophy and ʿirfān 
understand Mullā Ṣadrā primarily through a Peripatetic reading of ḥikmat. 
 
The second issue was a presentation of the major principles of ḥikmat and ʿirfān as well as a 
comparison between them. While Sadrian ḥikmat shares much in common with theoretical 
ʿirfān, the subjects are not the same. The epistemological discussion on the interplay between 
the intellect and kashf showed that both had their place in ḥikmat and ʿirfān. While kashf was 
the primary way to experience and grasp reality, the intellect played a key role in deciphering, 
explaining and developing insights received by unveiling. Wujūd is the most widely discussed 
issue amongst ḥukamāʾ as from it the most important principles are derived. It is first 
discussed as part of the general issues (al-umūr al-ʿāmmā) before being analysed further in 
relation to the Necessary Being in the specific issues (al-umūr al-khāṣṣa).  
 
While not all ḥukamāʾ will necessarily comment on the issues of walāyah and maʿād one 
would be hard pressed to find a ḥakīm with nothing to say about wujūd. For these reasons the 
chapter on wujūd was lengthier than the chapters on walāyah and maʿād and this is reflective 
on the literature produced in the period. In the chapter on wujūd the philosophical reading of 
Mullā Ṣadrā presents a wujūd which is self evident, principle and graded. While these concepts 
are shared amongst this reading and the other readings of Mullā Ṣadrā what distinguishes it 
as philosophical is its focus on the existence of existents. This focus made it hard for the 
ḥukamāʾ with the philosophical reading of wujūd to come to terms with the theory of the 
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oneness of Existence proposed by the ʿurafāʾ and consequently affected their ability to delve 
into the issues of walāyah and maʿād.  
 
On the other hand, the ʿirfānī reading presented Existence as essentially one and so 
interpreted univocality, quiddity and gradation differently. Other issues such as self evidency, 
actuality (nafs al-amr) and relation also carried different meanings based on the system of 
ʿirfān. The primary hermeneutic in ʿirfān was that of oneness which starkly contradicts the 
idea of separate existents propounded in philosophy. Manyness is explained through other 
concepts such as self-disclosure, manifestation and the analysis of Wujūd through conditions 
that do not give real existence to anything except Wujūd. Walāyah and wujūd are 
interconnected topics as walāyah answers the question of why wujūd emanates from the 
Necessary Existent. Therefore different explanations of walāyah were given according to the 
preferred reading of wujūd of the various ḥukamāʾ. While the ʿirfānī explanation of walāyah 
concentrated on the Names and the permanent archetypes, the philosophical explanation 
relied on concepts such as gradation and the First Intellect. The ʿirfānī exposition of walāyah 
is extensive, but the main concern of the thesis was to show how the concept was read 
differently by the different ḥukamāʾ. At the same time, Sadrian philosophers introduced 
oneness in the theory of the soul where the soul is the shadow of True Unity.  
 
Resurrection also builds on both wujūd and walāyah. While the most important issue in the 
chapter on resurrection was bodily resurrection which is primarily philosophical, the theory 
of resurrection as a whole can be understood in an ʿ irfānī light as well. The perfect human who 
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is the nondelimited Seal of the Saints plays an essential role in the return of all beings to their 
Creator due to his ontological position in the arch of decent and ascent and this was expressed 
by Mullā Ṣadrā in his Asfār.  
   
The third result was a glimpse into the correspondence between the scriptural sources, ḥikmat 
and ʿirfān. While there is still scope for further research into this area by the school of Qum 
itself, there is a clear correspondence between the fields. The relationship was illustrated in 
the discussion of the self evident nature of wujūd and its relation to the ontological arguments 
in reference to a ḥadīth from the Prophet when he was asked how he knew his Lord. Instead 
of knowing God from tracing the existence of existents back to the Necessary Being, the 
Prophet responds by saying that it is by God that he knew things. This is a quintessentially 
ʿirfānī response as it indicates towards the direct witnessing of God and oneness but is also 
linked to ḥikmat through ontological arguments which substitute existence for God. It is the 
knowledge of the soul — an important aspect of ḥikmat — which leads to knowledge of God 
according to a ḥadīth.  
 
Sabzavārī’s argument that in the extramental the meaning of wujūd is neither strictly univocal 
nor a homonymy, but is different for God and for other existents also found roots in the 
scriptural sources, which are adamant that God cannot be compared in any sense with His 
creation but at the same time the intuitive grasp of His existence is hard wired into the very 
nature of man. This issue was further philosophised by ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī who showed that 
God could not be known by His creation by categorising the different types of knowledge. His 
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point about the extent of knowledge being to the extent of effusion was completed by 
Qumshihī and Khumaynī who both showed that the vision of all knowers is through the niche 
of the Seal of the Saints. 
 
Another example was Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s answer to Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tihrānī about the 
correspondence between Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of motion in the category of substance and the 
verses of Qurʾān. Ṭabāṭabāʾī quoted a verse from the chapter of the Believers to show that man 
starts as a bodily creation and is then bestowed with a soul, but not in the sense of 
composition. Rather the whole creation of man becomes spiritual and is different to a pure 
material existence. The scriptural sources were an important part of the exposition of wujūd 
and walāyah in ʿirfān and in many cases clarity on an issue was given by quoting a Qurʾānic 
verse or a ḥadīth. This relationship became more manifest in the section on walāyah, and a 
plethora of literature was written especially by the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum who used 
the idea of the perfect human extensively to explain the position of the Imams and the 
superiority of Imam ʿ Alī over his contemporaries. Qumshihī used an ʿirfānī framework and the 
concept of the Exclusively Possessed Names to present a well known argument for the 
superiority of Imam ʿAlī in a new light. He thereafter went to show that this could have been 
the apparent belief of Ibn ʿArabī himself based on a statement in the Futūḥāt.  
 
This effort of Qumshihī is significant in the fight for the acceptance of ḥikmat and ʿ irfān among 
critics in the traditional ḥawza. The frameworks offered by ḥikmat and ʿirfān provide stronger 
readings of the scriptural sources due to their epistemic basis and strengthen textual and 
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historical conclusions. At times they explain intricacies in the scriptural sources which were 
hard to explain or provide deeper insights into their meaning. Conversely the scriptural 
sources also inspired ḥukamāʾ in their discussions such as that of the perfect woman. The 
scriptural sources are the benchmark for witnessing as they are an expression of the full 
Muḥammadan unveiling which cannot be surpassed.  
 
The scriptural sources perhaps played the largest role in the topic if resurrection. Aside from 
explaining the particularities of the afterlife it shaped philosophical discussion on the nature 
of bodily resurrection. Perhaps some of this focus was in the light of criticism from the 
theologians who condemned philosophy as contradictory to the outward statements of the 
scriptural sources. In that light, philosophers had to prove that their concept of resurrection 
was in line with the scriptural sources even if their interpretation was not a literal one and 
conversely prove the invalidity of a purely literal interpretation of the scriptural sources 
concerning resurrection.   
 
The final issue was the usefulness of ḥikmat in explaining and providing a stronger framework 
for theoretical ʿirfān. The idea of modes was a better way to explain the relationship between 
the various Names than the relationship between wujūd and quiddity that Qayṣarī used. 
Different types of relation easily explain the oneness of Existence while different existents are 
conceptualised. The flow of wujūd aids in the explanation of the flow of the Breath of the All-
Merciful and the The Real Through Whom Creation Takes Place. Qumshihī uses a 
philosophical example to lead to an ʿirfānī conclusion in his explanation of the ḥadīth: “The 
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first of us is Muḥammad...” The subject of the imaginal body also received great attention from 
Sadrian philosophers, who offered competing theories as to how the corporeal body would 
become imaginal.  
 
The study was limited to the works that were accessible as well as to the some of the more 
famous ḥukamāʾ. There is a lot of room for researching the ideas and contributions of a whole 
host of figures and works from the schools of Tehran and Qum. Many works were listed in 
chapter one while discussing the biographical details of the ḥukamāʾ that were peripheral to 
the main thrust of the investigation in this thesis. These personalities and works deserve 
further attention especially since some of these ḥukamāʾ are instrumental in the transfer of 
ḥikmat such as Ḥusayn Bādkūbahī, Mahdī Āshtyānī, ʿAlī Akbar Yazdī Ḥakīmī, Muḥammad 
Jaʿfar Langarūdī and Hāshim Rashtī. There is also room to further explore the ideas of the 
ḥukamāʾ that were discussed to some extent in this thesis. The rich works of Muḥammad Riżā 
Qumshihī especially offer tantalising prospects in the field of theoretical ʿirfān.  
 
Another important area that requires further research is the affect of ḥikmat on Sufi discourse 
in Iran. While this thesis focused on the more traditional sphere of the ḥawza, there were some 
important Sufi’s that attended classes in ḥikmat such as Maʿsūm Alī Shāh who studied under 
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī.902 How did these Sufi’s use ḥikmat in their own field and how did they 
conversely contribute to the development of ʿirfānī readings and theoretical ʿirfān within a 
more traditional setting? An indication of their importance was seen in the relationship 
                                                          
902 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 460. 
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between Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī and Muḥammad Bīdabādī. But what more can we learn about 
these relationships and what was the extent of cross fertilization? Other trends such as the 
interaction between the ḥukamāʾ and Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī; the impact of western philosophy and 
the development of the teaching and critique of western philosophy in the ḥawza; the maktab 
al-tafkīk and its modern manifestations and an examination of the scriptural reading of Mullā 
Ṣadrā are all important trends that deserve further investigation. 
 
Ḥikmat revolutionised Islamic philosophy and at the same time works in theoretical ʿirfān 
used a philosophical voice to explain their views. While those works used the philosophy of 
their time, ḥikmat provides a new set of concepts and terms which greatly aids the explanation 
of theoretical ʿirfān. Mullā Ṣadrā embarked on an interesting project of ridding philosophy of 
manyness using two key principles. For existents in the extramental he used the concept of 
gradation, where the reality of gradation was oneness and for issues that could not be 
incorporated into gradation — such as quiddity — he categorised as conceptual in reality and 
gave its reality to wujūd. This unification of the philosophy of wujūd brought ḥikmat close to 
the oneness of Existence in theoretical ʿirfān.  
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Glossary 
 
ʿadam dhātƬ:̄ Essential nonexistence  
ʿadam zamānƬ:̄ Temporal nonexistence 
ʿadam: Nonexistence 
aḍghāth aḥlām: Confused dreams 
adhkār: Formulations of invocation 
aḥādīth: Actions or words reported to have been spoken by the Prophet or the Imāms. 
al-ajnās al-ʿālīyah: The highest genera [summum genera] 
ajzāʾ: Parts 
akhaṣṣ al-lawāzim: The most specific proprium 
ākhirah: The hereafter 
akhfā: The more hidden 
ʿaks al-ḥaml: Reverse predication 
ʿālam al-dharr: The world of particles 
ʿālam al-mādda: The corporeal world 
ʿālam al-mithāl: The isthmus/ The Imaginal world 
ʿālam al-ʿuqūl: The world of the Intellects 
ʿāmā: The Cloud 
ʿaql: The intellect 
al-ʿaql al-kullī: The Universal Intellect 
aʿrāḍ: Accidental properties 
asạ̄lat al-māhīyah: The primacy of quiddity 
asạ̄lat al-wujūd wa-ʿaynīyat al-māhīyah: The principality of wujūd and quiddity 
asạ̄lat al-wujūd: The primacy of existence 
al-asmāʾ al-mustaʾtharah: Exclusively possessed Names 
ʿawāriḍ dhātīyah: Essential accidents 
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awliyāʾ: Saints/friends  
al-aʿyān al-khārijīyah: The external archetypes 
al-aʿyān al-thābitah: The permanent archetypes 
ʿayn al-yaqīn: Certain witnessing 
badāʾ: Change in decree. 
badan ukhrawƬ:̄ Otherworldly body 
baḥth al-khārij: Advanced research 
barzakh: The isthmus 
bisạ̄tạh: Simplicity 
basƬ̣t̄:̣ Simple 
bātịn: The inward 
bi-sharṭ lā: With the condition of being negated  
bi-sharṭ shay’: With a condition. 
burhān al-innī: A posteriori argument 
burhān al-limmī: A priori argument 
burḥān al-ṣiddīqīn: An ontological proof for the existence of God 
burhān: Proof 
buṭlān al-ṭafira: The impossibility of a gap in effusion. 
ḍaʿf: Weakness 
dahrī: Atemporal 
ḍarūrƬ:̄ Necessary 
dhāt: Essence 
dhawq: Taste 
dunyā: The world 
al-falsafah al-ilāhƬȳah: Divine philosophy 
fanāʾ: Annihilation 
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al-faqr al-wujūdƬ:̄ Existential poverty 
fasḷ: Differentia 
fayḍ: Effusion 
al-fayḍ al-aqdas: The most sacred effusion 
al-fayḍ al-muqaddas: The sacred effusion 
fikr: Thinking  
fiʿl: Action  
fiʿlīyah: Actuality 
fiṭra: natural disposition 
ghayb al-ghuyūb: Unseen of the unseen 
ḥadīth: Single of aḥādīth. 
al-ḥaḍarah al-ʿilmīyah: The Knowledge Presence/ The Presence of God’s Knowledge before 
existence  
ḥajj: Major pilgrimage 
ḥakīm: Sadrian philosopher 
ḥaml: Predication 
al-ḥaml al-awwalƬ ̄al-dhātƬ:̄ Primary essential predication/ intensional prediction 
ḥaml al-ḥaqƬq̄a ʿalā  al-raqƬq̄a: The predication of reality on its shadow 
al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-sịnāʿƬ:̄ Common technical predication/ extensional prediction  
ḥaqƬq̄ah: The reality 
al-ḥaqƬq̄ah al-Muḥammadīyah: The Muḥammadan reality 
ḥaqƬq̄Ƭ:̄ real  
al-Ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi: The Real Through Whom Creation Takes Place 
ḥaqq al-yaqƬn̄: Truth of certainty/experiencing the reality with certainty 
al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah: Motion in the category of substance 
ḥawza: Traditional Islamic seminary. 
al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq: A speaking/rational animal 
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ḥaythīyah: Mode 
ḥaythīyat al-sịdq: Mode of reference 
ḥaythīyāt: Modes 
hayūlā: Prime matter 
al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah: Transcendental philosophy 
hikāyah: Mimesis 
ḥikmat al-ishrāq: Illuminationist philosophy 
ḥikmat: Short for transcendental philosophy 
al-hiliyah al-basƬt̄ạh: Simple proposition/ a proposition in which the existence of something is 
confirmed. 
ḥudūth zamānī: Temporal origination 
hudūth: Origination  
ḥukamāʾ: Plural of ḥakīm (Lit.)The wise ones 
huwīyah: Ipseity 
iʿādah al-maʿdūm: The return to existence of nonexistent things 
 iżāfah ishrāqīyah: An illuminative relation 
iḥātạ: Comprehension 
ijtimāʿ al-naqƬḍ̄ayn: The coming together of two contradictories. 
ʿilm al-dhāt bi-l-dhāt: Where an essence is known by its own essence 
ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī: Knowledge by presence  
ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī: Knowledge by acquisition 
ʿilm al-yaqīn: Certain knowledge 
imkān: Possibility 
al-imkān al-ashraf : The possibility of the nobler 
imtināʿ: Impossibility 
inqilāb: A violation of the law of identity 
al-insān al-kāmil: The perfect human 
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al-ʿirfān al-ʿamalī: Practical ʿirfān  
al-ʿirfān al-naẓarī: Theoretical ʿirfān  
ishtirāk lafẓƬ:̄ Homonymy 
ishtirāk maʿnawƬ:̄ Univocity 
al-ism al-jāmiʿ: The Comprehensive Name 
iʿtibār: Conceptual construct 
itḷāq: Nondelimitation 
al-itḷāq al-ḥaqƬq̄Ƭ ̄al-iḥātƬ̣:̄ Nondelimited with real comprehensive nondelimitation 
itḷāq-i kamālƬ:̄ Nondelimited perfection 
ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl: The identity thesis 
ittiḥād: Union 
iżāfa: Relation 
iżāfah-i fāʿilƬ:̄ Agent relation 
iżāfah-i qābulƬ:̄ Opposing relation 
jadhba: Attraction 
jamʿ: Completeness 
jawhar: Substance 
jins: Genus  
al-jins wa al-faṣl al-ṣināʿī: A specified genus and species 
jism: Body  
al-jism al-laṭīf: Subtle body 
jismānƬȳat al-ḥudūth: Corporeal in its origin. 
juz’: Particular 
kamāl irsālƬ ̄sarayānƬ:̄ Flowing emanating perfection 
kamāl Perfection 
al-khārij: The extramental 
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kashf maʿnawī: Meaning unveiling 
kashf ṣūrī: Image unveiling 
kashf: Unveiling 
kathrah: Multiplicity  
kawn: Creation 
al-kayf al-nafsānī: Psychic quality/A quality of the soul 
khātim al-anbiyāʾ: The seal of the prophets 
khātim al-awliyāʾ: The seal of the saints 
khayāl: The faculty of imagination 
al-khayāl al-munfasịl: Discontiguous imagination 
al-khayāl al-muttasịl: Contiguous imagination 
khilāfah: Vicegerency 
kitāb al-āfāqƬ:̄ The book of the horizon 
kitāb al-anfusƬ:̄ The book of the soul 
kitāb tadwƬn̄Ƭ:̄ The recorded book 
kull: Universal 
lā bi-sharṭ al-muqsimī: Without condition as the source of division. 
lā bi-sharṭ al-qismī: Without condition as a division. 
lāzim: Necessary 
liqāʾ Allah: Meeting with God 
maʿād: Resurrection 
al-maʿād al-jismānī: Bodily resurrection 
al-maʿād al-ruḥānī: Spiritual resurrection 
al-maʿānƬ ̄al-ḥarfīyah: Incomplete meanings/non-substantive notions 
māddah: Matter 
maʿdūm: Nonexistent 
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mafātƬḥ̄ al-ghayb: The keys of the unseen 
mafhūm: Concept 
māhīyah: Quiddity 
al-malaʾ al-aʿlā: The highest presence 
manāzil: Stations 
manshaʾ: Origin 
maqūlāt: The categories 
al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah: The secondary intelligibles 
maʿrifa: Knowing 
masāʾil: Issues 
masdūd: Blocked 
al-martabah al-aḥadīyah: The degree of Non-dualistic Unity 
al-martabah al-wāḥidīyah: The degree of Dualistic Unity 
mawḍūʿ: Subject 
mawjūd: Existent 
al-mawādd al-thalātha: The three modalities 
al-mawt al-ikhtiyārī: Voluntary death 
misḍāq: Referent  
mizāj: Constitution 
mubham: unspecific 
mughālaṭa: Error/ sophistry 
muḥaqqiqūn: The realizers 
mujarrad: Abstract 
mulāzamāt: Necessary implications 
mumkin al-wujūd: A contingent existent  
murakkab: Composite 
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al-murakkab al-ḥaqīqī: Real composite 
al-murakkab al-iʿtbārī: Conceptual composite 
musāwiq: Synonymous 
mushāhadah: Witnessing 
mutaʿayyin: Determined 
nabī: Prophet 
al-nafas al-Raḥmānī: The Breath of the All-Merciful. 
nafs al-amr: Actuality, which is neither in the mental nor the extramental 
al-nafs al-hayawānīyah: The animal soul 
al-nafs al-jamādīyah: The mineral soul 
al-nafs al-kullīyah: The universal soul 
al-nafs al-nabātīyah: The plant soul 
al-nafs al-nātịqah: Rational soul 
naqs:̣ Imperfection 
nawʿƬ ̄i‘tibārƬ ̄ʿaqlƬ:̄ Conceptual intellectual specificity 
nawʿīyah: Being-a-species 
nisba: Relation 
nubuwwah: Prophethood 
al-nūr al-Muḥammadī: The Muḥammadan light 
nuzūl: Descent 
qaḍāyā nafs al-amrīyah: Propositions that have no direct reference to ascertain their 
truthfulness in the mind or in the extramental  
qadƬm̄: Outside of time/eternal 
al-qaws al-nuzūlī: The arch of decent 
al-qaws al-sụʿūdƬ:̄ The arch of ascent 
al-qiyāmah al-kubrā: Major resurrection 
al-qiyāmah al-sughrā al-āfāqī: Minor horizonal resurrection 
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al-qiyāmah al-ṣughrā: Minor resurrection 
quwwa idrāk al-kulliyāt: The potential to comprehend universals. 
quwwah: Potential 
raʾy: Personal opinion 
raḥim: The womb 
rajʿah: the Return 
rasm: A description 
rasūl: Messenger 
rūḥ: Spirit 
al-rūḥ al-aʿẓam: The greatest soul 
rūḥānīyat al-baqāʾ: Spiritual in its subsistence 
al-sạ̄dir al-awwal: The first emanation 
al-sạ̄dir al-thānƬ:̄ The second emanation 
safar-i nafs: The journey of the soul 
sālik: Wayfarer 
sarayān: Flow  
shaʾn: A task 
shakhsị̄yah: Being-a-individual 
sharīʿah: The divine law 
shayʾīyah: Being-a-thing 
shidda: Intensity 
shu’ūn: Tasks 
shubhah al-ākil wa al-ma’kūl: The contention of the eater and the eaten. 
sirr: The secret 
sulūk: Wayfaring  
sụ̄ra: An image 
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al-sụwar al-ʿilmīyah: Intelligible forms 
al-sụwar al-nawʿīyah: Specific forms 
taʿayyun: Determination 
al-taʿayyun al-iḥātƬ̣:̄ Comprehensive determination 
al-taʿayyun al-taqābulƬ:̄ Oppositional determination 
tabāyun: Exclusive 
tabaddul al-dhātī: Essential change 
tabdīl: Transformation 
taḥvīl-i dhātī: Essential transformation 
tajallī: Self-disclosure 
al-tajarrud al-tāmm: Complete abstraction 
tajassum al-a‘māl: The embodiment of actions 
takāmul al-barzakhī: Development in the Isthmus. 
tamaththul: Imaginalization 
tanāsukh: Reincarnation 
al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī: Celestial reincarnation 
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī: Corporeal reincarnation 
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī al-munfaṣil: Corporeal disconnected reincarnation 
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī al-muttaṣil: Corporeal connected reincarnation 
tanbīh: Indication 
taqyīd: Delimitation 
tarāduf: Synonymy  
tạrƬq̄ah: The path 
tarkīb: Composition  
tasalsul: Infinite regress 
tasāwƬ:̄ Equivalent 
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taṣawwuf: Ṣufism  
tashkƬk̄: Gradation 
tawḥƬd̄: The unity of God 
thubūt: Subsistence 
tikrār: Repetition 
ʿulamāʾ: Scholars 
vaḥdat-i iṭlāqī: Nondelimited unity 
valāyat-i kullī: Complete guardianship 
valāyat-i taṣarruf: The perfect man’s ability to affect the universe in any way he chooses 
vilāyat-i faqƬh̄: Guardianship of the jurist 
Waḥdah: Oneness 
al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah: A Shadow of True Unity 
waḥdat al-wujūd: Oneness of Existence  
wājib al-wujūd: The Necessary Existent 
walāyah: Guardianship 
al-walāyah al-takwīnīya: Existential guardianship 
al-Walī: The Friend (A Name of God) 
walī: Saint/friend of God 
wāṣil: One who has reached 
wujūb: Necessity 
wujūb bi-l-dhāt: Essential necessity 
wujūd: Existence 
al-wujūd al-ʿaynī: Extramental existence  
wujūd al-dhihnī: Cognitive/Mental existence 
al-wujūd al-ʿilmī: Mental existence 
wujūd al-khārijƬ:̄ Extramental existence 
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wujūd al-mutḷaq: Nondelimited existence 
wujūd al-rābit:̣ Existence-in-something-else 
wujūd bi-l-ghayr: Existence-by-something-else/accidental necessity 
wujūd bi-mā huwa huwa: Being qua Being 
wujūd li-ghayrihƬ:̄ Existence-in-itself-for-something-else 
wujūd li-nafsihƬ:̄ Existence-in-itself-for-itself 
wujūd maḥmūlƬ:̄ Predicated existence 
ẓāhir: The outward  
zuhd: Abstention 
ẓuhūr: Manifestation 
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ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn, The Psalms of Islam, tr. William C. Chittick (London: The Muhammadi Trust, 
1988) 
 
al-Amīn, Ḥusayn. Mustadrakāt aʿyān al-shīʿa, 7 vols (Beirut: Dār al-taʿāruf li-l-maṭbūʿāt, 
1408/1988) 
428  
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ʿAsṣạ̄r, Sayyid Muḥammad. Pāsukh nāma, ed. Aḥmad ʿĀbidī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 
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i āsār va mafākhir-i farhang, 2007) 
 
Dilthey, Wilhem. “The Rise of Hermeneutics” tr. F. Jameson, in New Literary History, 1972, (3/2), 
229–244 
 
 
Fanārī, Ḥamza. Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, 
Muḥammad Qummī, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ed. Muḥammad 
Khājavī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1388 Sh/2009) 
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Intishārāt-i dānishgāh-i Tehrān, 1374 Sh/1995) 
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 ,  AৄʾƬn̄a-yi īzadnumā (Tehran: Nashr-i jānān, 1376 Sh/1997) 
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 , Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā FayyāżƮ,̄ 4 vols (Qum: Muʾassasa-i 
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 , al-Insān wa al-ʿaqƬd̄a, eds. Ṣubāḥ al-Rubayʿī and ʿAlī al-Asadī (Qum: Maktabat Fadak 
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nashr –i ʿAllāma Ṭabātạbā’Ʈ,̄ 1997) 
 , Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt-i ḥakīm-i muʾassis Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris-i Ṭihrānī, ed. Muḥsin 
Kadīvar, 3 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i iṭṭilāʿāt, 1999) 
 
 
445  
Secondary Sources 
 
Abdul Haq, M. “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Being”, in Islamic Studies, 1967, (6/3) 267-276 
 , “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Man”, in Islamic Studies, 1972, (11/4) 281-296 
 
Abisaab, R. J. Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2004) 
 
Abu Rabi’, I. M. “Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective”, 
Islamic Studies, (44/4) 503-526 
 
Acar, R. Talking About God and Talking About Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ 
Positions (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 
 
Adamiyat, F. “Problems in Iranian Historiography”, tr. T. M. Ricks, in Iranian Studies, 1971, (4/4) 
132–156 
 
Adamson, P. Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 
 , (ed.) Classical Philosophy: A history of philosophy without any gaps, volume 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) 
 , and Taylor, R. C.  (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
 
446  
Adang, C. Ansari, H. Fierro, M. and Schmidtke, S. (eds.) Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A 
Diachronic Perspective on Takfir (Leiden: Brill, 2016) 
 
Adel, G. H., Elmi, M. J. and Taromi-Rad H. (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya: Shīʿī Teaching Institution: 
An Entry from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam (London: EWI Press, 2012) 
 
Ahmed, A. Q. “Post Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses: Innovation in the 
Margins”, in Oriens, 2013, (41 3/4) 317-348 
 , and Larkin, M. “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Intellectual History”, in Oriens, 2013, (41 3/4) 
213-216 
 
Ahmadvand, A., and Masroor, T. Fayż-i KāshānƬ ̄ az manẓar-i khāvarshināsān (Tehran: 
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2002) 
 
Fakhry, M. Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1958) 
455  
 
al-Fatlāwī ʿA. al-Nūrān al-Zahrāʾ wa-l-Ḥawrāʾ: min muḥāḍarāt al-ustādh al-Sayyid ʿĀdil al-
ʿAlawī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamī, 2009) 
 
Ghobadzadeh, N. Religious Secularity: A Theological Challenge to the Islamic State (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) 
 
Gilson, E. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956) 
 , The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (London: Gollancz, 1961) 
 
Gleave, R. “Continuity and Originality in Shiʿi Thought: The Relationship between the 
Akhbariyya and the Maktab al-Tafkik”, in Hermann D. and Mervin S. (eds.) Shiʿi Trends and 
Dynamics in Modern Times (XVIII-XX Centuries) (Beirut: Ergon Verlang Würzburg in 
Kommission, 2010) 71-92 
 
Gohlman, W. (ed.), The Life of Ibn-Sina (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974) 
 
Goichon, A. La distinction de l’essence st de l’existence d’après Ibn Sīnā (Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1937) 
 
Green, N. Sufism: A Global History (Chichester and Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 
  
Griffel, F. “al-Ghazali”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-ghazali/#PlaFalIsl [Accessed 7th May 2016] 
456  
 
Guppy, S. The Blindfold Horse: Memories of a Persian Childhood (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 
2006) 
 
Gutas, D. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad 
and Early ʿAbbasaid Society (2nd-4th/5th-10th c.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2012) 
 , Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014) 
 
Hairi, A. “The Legitimacy of the Early Qajar Rule as Viewed by Shīʿī Religious Leaders”, in 
Middle Eastern Studies, 1988, (24/3), 271-286 
 
Haʾiri Yazdi, M. The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence 
(Albany, SUNY Press, 1992) 
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Khālidī, A. Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī: guzārish-i zindagƬ ̄va ʿirfān (Tehran: Maʿārif, 1381 Sh/ 2002) 
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 , Madkhal ilā al-ʿulūm al-islāmƬȳah, tr. into Arabic by H. A. al-Hāshimī, 2 vols (Qum: 
Dār al-kitāb al-islāmƮ,̄ 1431/2010) 
 
Nasr, S. H. “The School of Iṣpahān”, in Sharif M. M. (ed.) A History of Muslim Philosophy , 2 vols 
(Wiesbaden, 1963-66) (1) 904–932 
 , An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1964)  
 , Ideals and Realities of Islam (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966) 
 , Sufi Essays (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972) 
 , “The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardi”, in Studies in Comparative 
Religion, (6/3) 
http://www.studiesincomparativereligion.com/public/articles/The_Spread_of_the_Illuminat
ionist_School_of_Suhrawardi-by_Seyyed_Hossein_Nasr.aspx [Accessed on 24/5/2016]  
 , Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, SuhrawardƬ ̄ and Ibn ʿArabƬ ̄ (Delmar, NY : Caravan 
Books, 1976) 
 , H. Dabashi and S. V. R. Nasr (eds.) Expectation of the Millenium: Shiʿism in History 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989) 
466  
 , The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996) 
 , and Leaman, O. History of Islamic Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996) 
 , Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy: Background, Life and Works 
(Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997) 
 , Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present (Albany: SUNY, 2006) 
 
Naṣrī, ʿA. Safar-i nafs: taqrīrāt-i ustād doctor Mahdī Ḥāʾirī Yazdī (Tehran: Naqsh-i jahān, 1380 
Sh/2001) 
 
Newman, A. J. The Formative Period of Twelver Shīcism: Ḥadith Discourse between Qum and 
Baghdad (Surrey: Curzon, 2000) 
 , Twelver Shiism: Unity and Diversity in the Life of Islam, 632 to 1722 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
 
Niʿma, ʿA. Falāsifat al-shīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1987) 
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